Moral and Ethical Considerations of Surrogacy

Surrogacy, defined as the ‘process of giving birth as a surrogate mother or of arranging such a birth’1, is a controversial issue with a broad spectrum of ethical positions. Even more divisive is the rise of commercial surrogacy, by which in any surrogacy arrangement the birth mother is paid or reimbursed beyond medical expenses. Surrogacy is a treatment option for those who are infertile, or as an alternative to adoption. However commercial surrogacy it is not just about fulfilling a desire to be a parent- it surrounds more complex issues of exploitation, commodity, and product. In this paper, I contend that surrogacy is morally permissible and should be made commercially legal in Australia.

To begin to unpack this debate, we must first ask; what is a commodity? For this paper, we will refer to commodities as raw materials used to manufacture a finished good, where a product is the finished good itself which is sold to customers. Elizabeth Anderson2, who passionately argues in the favour of enforced bans on commercial surrogacy, defines the modern market as the norm by which ‘production, exchange, and enjoyment of commodities’ is governed. She contends that commercial surrogacy degrades women, as it treats their wombs as nothing more than a commodity, arguing that this can lead to a ‘consumer demand’, where the significance of commercial surrogacy lies within the idea of ‘selling infants’ and that the tie between the ‘natural’ mother is treated as though it is bound only by monetary incentives. She also asserts that while it is superficially similar to other methods of obtaining a child, such as adoption, sperm and egg donation, which we as a society accept with little controversy, that it must shown that these practices differ at their moral core from commercial surrogacy.

Anderson’s claim that the way the child is treated, as in being bought and sold as a commodity, is problematic. There are many examples that show that this theory does not have to be the case. Take art dealers for example. They take significant care of works that are in their possession, not only because damage to the work will result in a lower monetary value, but also because they know that the people willing to spend x amount of money on a piece of art are also those most likely to take care of it. The buying and selling of artworks does not make them common, or a mere product - they have a personal value to those who seek them.

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Anderson also contends that by engaging in the transfer of a child through a monetary sale, all parties in the surrogacy contract agree that the ‘ties between a natural mother and her children [are] properly loosened by a monetary incentive’. I argue that this is not necessarily the case- we can look at this using the nonidentity problem. It is not as if the birth mother has an already established relationship with the child that she is giving away for monetary gain. Rather, all parties are co-working together to bring a life into this world that otherwise would not have been. Since, without surrogacy, the baby would not have otherwise existed, it cannot be argued that there was a relationship to harm or loosen in the first place.

Anderson may appear to have a leg to stand on by mentioning the relationship formed between mother and child during gestation, and that the loosening of this relationship for monetary gain could indeed be harmful to the natural mother. However, I believe that if it is permissible for a single, unemployed mother to give her child up for adoption it must also be permissible for a birth mother to trade her reproductive abilities for money. A woman who feels as though she is unable to look after a child without intolerably hindering her current lifestyle and gives up her child to adoption is equally guilty of loosening her bond with that child for a monetary incentive, whether it be by an external agent or circumstance. Presumably, neither we nor Anderson would object to adoption as a viable way of obtaining a child. Furthermore, if one of Anderson’s key contentions is to find the way in which commercial surrogacy is different to other methods of obtaining a child, such as adoption or sperm and egg donations, I argue that she has failed in doing so.

In conclusion, Anderson fails to establish, regarding her arguments concerning commodification, how commercial surrogacy is morally and ethically wrong, let alone how it garners enough virulence to be forcibly banned by the state. While it may be disconcerting that human life has the potential to become a marketplace agenda, when both science and society enter a new age it becomes necessary for the way in which we operate and think about things to shift also. Technology is a tool for expanding human potential and to allow for greater freedom, not to restrict it.