Marc Lynch’s The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (2016)

Allison Brown Governments and Politics of MENA Eric Nigh March 7, 2022 The New Arab Wars Essay Marc Lynch’sThe New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East (2016) covers a myriad of topics relating to the Arab uprisings, their subsequent failures, and the changed regional order and proxy warfare which remains in the modern day. With the vacuum of regional influence in the late 1980s, Lynch notes that the lack of another external regional power, such as the USSR in the Middle East, forced regional plays to choose to either accept the interventions and influence of the United States and be irrelevant in the international system or to act as rogue states (Lynch, 11). Regarding post-9/11 US intervention, Lynch remarks that it is not a coincidence that interventionism increased in tandem with anti-American sentiments in the Middle East (13). The United States’ “imperium” as Lynch describes, had always been a system that would tolerate human rights violations of its regional allies if they cooperated on the export of oil, anti-Communist measures, counterterrorism efforts, and the containment of Iran (22). Leading to the Arab uprisings were two different blocs established in the Middle East. The “Rejection Bloc” consisted of Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas who stood opposed to the “Moderation Bloc” led by Sunni dictators allied with the US – and indirectly with Israel—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE (15). These blocs became the de facto border of the Middle East leading up regional change, and with these blocs and areas of conflicts in mind, Lynch establishes the four axis of conflict: “[1] the Iranian-Saudi conflict, reinforced by Israel’s priorities continued to structure much of the region’s alliances and interventions, [2] the battle for leadership of the Sunni Arab world between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey, [3] the challenge posed by different 1 Islamist networks, from mainstream Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements to the violent extremists of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, represented a third level of conflict, [4] and the broader struggle between autocratic regimes and mobilized societies continued to unfold within a context framed by the three regional wars (44). In this essay, I will examine each of Lynch’s axis of conflict and draw comparisons with conflicts outline he in T New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East. Lynch’s first axis of conflict, the ongoing “Cold War” between Saudi Arabia and Iran which are reinforced by Israel’s priorities and regional influence from their backing of the United States and the West. The ongoing antagonism today is firstly an economic and political struggle which is only exacerbated by religious differences, and sectarianism. These sectarian differences, alongside different economic and political spheres of influence in the region fuels geopolitical tensions and conflict. Historically Saudi Arabia, a monarchy and home to many sites of Islamic significance, saw itself as the leader of the Muslim world. But this was challenged in 1979 by the Islamic revolution in Iran which created a new type of state in the region, a theocracy which had the explicit goal of spreading its mode of governance and influence throughout the region. Regional order drastically shifted in 2011 with the start of Arab uprisings and the spread of popular movements as well as political instability throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia took advantage of these political upheavals to expand their influence and territory, notably in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, further heightening mutual geopolitical suspicions of one another heightening to proxy warfare. Arguably the most prominent current example of Lynch’s first axis is the ongoing conflict in Yemen, which also serves as an example for how the first axis impacts intervention in the Middle East. On March 26, 2015, a Saudi-led coalition launched a military intervention in Yemen to roll back the seizure of Sanaa and Aden by the Shi’ite Houthi Movement. This initial military intervention relates to the 2 axis because the Shi’ite Houthi Movement is a proxy of Iran. The Saudis and their Gulf partners sought to restore to power the deposed President Abd Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, who had been elected in 2012 in a one-candidate referendum as the culmination of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s plan for elections and transition (99). Their allies in Yemen included the Muslim Brotherhoodlinked Islah movement “and, implicitly, al-Qaeda” (100). As a result of the military intervention from Saudi Arabia in response to the Iranian proxy Houthi rebels, leaders in the Middle East utilized the Yemen campaign as a new model for joint Arab military action, with the Gulf states acting independently to confront Iran rather than depending on the United States (101). Lynch’s second of axis is the ongoing contention and “the battle for leadership of the Sunni Arab world” occurring between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey or infighting within the ‘moderate bloc’ (44). The second axis is different from the first given Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Turkey are all vying for control of the Sunni Arab world. Along these lines, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are typically on the same side of disagreements and conflicts, where Qatar and Turkey often were not consistently aligned with each other or other Middle Eastern states. A phrase introduced early in course contents goes “me and my brother versus my cousin, me and my cousin versus the stranger” which provides an explanation of sorts for the foreign policies of these states. In this metaphor, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are brothers, Qatar and Turkey the cousins, and the stranger being Iran. Looking particularly to Qatar and their disagreements and conflicts with Saudi Arabia serves as an example of this axis and control for regional order. Qatar is wealthy with large amounts of natural gas and their television news station, al-Jazeera, is popular throughout the region and challenges Saudi Arabia’s role as the leader of the Sunni Arab world. Qatar also led various diplomatic initiatives in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Palestine which challenged Saudi Arabian leadership on these issues. Qatar also took a leading role in the media of the Middle 3 East with al-Jazeera, a forum for uncensored news and debate that was unique in the Middle East. Qatar also funded a “wide range of transnational movements, journalists, and politicians”, of whom were frequently creating more Qatari influence and challenging the regional power of Saudi Arabia in the Sunni world (102). A direct example of this second axis of conflict is also the close Qatar ties (as well as al-Jazeera) with the Muslim Brotherhood. During the Muslim Brotherhood’s –year of democratically elected –power in Egypt, Qatar gave President Mohammed Morsi’s government substantial loans. This funding, as well as the support of state-sponsored news which favored the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, caused tensions relating to Lynch’s second axis and conflict and would shift the regional order in subsequent years (92). As an aside, Lynch also notes that “the role of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Turkey, and the UAE have in many cases supplanted even the role of the United States as deeply polarizing issues of contention in regional politics” (89). As regional powers shift in the Middle East from the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and a lack of influence regionally currently place even more of an emphasis on the importance of the second axis of conflict and the states seeking to be leaders of the Sunni Arab world. Lynch’s third axis of conflict is the ongoing, interstate conflicts which occur from different Islamist networks, paramilitaries, and terrorist organizations. This third axis of conflict ranges in ideologies of Islamic groups, from the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi movements to more extremist, violent groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Although always present, Lynch argues that the political instability following the Arab uprisings led to the increased violence and territorial control of these non-state actors in states such as Iraq and Syria among others. These nonstate actors and their territorial spread and violence also lead to foreign intervention. The collapse of Syria post-Arab uprisings serves as an example of how the Islamic State was able to seize power and gain territory. During the 2011 Arab uprisings in Syria, protesters and civilians protested 4 against Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Assad, backed by Iran, Russia, and the terrorist group Hezbollah cracked down with violence against the protesters. A proxy war against the Assad’s violent crackdown formed with the insurgency being funded by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Turkey, and the United States to a degree (189). In this sense, the ongoing conflict in Syria is also tied to Lynch’s first axis of conflict, with proxies funded from both Iran and Saudi Arabian backed militias and insurgents. Although the US supported the insurgency fighting against the regime of Assad, nonstate actors like the Islamic State complicated efforts. Underlining this funding, especially for the US, was an urgency to control the landscape as it seemed prime for extremist and terrorist groups to emerge and gain power in regional uncertainty. With this, President Obama, among other allies, grew increasingly aware that the Syrians rebels would be able to overthrow Assad on their own, and discussed other ways besides funding, to support the rebels (195). President Obama’s Administration was willing to provide military aid and arms to the insurgents, but could not guarantee the military aid would not fall to the Islamic State and other militias. Regardless, groups funded by the US and allies also sought out funding from other acceptable and unacceptable regional actors, as deemed by the US. Qatar and Turkey guided the West and maintained relationships with groups such as Jubhat al-Nusra, despite its designation as a US terrorist group. Another Turkish partner, Ahrar al-Sham, was also marked as a US terrorist organization, but continued to receive Turkish funding (198). These conversations of US support appeared domestically as well in discourse, with Western publicists continually trying to sustain the image that the rebels were moderate and secular, but this picture became more convoluted as the conflict continued, and different groups sought out funding from extremist and secular sources. For years, Syria would continue to be stuck in a stalemate in their civil war, and proxy war, with funding coming from external sources and the continuation of violence, with no end in sight. ISIS continues 5 to captivate the US more so than the Assad regime and leads to the US to become further involved with the group in Syria and even Iraq (187). The conflict in Syria encompasses both the second and third axis of conflict, which makes it more intertwined and difficult to resolve in the ways which state against state conflicts can be funded and mediated. Lynch’s fourth axis of conflict speaks to the broader, ongoing social struggles between “autocratic regimes and mobilized societies” (44). Popular movements throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa are common throughout the history of the region. Looking in particular to the Arab uprisings starting in 2011, they undeniably serve as an example of Lynch’s fourth axis. The Arab uprisings started in Tunisia in 2010 with the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in response to the Tunisian government’s seizure of his business and police corruption. Out of Tunisia, mass demonstrations spread across the Middle East and Northern Africa, famously including protests like that of Tahir Square which called for President Hosni Mubarak’s removal that would come after eighteen days of public demonstrations. Following the Arab uprisings subsequent “failure”, with the return of even more repressive and violent government structures, the US looked to “right-size” foreign policy, leaving what some would call a strategic failure in states such as Syria during the Obama Administration. It is evident how this idea of “right-sizing” of US foreign policy and interests still impacts decisions made in the Middle East, such as the recent withdrawal from Afghanistan and questions of US-Saudi Arabian interests taking precedence over US values. In conclusion, Lynch’s four axis of conflict in the Middle East and Northern Africa continually overlap and exacerbate both past and current issues and conflicts. This remains true immediately following the Arab uprisings with the Obama Administration, policy negotiated under the Trump Administration such as the Abraham Accords, and the Middle Eastern foreign policy decisions enacted thus far by the Biden Administration. Critical to MENA foreign policy as well is 6 public discourse. The American public’s perception shifts on issues, Syria would leave the public eye which instead focused on Benghazi, Israel, and the Iranian Nuclear Program. It is also important to note how in turn, public discourse can shape foreign policy, and how this continues to shape USMiddle Eastern relations currently. Bibliography Lynch, Marc.The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East. Public Affairs, 2017. 7