Economic Turmoil and Rise of Paramilitaries in Nazi Germany

Economic Turmoil, Political Extremism and the Rise of Paramilitaries in Nazi Germany: The Role of theFreidrikorps , Sturmabteilung (SA), Schutzstaffel (SS), and Geheim Stattspoleiza (Gestapo) Allison Brown HIST 4310: WWII in Europe Dr. Blackler 20 February, 2022 “That so many Germans became Nazis was not an accident, an unlikely result of disastrous 1 economic and political conditions.” Fritzsche, a prominent historian, wrote the aforementioned which alludes to the economic and political turmoil which would plague democratic Weimar. The dangerous potentials of political and economic instability would lead the state to foster political extremism which would manifest into violence and the development of paramilitaries. In this essay, I will argue economic turmoil led to political extremism and the subsequent militarization of paramilitary groups including the Freidrikorps, Sturmabteilung (SA), Schutzstaffel (SS), andGeheim Stattspoleiza (Gestapo), which all contributed to Hitler’s consolidation of military power with the Reichswehr. To make this argument, this essay will first briefly examine the economic situation in Germany, discuss the paramilitary groups in Germany from 1919 to 1933, and then analyze how paramilitaries were pivotal to Hitler’s consolidation of power. Fascism and its precursors play a key role in Hitler’s consolidation of power. As economic, political, and military instability are precursors so is the overwhelming sense of crisis beyond the reach of traditional solutions and the recognition of violence as a “beautiful orchestration of the power and efficacy of will.”2 Both of these precursors are apparent with the economic instability and inception of paramilitaries to de facto establish military stability for those seeking power. It is important to note that paramilitaries such as those in Germany developed through Europe in states like Italy and France, as economic turmoil led to fascism which developed through political extremism and paramilitaries. To begin, it is necessary to examine the economic turmoil which persisted in Germany during this period of transition leading up to Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933. Weimar’s economic 1 Peter Fritzsche,Germans into Nazis, pg. 8 2 Robert O. Paxton,The Anatomy of Fascism, pg. 41 1 crisis or “The Troubles” spanned from 1919 to 1923. During this period, hyperinflation and deflationary spirals created unprecedented economic turmoil and a collective fear among Germans as economic inflation fostered political extremism. Running parallel to these concerns was a sense of humility in the post-WWI era as historian Benjamin Hett argues, these mentalities combined with the 3 political and economic situation laid the ground for the dangerous fascist potentials. As Fritzsche also poses, “So were not political extremists such as these imply the parasitical creatures of4 crisis?” The NSDAP “catch all party” was formed in 1920, and found popularity among German voters primarily from its propaganda and campaign posters which promoted economic well-being with slogans like A “ rbeit, Freiheit und Brot!” or “Work, Freedom, and Bread!” By appealing to the economic turmoil in which many Germans near the end of the Weimar Republic faced in the aftermath of failed economic recovery from the Dawes Plan (1928) and the Young Plan (1929) 5 resulting from the global Great Depression. The descent into “counter-revolutionary violence” in the form of paramilitary groups however, started earlier with the Freikorps who suppressed the Spartacist uprising and the following 6 insurgency of January to March 1919. The Freikorps were a decentralized coalition of militant groups who were nationalistic, anti-Socialist/Communist, and strongly opposed to the Treaty of Versailles. A number of militants fought in World War I and many members Freikorps of gave credence to the ‘stab-in-the-back’ myth leading to Germany’s defeat. The also assassinated Freikorps Karl Liebknicht and Rosa Luxemburg, facing minimal charges in Weimar’s failed judicial system. The Weimar government, at the time led by Friedrich Albert, utilizedFreikorps the when beneficial to the state, using the paramilitary group to quell the German Revolution of 1918-1919 and the 3 Benjamin Carter Hett,The Death of Democracy, pg. 64 4 Peter Fritzsche,Germans into Nazis, pg. 158 5 Blackler, Adam. “State of Emergency” Lecture, Spring 2022 6 Geoff Eley,“Conservatives and radical nationalists in Germany: the production of fascist potentials , 1912-28,” pg. 55 2 Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919. Albert’s use of Freikorps the set a dangerous precedent moving forward for the state acknowledgment of legitimacy and use of paramilitary organizations. The Freikorps disbanded in 1920, but many members joined the nascent NSDAP. It is also important to note that future players, Heinrich Himmler, Ernest Röhm, and Karl Wolff, were all members of the Freikorps . The Sturmabteilung (SA), formed in 1921 in Munich, were colloquially known as ‘brownshirts’ due to their brown uniform. Initially, many members were ex-soldiers or unemployed men, again referring to the economic turmoil which led to political extremism. The SA was primarily responsible for the protection of leading NSDAP members and disrupting other political opponents’ meetings. A former member of the Freikorps , Ernst Röhm led the SA starting in 1931. The SA was distinctly separate from the German army and often used street violence to intimidate Nazi opposition groups such as socialists. During the global Great Depression from 1929 to 1933, the SA grew in its ranks, an example of poor economic climate leading to political extremism and radicalization.7By 1934, the SA was one of the largest paramilitaries globally at just under five million, dwarfing theReichswehr which was prohibited from being more than one-hundred thousand standing men. The importance of this wide discrepancy is twofold. First, the SA was a superior power to theReichswehr, meaning their paramilitary held more power. And second, this discrepancy in power would lead to caution from Hitler about the autonomy and motives of the SA. In part due to Hitler’s uncertainty about the SA and shaped by a broader lack of concern regarding Hitler’s fragile hold on German power, Geheim the Stattspoleiza (Gestapo) was formed in 1933. The first leader of the Gestapo was Rudolf Diels, but would later be led by Heinrich Müller. The Gestapo acted outside legal judicial processes, with its own courts and effectively acted as judge, jury, and frequently executioner in carrying out extrajudicial killings. The Gestapo at this time acted 7 Blackler, Adam. “State of Emergency” Lecture, Spring 2022 3 as an agency to oversee unlawful surveillance of German citizens, both those claimed to be in opposition of the NSDAP and otherwise. Their presence was felt throughout Germany, and only added to the immense fear and discomfort at the time. Within the Sturmabteilung (SA) during this period was the Schutzstaffel (SS). Formed in 1925, the SS was created similar to the SA as an initial protection force for Hitler. The SS was a small subdivision of the SA with approximately three hundred members until 1929. At that time, Heinrich Himmler took over the organization, and expanded it dramatically. By 1933, the SS had expanded to over thirty-five thousand members within the SA. Hitler’s growing concern and discontentment over the SA and its leader Röhm, as well as concerns over the SA’s power, would culminate in 1934 with a covert meeting in Wilhelmshaven. Hitler had near total control over Germany but, nonetheless, perceived threats from the SA and Ernest Röhm were concerning to him. Hitler knew the SA could destroy his plans to merge both the offices of the chancellery and the presidency under his leadership. Furthermore, both Hitler and the had a mutual enemy Reichswehr with the impending influence of the SA under Röhm. During the meeting in Wilhelmshaven , Hitler met with theReichswehr and supposedly came to an agreement; Hitler agreed to never disband or replace theReichswehr with the SA in return for the commitment following the death of President Hindenburg, theReichswehr would be loyal to Hitler. TheReichswehr’s support, Hitler knew, would be critical for his legitimacy to take power and this covert agreement would make certain of that. Thus, the SA and Röhm, with their presence and control, were an obstacle to garnering the future support of theReichswehr. Although some conflict between the SS and SA were based on rivalries of leaders and their role to meet Hitlers demands, members in both paramilitaries had key socio-economic differences. SS members were generally from the middle class, while the SA had its base among the unemployed 4 and working class. The socio-economic divide is another example of how the economic troubles in Weimar and Nazi Germany contributed to political extremism both in average German society and within members of paramilitaries. Hitler’s concern regarding the SA and Röhm led to the Night of the Long Knives from June 30th to July 2nd, 1934. Fearing that the paramilitary SA was an obstacle to his ascension to power, Hitler ordered the SS to depose of the organization's leaders, including Ernst Röhm. At least eightyfive others murdered in the span of three days, however, estimates run from seven-hundred to onethousand in reality. Those murdered included an array of people, not just those in the SA, but also included journalists and priests. Among the murdered were Kurt von Schleicher, Gregor Strasser— who until 1932 had been second only to Hitler in the Nazi Party—and Reichswehr General Ferdinand von Bredow. The violence continued until July 2nd and as the SA collapsed, and the violence perpetrated by Hitler and the SS signified the establishment of the SS as having total control of Germany. Hitler received a letter of gratitude from President Hindenburg following the attacked, who was impressed by Hitler and the SS’ ability to act. Given Hitler’s agreement with the Reichswehr and the suppression of the SA and Röhm, when President von Hindenberg died the following month, Hitler was able to exercise full military control. In conclusion, economic turmoil and instability in Weimar in part led to the political extremism which would lead to extremism in the NSDAP and paramilitaries. The development and influence of paramilitaries beginning with the Freidrikorps and developing into the Sturmabteilung (SA), Schutzstaffel (SS), andGeheim Stattspoleiza (Gestapo) was critical in Hitler assuming military control with theReichswehr in 1934. After the Nazi Party and Hitler the Schutzstaffel (SS) and Geheim Stattspoleiza (Gestapo) would continue to occupy an important role within the totalitarian 8 state with what came next being worse than previously imaginable. 8 Eric D. Weitz,Weimar Germany, pg. 367 5 6