Analysis Of Operation Anaconda: How Bad Intelligence Started It All

Abstract

Operation Anaconda was supposed to be a decisive 3-day assault by U.S. military and Afghan forces against enemy Taliban and al Qaeda resistant forces in the Shahi-Kot Valley that turned into a bitter drawn-out 17-day battle (Kugler, 2007). Although Anaconda was considered a success, in the end, its initial plan failed to survive contact with the enemy due to a cascading sequence of improbable events. Most, if not all, of the challenges Anaconda faced stemmed from a lack of good intelligence on the number of enemy fighters and their weaponry. Yet when confronted with this uncertainty, U.S. military officials still sanctioned the launch of Operation Anaconda along with a battle strategy that grossly underestimated the enemy. Thus, the inaccurate intelligence picture was the first thing that went wrong and caused domino effects which lead to a pitched battle that dragged on for several days. This paper analyzes the challenge of generating accurate intelligence estimates of enemy forces, intentions, and capabilities for tactical battles as well as how it relates to the mission command principles of competence, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance.

Bad Intelligence

In mid-January 2002, U.S. officials began receiving intelligence reports suggesting that enemy forces, including al Qaeda, were assembling in the Shahi-Kot Valley (Kugler, 2007). Due to this valley’s geographic vicinity to Pakistan, where numerous enemy troops escaped to from earlier events during the war in Afghanistan, it was a natural place for the enemy to regroup its forces (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2012). The Shahi-Kot Valley was also rich in natural terrain features such as caves, crevasses, and other protected locations, which complemented the enemy’s guerilla fighting style. U.S. officials contemplated an assault in late January 2002. There was a concerted effort weeks before the battle from U.S. military leaders to obtain proper intelligence. Therefore, U.S. special operation forces sent several reconnaissance teams with the hope of getting a better picture of the enemy (Geibel, 2002). However, this effort failed to estimate the number of enemy fighters and their capabilities accurately. It only yielded an outward appearance that the valley seemed mostly devoid of people, and reconnaissance periodically detect only small clusters. This paper examines U.S. military officials' decisions made from faulty intelligence estimates collected to explain how it led to poor operational planning, and how one can observe elements of mission command principles of competence, discipline initiative, and risk acceptance.

Discussion

U.S. officials did their best to generate estimates of the enemy’s strength. Initially, intelligence estimates suggested that anywhere between 100–1000 enemy fighters could be in Shahi-Kot Valley. But gradually, a consensus emerged that the number was likely 200–300 fighters with light weapons along with 800–1000 Afghan civilians living in villages on the valley floor (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2012). However, intelligence assets indicated the problems of obtaining accurate, actionable intelligence in murky situations. Overhead surveillance sensors could not pinpoint the enemy's strength and intentions, which caused uncertain data reliability. Due to the faulty intelligence estimates, U.S. officials who planned Operation Anaconda did not expect a bitter battle for control of the valley and made poor decisions that resulted in U.S. casualties that totaled eight military personnel killed and over 50 wounded.

Mission Command Appraisal

Mission command requires capable forces and an environment of shared understanding among commanders, staffs, and subordinates to accept prudent risk. Each principle empowers agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. The subsequent sections will be examining three of these principles in further detail in conjunction with Operation Anaconda's intelligence failures (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019).

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Competence. Tactically and technically competent commanders, subordinates, and teams are the basis of effective mission command (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019). Operation Anaconda required competence at all levels to execute operations as complex as Anaconda. Battle plans had to be shifted soon after H-Hour to adapt to Afghan troops' loss, who was supposed to have performed the critical hammer portion of the operations hammer-and-anvil strategy (Kugler, 2007). After the allied Afghan hammer failed to execute their task, the U.S. ground forces, which formed the multiple anvils, were left vulnerable to counterattacks from fierce enemy resistance unaccounted for in early intelligence reports. Nevertheless, U.S. forces exhibited flexibility and competence by adapting to the situation. The battle quickly turned into a series of platoon-sized engagements with U.S. ground forces suppressing enemy troops deployed above them in concealed mountain positions; U.S. rotary and fixed-wing aircraft trying to provide close air support (CAS) by striking small mobile targets.

Disciplined initiative. Disciplined initiative refers to the duty an individual or group has to exercise initiative within the constraints of the commander’s intent to achieve the desired end state (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019). During Operation Anaconda, al Qaeda fighters demonstrated the ability to adapt by showing knowledge of tactics that diluted U.S. infantry, special operations forces, and airstrike effectiveness. They were successfully able to leverage the Shahi-Kot Valley terrain to their advantage by effectively using it for camouflage, dispersal, and protected cover (Kugler, 2007). This was again a miscalculation by U.S. military planners due in part to the inadequate intelligence. U.S. ground forces became strained from constant enemy engagement beyond the intended assault schedule, and as a result, suffered significantly more casualties than anticipated. Task Force Rakkasans' command took the initiative to revise the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) plan soon after the battle pivoted to a new direction. They opted to evacuate the wounded on helicopters that had to resupply the ground forces with additional personnel and equipment anyway rather than letting designated MEDEVAC helicopters fly and possibly risking further equipment damage or personnel injury (Midla, 2004).

Risk acceptance. Risk is part of every operation, and it must be analyzed to determine the amount that exists and how to mitigate it (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2019). U.S. Air Force records showed that before Operation Anaconda commenced, both the ground and the air components considered a more extensive lead-in bombing initiative than what transpired (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2012). For reasons stemming from the deficient intelligence reports available at the time, Task Force Mountain planners ruled out such a campaign was necessary. One reason was to preserve the surprise element and decrease the risk that al Qaeda fighters would receive an advanced warning to deploy from the valley floor into mountain positions. Another reason was to preserve the reconnaissance and intelligence exploitation of caves. A third reason was uncertainty about the number and location of innocent Afghan civilians that might be affected. Underlying all of these reasons was a judgment from leadership to move forward with the operation. They became convinced that the combination of planned ground forces was enough combative power to accomplish the mission.

Conclusion

Accurate threat estimates allow for comprehensive battle plans that prepare combat forces for unexpected developments that can spell the difference between failure and success. Although these observations are valid for almost all battles, Operation Anaconda highlights their continued importance in the Information Age. Anaconda also shows how problems in the initial acquisition of precise threat data can have budding effects on the battlefield, creating opportunities for U.S. troops to demonstrate mission command principles throughout the operation for future exploration. Understanding the topics this paper has chosen to study can help leaders improve future multilateral campaigns against small and mobile enemy combatants who employ asymmetric tactics often pursed in expeditionary warfare.

References

1. Geibel, A. (2002). Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002. Retrieved from https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2017-Online-Exclusive-Articles/Operation-Anaconda-Shah-i-Khot-Valley-Afghanistan/
2. Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2019). Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Publishing Directorate.
3. Kugler, R. L. (2007). Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle. Washington, DC: National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy.
4. Kugler, R. L., Baranick, M., & Binnendijk, H. (2012). Operation Anaconda Lessons for Joint Operations. Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
5. Midla, G. S. (2004). Lessons Learned: Operation Anaconda. Military Medicine, 169(3), 811–812. https://doi.org/10.7205/milmed.169.3.viii
6. Operation Anaconda: The Battle of Roberts’ Ridge. (2020). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ra4QEXLvZ6c&feature=youtu.be