Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue as a Compelling Case for Realism

Introduction

Thucydides might be one of the most influential figures not only as a historian but also the founding father of realism through his writing, the ‘Peloponnesian War’ (Viotti and Kauppi, 1987). His book would suggest significant paradigms about realism (Keohane and Nye, 1977:42), and this has been considered as the core textbook penetrating all the time (Welch, 2003:303). Among his stories, it could be suggested that the three stages of the Melian dialogue – before the dialogue, during the dialogue, and after the dialogue - provided essential perspectives to classical realists, neo-realists, and neo-classical realists in concerning the power-seeking behavior of states.

Focusing on before the dialogue, neo-realists could find out that fears from international anarchy could encourage states to maximize their power, observing Athens’ argument that ‘ruling is the only way to escape from being ruled by others’ (Forde, 1995:149). Reflecting on neo-classical realists, it could also be claimed that different national characteristics formed by distinctive political atmospheres were another convincing factor in explaining states’ decisions to pursue to power (Ober and Perry, 2014:226; Monten, 2006:12).

In considering the time period in which the dialogue was being written (hereafter referred to as the ongoing Melian dialogue), Athenians attempted to negotiate with Melos to persuade them to surrender (Ober and Perry, 2014:214). Melos refused Athens’ suggestion and decided to fight Athens’ overwhelming military power (ibid). As a result, while Melos faced destruction; classical realists could discover fundamental assumptions about human nature that, irrespective of nationality, human beings would behave in the same way as Athens when concerning power (Morgenthau, 1946:203; Donnelly, 2000:10).

After the Melian dialogue, it could be proposed that neo-classical realists approached to another core idea that the maximization of power to escape from fear could turn into self-destruction by creating a security dilemma and getting involved in the war by other states (Herz, 1950:157; Welch, 2003:304).

In this regard, this essay argues that the Melian dialogue would provide essential theories to three schools of realism in a matter of state’s power-seeking behaviors – human nature in classical realism, anarchic fear and security dilemma in neo-realism, and national characteristics in neo-classical realism – by dividing three stages; before the dialogue, ongoing the dialogue, and after the dialogue.

Main body

For the sake of comprehending Athens’s fear and their decision on pursuing power, it might be proper to claim that Athens would already be aware of the international anarchic system. In accordance with Schuman (1941:9, cited in Donnelly, 2000:10), the term of anarchy would be described as the world in the jungle with the absence of central authorization, and that international anarchic system might be the most influential factor to intensify the fear, which could lead states to pursue the power (Monten, 2006:6; Grieco, 1988a:498, cited in Donnelly, 2000:58).

In this sense, the fear Athens felt before the Melian dialogue could not only be amplified by the international anarchic system, since there was no central authorization of controlling the balance of power between Sparta and Athens but also make Athens maximize the power in order to secure their security with this idea that ‘ruling is the only way to avoid being ruled by others’ (Thucydides, 1980:6.87, cited in Forde, 1995:149). Furthermore, as specified by Gilpin (1988:593), among driving forces in the pursuit of power, fear is the most convincing factor which always makes the states strive the power until restrained by other states.

In that regard, by reconsidering the background of Melian dialogue concerning why Athens made a decision to invade Melos, neo-realists could obtain valuable insights of what extent the anarchic environment in international affairs could amplify the fear and how far that fear could contribute to states to maximize the power for security. Thus, it could be argued that, since international anarchy would escalate the level of fear, states might concentrate on the way of maximizing power so as not to be controlled by other states and to maintain their security, which could be underlying reasons to describe the situation before the Melian dialogue.

Additionally, neo-classical realism emphasizing on the distinctive national characteristics could be expected to reinforce the overall explanation regarding the background of Melian dialogue as well. Neo-realistic approaches, based on the state-centric viewpoint, could be often considered as an oversimplified theory in dealing with the state’s motivation of maximizing power (Waltz, 1979:93-95; Snidal, 1985:35). In a matter of that, it would be helpful to light on another underlying cause in the background of Melian dialogue. Thucydides’ idea could be suggested that different national characteristics in Athens and Sparta were able to account for the states’ power-seeking behaviors.

Donnelly (2000:57) argued that states’ motivation of pursuing power might not be consistent to every state. For instance, unlike Athens’ concrete manner to pursue power (Smith, 1986:219-21, cited in Donnelly, 2000:8; Forde, 1995:147), it could be claimed that Sparta would indicate himself with a passive manner when confronting the increasing power of Athens, rather than actively responding to it by elevating the level of power in the same level as Athens (Jones and Powell, 1942, cited in Lee, 2019:75; Bagby, 1994:147). With respect to both states’ different manners of power-seeking behaviors, Thucydides attempted to give a reason by emphasizing on both states’ distinctive national characteristics (Gilpin, 1988:593; Doyle, 1986:68-69).

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And these dissimilarities in national characteristics could be described by each nation’s political atmosphere with the neo-classical realism’s idea which considers the process in decision-making as a crucial intervening factor (Rosa, 2018:148), for instance, democracy in Athens and oligarchic in Sparta. In accordance with the Corinthian speech in Thucydides’ book ‘Peloponnesian War’, it had been claimed that Athens adopted the democracy as their political system, which collected a number of citizens’ opinions at once and was available to quickly adjust their stance to the surrounding environment, leading Athens to make decisions in bold and innovative means (Ober and Perry, 2014:226; Monten, 2006:12).

In short, Athens could be viewed as a risk-lover to obtain potential profits such as power. In opposition to Athens’ national characteristics, Sparta had been described timid and slow country responding to situations such as Athens’ uprising powers (Doyle, 1986:68-69), and political cultures in Sparta’s oligarchy would probably lead Sparta to preserve the status quo rather than taking an adventure, in that a few numbers of leaders could have final determination in the way of conducting state affairs and they might consider opportunities as potential loses, viewed as risk-haters (Ober and Perry, 2014:226; Monten, 2006:12).

At this point, it could be held that, in terms of power-seeking behaviors, national characteristics created through the political atmosphere could be another significant factor to inspire states to determine whether to be a risk-lover, likewise Athens or to be a risk-hater, Sparta. With a shared idea of states’ power-seeking behavior, neo-realists and neo-classical realists could discover their core theoretical approaches - fear in international anarchy and national characteristics from the political atmosphere - by inspecting before the Melian dialogue. Next paragraph will be dealt with how classical realism’s core idea, human nature, could emerge during the dialogue.

While Athens had been negotiating with Melos, Athens argued to Melos that ‘all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do’ (Thucydides, 1980:5.105.2-3, cited in Bagby, 1994:13). In considering reasons regarding that argument, it seems possible to speculate that Athens highlighted the universality of states’ power-seeking behavior based on the human nature. Concerning the universality, Athens might consider that human nature itself would not change (Thomson, 1985:17; Monten, 2006:12). So, bearing in mind of a constant manner in human nature, Athens could claim that the Melos would do in the same behavior as Athens. In a similar vein, Gilpin (1988, cited in Welch, 2003:304) also argued that the behavior of human beings could be tractable and predictable due to the unchanging human nature.

In addition to the constant human nature, a number of classical realistic scholars would approach to the egoistic human nature to answer the question ‘why do human beings pursue power?’ (Morgenthau, 1943:203; Donnelly, 2000:10). So, with the constant and egoistic human nature, it has been claimed that all states would continuously pursue the way of maximizing the power beyond the existing power for improving their security (Smith, 1986:219-21, cited in Donnelly, 2005:8; Forde, 1995:147).

That presupposition could be the main reason of persuading Melos to surrender, in that, in Athens’ expectation, Melos would accept their request so as to keep pursuing the power instead of choosing self-destruction. In this respect, it could be proposed that Athens might justify their behavior of pursuing power with the assertion that all states would seek the power and behave in the same manner due to constant and egoistic human natures, which could be fundamental ideas to classical realists in explaining the states’ power-seeking behaviors through ongoing Melian dialogue. Last paragraph will describe outcomes after the Melian dialogue with a neo-realistic lens focusing on the security dilemma and its aftermath of it.

By considering Athens’ argument that ‘ruling is the only way to avoid being ruled by others’, neo-realists could discover fundamental paradigms in their theory that maximizing the power might be considered reasonable states’ action as a means of escaping from the fear and securing the state in the international anarchic system (Collins, 2016; Donnelly, 2005). However, in a matter of after the dialogue, it might also be necessary for neo-realists to consider that overcoming the fear by maximizing power could trigger the security dilemma by threatening other interrelated countries and could even turn into self-destruction by either waging a war or being engaged in.

In the case of Athens and Sparta, it could be claimed that Athens’ fear to be ruled was transformed into another type of fear to Sparta. In other words, Athens’ fear and efforts of overcoming it could be interpreted as major threats to Sparta, which could make war between them inevitable (Martin Ostwald, 1988, cited in Forde, 1995:147; Welch, 2003:304). For instance, in Lebow’s perspective (2007:168), Athens’ behavior and consequent highly intensive conflicts with Sparta might be proper examples in what John Herz called a ‘security dilemma’ that states A’s action of increasing the power to escape from the fear could turn to state B’s motivation to accumulate power not to be threatened by state A’s increasing power and these situations would be relentlessly repeating as there is no internationally centralized authority to stop them (Herz, 1950:157).

Thus, in opposition to Athens’ decisions to be the power-seeker and trials to secure their position in international anarchy, those caused another fear from Sparta, which would eventually ruin Athens after the Melian dialogue (Levy, 1987:83, cited in Lee, 2019; Ober and Perry, 2014:226-27; Martin Ostwald, 1988 in Forde, 1995:147). In that regard, in an ironical sense, it could be suggested that, as for Athens, the initial motivation to increase the power could be a reasonable state’s action in order to escape from the fear in international anarchy, but the outcome from it could be self-destruction to Athens for escalating the level of the security dilemma and triggering other interrelated states to wage a war with Athens. That outcome could be considered as a valuable theoretical insight to neo-realists in terms of the negative effect of states’ power-seeking behaviors.

Conclusion

Through Melian dialogue, it could be assumed that core ideas in three types of realism would be identified by dividing Melian dialogue into three stages; before the dialogue, during the dialogue, and after the dialogue. With respect to the stage of before the dialogue, neo-realism and neo-classical realism could discover their core theoretical findings that the fear of international anarchy could be a compelling motivation to maximize states’ power and national characteristics shaped through the internal political atmosphere could also be another convincing element to describe states’ behaviors in terms of increasing the power. During the dialogue, constant and egoistic human natures, shown and suggested by Athens’ argument, could be the main theoretical ideas of classical realists in explaining the states’ power-seeking behavior. At the last stage, after the dialogue, it could be suggested that neo-realist would realize that states’ behavior of increasing power to escape the fear of an anarchic system could trigger the escalation of security dilemma with other interrelated countries and could be self-destruction by waging or being involved into the war regardless of states’ intention.

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