The Peloponnesian Wars (431 – 404BC), also known as the fall of Athens, demonstrated the power and capacity of the two of the strongest rival poleis in Ancient Greece, Athens, and Sparta, who were both competing for dominance. The two city-states varied across multiple aspects. Although the Athenians were well cultured and educated, had naval forces, and led the Delian League, the Spartan’s militaristic practices, values, army, alliances, and battle strategies significantly contributed to their cultural identity that helped secure their upper hand victory in the Peloponnesian Wars.
Sparta in Ancient Greece was known for incorporating militarism into their practices and teachings, which proved as an asset against Athens in the Peloponnesian Wars. While this lifestyle was ordinary for Spartans, the Athenians lived a more simple and more civilized lifestyle where school and art were customary. For example, in Sparta, children were expected to be strong since birth. If a newborn was deemed weak or deformed, it would be left on a remote hillside or tossed into a gorge to die. When boys reached the age of seven, they were forced to attend military school where they learned army tactics and fighting techniques (Wissar, 2012). However, they lived in poor conditions, were not fed properly, wore only one set of clothing, and participated in relentless training that sometimes even required them to steal in order to survive, and get whipped in order to build resilience. Their intense training can be supported and explained by a quote from Xenophon, an Athenian soldier, and historian. He says,
“In fact, with his feet so trained, the young Spartan would leap and spring and run faster unshod than another in the ordinary way. Instead of making them effeminate with a variety of clothes, his rule was to habituate them to a single garment the whole year through, thinking that so they would be better prepared to withstand the variations of heat and cold… It is obvious, I say, that this education was intended to make the boys craftier and more inventive in getting supplies, while at the same time it cultivated their war like instincts” (Xenophon, 375 BCE).
Similarly, girls were trained to be strong, physically fit, and experienced in combat but in less harsh conditions (Eshuys, Guest, Bowman, Davies, & Phelan, 2000). A possible reason as to why Spartan children were brought up this way was because they feared that the people they conquered, the Helots, would revolt against them. The Helots were treated as slaves and outnumbered the Spartans seven to one. In contrast, Athenian children were taught many skills other than battling. At age 6, boys attended school and studied subjects such as maths, writing, reading, history, public speaking, good behavior, music, and sports. This allowed them to pursue any career they desired and, unlike Sparta, was not restrictive in turning boys into soldiers. Primary sources Figures 1 and 2 visually represents the subjects Athenian boys studied (Douris, 2013). On the other hand, girls were taught by their mothers on skills such as: managing a household, budgeting, buying, dressmaking, and entertaining (Eshuys, Guest, Bowman, Davies, & Phelan, 2000).
Figures 1 and 2: Vase painting depicted school life for boys in Athens by Douris, an Ancient Athenian vase-painter (Douris, 2013)
Due to the vast difference in education, lifestyle, practices, and values between the Spartans and Athenians, it can be deduced that Sparta’s militaristic view would have given them a generous advantage against Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars. This is because whilst the Athenians went to school for artistic pursuits, the Spartans trained to become warriors of their country, led by their combatant ideologies and bred-for-war customs and upbringing.
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Pre-war aspects such as polis involvement in the Delian or Peloponnesian League, and army strength, could have contributed to a city’s victory or defeat. The Delian League, led by Athens, was initially formed to liberate Greek allies from Persia. However, Athens yearned an empire and soon achieved this by conquering polis after polis. In response, Sparta formed the Peloponnesian League and led the poleis who also feared Athen’s power-hungry behavior. This event was also described by Thucydides, an Athenian general, and historian of the time, claiming that,
“The real reason [that] forced the war was the growth of Athenian power and Spartan fear of it” (Thucydides, 1872).
Therefore, as a result of the two of the most powerful city-states forming their own alliances, the Peloponnesian War was inevitable (Burvill-Shaw, et al., 2012). As Athens was on its rise to power and dominated the Mediterranean Sea with their naval supremacy, they were able to assemble a number of supporting city-states such as Aegina, Byzantium, Chios, Lesbos, Lindos, Naxos, Paros, Samos, Thasos, etc. The Peloponnesian League on the other hand, was only between Sparta, Corinth, Elis, and Tegea (Cartwright, 2016). Hence, Athen’s league was stronger than Sparta’s and therefore would have been beneficial for them in the War. With regard to army supremacy, both city-states had equally strong forces. Such that Sparta led a remarkable army, and Athens led an exceptional navy. As previously stated, Sparta’s army was developed through years of strict militaristic customs and therefore found its name in history as the protector of Greece. As for Athens, their creation of a navy was encouraged by an Athenian general and statesmen, Themistocles. It was initially formed to exploit Persia’s naval weakness, should they return to Greece for another attempt at invasion, Athens would be prepared with a navy. Consequently, Athens began building their navy by using money from their silver deposits to build ships and trained soldiers to fight in the navy (Greek Boston, n.d.). For these reasons, it can be inferred that although Athens had a stronger alliance than Sparta’s, and shared equally formidable armies, events during the Peloponnesian War must have influenced Sparta’s upper hand victory.
Battle strategies, major generals, inconvenient misfortunes (for Athens), and a stroke of luck (for Sparta), were some of the events that happened during the Peloponnesian War that saw the rise of Sparta. In 459BCE, Sparta was in conflict with two of its allies and Athens took advantage of this by allying with Megara. Consequently, war began, and fifteen years later, it was concluded with the 30 Year’s Peace Treaty. However, the peace did not last long and in 432BCE, Corinth called a meeting with the Peloponnesian League and decided that Athens broke the treaty. Hence, the second phase of the war began. Pericles, an Athenian general, devised a defensive strategy and built three six-kilometre walls that ensured the safety of Athens. Because the wall connected Athens to the coast, Spartan army could not defeat Athens due to their weak navy, and Athen’s navy was unable to attack Sparta’s military on land (Burvill-Shaw, et al., 2012). Not only that, this meant that the peninsula on which Athens was located, Attica, was exposed. As a result, Athens had no choice but to allow the residents of Attica into the city walls – hence the skyrocketing of Athen’s population. Unfortunately, in 430 BCE, a plague broke and claimed almost two-thirds of the Athenian population, Pericles included. In response, Sparta decided to invade those poleis surrounding Athens. This strategy was meant to cut Athen’s food supply but was unsuccessful in doing so because, firstly, it was traditional for Spartan soldiers to return to the city each year, and secondly, Athen’s stable trade network with its numerous allies prevented them from starvation. Eventually, in 421 BCE, the second phase of the war ended with the Peace of Nicias. In 415 BCE, Alcibiades, an Athenian general, launched an expedition to attack Sicily with the hopes that once it was captured, they could cut off Sparta’s supplies. In his speech to convince Athens, he said,
“If we do not rule others, others will rule us” (Alcibiades, n.d.).
However, shortly before the expedition, Alcibiades was accused and charged with sacrilegious acts. Despite this, he continued to Sicily, but took the chance to flee to Sparta, in fear for his life if he returned to his home. Once accepted into Sparta, he advised them on how they could defeat Athens. As a consequence, in the third and last phase of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta saw a chance at victory. Surprisingly though, Athens continued to fight on until 404 BCE but was forced to surrender when a siege fell upon them (Burvill-Shaw, et al., 2012). This was strategized by the Spartan Kings, Pausanias and Agis II, and Lysander, a Spartan general, who blocked Athen’s ports. For these reasons, it is evident that both of the city-states had almost equal chances of winning the War, but due to battle strategies and unforeseen events, Sparta reveled in their military success whilst Athens fell to its knees.
It can be deduced that although the Athenians were well cultured and educated, had naval forces, and led the Delian League, the Spartan’s militaristic practices, army advantage, and alliances had held both city-states quite on par with each other in the War. This is because whilst the Athenians went to school for artistic pursuits, the Spartans trained to become warriors of their country, led by their bred-for-war customs and upbringing. Furthermore, Athens had a stronger alliance than Sparta’s and shared equally formidable armies. Therefore, it was in fact, during the third phase of the War, when an Athenian traitor, Alcibiades advised Sparta, as well as a cleverly devised plan made by Sparta’s kings and general that turned Sparta’s victory into Sparta’s upper hand victory. Needless to say, it was unfortunate for Athens to suffer a plague and siege during the War. In summary, Sparta’s militarism, alliances, and battle strategies significantly contributed to their cultural identity which helped them secure their upper hand in victory in the Peloponnesian Wars.
Bibliography
- Burvill-Shaw, S., Cremin, A., Cadzow-Andreas, L.-A., Lewis, R., Smith, R., Wood, B., . . . Barnes, N. (2012). Jacaranda World History Atlas for the Australian Curriculum. In S. Burvill-Shaw, Jacaranda World History Atlas for the Australian Curriculum (pp. 48-49). John Wiley & Sons Australia.
- Cartwright, M. (2016, March 9). Peloponnesian League. Retrieved from Ancient History Encyclopedia Website: https://www.ancient.eu/Peloponnesian_League/
- Douris. (2013, November 11). Attic Red-Figure. Retrieved from University of Oxford Website: https://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/tools/pottery/painters/keypieces/redfigure/douris.htm
- Eshuys, J., Guest, V., Bowman, R., Davies, G., & Phelan, P. (2000). Nelson History 1. In J. Eshuys, V. Guest, R. Bowman, G. Davies, & P. Phelan, Nelson History 1 (pp. 80-82). Nelson Australia.
- Greek Boston. (n.d.). Developing the Athenian Navy of Ancient Greece. Retrieved from Greek Boston Website: https://www.greekboston.com/culture/ancient-history/athenian-navy/Thucydides. (1872). The History of the Peloponnesian War. London.
- Wissar, A. (2012, December 20). Athenian Culture vs. Spartan Culture. Retrieved from academia.edu.au: https://www.academia.edu/21825984/Athenian_Culture_vs._Spartan_Culture Xenophon. (375 BCE). The Polity of the Spartans.
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