Colonialism, Nationalism, and 21st-Century Crimes Against Humanity

The Role of Colonialism and Nationalism in Crimes Against Humanity in the 21st Century & the Difficulties of Universal Human Rights Allison Brown HIST 4990: Crimes Against Humanity Dr. Blackler December 17, 2021 Since WWII and the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, global dialogue regarding universal human rights has evolved exponentially. But why do universal human rights struggle to be equally implemented? Why do human rights violations still occur in the modern day? When considering these questions, it is essential to understand that international law is more a dialogue than a binding, international enforcement mechanism. International human rights doctrine is used by the individual who created it, according to historian David Kennedy, universal human rights legislation “catalogs the arguments people have used to assess the legitimacy of state behavior [and is] a way to discuss what is appropriate 1 in world affairs, international law only rarely offers a definitive judgment on who is ri ght.” This paper’s argument is two-fold. Although political extremism and societal racism undeniably are the cause of crimes against humanity in the modern era, they are not the core causes. Rather, the continued influence of colonialism and nationalism act as exacerbating, core causes which lead to political extremism and societal racism. Therefore, the aforementioned contributions of colonialism and nationalism alongside institutional paradoxes and intrinsic problems with implementation explain why universal human rights are not institutionally viable in the twenty-first century. In this essay political extremism is defined as activities which are politically fringe, or not in accordance with norms of the state. Political extremist ideals can also be fully intolerant towards others and often reject democracy. And societal racism is defined as the institutional basis derived from a society’s historical, cultural, and interpersonal practices which places one or more ethic or social groups in a higher position. 1 In order to understand the lasting implications of colonialism and then the effects of nationalism, first it is necessary to examine how outlooks towards statehood and nationality shaped the development of states emerging from the colonial spheres at the start of the twentieth century. In 1917, President Wilson ushered in a new era for human rights doctrine with his Fourteen Points speech, which called for the creation of homogenous states to be formed across Europe and the colonial sphere to maintain post-WWI “stability” and ensure the protection of minority populations. Various points called for new states to be drawn along lines of nationality. For example, the speech called for, “a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy” that would be drawn “along clearly recognizable lines of nationalit2y.Si”milarly for Poland, Wilson recommended “an independent Polish state which would include the territories inhabited in indisputably Polish populations.3” These excerpts and case examples from Wilson’s Fourteen Points affirms the global change to a system of nation states, and the role of nationality in the implementation of human rights doctrine. Although statehood and the protection of nationality tended to support human rights, it is important to note that these protections were not absolute. By anchoring human rights to statehood, universal human rights faced barriers, and populations who did not identify with the majority were at severe risk of persecution and violence. Moreover, theoretically it seemed an easy task to establish country lines based on nationality, but in reality, different religious, ethnic, and other populations were dispersed throughout regions. In this era of nation-states in the nineteenth century, human rights were not individualized for those in society, but instead were anchored in the national community from a national 2 government. From the Berlin Congress to the Paris Peace Conference, “human rights were widely proclaimed to be based in national citizenship, and that the nation, to the extent possible, should be homogenous in charact4eTr.h”ese doctrines upheld President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the intrinsic protections guaranteed for homogenous states. In this era, every “civilized” population needed a state in order to ensure human rights. Following the unprecedented, world-wide conflicts of World War I and II, global victors advocated for the creation of homogenous states as a way to theoretically ease violence and persecution among minatory populations. However, de facto, it proved incredibly difficult to define which demographics comprise different states and where those nation-lines would exist based on racial, religious, and ethnic identities. Protections for human rights ienxitshteeodryat an international level, but legal backing was extensively limited to only include individuals recognized as citizen5sT.his is affirmed in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) established in 1948, “Everyone has the right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality” and is the foundation of state-identity and security both at the time of the UDHR’s passage in 1948 and into 6 the twenty-first c entury. With an understanding of the backdrop of colonial influence and the role of states and nationality play in the conception and implementation of universal human rights, we can now move forwards to examine the roles which nationalism and colonial influence play in crimes against humanity. 3 The conclusion of World War II and traditional colonial interests both in Asia and throughout the global south revealed new possibilities for Cambodia. Global powers, those colonizing, post-conflict shifted to focus on their global mission of promoting national independence and democra7cy. In Cambodia, after the internal unrest that followed the decolonization of Cambodia in the post-WWII era, the communist regime the Khmer Rouge led to the death of an estimated one and a half million people from 1975 to 1979. The Cambodian Genocide serves as an example of violence and crimes against humanity wherein colonial impacts and nationalism play out. In a pseudo-combination of communist ideals modeled from the Chinese system, which was modeled from the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, the Khmer Rouge exemplified the dangerous potential nationalism poses when in the world order, the desirable state is portrayed as a homogenous one. Weitz describes the Khmer Rouge as the “purifying ethos of revolution, the drive to create a homogenous, perfect society” which was combined with “an extreme nationalism that had deep roots in Khmer culture, but that also developed in the context of French colonial control and the decades-long struggle of Cambodians against French and American influence and intervention” which would lead to the Khmer 8 Rouge’s “radicalized nationalism. T ” he combination of both a colonial past alongside the goal of achieving a nationalistic state led towards an unimaginable campaign of political violence. Overall, the entire campaign of violence which the Khmer Rouge carried out was against distinct nationalities including Chinese, Vietnamese, and Chams or Austronesian populations. What they all had in common was that, in the view of the Khmer Rouge, they were defined as 4 hostile to the state-wide campaign to construct a homogenous and egalitarian Khmer society. However, though, at the start of the Khmer Rouge’s reign they initially “blended political, social, 9 and ethnic criteria, and parsed individuals into particular slots often in a highly arbitrary matter.” This is evident in the first delineation of the Khmer Rouge between the “new” and “old” populations. The “old populations” were the individuals who were allied or tied to the Khmer Rouge prior to their seizure of power. But “new people” were those who resided in cities or lived in acres of control under the Lol Nol Regime. “New people” were also those who served the old system, as was portrayed in Loung Ung’s “First They Killed My Father” (2000) with the main character’s father, Seng Im Ung, working as an official for the Lol Nol government, being persecuted, and eventually killed, after the Khmer Rouge and new regime took10 pTlh ae ce. “new people” were not persecuted based on their race at this stage in the Cambodian Genocide, instead, they were persecuted because of the perceived threat which they posed to a homogenous state in Kampuchea. Additionally, the Khmer Rouge implemented a class system between the different ethnicities and status within the state. Weitz explains “the Khmer Rouge racialized class and nationality, making all members of the three groups bearers of identical characteristics, no matter what they had don1e1.”This dangerous system of classification allowed for a collective “other to emerge”, leading to an escalation of violence and empowering average citizens to act against one another in support of a new, homogenous state. The value of such a state presented as the global ideal for a highly-functioning and prosperous nation. 5 Fundamentally, the Khmer Rouge blended together different political, social, and ethnic categories to fit the regime’s needs of persecution and violence in order to pursue their ideal state1.2 This serves as evidence that nationalism and the notions of a hegemonic state strongly contributed, alongside societal racism and political extremism, to the Khmer Rouge’s arbitrary violence and subsequent genocide in Cambodia. Turning to another example, Rwanda serves as a prime example of how colonial mentalities on nationalism and statehood exacerbated political extremism and societal racism. Following WWII, Deutsche Ostafrika became Ruanda-Urundi and was a colony of Belgium from 1922 to 1962. Under colonial rule, a racial hierarchy was instituted between the Hutu and Tutsi groups, and the less well-known Twa group. Belgian colonial powers placed more of an emphasis on the minority Tutsi group, lifting them to higher positions in society both during and post-colonial influence. Historian James Walker describes this colonial system of hierarchy as being “inscribed in the differential treatment accorded to each group, as a result, the potential for 13 conflict certainly existed between Hutu and Tutsi s. T”he Belgian colonial government also instituted identity cards, akin to those implemented in other scenarios where violence increased and in some cases lead to genocide. These identity cards rationalized political extremism, formally documenting the differences in people’s identities and demarcating them to one another and to the state as ethnically different. The Belgians would leave Rwanda colonially in 1962, but 14 the ramifications of their colonial rule would rema in. 6 Prior to the Declaration of Rwandan Independence, the Belgians would shift to support the majority Hutu population and prop them up to lead governmental structures. Following this change in power and growing aggression following the Bahutu Manifesto in 1957, Tutsi refugees migrated to the border, with over three-hundred thousand at the border by 1964. The mass migration resulted in the establishment of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), who after years of tension would sign a peace agreement with the Republic of Rwanda in the Arushua Accords of 1993. Tensions would still continue to escalate, all culminating in the radio call on April 13, 1994, calling “cut down the tall trees”, with eight-thousand deaths following each day after 15 during the Rwandan Genocide. However, on May 1, 1994, only weeks after the initial violence started, the United States Department of State internal memo to the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, subject-line “Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda” established: “Although lacking in legal consequences, a clear statement that the USG believes that acts of genocide have occurred could increase pressure for USG activism in response to the crisis in Rwanda … If we do not seize the opportunity presented by for a such as the UNHRC to use the genocide label to condemn events in Rwanda, our credibility will be undermined with human rights groups and the public would may question how 16 much evidence we can legitimately require before coming to a policy conclusion.” Regardless of the Department of State’s intelligence of the grave nature of the situation in Rwanda, the United States, and the international community, would remain ambivalent to the situation and not intervene. On a visit to the Rwandan capital, Kigali, in 1998, President Clinton apologized for not acting quickly enough or immediately calling the crimes gen17oT cihdee. 7 United States’, and the international community’s, failure to act in Rwanda was indicative both of the domestic situation in the United States and the viability of involvement, but also the intrinsic difficulties of enforcing the protection of universal human rights. Universal human rights have proven difficult to enforce since their conception with the UDHR in 1948. In her work, “Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century” (2017), Kathryn Sikkink describes a current system in which international human rights doctrine and advocacy work is an ongoing process which requires perseverance and vigilance globally.18 Vital to her argument, Sikkink highlights the role of advocacy in the sphere of international human rights codification expecting, “human rights will continue to be a discourse that can mobilize both domestic and international pu1b9liIcnt”s. his statement, Sikkink admits to a shortcoming of international human rights, they are a “discourse” that serves to “mobilize” in contrast to international doctrine which is binding or has retributive measures. The central problem with universal human rights doctrine is that it is ambiguous. The ambiguity, which allows governments to rationalize almost anything they do, is a deliberate choice to ensure signatories their own sovereignty still in situations where violations are in question. International human rights doctrine does not require western countries to change their behavior, while, in principle, it expects massive changes in the behavior of most non-western countries. Both foreign aid and human rights enforcement can be corrupted or undermined because western countries have strategic interests that are not always aligned with the missions of those institutions. But the major issue, in both cases, is that the systems reflect a vision of 8 good governance rooted in the common historical experiences of western countries and that prevails in countries that enjoy wealth, security, and order. Although more discourse than hard, followed policy with consistent enforcement, universal human rights are a move in the right direction. By identifying and legislating the core rights that everyone deserves, recruiting world leaders to assist in their discernment and construct institutions and organizations to press for their realization, there is a better system for dealing with human rights abuses. And failing to do anything is not a better option, advocating for universal rights are better than ambivalently standing by in the face of crimes against humanity. 9