Creating the Political Student Soldier - Report

Creating the “Political Student-Soldier” A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in German Studies. ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iv Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Political Consciousness ................................................................................... 13 Chapter 2: Academia in Service of the Nation ................................................................. 26 Chapter 3: The Work-Student ........................................................................................... 35 Chapter 4: Nationalistic Militarism, or the “Soldier” in the “Political Student-Soldier” . 45 Chapter 5: The Student as National Socialist ................................................................... 61 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 68 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 70 iii iv Introduction The bonfires towered as tall as a man—taller, even, than the student heaving stacks of books into them. On the night of May 10, 1933, 34 universities across Germany witnessed the mass conflagration of books deemed antithetical to the values of the German Volk.1 Those selected to burn ranged widely, including the works of Bertold Brecht, Karl Marx, Eric Kästner, Erich Maria Remarque, Thomas Mann, Jack London, Helen Keller and many others.2 As the flames leapt into the sky, dozens of university students and Sturmabteilung men formed ordered lines in the darkness, passing the tomes from one to the other until they reached the site of destruction. This demonstration was not forced upon the students by National Socialist leadership; it was planned, advertised, and carried out by the German Student Union, the Deutsche Studentenschaft. Groups of students spearheaded the effort and worked together with professors and police to choose and collect the books as a part of the campaign “against the un-German spirit.”3 Nazi party leadership, however, was not thrilled by this display. No official Nazi organization participated in the protest; Hitler and his cabinet maintained silent distaste for the event and refused to allow further such incidents.4 In their “Twelve Theses Against the UnGerman Spirit,” published the preceding April in the favored National Socialist newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter, the Deutsche Studentenschaft enumerated 1 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Nazi Book Burning, accessed December 8, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yHzM1gXaiVo. 2 “Book Burning,” accessed December 8, 2018, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/bookburning. 3 “wider den undeutschen Geist;” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Nazi Book Burning. 4 Hans D. Sluga, Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993). demands for both the university and German students to take a greater role in the protection and strengthening of the Volk.5 In creating “General Principles for the Compilation of Blacklists,” Wolfgang Herrmann emphasized that the lists were of a “literary-political nature.” (literaturpolitischer Natur) The public insistence of the students, as well as their overtly political manner surrounding the book burnings shows the event to be the culmination of the evolution of a new type of German student, what I define as the “political student-soldier.” In introducing the first volume of Der Deutsche Student, the official student journal of the Deutsche Studentenschaft, the publication’s editor, Gerhard Schröder, wrote, “The German student is National Socialist…The coming student will be student, and soldier, and worker in one person. Political student body, political military, and political workers must be merged together.”6 Schröder’s piece effectively worked as a mission statement, declaring the values of the Deutsche Studentenschaft. As students flocked to membership of either the Deutsche Studentenschaft or its contemporary, the Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (the National Socialist German Students’ League), thousands of brown-shirted students dominated German universities. How did this shift in role and identity come about? What power did Nazi students exert on their campuses, region, even the nation? Taking into account the ideological shallowness that is inherent in National Socialism, the goal of a university would appear to be at odds with the movement. This raises the question: how did students, though they were not alone in this shift, become attracted to a party devoid of a sound intellectual 5 “When Books Burn: Lists of Banned Books, 1933-1939,” accessed December 8, 2018, http://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/burnedbooks/documents.htm. 6 Gerhard Schröder, “Der deutsche Student,” Der Deutsche Student, August 1933. 2. 2 basis? Through analysis of newspaper articles and advertisements, biographical accounts, and student publications of the Weimar Republic and the early years of the Third Reich, I have found that students underwent a change in self-conception. The way students thoughts of themselves changed from the objective, non-political university attendee to the rabid student-soldier. Context of the turbulent period of the Weimar Republic is essential to understanding the shift in student identity. Politically, the period following Germany’s loss of the First World War was highly unstable and marked by political extremism on the right and the left. The new constitution of the fledgling republic was enacted during mass strikes by “militant workers” with radical demands, such as nationalization of the coal industry.7 Violence was widespread. The largely unsatisfactory terms of the Versailles Treaty that ended in the humiliation and subjugation of Germany to the Allied forces earned the majority political parties considerable ire on the national stage. Paragraph 48, declaring a state of emergency, was frequently invoked by President Friedrich Ebert and later, Paul von Hindenburg to censor extremist right-wing media and crush revolts on the left.8 By the end of the decade’s tumult, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was unable to form a cohesive and stable government throughout 1928, leading to a severe loss of credibility. Such instability was reflected in Germany’s elections, as both the radical right and left made gains as early as 1924.9 The majority of the new and old middle classes, from which most university students came, turned to the conservative right in this shift. 7 Martin Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 1800-2000 (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2006). 220. Ibid., 231. 9 Ibid., 234. 8 3 The economic situation of the interwar period contributed significantly to the popularity of National Socialism among university students. With the economy already drained from the war effort, the harsh political and economic terms set out in the Treaty of Versailles added insult to injury. Attempts at economic recovery and reparation repayment resulted in rapid hyperinflation. From 1922 to 1923 alone, the internal price of the mark rose by 75,000,000,000%.10 This devastated the middle classes and pensioners, who lost all their savings with the inflation. Unemployment skyrocketed and wages fell to 70% of their pre-war levels.11 As many bourgeois young men and women were unable to find work, they often returned to the university.12 Disenchantment with job prospects combined with a sense of shame at the inability to attain the same status, let alone a higher station, than one’s elders. Dreaming of achieving promised economic prosperity, members of this strata, especially youth, took on a utopian outlook toward the extreme right and renewed German nationalism. The Nazi student movement centered on support for the idea of a unified German Volk and rallied around the nationalist cause. Drawing from the work of Peter Fritzsche’s Germans into Nazis,13 I emphasize the renewed German nationalism that stemmed from the outset and duration of the First World War as a force that brought people together across class boundaries. Rather than viewing German patriotism as an established force that was called upon as matter of obligation after World War I, “identity rather than duty was at work here. Loyalties were discovered and claimed rather than acknowledged and 10 Bernd Widdig, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany, Weimar and Now 26 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Maier table, 15. 11 Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 1800-2000. 234. 12 Michael Stephen Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts: The German Students’ Path to National Socialism, 1918-1935 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). 23. 13 Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998). 4 served.”14 A new form of national feeling was created. In light of the SPD’s failure to provide a successful model of liberal policy, right-wing rhetoric of nation retained an attractive appeal. The demands of total war mobilization on the homefront had strengthened a sense of community and created an association between nationalism and war; an experience that would be recalled in the interwar period in the rallying cries of populist parties and student publications. I find that print pieces written by and for students facilitated building a greater sense of national consciousness and mass participation and relation of the Volk. Academic pieces of this nature, I argue, also provided a veneer of intellectualism to National Socialism, coopting the creation of an “intellectual” community of völkisch young men. German nationalism of the Weimar period, practiced on the fanatical right, achieved a tremendous amount of grassroots energy.15 As demonstrated by the illustrated “Campaign Against the Un-German Spirit,” students were often ardent participants in the nationalist spectacle. Peter Fritzsche notes that the casual integration of political motivations into the daily routine of middle-class Germans struck the right balance between economic concerns and focus on the community of the people (Volksgemeinschaft). Student organizations that spanned across the country employed similar methods and outreach to advertising their belief and recruiting fellow students and non-academic, working-class populations. In appealing to such a broad audience, early Weimar students’ rhetoric surrounding National Socialism downplayed the roles of racial anti-Semitism and socialism, opting instead to emphasize the nationalistic fervor that had taken hold of Germany.16 The identity of the “political 14 Ibid., 6. Ibid., 134. 16 Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 1800-2000. 247. 15 5 student-soldier” combined the intellectualism of the university with this activist nationalism. During the Weimar Republic, the future of the German university was the subject of serious deliberation. Having been left largely unchanged through industrialization and World War I, German universities became known as antiquated institutions in need of reform. The “mandarin intellectuals” of the university felt themselves to be losing their much-respected status within German society.17 Professors were given vast freedom over the content of their lectures and lessons, and held considerable authority within academic structures. During the time of the republic, most professors were conservative champions of the empire and an expansionist military.18 Though political and intellectual attitudes were expressed, or evident from lecture, professors and Dozenten (unpaid academics with the license to teach) maintained an official status as “apolitical.” This understanding was constructed by the position of the academic as a top-tier civil servant, one whose daily bread was drawn from a government wage. To be a political agent was seen as a conflict of interest. Increasingly in the 1920’s and 1930’s students railed against academic objectivity, demanding that scholarship be placed in service of the nation. Notions of “academic freedom” transitioned similarly; it was traditionally founded in a separation between the government and academics. Weimar students argued the opposite, however. To be “academically free” was to allow for uncensored political engagement.19 This call to integrate political action into the repertoire of the university student was a rising trend that significantly contributed to the expansion of National Socialism 17 Friedrich Paulsen, The German Universities, trans. Frank Thilly and William W. Elwang, 1906. Steven P. Remy, The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002). 9. 19 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 19. 18 6 yet is little represented in historiography. Broad histories of the Weimar Republic, such as that of Weimar Germany by Eric D. Weitz20 or A History of Modern Germany: 18002000 by Martin Kitchen,21 refer little to universities or student movements. When included, the universities are discussed as preserving anti-republican sentiment and strongholds of conservative ideology.22 Studies on the growth and development of National Socialism often center on powerful leaders from within the party; focusing on the biographies of men like Hitler and Goebbels, Himmler and Heydrich. Concentrating on the actions of the few, this scholarship overlooks the involvement of the many and the everyday attitudes, actions, and decisions that contributed to the power of these men. In focusing on the university’s involvement in Nazism, Steven P. Remy’s book, The Heidelberg Myth,23 offers an important contribution to the English historiography of twentieth century German universities. His work concentrates on the role of professors within the university in relation to the rise of National Socialism and seeks to break a preconceived “myth” of professorial distance from the movement. According to Remy, with the exception of Max Weinreich’s 1946 book, Hitler’s Professors, the historiographical consensus surrounding professors and National Socialism was based on the work of Gerhard Ritter’s 1945 article, “The Professor in the ‘Third Reich,’”24 which concludes that professors largely defended their autonomy and wanted little to do with the regime.25 Framing his work as breaking a historically promulgated myth, Remy’s tone indicts histories that ignore or downplay professors’ influence. Michael H. Kater and 20 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2007). Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 1800-2000. 22 Weitz, Weimar Germany. 23 Remy, The Heidelberg Myth. 24 “Der Professor im ‘Dritten Reich’” 25 Remy, The Heidelberg Myth. 2-3. 21 7 Mitchell G. Ash have rightly criticized Remy’s work for creating an exaggerated “myth” of denial where none existed26 and ignoring the numerous German studies on universities that emerged in the 1970s.27 Both critics confirm, however, that The Heidelberg Myth is one of the most comprehensive studies in English of National Socialism in universities. The work of Michael Steinberg, R. G. S. Weber, and Michael H. Kater have focused specifically on the issue of students in the rise of National Socialism. Weber’s work, The German Student Corps in the Third Reich, concentrates on the relationship between Nazi student organizations, such as the Deutsche Studentenschaft and the Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund, and fraternities, as groups with tremendous extra-curricular social capital.28 In an attempt to combat the assumption that the militaristic traditions of the corps was the breeding ground of Nazi para-militarism, Weber shows resistance from within the typically apolitical fraternal orders to National Socialist political endeavors. As Nazi student groups grew in strength, their leaders targeted fraternities as a source of conservative opposition to the regime, though Weber also demonstrates National Socialist doctrine was exercised unevenly between groups. As preestablished, organized communities of students, the failure of fraternities to stem the politicization and militarization of the German student demonstrates the popularity and force of Nazi doctrine. Steinberg’s study, Sabers and Brownshirts, encompasses a wider scope, covering the sociological position of the young men and women in their adoption of and 26 Michael H. Kater, “The Myth of Myths: Scholarship and Teaching in Heidelberg,” ed. Steven P. Remy, Central European History 36, no. 4 (2003): 570–77. 27 “Ash on Remy, ‘The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University’ | HGerman | H-Net,” accessed December 18, 2018, https://networks.hnet.org/node/35008/reviews/43745/ash-remy-heidelberg-myth-nazification-and-denazification-german. 28 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 8 participation in Nazism. The convergent factors of chaotic Weimar politics and economic instability dovetailed with shifting social patterns that fundamentally changed the life of the university student. The middle-class, educated student was of an elite status in German society, a caste that lost status during the years of the Republic. Students organized as a means to voice their concerns with new, strained living conditions in a political climate, according to Steinberg. Societal trends that de-emphasized the importance of education and upheld the significance of leadership fed into the ideology of German students during the late 1920’s. For Steinberg, student reactions to these influences are characteristic of their middle-class attitudes and upbringing, exercised on the unique stage of the university. This work contributes invaluable discussion on the societal position of the German student, with the pressures and expectations therein, that are pertinent to the rising influence of Nazism in the student body. I seek to add to this interpretation an increased emphasis on nationalist sentiment and the influence of the ideological crisis of the university, which are nearly absent in Steinberg’s account. Like Sabers and Brownshirts, Kater’s Student Body and Right-Wing Radicalism in Germany: 1918-1933 emphasizes the sociological factors that fed into student participation in National Socialism. The Weimar student faced a battle for social and economic existence that was unprecedented and, compared to other social and career groups, unequalled.29 The same socio-economic concerns that plagued the student body were foundational to the crisis of education (Bildungskrise). Kater’s use of data from other social groups to demonstrate the insecure position of students, and the attraction of 29 Michael H. Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918-1933: eine sozialgeschichtl. Studie z. Bildungskrise in d. Weimarer Republik, 1.-3. Tsd, Historische Perspektiven ; 1 (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1975). 11. 9 National Socialism amidst such anxieties explains the early and unique adoption and absorption of Nazi ideology for my own study. The work of these academics, however, neglects or downplays the enticing militant spectacle of the concurrent nationalist revolution. Appeals to students, whether by NSDAP propaganda or by the students themselves, often called upon the youthful masses to work for the Volk and/or Germany. As demonstrated by Fritzsche, post-World War I German nationalism was tied to the memory of war and thus imagined the industrious male soldier as the ideal citizen. Building on these scholars and integrating the importance of nationalism, this thesis argues that the renewal of the nation offered pride and opportunity to the endangered, educated young men and women opportunity to regain lost status within society. Focus on the betterment of the people and the university was a new, political undertaking that demanded social activism, in and out of the classroom. During the Weimar Republic and the early years of the Third Reich, university students conceived of a new self-identity founded in these tenets, yielding the model of a political student-soldier. As young men strived to meet this ideal, they adopted and strengthened the cause of National Socialism. The interior self-transformation of the students was visually evident externally. The German university in 1921 was a place of color. University students bustled from place to place in a great array of heterogeneity; fraternity men wore the various hues of their associations, free students in civilian coats and shirts, women attended in dresses that, if perhaps modest in the economically downtrodden times, bespoke the mode of the era. By 1933, this image of individuality shifted dramatically to the drab. Where the beer-imbibing “student prince” once lounged, disciplined, hard, and 10 militaristic National Socialist students gathered. They were both uniform and uniformed; their standard attire as “Brown Shirts” was just that, military uniforms, complete with jack boots and red swastika armbands. Where the fraternity men’s traditional outfits, worn in assembly on days of imperial/national dedication or celebration, were audacious and vaguely reminiscent of officers’ clothes, the militarism of the Brown Shirts was pronounced in their stark verisimilitude to contemporary drab, as if they were to walk into battle at any moment. To a viewer of the Weimar Republic, the aggressive connotation in such attire would have been especially recognizable—soldiers returned from the war were still on the fore of the public’s minds and hearts and Freikorps groups of paramilitary men continued to roam the country. The students’ appearance was stark amid the landscape of the university, and highly provocative. Administrations tried in vain to ban their uniforms and symbols, but to no avail.30 The visuality of their youthful revolution was not to be tamed. The bland, brown uniform, representative of the Nazi students’ orderly and hyperdisciplined ideology, slowly suffocated the visual space on the grounds of the university. Gradually, but within a matter of years, the brightness of the Corps and “free” youth were replaced by brown with splashes of antagonistic red, as National Socialist groups began to crop up within the university in 1926 and gain in popularity as the decade progressed. The sheer repetition of their sartorial selections provided an image of strength (the strength of numbers) and proliferation. National Socialist students conceived of their movement as a revolution of “New Germany,” a generational shift for the renewal of the nation. The ubiquity of their almost standardized image was a constant reminder of their 30 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 96. 11 militaristic goals and völkisch ideals. Many student journalists of the era report this feeling of revolution in the air as a remarkable and electrifying experience; their commitment to this sensation is in itself echoed and renewed visually. The uniformity of the Brown Shirt also erases individuality. As stated in the first issue of the German Student Union’s official publication, The German Student, „der deutsche Student gehört nicht sich, sondern seinem Volk und seinem Staate.“31 The visual similarity of each National Socialist situated him within the Volk and the party, eliminating his individuality in the context of the university and the movement. As the young men preached comradery and nation, they were visually invested into their communityoriented mindset. In an era of political, economic, and social chaos, young men were seeking identity and found a hope in the image of the disciplined, hyper-masculine, and militant National Socialist student. Not only present in the flesh, propaganda generated and repeated this representation of the ideal youth. One living in the period could see the hyper-attractive ideal and its literal, physical incarnation in the same glance on the university grounds. This made the propagandistic model of perfection appear attainable. The frivolity evident in the bright and bedecked fraternity attire was replaced by ascetic harshness—these were young men that were to be taken seriously. This shift in appearance is emblematic of the desires of the students themselves. 31 “Der Deutsche Student,” G.S., Der Deutsche Student, August 1933, 2. 12 Chapter 1: Political Consciousness One of the most salient and important transformations for the average German university student during the Weimar Republic and Third Reich was the shift to perceive of themselves as political beings, for whom activism and interest in local campus and national affairs became a matter of duty and privilege. Students, fraternities, and the entire university, at least in word, were traditionally apolitical and disaffiliated from governmental affairs despite the latter being an institution of the state.32 The inclusion of party-politics within the university would corrupt academia. The student, for his33 part, was to be focused on studies or living the life of the “student-prince,”—not involved in social activism. This changed after World War I, as young men became more concerned with the broad political affairs that were entering and effecting their everyday lives, especially in combination with the waves of popular agitation as anger against Weimar republican leaders and rumors of their treasonous deception swept the nation. To be politically-minded and politically active entered the self-conception of the student as a point of duty (Pflicht) as a proud, able member of the people (Volk) and member of the generation that would ‘renew’ (erneuern) Germany. Politics was a way for the new “student-soldier” to contribute to the nation in a hierarchical, status-bearing manner—an expectation of collegiate life that was quickly eroded in the governmental and economic chaos of the era. As a result, students protested in mass groups in and out of the 32 Paulsen, The German Universities. 250. I generalize to masculine pronouns, as the majority of university attendees were male, though women were also a part of campus politics, especially in the later years of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. 33 13 classroom, formed student inter- and intra-university unions, and advocated for a political education, specifically one that followed and supported the tenets of National Socialism. Through this change in self-conception, German university students, through their own education, crafted themselves in the political image they aspired to embody. The politics of Weimar Germany were in a state of chaos from the outset of the mutiny of sailors, soldiers, and workers in Kiel that was its impetus.34 The November Revolution splintered the military and instigated the formation of left and right-wing paramilitary groups that continued into and beyond the formal declaration of the republic by Philipp Scheidemann on November 9, 1918.35 The Republic was not blessed with peaceful waters. The loss of World War I was not easily accepted by the totallymobilized nation—a nation who lost millions of young men and civilians to the cause, suffered through extensive rationing, and barely endured the harsh “turnip winter” (Steckrübenwinter) of 1916-1917. For many, the loss of the military could only be explained by a failure on the homefront to support the fighting forces by politicians. These “November Criminals,” often construed as the socialist signers of the Versailles Treaty, were maligned throughout Germany.36 According to the popularly believed “stab in the back” myth (Dolchstoßlegende), Germany’s leaders traitorously allowed the nation to surrender; as it was widely held they were not losing the war, this was especially infuriating. The myth was even publicly supported by popular military men, specifically Paul von Hindenburg.37 The Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties also enraged the citizens of Germany, who saw the extensive reparations and formal admission of guilt 34 Weitz, Weimar Germany. 17. Ibid., 19. 36 Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 1800-2000. 223. 37 Ibid. 35 14 as offensively excessive. The stage of national politics was the site of extreme groups on both ends of the spectrum battling for recognition and votes against the more moderate, socialist parties that built the coalition government throughout the Weimar period, from the Communist Party of Germany or KPD (Kommunistische Partei Deutschland) to the rising National Socialist Party or NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei). Politics were at the forefront of classes and demographics of people previously unconcerned with the affairs of the nation. The university was one such area. Traditionally, the German university was disaffiliated with the politics of the country, because of and despite the institutions’ formal association with the government. According to Friedrich Paulsen, professor and philosopher at the University of Berlin at the turn of the twentieth century, the university had a “dual position” as both a state institution and a “free scientific corporation.”38 Conceptually, “the regulations governing the universities and the faculties are passed by the government, usually with the advice of the corporations. In Prussia, the faculty statutes are prescribed by the Ministry of Education. The government also defines the function of the universities and grants their privileges.”39 Public and funded by the central government, the universities were at the mercy of the state for much of their operation. This vulnerability was deemphasized by Paulsen, however, who maintained that the state was kept out of the classroom and research, in order to exercise greater academic freedom; “If a university is primarily a scientific institution, its freedom must be taken for 38 39 Paulsen, The German Universities. 76. Ibid. 15 granted.”40 Paulsen touts the close relationship between students and faculty,41 but denies the political influence of professors; “The scholars cannot and should not engage in politics.”42 This was the case in word only—often professors, many of whom were conservative monarchists who maintained this position through the years of the Republic, voiced their political opinions in lecture.43 Shows of patriotism were few and unwelcome.44 In short—“The universities are and desire to remain non-political corporations.”45 The widespread agitation and participation of university students during the revolutions of 1848 was remembered by the German government for decades to follow, resulting in restraints on student activism and an overall aversion by the administration and the faculty toward political students at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. Even as this attitude was softened by an understanding of the need for civic education (staatsbürgerliche Erziehung), the university preferred to cultivate a spirit of national character and propensity for future political involvement, rather than encourage active participation. Before 1879, the university was deputized as “maintaining order, morality, and honor among students and with interceding against the excesses of academic life preventatively or repressively without unsuitable reduction in academic freedom.”46 An education bill in the Prussian Landstag in 1879 raised the 40 Ibid., 81. The role of “science” is of the highest importance for Paulsen as a neo-Kantian philosopher. There is also a possibility that the edition from which my research was conducted translates “Wissenschaft” as “science” rather than “knowledge,” for his description often contextually refer to empirical research and objectivity, rather than the physical and biological sciences. 41 Ibid., 183. 42 Ibid., 225. 43 Remy, The Heidelberg Myth. 9. 44 Paulsen, The German Universities. 258. 45 Ibid., 250. 46 Konrad H. Jarausch, Students, Society, and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of Illiberalism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982). 336-337. 16 debate over academic freedom. As some stood up for the rights of student participation in campus politics, others expressed an opinion similar to that of the historian Sybel; “As long as I have had any influence on our students…I have always said to them: ‘For the present you are here to learn, to prepare yourself through scholarship for later political activity.”47 Administrations were given the power to punish and dissolve student associations on the basis of academic discipline.48 Late nineteenth century educational policy centered on the maintenance of the “patriotic and moral attitudes” of students.49 The issue of students’ role in political events spread throughout the nation and became a popular topic of university attention. Some, such as Theobald Ziegler, advocated that “practical politics is a task for men and not for youths.”50 Others advised that “the study of politics and political life” should be pursued in order “to acquire a political conviction.”51 This was limited to a distinctly non-partisan conviction; a student “ought not to be sworn to a party.”52 The Union of German Students (Vereine Deutscher Studenten) conflated political action with national duty, “To champion this kind of politics, to be active in politics, especially national ones, in order to learn with the conscious aim of being useful to the fatherland, that is a high and beautiful task for German students, which is truly worthy of the effort of the best!”53 Despite this insistence, however, politically active students at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth were a minority.54 47 Ibid., 337-338. Ibid., 339. 49 Ibid., 340. 50 Ibid., 341. 51 Ibid., 342. 52 Ibid., 342, 343. 53 Ibid., 343. 54 Ibid., 343, 345. 48 17 The turn of the century saw a movement in the university for a “civic education” (staatsbürgerliche Erziehung) that would imbue students with a spirit of national loyalty, without being skewed too heavily toward specifics, contemporary issues, or practical political participation.55 This form of political education was advocated by both Otto von Bismarck and Wilhelm II, but in the beginning focused more acutely on primary and secondary education. The universities, for their part, desired an “intellectual conception of politics.”56 In stark contrast to the later “Neue Wissenschaft” of the Weimar Republic and Third Reich, “most professors shrank back from the radical implication of such learning-through-doing and reasserted the necessity of cognitive skills.”57 There were few courses offered, however, to reflect this desire for instruction in politics, and several, including Marburg theologian Martin Rade, commented on the ignorance and dissociation of the German student from political consciousness prior to World War I. A few liberally-minded professors, including Max Weber and Walter Rathenau, advocated for “political self-education” as a matter of creating a responsible citizenry. However, despite the passionate patriotism of fraternal men, this idea was inert within the, as paraphrased by Konrad Jarausch, “touching lack of political interest and the saddening ignorance” of Germany students.58 The concern for a civically-oriented education that forwent partisan alignment and the lackluster interest of the German student in “political self-education” changed drastically after World War I as the völkisch movement captured the minds and hearts of “Young Germany.” The rising tide of nationalism, as illuminated earlier, was 55 Ibid., 218. Ibid., 220. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., 222, 223. 56 18 strengthened through the experience of war and the November Revolution of 1918. ‘Nationalism’ was not confined to the political border of Germany, however, but rather the greater German people (Volk), a term that had connotations of culture, linguistics, and, for some racist thinkers and politicians of the era, blood. German university students, taken with the grossdeutsch conception of Europe, extended their student union memberships to include all German-speakers (die Sprachgebiete), including those of the Czechoslovakia and Austria.59 As early as 1921, the Bavarian University Newspaper reported in its “Academic News” section, “Eine akademische Bewegung. Die völksiche Bewegung innerhalb der deutschen akademischen Jugend hat in der kurzen Zelt seit dem Kriege eine überraschend große Ausdehnung und in der Gründung die Deutschen Hochschulrings, der fast zwei Drittel der gesamten Deutschen Studentenschaft umfaßt, feste Gestalt gewonnen. Nun ist es dem Hochschulring gelungen, die aus seinem Kreise hervorgegangenen Akademiker und eine große Anzahl seiner Freunde und Gönner zur Vereinigung ‚Förderer des Deutschen Hochschulringes‘ zusammenzuschließen.“60 University students framed their nationalist sentiments into an active belief in the Volksgemeinschaft, and felt it their duty to contribute to and strengthen the Volk. As nationalism took center on the political stage, and nationalist parties proliferated during the Weimar Republic, students placed this sense of duty in political activism. Students, for whom the university was the center of their career goals, academic interests, and daily lives, expressed their political nationalism on campus and wished to have this vision for the future, this Volk-based world outlook (Weltanschauung), taught 59 60 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 62. „Akademische Nachrichten,“ Bayerische Hochschulzeitung, 1921, Münchener DigitalisierungsZentrum, 8. 19 by the faculty and enabled and encouraged by the administration. This desire for political presence was not supported by the traditional, apolitical university, leaving the students to create their own form of political self-education. University administrations’ failure to provide tuition, housing, and work to the struggling students of the Weimar Republic provided a parallel mindset that the students applied to their curricular wants: they would have to undertake it themselves. After the Erlangen Student Day (Erlanger Studententag) in November 1921, a national conference of student groups. The Bavarian University Newspaper published a speech given in Göttingen by the then-leader of the German Student Union, Franz Holzwarth. He begins by outlining the “crisis of mission” (Aufgabenkreis) of the German Student Union as belonging to three areas, the “studentpolitical, university reform, and the economic,” with the student-political in the foreground.61 Holzwarth calls for the creation of an international network of student organizations, a desire which was fundamental to the founding of the Student Union, which was composed in the majority by völkisch conservatives. To the question of university reform, he upholds the idea of a “civic education” (staatsbürgerliche Erziehung); “Wichtig ist auch die staatsbürgerliche Erziehung der Studenten, die sich noch heute allzuoft gerne in negativer Kritik am Staate gefallen. In dieser Arbeit unterstützen private Bestrebungen anderer Verbände, z.B…von Professor Martin Spahn und Mitarbeit des Politischen Kollegs abgehaltene Politische Studentenkurs, die Arbeit studentischer Führer auf diesem Gebiete. [sic]“62 He maintains Martin Spahn and the Political College as the epitome of civic, political education. Spahn, at this time, was a 61 „Zukunftsarbeit der Deutsche Studentenschaft,“ Bayerische Hochschulzeitung, November 21, 1921. “das studentenpolitisch, hochschulreformische und wirtschaftliche Gebiet.“ 62 Ibid. 20 member of the German National People’s Party (DNVP), a national-conservative party that followed völkisch and antisemitic doctrine. His program, the Political College, described as a “Hochschule für nationale Politik,” offered leadership seminars that emphasized inspiration to action, rather than contemplation.63 The “College” was founded in 1920 out of the efforts of the June Club (Juniklub), an intellectual circle founded one year prior in opposition to the left-leaning November Club and focused on educating young conservatives. Dominated by the völkisch-nationalist Arthur Moeller van der Bruck, who believed in the mystical revival of the German nation through a “spiritual racial purity,”64 (original italics) the June Club was central to early radicalnationalist thought. Moeller significantly contributed to the integration of specifically young conservatives into the Political College, as the club and program interacted.65 The June Club persistently called for an end to the multi-party system in favor of a dictatorship founded on the “principles of nationalism, Christianity, corporatism, and leadership.”66 These values were endorsed and spread through the lecture-circuit of the Political College. It is significant, then, that the leader of the general German Student Union is not only applauding the ideology and work of Spahn and the Political College, but also referring to the radical, völkisch, and conservative as a normative part of a civic education. Though the Political College was facing opposition from the democratic, “funktionalistisch,” and cosmopolitan German Academy for Politics (Deutsche 63 Steven D. Korenblat, “A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the Deutsche Hochschule Für Politik, 1920-1933,” Central European History 39, no. 3 (2006): 394–430. 400-401. 64 Gerhard Krebs, “Moeller Van Den Bruck: Inventor of the ‘Third Reich,’” The American Political Science Review 35, no. 6 (1941): 1085–1105, https://doi.org/10.2307/1950548. 1104. 65 Ibid. 66 Roy Pascal, as quoted in Werner E. Braatz, “Two Neo-Conservative Myths in Germany 1919-32: The ‘Third Reich’ and the ‘New State,’” Journal of the History of Ideas 32, no. 4 (1971): 569–84, https://doi.org/10.2307/2708978. 573. 21 Hochschule für Politik or DHfP), it had a profound impact on the political conscious of German students, as it introduced ideas that gained traction among the youth and spread from university to university. By framing Spahn’s völkisch nationalism as a matter of basic civic education, this brand of nationalism loses its fringe status and perception of being a matter of bias—instead the völkisch thought becomes basic political thought. As this form of politics was being preached from intellectuals and professors above, students, on their own level, were publishing and lecturing themselves. Seeing the university’s inability to provide for their economic needs and the states’ supposed spurning of völkisch initiatives, students continued and heightened their commitment to a political self-education. A spiritual nationalism and engagement with the historical and contemporary Volkstum is evident in a 1924 piece out of the Bavarian University Newspaper, entitled “Deutschlands Lage und Erneuerung.” In this article, the author, Otto Fache, states, “Angesichts einer solchen Lage [the territory of the German people] scheint ein Aufstieg unmöglich. Doch ist nichts verloren, solange der deutsche Geist noch lebt! Er ist die unversiegliche Quelle innerer deutscher Erneuerung, deren Hauptträger zu sein, die Elemente nordischer Rasse in unserem Volk berufen sind. Sie haben eine Art eigenes Volkstum zu bilden, das sich umsetzt in einen Staat, in dem die Strebungen dieses Volktums zur Tat werden.“67 Noticeable in this citation is the spiritual or geistlich construction of Germanness. Much of the völkisch students’ publications refer to the German spirit as the source of power and strength (Kraft). As opposed to the external world of chaos, this “bottomless 67 “Deutschlands Lage und Erneurung,” Bayerische Hochschulzeitung, July 19, 1924. 22 source” for German renewal comes from within. The reactionary pride of German youth in this time, partnered with the intoxicating scent of revolution in the air, is embodied as this inner strength. This quote is also emblematic of the popular characterization of the German people as a racial (Rasse) category. The influence of biological racism, from thinkers including Günther,68 is thus integrated into the experience of national feeling. Lastly, Fache collapses the goals of the Volk with the goals of the government. According to him, the German spirit can bring to action the strivings of the people, manifested in völkisch policy and institutions. The good of the people and the wellbeing of the nation are synonymous in this piece; the only true nationalism is one that advocates for a state that reinforces the goals of völkisch nationalism. The “strivings” of the German people are also, then, the renewal of the nation. This represents an attractive argument that appealed to increasing numbers of university students—politically active citizenship for the betterment of society. Despite the wave of political desire rising from the students, the “apolitical,” Humboldtian university was not entirely open to the, rather sudden, growth of political activism. In order to achieve the right to exercise their opinions and attain the völkischnationalist education they desired, Weimar university attendees protested and worked their representative bodies into the administrations themselves. The late 1920’s saw several demonstrations in the name of “academic freedom.” In 1927, for example, the Prussian Minister of Culture, Carl Becker, forbade Prussian university associations from creating formal ties with Austrian groups, groups that were vehemently racist and militaristic. When this measure was met with mass disquiet and riot, Becker, believing in 68 Jennifer Michael Hecht, “Vacher de Lapouge and the Rise of Nazi Science,” Journal of the History of Ideas 61, no. 2 (2000): 285–304, https://doi.org/10.1353/jhi.2000.0018. 23 the power of democracy and legitimate civic education, offered the students the chance to vote. The November vote overwhelmingly struck down Becker’s ordinance, claiming it to be an infringement of students’ rights to academic freedom.69 A photograph in the German State Archive shows another such protest at the University of Berlin in 1929.70 Mass gatherings were one way students pressured their administrations toward their own political goals. By the end of the decade, the concentration of nationalistic students was such that mass displays of distaste were hugely disruptive. This included students stamping their feet, shouting insults and refutations, and walking out of classes taught by professors whose ideology did not match the desires of the students.71 In 1927 as well, Spahn and Alfred Hugenberg found themselves in an increased position of power as the German National Peoples’ Party (DNVP) entered the Reich government, altering the balance of power within the Interior Ministry in their favor. They used this leverage to force the oppositional DHfP into a cooperative settlement, requiring that the DHfP allow Political College lecturers to teach their students and partake in jointly-sponsored, public programs of public education.72 Though the DHfP attempted to limit the influence of the Political College by excluding officials of the program from separately organized political education courses and public service trainings, the völkisch movement had captured the hearts and minds of the students, 69 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 67. Georg Pahl, Eine Gewaltige Studenten-Demonstration Für Das Bekenntnis Zur Akademischen Freiheit Fand Vor Der Universität in Berlin Statt. Blick Auf Die Studenten-Demonstration Vor Der Universität in Berlin., 1929, Photograph, 1929, Bundes Archiv. 71 Sluga, Heidegger’s Crisis. 147. 72 Korenblat, “A School for the Republic?” 405. 70 24 whose power within the university and will to embrace völkisch nationalism can be clearly seen. 25 Chapter 2: Academia in Service of the Nation “One speaks of a revolution in knowledge.”73 Evident in student publications of the Weimar Republic and the early years of Reich is a trend advocating for the practical application of knowledge and education for the betterment of the nation and/or folk community (Volksgemeinschaft). Student authors, student leaders, professors, and Dozenten74 participated in the movement toward a “new knowledge” or “new science” (neue Wissenschaft). The “new science” was applied across all disciplines, whether biology, folk literature, or art. A pragmatic education would be better suited to the depressed situation students were coming of age in. This was not the rhetoric that was used in conceptualizing the “new science,” however. Its description was constructed in romantic and aspirational language, as a matter of philosophic betterment. It contrasted with the Humboldt model of universities that was concerned with the liberal arts and the pursuit of research for the betterment of the scholastic community. This structure was decried scornfully. The new conception of knowledge was adopted by Nazi advocates especially. The “new science,” was therefore not only not-liberal, it was almost always National Socialist. Research, no matter the subject, was thus a political matter, and its pursuit, a matter of duty. The role of the university as a political actor was key among debates between thinkers including Ernst Krieck, Alfred Bäumler, Adolf Rein, Hans Freyer, Karl Jaspers, 73 „Wissenschaftslager,“ Der Deutsche Student, July 1934, 405. “Man spricht von einer Revolution der Wissenschaft.” 74 Dozenten were graduated doctoral students that were non-salaried but allowed to teach at the university. As the term doesn’t translate well into English, I will continue to refer to them in German. 26 and Martin Heidegger.75 Many of these men, especially Bäumler, Krieck, and Heidegger, were closely aligned with student groups, who used their influence to communicate and advocated for their own interests within the university. Ernst Krieck, for example, was writing philosophical treatises on the nature of education even before joining the National Socialist movement, of which he became a leading theorist. In 1920 he published the The Revolution of Science; (Die Revolution der Wissenschaft) two years later came his most prominent work, Philosophy of Education, (Philosophie der Erziehung) in which he advocated for a theory of education centered on different forms of community. In the 1930’s Krieck began to promote politicization of the sciences in his work, “National Political Education.” (Nationalpolitische Erziehung) Throughout the Nazi regime, he published a bimonthly magazine, Volk im Werden, or “A People in Becoming,” that centered on National Socialist education. The culmination of his theory is prominent in a piece that headlines the September issue of Der Deutsche Student, the political journal of the Deutsche Studentenschaft, “Erneuerung der Wissenschaft.”76 Krieck’s piece represents much of the changing attitude of students toward the conception of knowledge and the purpose of a university education. He writes, „Eine neue Gesamtaufgabe des völkischen Lebens führt mit einem neuen Lebensgefühl und einer entsprechenden Weltanschauung auch erst Sicht und Möglichkeit einer neuen Wissenschaft herauf.“77 Here, he connects the spiritual condition and support of the German people (Volk) with a new way of understanding scholarship. The search for a new world outlook or worldview (Weltanschauung/Weltbild) is consistent with the search for a new construction of 75 Remy, The Heidelberg Myth. 31. “Erneuerung der Wissenschaft,” Der Deutsche Student, September 1934, 501-504. 77 Ibid. 76 27 knowledge, one that is „völkisch-politisch” and reflects “life’s reality.”78 The focus on reality and lived experience is crucial to Krieck and followers of this theory. The new science: „Wissenschaft ist in das Geschehen einverflochten, ist selbst ein Teil des Geschehens.”79 This line demonstrates a persistent characteristic of the proposed “new science,” an emphasis on subjective experience rather than “objective” knowledge. There’s an element of self-transcendence in Krieck’s conception; he emphasizes the role of instinct80 and evokes popular conceptions of the youth as revolutionaries in action and in the making; “Spürt man nicht heute schon in gewissen Schichten der akademischen Jugend die Reaktion auch auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaft?”81 He defines the foundational problem of knowledge mainly, „…es geht um eine neue, uns nötige Art der Fragestellung und Antwortfindung, es geht um Sinn und Wirklichkeitszusammenhänge in der Lebensganzheit—es geht um ein neues Weltbild, an dem die Wissenschaftszweige allesamt mitzuarbeiten haben….sondern um Prinzip und Gesamtheit der Wissenschaft überhaupt.”82 Krieck’s theory lacks a basis in reality, by design. It is knowledge that must be felt to be understood, and therefore undermines previous, liberal arts commitments to empiricism. The revolutionary fervor, the nationalistic excitement, that was exploited in the rise of National Socialism is the basis for this theory of knowledge acquisition. In relying on spirited feeling, Krieck was able to craft an education concept for an antiintellectual movement. 78 Ibid. „Lebenswirklichkeit“ Ibid., 502. 80 Ibid., 503. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid., 503-504. 79 28 Krieck, while an influential theorist of National Socialist doctrine, was not alone in conceiving of scholasticism in this manner. Often periodicals aimed at a student-based readership and were comprised of essays and reports by professors, Dozenten, and students. Many pieces described “liberal objectivity” (Objektivität) as an outmoded construct of the old era of the university. In a piece titled “Hochschule, Student, und Lehrdienst” that appeared in Der Deutsche Student, the author, a student named Hellmut Haubold, traces the origins of the then-contemporary model of university to the Enlightenment and the treatment of the natural sciences as a product of Fichte, Humboldt, and Hegel.83 He writes that their efforts to bring together a concept of state, nation, and knowledge was honest, but misguided; „Fichte’s Vorschlag einer deutschen Nationalerziehung blieb ein utopischer Plan.”84 This conception of the university was appropriate so long as Germany remained under “bourgeois leadership,”85 but was no longer applicable, as the German nation had been “reconstructed” by the working class, who had defended their (rightful) place in the life of the people and fought to assert themselves.86 Education was so closely associated with class, the new and old bourgeoisie many of the student themselves originated in, that it must be reconstituted in the context of the movement that championed the worker as the everyday hero of the German nation. In the political and economic chaos of the Weimar Republic, a government constituted by propertied, educated, and liberal statesmen, the type of knowledge that could not relieve the students’ plight was suspect. All things bourgeois, or bürgerlich, were suspect; the Republic itself was a “utopian plan.” Another piece titled 83 “Hochschule, Student, und Lehrdienst,” Der Deutsche Student, August 1934, 445-446. Ibid., 446. 85 “bürgerlicher Führung” 86 Ibid. 84 29 “Kämpfende Wissenschaft” states, „‘Objektive‘ der liberalen Wissenschaftsauffassung versinkt und vergeht, wie alles Blutleerse und Unkämpferishe zum Untergang verurteilt ist.”87 The author continues, „Alle Versuche, autonome Bezirke der Wissenschaft abzustecken, und unter der Fiktion einer “voraussetzungslosen” Wissenschaft ihre und ihrer Träger Isolierung vom politischen Kampf des Volkes vorzunehmen…”88 The very idea of an empirical, objective form of science is rejected as a contemptuous concept. The derisive tone of this statement indicates that empirical standards had been undermined within at least the context of the university. It also indicates a negative strength in the insults of “bloodless” and “unaggressive;” the ideal form of knowledge would be the opposite: violent and militant. An “isolation from the political struggle of the people” is portrayed as obviously deleterious—an indication of the rising importance of politics in the lives of students. The very definition of an objective stance, being removed from political prejudice, is also its own downfall. Objectivity of scholarship, a form of disinterestedness, an attempt at the limitation of bias, is portrayed not only as impossible, but undesirable. If not objectivity, then what was the foundation of the “new science?” Subjective experience is heralded as the source of the new form of knowledge meant to overtake and “renew” the university. “Am Anfang war die Tat!” Nicht aus Grübeleien und Theorien, sondern durch die Tat, die sich mit der unbegreiflichen Notwendigkeit eines Naturgesetzes vollzog, wurde das werdende Reich Wirklichkeit.”89 This loaded statement begins a piece titled “Wissenschaftslager”90 by student G. Helmut Schwabe from a 1933 87 „Kämpfende Wissenschaft,“ Der Deutsche Student, January 1935, 27. Ibid. 89 „Wissenschaftslager“ Der Deutsche Student, 400. 90 Ibid. 88 30 issue of Der Deutsche Student. The author connects the importance of action at the expense of cognition to a perception of the German destiny (Schicksal) that resulted in the Third Reich with the unyielding, if not also romantic, strength of nature. Not only is the Nazi regime predestined and righteous, it is natural, and could only come about by the raw strength of action, rather than removed, passive study. This belief in the wisdom of deed before thought is carried through to the students’ conception of the “new science.” Schwabe, continuing, degrades his experience as a biology student. Where he first learned to love both nature and learning through the experience of nature, he was disappointed by his studies at university where he found only, “remoteness and superficiality.”91 (Ferne und Oberfläche) „Dort, wo ich das Lebendigste zu finden hoffte, war nur totes und verstaubtes Stückwerk. Ich wollte erfassen und lernte zergliedern.”92 Objectivity is dramatically painted as removed from life, and therefore, from a deeper, truer sense of reality. The true heart of knowledge, for Schwabe and other students of the Third Reich, lies in experience. „Anfang und Quelle aller Wissenschaft muß also das Erlebnis sein. Die Wissenschaft von gestern hat versucht, um einer sogenannten Objektivität willen, den Wissensstoff vom Erlebnis zu abstrahieren. Damit entfernte sie sich von der Quelle und verlor um einer scheinbaren Objektivität willen die lebendige innere Kraft.”93 Schwabe spends the majority of his piece on the discussion of this inadequacy in academia in order to further the importance of his title subject: knowledge camps that are run like a military training site. The nationalistic propensity towards militarism is thus 91 Ibid., 403. Ibid. 93 Ibid., 404. 92 31 connected with new conception of knowledge that relies on bold action. Other pieces rely on struggle (Kampf) to locate the source of the new science. ‚In den Zusammenhängen von Tat und Leben, Staat und Volk, wird auch die Wissenschaft ihren Raum gewinnen, aber nicht durch eine betrachtende Erkenntnis, sondern durch Wagnis und Kampf!”94 This method of education offered a door to the common person: if it is not empirical knowledge that must be attained through exhaustive, and expensive, study, and the basis of knowledge comes from an inner source of instinct and daring, then there is the potential for the worker, too, to have a claim to understand National Socialism—if only he knew where to look. The lack of lived experience crucial to a true education is portrayed as a theoretical reason for real-world reforms. One such reform advocated for in an article in Der Deutsche Student is the promotion of a “teaching service” (Lehrdienst) for those aspiring to become lecturers after receiving their degree. In his piece, Hellmut Haubold writes, „Der Studienplan der deutschen Universität sieht Wissensaufnahme ohne Erfarhungsunterbau vor. Er födert ein abstrakt-theoretisches Denken, ohne daß die nötige Erlebnisbasis beim Studenten vorhanden ist.”95 This is justification for greater opportunities for students, doctoral or not, to gain on-the-job experience, but the call itself betrays the rhetoric. Students struggling to subsist during their studies were also facing extraordinarily high unemployment rates in Weimar Germany, and the students that had best chance at achieving the dream of white-collar employment were those that could apply their subject areas immediately to available positions.96 Haubold advocates 94 „Kämpfende Wissenschaft,“ Der Deutsche Student, 29. „Hochschule, Student, und Lehrdienst,“ Der Deutsche Student, 448. 96 Michael H. Kater, “The Work Student: A Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Early Weimar Germany,” Journal of Contemporary History 10, no. 1 (January 1975): 71–94. 95 32 for occupational experience (Berufserlebnis) to be built into the university course for potential lecturers as a matter of producing better educators, and therefore a better education, but also to correct the injustice of classist hierarchies. He states that the old structure of the university coursework is lacking due to the fact that the lengthy theoretical and practical training course is performed after the time of study, this “…läßt eine organische Verbindung vermissen.”97 Instead, he alludes that this missed connection is because ‘…beginnt der praktische Dienst nicht mit einer Lehrlingszeit.”98 In such a period, the teacher may become less like the presently “isolated” academics and more a combination of leader and comrade.99 Wolfgang Erxleben demonstrates another plea for aspiring educators in “Student und Lehrerberuf.”100 He calls for occupational training for aspiring educators. The teachers-to-be of his piece, however, are for children and adolescents. “Daraus ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit für den Studenten, auch auf schulischem Gebiet schon während seiner Studienzeit ein lebendiges erzieherisches Können in sich zu entwickeln.”101 He pushes into wider, primary school policy, saying that such an offer is the duty (Pflicht) of the school itself, as well.102 This proposal offers not only “practical, educational” opportunities that would better the future legion of German teachers, but would offer students a chance at employment, with the added enticement that a student from the city would visit a rural school, go from house to house in his time and, upon the completion 97 “Hochschule, Student, und Lehrdienst,” Der Deutsche Student, 448. Ibid. 99 Ibid., 449. 100 “Student und Lehrerberuf” July 1934. 101 „Student und Lehrerberuf,“ Der Deutsche Student, 397. 102 Ibid. 98 33 of his studies, return.103 Another bonus of such a proposal? The opportunity to earn money. „Denn der Student soll durch seine Arbeit ja lernen; und da wird er auf die Möglichkeit, evtl. durch seine Arbeit Geld zu verdienen. (original emphasis)”104 This “practical-pedagogical”105 proposition demonstrates the socio-economic foundations for criticism of objective, humanistic education. When technical students began to surpass university students in employability,106 the latter needed the skills and “lived experience” to compete. In response to the academic crisis in the university, students sought to move away from what they deemed to be antiquated liberal tradition in favor of a romantic, experience-based, subjective definition of knowledge. Academia was to do practical work for the national cause, as well as provide a more employable education in the face of great economic instability. 103 Ibid., 398.“Vielleicht läßt es sich, wenn die Geldmittel knapp sind, durch Austausch von Haus zu Haus ermöglichen, daß gerade der Student, der aus der Stadt kommt, einmal in die Landschule geht und umgekehrt.“ 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid., 400. “praktisch-pädagogischer” 106 In 1923, 4.2 percent of students held sought-after teaching positions, while only .9 percent of technical students did so. In positions such as industrial bureaucracy, professions that persisted well throughout the turbulence of the Weimar government, however, technical students were preferred at 3.1 percent employment to 1.3 percent of university students. 34 Chapter 3: The Work-Student In addition to political and cultural flux, one of the main instabilities of the Weimar Republic was the economy. Periods of inflation, rationalization, and depression wreaked havoc on the lives of German students. Michael H. Kater explains the students’ position as generally middle-class and yet-to-be educated positioned them in unstable and miserable conditions; this yielded a crisis for the students in a fight for their very existence.107 Facing financial difficulties in their daily life, students also faced a loss of status with the rest of the educated middle-class (Bildungsbürgertum). In part a symptom of these economic difficulties but ensconced in the rhetoric of a philosophic shift, students and intellectuals argued for a “new knowledge” or “new science” (neue Wissenschaft) that opposed the liberal arts and “hyper-specialization” of disciplines. This resulted in a push to make academic study more practically applicable to the day-to-day reality of Germany. Economic pragmatism combined with nationalistic idealism to yield student activism. In other words, students themselves aimed to place scholastics in service of the nation. That they advocated for such a shift is indicative of a new selfconception of youthful, male108 Weimar students as political actors. This stood in opposition to past notions of the non-political student body within the non-political university. Increasingly through the period of the Republic and into the early years of the Third Reich, a sense of political duty is promulgated in the publications of student 107 Michael H. Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland, 11. Female university students were also engaged in political activism and had specific organization later within the Nazi Party, however their numbers in admission were low and the nationalistic rhetorical focus of “the political student” were primarily young men. 108 35 groups, especially that of National Socialist organizations. Thus, the nationalistic “workstudent” (Werkstudent) created a new self-understanding as a political student-soldier. Though inflation of the Deutschemark occurred throughout the First World War; it peaked at a catastrophic level in 1924. Originally the product of the government borrowing to finance the war, Germany’s economy was not able to rebound after emerging from battle less than victorious.109 Though the nation was able to transition from total-war mobilization to peacetime industrial operations, the influx of ex-soldiers from the front into the labor force and constant demands for higher wages by workers were mitigated only with a depreciated Mark. Industries, in order to provide such wages, increased prices in kind. As the Allies demanded 132 billion goldmarks in reparations, which was portrayed as an exorbitant sum in German media, the German government floundered against adamant opposition to tax increases and a severe dearth of investment.110 Business stagnated, unemployment climbed, and living costs multiplied dramatically, the index for which places 1918 at 100, and 1922 at 15,040.111 In order to enforce their reparations claim, France and Belgium entered and occupied the vital coalmining region of the Ruhr valley in January of 1923, grinding production to a halt. This sent shockwaves throughout the economy, as much of it was interconnected with the output of the Ruhr. To support the passive resistance to the French, Germany printed more and more currency to cover welfare and credit programs, feeding into an everincreasing dynamic of wages and prices.112 From 1922 to 1923 alone, the internal price of 109 Weitz, Weimar Germany, 131. Ibid., 134. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid., 135. 110 36 the mark rose by 75,000,000,000%.113 The results of the hyperinflation on the population were drastic. Strikes, looting, and agitation proliferated across the country. The savings and assets of the middle-class were wiped away and white-collar income, especially of those employed in the civil service, sunk to the level or below the level of an unskilled worker.114 Average real wages were reduced to 70 percent of what they were before 1914.115 Citizens who had loyally supported the war, in spirit and in war bonds, lost faith in the government. Popular right-wing propaganda blamed the Weimar government. According to this view, as Martin Kitchen put it, “[the republicans] had first stabbed the country in the back, and then robbed the little man of his savings.”116 The appointment of Gustav Stresemann to the chancellorship by president Friedrich Ebert was the first in a series of moves to build a coalition government between Streseman’s party, the German People’s Party, and the Social Democrats and to re-orient the German economy. With the assistance of a critically debated Article 48 that granted generous powers to declare a state of emergency, the government established the Rentenmark as the new currency, which halted the rapid inflation.117 It also decreased the wages of the civil service and cut welfare subsidies to the poor and unemployed, allowing many of the social issues it had won in the workers’ favor to shift to the hands of industry. The Dawes Plan of 1924 relieved the immediate burden of reparations by offering a lengthened schedule for payments; France and Belgium, in conjunction, withdrew from the Ruhr. The period between 1924 and 1929, as a result, was a greater 113 Widdig, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany. Maier table, 15. Weitz, Weimar Germany. 138. 115 Martin Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 234. 116 Ibid. 117 Weitz, Weimar Germany. 142. 114 37 period of stabilization for Germany. Working class protections, however, were annihilated as a result of the stabilization efforts, expanding the ire of the German people against the government. “Rationalization,” the process by which scientific precision and method were applied to industry in order to increase output, defined the day. As industry became increasingly mechanized, workers were reorganized, limited, and exploited in the workplace. Weitz notes that the labor force of the mining industry decreased 33 percent from 1922 to 1928, despite an increase in production.118 This gave further reason to question the socialist motives and rhetoric of the Republic and democracy in general. Despite these measures, the employments of the “new middle-class” (neue Mittelstand) were one of the greatest opportunities for social advancement.119 Distinct from the “old middle-class,” (alte Mittelstand) who were independently-employed shopkeepers and proprietors, the “new middle-class” were often clerks and administrative bureaucrats.120 They were subject to the wiles of fiscal policy, as they took their bread from the hand of the government. It was within these ranks of educated, attainable, and hierarchical positions that, despite being wage-laborers, middle-class workers distinguished themselves as “workers of the mind” and not “of the fist.”121 The educated class, the Bildungsbürgertum, were especially disaffected as the economy became increasingly specialized and the broadly educated were placed at a disadvantage.122 118 Ibid. 152. Ibid. 156. 120 Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983). 3-4. 121 Kater, “The Work Student: A Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Early Weimar Germany.” 80. 122 Kitchen, A History of Modern Germany, 1800-2000. 243. 119 38 The stock market crash of 1929 caused ripples the world round, and Germany was no exception. In fact, the depression hit German labor harder than American.123 An astronomical 40 percent of the workforce in Germany was unemployed in the early ‘30’s as a result.124 Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, a Centrist appointed by President Hindenburg in early 1930, adopted deflationary policies—cutting government spending, business labor costs, and dropping prices. Other, more Keynesian, proposals were denied as leaders feared a reprisal of the hyperinflation disaster of 1923.125 The Social Democrats meekly accepted the need for such policies, despite their detrimental effects on the living standard of the average German, as Brüning continually invoked Article 48 to achieve his political desires. Facing yet another crisis in just over a decade, the German people were plagued by destitution and desperation. The republic continued to fail the average citizen, whether bourgeois or working-class. The impacts of these fluctuations in the economy meant worsening conditions for university students. According to Kater, such conditions posed a threat to the existence of the expected lifestyle of the student. Traditionally, the university attendee was a young man of elite or upper middle-class background. This started to shift at the beginning of the twentieth century, as the rising “new middle-class” found new wealth and social mobility in educating their sons (and occasionally, daughters.) During the summer and winter semesters of 1911/1912, 31.3 percent of Prussian126 students’ fathers belonged to professions of the “new middle-class,” while 48.5 percent were members of the “old 123 Weitz, Weimar Germany. 161. Ibid. 125 Ibid., 162-163. 126 As noted by Steinberg, admission standards were consistent throughout Germany, and so social distribution varied little from place to place. 27. 124 39 middle-class” (15.7 percent) or elite (32.8 percent).127 By 1924/1925, the social distribution had shifted to 37.82 percent “new middle-class,” 21.9 percent “old middleclass,” and 30.37 percent elite. This trend accelerated through the “golden years” of the Republic and the depression of the early 1930’s; Prussian students were 47.1 percent “new middle-class,” 19.00 percent “old middle-class,” and only 26.31 percent elite in the semesters of 1931/1932.128 These backgrounds were little reflected in the living standards of the students, however. During the tenure of the republic, a fifth to half of students were not making the minimum income for subsistence (Existenzminimum).129 In 1921, for example, the average sum for adequate means of living in Munich was approximately 600 Marks a month, while the average student income was only 520 Marks. At the University of Munich, 61 percent of students were below this minimum standard.130 Workers, by comparison, were earning between 665.60 and 896.00 Marks,131 a humiliating fact for the socially-conscious students. A hardworking student in Berlin, in 1930, would still have to allot 42.6% of his income to diet alone.132 By 1932, around a third of students were unable to finance their university lives on their own; many looked to employment during breaks, family, and fraternities to make up the deficit. Students increasingly sought employment as a way to cover their tuition and living expenses. This created a new breed: the “work-student” (Werkstudent). In the summer of 1920, only 9 percent of students fell under this designation—one year later 127 Michael Stephen Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts, 26. Ibid. 129 Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918-1933. 44. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid., 45. 128 40 that number rocketed to 32.5 percent.133 Young men took advantage of their holiday months to find employment that could sustain them during their weeks of study. The summer semester of 1923 saw 24.2 percent of students working; during the fall break from August to October of the same year, however, 49.8 percent of universities students and 65.0 percent of engineering students at technical schools (Technische Hochschulen) were in the labor force.134 Students of non-elite background were more inclined to require employment and were often in lower-class fraternities that did not have the means to offer the extensive support the wealthy and exclusive Corps could.135 The movement began as the work of enterprising necessity by individuals, but eventually universitybased placement services appeared as the “work-student” became a cultural phenomenon on campuses across Germany.136 Such services were established with connection to the national student self-aid agency (Wirtschaftshilfe der Deutschen Studentenschaft) in 1921. This strengthened the authority and connections of student governments within the campus and to industries that sought to advertise labor opportunities to the university populations.137 Though high percentages of students were engaged in work outside of scholastics, and many struggled to makes ends meet, they still felt themselves to be distinct from the working classes. Succinctly put by Michael Steinberg, “Class in Germany was often more a question of psychological position than income…In this regard, it should be stressed that prewar conceptions of status tended to prevail in spite of economic upheaval.”138 133 Kater, “The Work Student: A Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Early Weimar Germany.” 72. Ibid., 73 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid., 75. 137 Ibid. 138 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 24. 134 41 Though they were “work-students” they were still students, which came with the reputation of the indulgent “student-prince” as well as the understanding of potential upward movement in society. The public relations work of the student self-aid organizations attempted to combat the indulgent, privileged image of the students, and students themselves often attempted to “outwork the worker” to break such associations. In their own self-conception, though, the student was superior to the uneducated, unskilled laborer.139 They were reduced to such work as a matter of practicality, not out of a displacement in class. Housing with meager means was a persistent issue for the students, one they were largely left to solve on their own. Attendance to universities rose markedly after the end of the First World War. The student population before the war in 1911/1912 was 81,500, in 1919/1920, it had risen to 120,300—an almost 50% increase. Attendance continued to climb, three years later, before the height of hyperinflation took its stranglehold in 1923, the total number of German students reached 130,700.140 Though the number of students declined from 1923 to 1926, they never dropped to pre-war levels and rebounded into the years of the depression. Universities were not equipped to offer housing to this number of students. Rent was another significant portion of the monthly income; for an occupant of Dresden in 1923 the minimum rent took up over 15 percent of the existence minimum. In 1929 in Leipzig, the proportion was as high as 25 percent. 141 The fiscal policies of Stresemann in 1924, though stabilizing, allowed for renters to take advantage of the students’ poor situation. Rationalization benefits largely excluded students who were 139 Kater, “The Work Student: A Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Early Weimar Germany.” 81-82. Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 34. 141 Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918-1933. 47. 140 42 unable to work double shifts during the school year and lacked a professional skillset.142 Since university-provided housing was rare and, as students did not, in general, live with family during their years of study,143 they were forced to find housing elsewhere, often in places of squalor—to find students sleeping in sheds, bus waiting rooms, and even the open air was not uncommon.144 Student welfare was an issue taken up by the students themselves; they formed organizations for student aid and demanded relief via proposal measures and protests. Government and university aid remained insufficient for their basic needs.145 A warning issued by the student body of the University of Leipzig in December of 1923 reports, “a freakish climbing of rent rates against [the students], that have a downright unpleasant effect on the economically weak fellow students.”146 The announcement is significant in its origin and self-assertion. The university had little physical infrastructure or funds allocated to offer affordable housing, and so did not act on the issue. Knowing this, the students declared the crisis themselves. In doing so, the students acknowledged that they were forced to advocate for themselves under the intense economic strain of the times. This was a message intended for the greater student body, indicating that the proportion of the “economically weak” effected by the exorbitant rent prices was not a marginal fraction. Students had to advocate for themselves as a matter of survival, building organizational infrastructure in the process. In having to promote their needs in the 142 Kater, “The Work Student: A Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Early Weimar Germany.” 88. Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918-1933. 45. 144 Ibid. 47. 145 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 35. 146 Kater, Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918-1933. 46. „einer ungeheuren Steigerung der Mietpreise entgegen, die recht unangenehme Auswirkungen auf die wirtschaftlich schwachen Kommilitonen haben.“ 143 43 context of society’s financial pressures, students engaged in social activism. With a loss of faith in the floundering government, this activism was not far from political concerns. The economic plight of university attendees was fundamental in the development of their identity as political actors. 44 Chapter 4: Nationalistic Militarism, or the “Soldier” in the “Political Student-Soldier” One of the most compelling scenes of the National Socialist regime are the ranks of hundreds of young men in stark uniformed dress, the image of nationalistic fanaticism. Notable for their lack of individualism, their militance, and the sheer excitement of the moment, German youth eagerly participated in the showing of nationalistic fervor during the 1920’s and early 1930’s—university students were no exception. Renewed nationalism after World War I provided rhetorical and motivational basis as the students’ perception of self shifted to that of the “political student-soldier.” Demonstrated by Peter Fritszche in Germans into Nazis, the nationalism of the interwar period mobilized by National Socialism was filled with reference to 1914—the beginning of the first World War and militaristic pride. This is one reason why, as students were increasingly taken with the nationalist cause, their activities and expressions became increasingly bellicose. Continued evocations of the fallen, sacrificed young male soldier from the Great War were a popular representation in student publications; they who came of age reading the glorious war stories of Ernst Jünger, published letters from the front, and the battle tales told by the community. The ideal young man became the masculine, ascetic, and brave infantryman, and students strived to reconcile their self-concepts with this image. The loss of World War I devastated the German public. The people had heavily invested in the war, buying war bonds, suffering through ever-tightening rations and harsh industrial munitions productions, and grieving the deaths and grave wounding of 45 millions of young soldiers. Two million German men were killed in the conflict, and 4.2 million were wounded.147 Not only had Germany lost the war, it was humiliated. The Allies demanded rapid and immediate demobilization of the German army148—this in addition to years of deprivation for a war, whose loss was a surprise to the German public, bred discontent throughout the military and society at large. Germany at the time of the armistice was ablaze with revolutionary and, generally, political fervor. Rioting groups ruled the streets in the tumult. The situation was worsened with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles—loss of indisputably German territory and all colonies, drastic reduction of the military, an unspecified amount of reparations, and formal blame for the instigation of the war in what came to be known as the “war guilt clause.”149 Reaction to such terms was vehement and negative, by common folk and government officials alike. Ultimately, Germany was given little choice, and agreed to the terms despite formal and informal protestations. Across the country people reviled the “November Criminals” and increasingly believed the “stab-in-the-back myth,” propagated by right-wing opponents to the treaty and supported by Paul von Hindenburg himself. In the eyes of the public, the war had not been lost by military failure, rather the sabotage of government leaders. At the announcement by Phillip Scheidemann on February 6th, 1919, the Weimar Republic was declared, and a democratic constitution laid out. This “triumph” for democracy was short-lived, however—from the outset, the Republic was plagued by riotous political groups on the right and left. Many of these groups took on a nationalist outlook, especially those on the right. The “nation” was not the mere political boundaries 147 Weitz, Weimar Germany. 8. Ibid., 22. 149 Ibid., 35. 148 46 of Germany, it was the community of the German people. (Volk) Though the idea of the Volk can be dated back to Gottlieb Fichte’s Address to the German Nation, it took on a new definition in the theories of Hans Günther at the beginning of the twentieth century.150 Günther’s pseudo-racial theories of Germanic/Aryan people inspired other theories of Volk and nation, many of which justified the inclusion of Austrians and other German-speaking peoples as rightful members of the German community. (Volksgemeinschaft) For many nationalist groups, the Volk became a rallying cry for international unity and cooperation between Germanic people and, eventually, the political impetus for Anschluss with Austria. Though many of the conditions that outraged German citizens were ameliorated by the Locarno treaties negotiated by Gustav Stresemann in 1925, reactions to the news varied across the country. As chancellor, Stresemann was a strong proponent of the policy of “fulfillment,” which sought cooperation with France and Great Britain to rework the terms of Versailles. Stresemann’s work in Locarno officially recognized the Western borders of Germany established by the Treaty of Versailles and promised only not to change the eastern boundaries by force.151 France promised to withdraw remaining troops out of the Cologne area and Germany was granted a permanent seat on the council of the League of Nations, which it had been barred from joining at the end of the war.152 For these compromises, Stresemann and Aristide Briand, the French foreign minister, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926, such was the eagerness for justice and nonaggression between France and Germany. This “spirit of Locarno,” as noted by Eric D. 150 Hecht, “Vacher de Lapouge and the Rise of Nazi Science.” Weitz, Weimar Germany. 109. 152 Ibid. 151 47 Weitz, inspired other political moves for Germany through the end of the 1920’s, including such anti-militarist measures as the commitment to diplomatic solutions to international conflict proposed by the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 and the approval of the Geneva Convention terms by the Reichstag in 1929.153 Despite these successes on the world stage, and the approval of the Nobel committee, the response to the Locarno Pact was met with polite applause from the left and vehement hatred from the right. Acquiescence, negotiation, and peace agitated the militaristic, nationalistic Right; Stresemann was reviled in their papers, posters, and other media as a puppet to foreign powers.154 The political furor after the ultimate loss and end of World War I has prompted many historians to locate the origins of modern German nationalism in 1918 and 1919. Peter Fritzsche, in German into Nazis, has notably argued that the origins of twentieth century German nationalism originated, rather, in 1914, with the binding of society to the war effort and the imagined German nation. World War I reorganized the national consciousness and unified the people. Germans began to identify themselves with Germany, rather than obligingly fulfill a role foist upon them by compulsion from imperial command. Mobilizing labor, donations, and popular imagination toward the war effort created a renewed idea of common community in Germany. It widened and popularized German identity into the working classes.155 The prevalence of national feeling in media such as newspapers increased with the invocation of the war. Published war stories, letters from the front, and even the purchasing of “consumer kitsch” related 153 Ibid. Ibid., 111. 155 Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis. 57. 154 48 to the war effort combined to create this effect.156 Even in the absence of prosperity, as in the strife-ridden “turnip” winter of 1916-1917, Fritzsche argues that a new sense of national community was created in the common struggle for survival. (Durchhalten) The Germans were a collective people in their efforts to support beleaguered soldiers on the battlefield as well as make do with severe rationing; “What the spirit of Durchhalten did was to magnify the efforts of the German people: the endurance of ordinary soldiers, the resolve of volunteers at home, and the spartan virtues of leaders like Hindenburg.”157 The energy promulgated by the nation’s battle cries was electric; later nationalist student groups utilized memory of this spirit to further their cause. One of the most salient references popularly mobilized by students of the Republic and the Third Reich was the myth of the Battle of Langemarck. First constructed by the German press in late 1914, reports on the battle detailed hordes of patriotically motivated youth, many students, charging arm-in-arm into lines of oncoming British.158 They fell to their deaths as sacrificial lambs while singing the Song of Germany (Deutschlandlied or “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles!”). The image was one of youthful spirit, complete devotion to the nation, and coming-of-age masculinity. In reality, however, only 18 percent of those in the brigade were youth educated at a secondary school level or above and teachers.159 Most of the casualties of Langemarck were actually older men and reserves forces. Thousands of the volunteer soldiers were, however, members of the German Youth Movement, which saw young people forming groups based around 156 Ibid., 50. Ibid., 75. 158 George Lachmann Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, 1. publ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 70. 159 Ibid., 71. 157 49 romantic ideals and nature-based activities. The participation of youth movement members was exaggerated and extended to connect their sacrifice to the nationalist imaginings of the future, painted, instead, as noble academic victims.160 Though false, German reporting on the battle created a national myth of the heroic students’ death on the battlefield that persisted through the First World War and into the next. Weimar students glorified the dead of the Battle of Langemarck as their predecessors;161 the myth offered what Nazi students judged to be an accurate mirror of themselves. The legend of the youthful dead was not exhausted by the 1930’s. The 19331934 collection of articles from the German Corps-Newspaper (Deutsche Corpszeitung), a periodical oriented toward fraternity students, features a piece titled “Der Jugend Inhalt und Sieg,“162 which includes, „Der Geist der Jugend ist ewig der gleiche, von Langemark über Horst Wessel bis zu uns; er ist die Verpflichtung, das Alte zu ehren, drum flattern wieder Schwarz und Weiß und Rot. Und er gibt uns den Willen zum Leben, und deshalb die Hakenkreuzfahne hoch!...In der Gegenwart leben heißt: für die ewige Jugend des Volkes zu kämpfen, damit wir im Alter an die uns folgende Jugend das Erbe der Väter weitergeben.“163 In this view, nationalistic militarism was a matter of historical necessity, in order to retain the rightful control over the fatherland; the students of Langemarck fought for the same reasons Nazi students did. The Langemarck students’ mythic sacrifice for Germany reframes nationalism from obligatory patriotism for the crown to a duty for the German people. These predecessors offer will (Willen) and duty 160 Ibid., 72. Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 108-109. 162 “Der Jugend Inhalt und Sieg,“ Deutsche Corpszeitung, April 1933-March 1934, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen, 8. 163 Ibid. 161 50 (Verpflichtung), giving the new generation power and charging them with the need to use it, thus giving an inspirational and historical weight to their cause. A song from the same publication, “Der Tag hat uns zum Kampf gestellt,”164 is subtitled, „Lied der deutschen Studenten in dieser Zeit“165 and features lyrics that urge the young men to battle. “Wir rüsten uns zu harter Wehr/ in Zucht und Treue, Pflicht und Ehr‘/ und fürchten keine Narben./ Im Wollen und im Opfern stark/ den Brüdern gleich von Langemark [sic],/ die vor und für uns starben.“166 Here, too, the content likens the intended audience to the sacrificial young men at Langemarck, especially noting their will (Wollen) and victimhood (Opfern). That such a message is communicated through a song, a frequent tool of spirited propaganda in this period, is notable—especially with the importance of song to the legend of Langemarck. Noted in the publication, too, the text and music of the composition was first published on the 7th of January 1933 in the “Stralsunder Tageblatt.” To be published in a local daily newspaper, firstly, indicates a generous acceptance of such content by the Stralsund community, as it would have appealed to the reading citizenship where it circulated. This would have been traditionally upper and bourgeois classes—from which most students originated. The song was republished in a publication intended for German fraternity men—a sign and appeal of the publishers that the song would be understood and received by their readership. University students utilized the powerful imagery and legacy of the Battle of Langemarck in communal festivities, imbued with nationalistic fervor and a spirit of 164 “Der Tag hat uns zum Kampf gestellt,“ Deutsche Corpszeitung, April 1933-March 1934, 9. Ibid. 166 Ibid. 165 51 tragic heroism. Such celebrations are evident in both Bavarian student newspapers, whose readership was aimed more at students broadly, and The German Student (Der Deutsche Student), which was written in line with National Socialist ideology. The November 8, 1928 issue of the Bavarian University Newspaper contains an advertisement on the first page for a “Langemarck-Gedenkfeier,” inviting “your Highnesses” (“Euer Hochwohlgeboren”) to the commemoration. It includes a list of speakers who will address attendants, including the rector of the University of Munich (Dr. Bumke), a lawyer (Dr. E. J. Jung), and the chairman of the Deutsche Studentenschaft (cand. jur. W. Schmadel). The range of orators in the advertisement speaks to the range and eminence of the allusion to Langemarck—such participation marks a demonstrated acceptance and endorsement of the comparison and honor of the students and the fallen of the First World War. The Ministry of Culture warned rectors and senators to avoid political expression in participating in such festivals, but they appeared and often participated enthusiastically.167 The inclusion of the student leadership chairman is significant, as well, as it places the organization in direct alignment, as well as denotes a level of authority held by the position. The Deutsche Studentschaft was taken seriously enough that a local leader’s lecture is advertisement-worthy. An excerpt from the student body from 1928 follows this link; “the Deutsche Studentenschaft should renew the revolution of self-sacrifice and loyalty of the students of 1914.”168 Here again is the common theme of individual self-sacrifice for the fatherland, loyalty, and revolutionary feeling—the components of a nationalistic memory that the active movement could gesture to for historical authority. 167 168 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 109. Ibid. 52 Other reminders of Langemarck persisted, including the founding of an auxiliary youth group that emphasized military training, ideologically and skillfully named “Stahlhem-Studentenring Langemarck.”169 Banner advertisements in later issues of the Bavarian University Newspaper proclaim that the reader must “Denkt an die Langemarksende der Deutschen Studentenschaft!”170 The reader is implored to remember the fallen young men, as the Deutschen Studentenschaft is painted as the direct heir to their legacy. Nationalistic allusions to World War I did not stop at Langemarck, but rather expressed themselves through republished letters of such students and a reorientation of the student body towards persistent militarism. During the war, it was common for family members to publish their relations’ letters from the frontlines in local newspapers; circulation of such stories informed the homefront of life in battle and provided fodder for nationalistic support of the war effort.171 Compilations and reprisals of these letters continued to be popular reading selections for the Weimar audience. The publication of a selection of over 20,000 student soldiers (Frontstudent) in 1928 prompted an article in the Bavarian University Newspaper, “Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten,” about one such compilation, which exalts these young men as models of the gritty, but heroic “reality” of war. Reading their words would allow a more genuine understanding of war, and the of duty they felt as they dove into losing circumstances, as well as prevent their stories from disappearing.172 Other publications utilized the raw energy of the First World War more directly—publishing a supposed letter from a student himself. The propagandistic nature 169 Ibid., 124. Bayerische Hochschulzeitung, February 9, 1933. 171 Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis. 50. 172 „Kriegsbriefe gefallener Studenten,“ Bayerische Hochschulzeitung, November 2, 1928 170 53 of this specific selection highlights the promise, determination, and precarity of the youth, as the young man glorifies his comrade for the reader, highlighting his educated, near noble relations back home and speaking to the years of productivity that could have been to come. The thinly veiled idolatry and pointed nationalistic messages reads too pat to be authentic. The author of this “letter” is depicted as the ideal role model for student consumption, placed conspicuously in a periodical catering towards nationalistic, militaristic students.173 Students’ experiences living through World War I on the homefront did not dissuade university students from the thrall of militarism. The recollections related to the war as a source of nationalistic fervor focused on the thrill of battle, the collective identity and goals of their duty for the Fatherland, and the nobility of sacrificing oneself for the destiny (Schicksal) of the Volk, ignoring the realities of intense rationing and starvation, the loss of investments through war bonds and hyperinflation, and mass casualties. For university students in the Weimar Republic, a belief in the duty (Pflicht) and honor (Ehre) of militarism became a source of identity. The typical attitude of students before World War I was less motivated by blood-lust and more so the traditionimbued Corps connection to the imperial army. Dated military-inspired uniforms, continuation of the Mensur (or dueling), and formal presence at imperial celebrations were typical demonstrations. The connection was one of tradition, not fervor for the battlefield. This changed as the fallen were glorified after World War I—to be one of the collective sacrifices for the fatherland was celebrated as an honor of the utmost respect. 173 Ibid. 54 Students applied this militaristic mindset increasingly throughout the decade as a solution to political resentment. The political vehemence against the Versailles Treaty and the continued imperialistic thirst for territory was compounded by the impotence of a stunted military force, as Germany was forced to have a limited army corps and to return to pre-war borders. A 1924 article in the Bavarian University Newspaper, “Deutschlands Lage und Erneuerung”174 by student Otto Fache, creates an extremely anti-Weimar government appeal for hope for Germany’s future by applying militaristic rhetoric to a plan for economy and political change. He begins with an indictment of the Versailles Treaty and those that enabled its creation, noting especially the reduction of Germany’s borders from “was unsere Recht war, und dass wir unser unveräuserliches Recht wahren werden.”175 He outlines the “living space of the Germans” as „das Gebiet zwischen Rhein, Maas, Rhone, Po, Donau, Dnepr, Drina nordwärts zum Meer. In ihm hat sich unser geschichtliches und kulturelles Werden vollzogen.“176 After outlining how these borders are historically relevant, he places faith in the ability of the German spirit (Geist) from an inner source (innere Quelle) and the “elements of the Nordic race employed in our people.” It is the people, Fache highlights, that will renew the German society and economy. “Doch nicht Rausch und Begeisterung, sondern zähe Arbeit vermag Abhilfe zu schaffen.”177 “Cool heads” and “clear outlook on world events” will prevail.178 He completes his call with a military-laden metaphor: „Zwar ist unser Schwert uns zerbrochen worden, nicht aber unsere Wehrhaftigkeit. Mögen ihr die Waffen nicht fehlen 174 “Deutschlands Lage und Erneuerung,” Bayerische Hochschulzeitung Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 Ibid. 178 Ibid. „kühle Köpfe” und “klarem Blick das Weltgeschehen.“ 175 55 und die, so fähig und willig sind, sie zu führen, wenn ‚die Saat reif zur Ernte steht!”179 This implication conflates hard work with calculated violence and appeals to a sense of lost power in his young male readership. “Ability to fight” (Wehrhaftigkeit) is upheld as a noble and valuable source of strength for Germany by this metaphor. The call for readiness and will is a winding punch of a future force that will imperialistically reclaim land and status on the level of the nation they believe to be rightfully theirs. Though he calls for inner strength and nonviolent means, his call must be written in the language of militarism to appeal to his audience. Four years later, the same newspaper’s front page feature two pieces that also prove the growing strength of this trend, “Wehrhaftmachung,” und “Der lebende Front.” The first piece, “Wehrhaftmachung,” published November 2, 1928, concerns itself with a polemical take on the utility, or rather, lack of utility of gymnastics in creating youth fit for the defense of the nation. The gymnastics movement (Turnbewegung) was a strong cultural force in Europe in the 1920’s as a key factor in early German nationalism and a notable influence on universities campuses. Photos of smiling male and female collegiate gymnasts abound, preserved in the German state archives to this day.180 The author of this piece, however, takes issue with Ludwig Friedrich Jahn’s justification of gymnastics as a form of military-readiness, referring to it as an “Überschätzung ihrer Bedeutung für wahre Wehrhaftmachung,” and symptomatic of “schwämerische Romantik,” instead of, “eiserne Disziplin und harten Kriegergeist.”181 This is not to say that the author dismisses the validity of militarization—far from it. Militarism and combat-readiness is exhorted; 179 Ibid. “Bundesarchiv - Picture Database:,” accessed May 3, 2019, https://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de/. 181 “Wehrhaftmachung,” Bayerische Hochschulzeitung, Nov 2, 1928. 180 56 “Die sittliche Erneuerung eines Volkes ist noch stets mit dem heißen Streben nach Wiedergewinnung seiner Wehrhaftigkeit verbunden gewesen.“182 The student-journalist upholds the goal of “kampffähige, zuverlässige disziplinierte Jugend,”183 but accuses Jahn of misdirecting efforts to this end. He argues, instead, that students must be trained in realistic military physical practices (Leibesübungen) in order to instill the proper form of fighting spirit, one that is actually soldier-like, rather than merely “combat-ready,” for, “Wehrhaftigkeit ohne Soldatentum gibt es nicht, hat es nie geben. ‘In tapferen Völkern,’ so sagt der Geschichtsschreiber, ‚müssenalle schulmäßigen Leibesübungen kriegerischen Zwecken dienen, wenn sie nicht zu läppischer Speileri ausarten sollen.‘ „184 This great concern for the creation and training of proper soldiers out of students is immediately salient in this piece, whose importance to the student audience of the paper is emphasized by its front-page status. It demonstrates the strengthening tie between nationalism and militarism, rejecting gymnastics as “romantic,” despite its earlier prominence in the nationalist movement. The themes of hardness, spirit-willed desire to fight for the nation and the people, and masculinity are continued threads throughout the piece, signaling the author’s desire to promote and spread these values among other fellow students. As demonstrated by a rhetorical obsession with the legend of Langemarck, militarism became a vital component of the ideal university students wished to attain. The mythologized generation of young men “sacrificed” (Opfern) to the war were tough (hart), fervent, and one of the gloriously anonymous masses. The writings of Ernst Jünger were bestsellers after the end of World War I and during the Weimar Republic,185 182 Ibid. Ibid. 184 Ibid. 185 Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis. 4. 183 57 as German society sought the experience of the soldier. The legendary dead soldier was modelled by the living Jünger, whose works glorified the experience of battle, romanticized slaughter, and made a lasting impression on German youth. This is demonstrated in a piece from the Bavarian University Newspaper from November 1928, “Die lebende Front.” The author of this front-page piece provides a telling quote from Jünger’s Wäldchen 125 (published in English as Copse 125) as the opening lines to his piece; “Der Krieg ist uns mehr als eine stolze und männliche Erscheinung, er war uns auch ein geistiges Erlebnis und ein Bekanntwerden mit seelischen Kräften gewesen, von denen wir sonst nie erfahren hätten. Er ist der Brennpunkt unseres Lebens, der unsere ganze fernere Entwicklung bestimmt.“186 The student-writer continues by promoting Jünger’s spiritual interpretation of war, „Nicht Friede, sondern Kampf ist die Losung, der geistige Kampf um den Sinn des Krieges…“187 and identifies himself and his co-students as “comrades of the dead.”188 (Kamaraden der Toten) Though coming of age a full decade after the end of the war, the author places young men as the righteous brethren of World War I soldiers, responsible for their remembrance and the continuation of the fight. Though the author expresses concern over the romanticization of the war experience, he continues to uphold the spiritual experience of the battlefield, “Sie [die zurückgekehrte Soldaten] haben einen anderen Maßtab zur Wertung aller Erscheinungen geschaffen. Diese Männer haben das größte Schicksal erlebt, das ein Mensch erleben kann, und sie werden, wenn ihre Zeit gekommen ist, ihr eigenes Schicksal und das ihres Volkes in die Hand nehmen.“189 In this experience, these returners, the “living front,” 186 “Die lebende Front,” Bayerische Hochschulzeitung, November 15, 1928. Ibid. 188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 187 58 serve to “spiritually influence the youth” and “lead the heroic path”190 The psychological trauma, though not discussed in so many words, is the concern of the author as an honorable cross to bear, rather than an odious result of a detrimental war. What would today be called “trauma” is upheld as another noble sacrifice, even if one survived the frontlines. By utilizing the words of Jünger, the student preaches sacrifice of the mind to an audience who, themselves, are designated to matters of the mind. After 1928, the year the latter articles were published, the Nazi Party began to see significant gains in the polls. In 1928, the NSDAP garnered 12 seats and 2.6% of the vote. Two years later, they would take 107 seats with 18.3% of the vote and would more than double by 1932 with 230 seats and 37.3%.191 The militaristic intent of Nazism appealed greatly to students who were already incorporating it into their identities. Their aggression was supported within the structures and journals created by National Socialist students, such as the Deutsche Studentenschaft and its official publication, Der Deutsche Student. Ideas such as barrack-style housing, military-esque physical drills, and army drab outfits were endorsed by the students.192 A regimented lifestyle was theorized as providing discipline and training for the student-soldiers, connecting physical performance with mental exercise as a vital part of an experience-based learning process.193 Militarism became a rhetorical rallying point—even knowledge was promoted 190 „Die lebende Front,“ Bayerische Hochschulzeitung.“…geistigen Einfluß die Jugend zurückführen auf die heroische Bahn.“ 191 “Weimar Elections 1928 to 1932,” History Learning Site, accessed May 2, 2019, https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/weimar-germany/weimarelections-1928-to-1932/. 192 “Wissenschaftslager” and others, Der Deutsche Student. 193 Ibid. 59 as requiring a “fighting” spirit.194 The spirit of nationalism was redirected from the state to a spirit of “revolution” for the Volk. As the size of the NSDAP grew, so did the numbers of their early paramilitary unit, the Sturmabteilung (SA). (The Schutzstaffel (SS) would take over this designation in 1934, deposing, but not disbanding, the SA.) The SA worked as the party’s everyday foot soldiers, attending rallies, defending meetings, and physically intimidating political opposition.195 Some student authors linked the university to the SA, as comrades and as an aspirational, honorable position after completing one’s education; “In der Studentenschaft wurden die Kameraden in die SA. eingereiht.”196 As another author in an article titled, “Hochschule und Wissenschaft” Joaquim Haupt begins by positing “Der SA.-Dienst, der Arbeitsdienst, das Kamaradschafthaus sind Einrichtungen an den Grenzen der Hochschule selbst.“197 Students idealized the SA’s hardness, militancy, and Volk-centered “activism.” By advocating for the SA as a partner to the university, they intimately linked student life to the Nazi Party and its values. Though Nazi party leadership utilized the growing tide of militarism to appeal to young males, it a was self-sustaining enterprise within the university, that constituted an identity shift from that of the ardent academic to utilizing knowledge to metaphorically and literally fight for the nation. 194 „Kämpfende Wissenschaft,“ Der Deutsche Student. 27-29. “SA | Definition, History, & Facts,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed May 2, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/SA-Nazi-organization. 196 “Hochschule, Student und Lehrdienst,” Der Deutsche Student, 447. 197 “Hochschule und Wissenschaft,” Der Deutsche Student, January 1935. 195 60 Chapter 5: The Student as National Socialist Much of the scholarship on the rise of National Socialism in the academic realm focuses on the state/official implementations from above onto the university system or highlights the activity of professors in educating a flock of Nazi students. Less common is close examination of the impact of the students themselves on the structure of curriculum of the university. German higher education before Weimar, at least according to Paulsen, was constructed on a relationship between student and faculty not as one of superior and inferior, but rather “commilitones, fellow-soldiers.”198 He also states, “the individual student chooses not only his university, but his teachers, and in case he no longer desire to follow them, nothing will prevent him from deserting them whenever he likes and going elsewhere.”199 Though this relationship may be overstated in its portrayal of student freedom, as the author is trying to represent the German university as the height of academic excellence, the sentiment underlying the role of the student within the university places him/her in a position to have greater input in their curriculum. During the Weimar Republic, however, the influence of students on the appointments of professors, courses offered, and extracurricular programs increased dramatically, the result of effective student protest and the cooperation of increasing numbers of radicalnationalist government officials. As the numbers of students within the German university spiked after the First World War, the Allgemeiner Studentenauschuss (AStA) became increasing important in 198 199 Paulsen, The German Universities. 184. Ibid. 61 advocating for matters related to student life, typically economic matters. Each student government was concerned with the students of its own particular university. The German Student Union (Deutsche Studentenschaft or DSt), formed in 1919, was founded in an effort to united these student committees, including those in Austria and Czechoslovakia, into a larger representative body. As the völkisch movement grew amongst the students, the DSt came to be dominated by a hyper-nationalist majority that became politically invested in social and academic matters affecting students. Many students remained removed from campus politics; withdrawal from university affairs by the disinterested resulted in a shift of the student voting population to the right.200 As the fraternities, or Corporationen, were adamantly against involvement in political matters, preferring to keep their image of tradition and elitism, national groups began to crop up in the university. As early as 1926, National Socialist student groups were present on at least 20 universities.201 The National Socialist German Student League (NSDStB) was founded that same year, though it only became officially affiliated with the Nazi party in 1927.202 It was the students themselves whose interest in politics and the German nation led to the first roots of National Socialism within the university. After this point, National Socialist students worked to engage the rest of the university in their political-nationalist mission. The league sponsored lecturers open to the entire student body that preached völkisch, spiritual ideology and created intense education programs within their own circles committed to academic meditations on the matters of National Socialism, spreading their thought across campus and community, 200 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 104. Ibid., 72. 202 Ibid., 76. 201 62 and training leaders within the movement.203 In later years of the Republic, as Nazi leaders were increasing in power and prestige, party members were invited to speak. When not available, the students themselves would lecture.204 As members of “New Germany,” endowed with the future of the nation, they considered themselves just as versed and authoritative on the subject of intellectual nationalism. Despite the best efforts of fraternity heads and alumni (alte Herren) to forbid participation in the League in conjunction with membership in their societies, increasing numbers of fraternity men pledged their devotion to the League, often bringing friends with them.205 As the number of Nazi students increased, their influence filled pre-existing organizations within the university, notably the student representative bodies (Fachschaften) that would meet with administration and faculty to discuss and influence courses. As the League grew in power and its members won elections within the university, it kept a tight rein on the general student governments. Non-affiliated student offices on campus were taken over, including editorships of university publications, lecturing offices, libraries, political education offices, and those dedicated to work on the borders of the country.206 Where such posts did not exist, they were created and subsumed within the territory of the political student-soldiers. By 1931, the NSDStB took over control of the German Student Union, which had been struggling under a lack of official recognition and support from state administration. Though still the German Student Union in name, the majority of its members were National Socialist and it became a key creator of propaganda for the Nazi Party. Even the Corporationen fell 203 Ibid., 77. Ibid., 78. 205 Ibid., 81. 206 Ibid., 93. 204 63 under the encompassing influence of the National Socialist DSt, as many articles and reports from the German Corps Newspaper (Deutsche Corpzeitung) demonstrate a spiritual commitment to labor for the Volk. Some exemplary titles include, “Die geistigen Strömungen in deutschen Hochschulleben,“ „Die geistige Aufgabe der deutschen Corps,“ „Volkslehre ist unsere Ehre,“ and „‘Das Volk schaut auf Euch, Studenten!‘“ One such piece, entitled “Our New Way,” explicitly commits the fraternities to work within offices of student management and comments positively on the official relationship between the Corps and the DSt; “Die Verbindungen, die ‘Bünde,’ sind nunmehr ein notwendiger Teil der Deutschen Studentenschaft und müssen sich der daraus sich ergebenden Pflichten bewußt sein.“207 Students continued to harass professors who did not expressly share their political values; such was the case in June 1931 with Professor Hans Nawiasky, a prominent member of the faculty of Law at the University of Munich. His lecture, in which he compared the Treaty of Versailles to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was met with mass protests, requiring the rector of the university to step in to attempt to disperse the threatening crowds of students. They didn’t listen. Instead, Professor Nawiasky was led from the hall to the sound of jeers, shouts, and whistles from the student body.208 Instances like this were not uncommon and altercations with police were often reported with great sensationalism in the press, making heroes out of those students involved. As noted by Steinberg, the protests and provocations of the students were likely not the doing of party leaders, but rather came from the students themselves.209 The action of 207 Heinrich Curschmann, „Unser neuer Weg,“ Deutsche Corpszeitung, Berichte, 149-150. Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 100. 209 Ibid., 96. 208 64 students within leadership structures pre-existing within the university, co-opted and customized to fit their political mission, indicate a shift of identity within a significant portion of the student population. Their “duty” to the nation was a guiding principle in their takeover of the university, changing the “apolitical” campus to a virulent nest of hyper-masculine Brown Shirts. Originally, in the mid-1920’s such groups advertised themselves within the framework of the non-political, insisting that nationalism was a nonpartisan matter.210 Having ties with a party, winning elections within the student government, and agitating for a political education could not be construed as non-political actions, however. As National Socialism grew in popularity, students began to reconstruct and redefine the definition of “political” in their favor. To be “political” was disassociated from being partisan—instead, to be political was to advocate for the völkisch ideal of the nation. Such opinions took over student publications by the early 1930’s and featured prominently in the official journal of the German Student Union, “The German Student.” (“Der Deutsche Student”) In its foundational edition, in August of 1933, its first pages include an introductory message as follows: “Die Umgestaltung des politischen und hochschulpolitischen Lebens hat naturgemaß auch die studentische Presse in ihren Kreis einbezogen. In Übereinstimmung mit dem Reichsinnenministerium wurden—um die neue Aufgabe einheitlich gestalten zu können…Es geht uns um politische Arbeit. Nur von hier aus erhält diese Zeitschrift ihren Sinn. Das Ganze des studentischen Lebens, darüber hinaus des Lebens der gesamten jungen Generation soll hier Niederschlag finden, erzieherisch, aktivistisch, fordernd.“211 The notice unswervingly and proudly identifies 210 211 Ibid., 72. “Zur Mitteilung!“ Der Deutsche Student, August 1933. 65 Germanness, in the form of the average “German Student,” with being political. It declares a mission in political work and highlights and defines the whole of student life with education, activism, and demanding. Being essentially a mission-statement for the publication, these are the characteristics that are considered most important, by the student publishers’ standards, to the identify of the average German university attendee. The first article of the first issue, continuing on this theme, also makes a claim on the identity of “the German Student.” Written by G.S., presumably Gerhard Schröder, a frequent presence within the pages of the journal, the first two sentences proclaim, “Der deutsche Student ist Nationalsozialist. Und zwar ist er es primär.”212 Such a student, “weiß…die Vordringlichkeit des politischen Geschehens, in dem er steht, weiß er um die große Aufgabe zu dem Neuen, das er mit zu gestalten hat.“ The political is portrayed as a spiritual aspect of the inner personhood of the German student, first and foremost a National-Socialist. He is uniquely oriented to an assignment of the new order, in this political being, as well. This „geistig-politische“213 mission is outlined as limitless service, “Dienst an Volk und Staat, Dienst an der Hochschule, an der Wissenschaft, in der Studentenschaft, in der S.A., im Bund, im Lager, Dienst, der nicht zu Ende geht, weil Dienst und Leben zusammenfallen!“214 The German people and the German government are here connected to one another. Whereas they were formally separated in their battle against the Republican state, with the rise of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor earlier that year, the students now identify the Volk with the state. As the state is National-Socialist, ultimately an enticing branch of extreme völkisch nationalism, then so, too, is the German 212 Schröder, “Der deutsche Student,” Der Deutsche Student, 1. Ibid., 2. 214 Ibid. 1. 213 66 people; “Volk und Staat treffen sich aber nur im Nationalsozialismus.”215 It is not enough to be a political servant of the people, however, the German student must also be “genau so wie Soldat sein!”216 Speaking for and appealing to students all across Germany, this piece, and this journal, seeks to inform and align student identity as a political studentsoldier. 215 216 Ibid., 2. Ibid. 1. 67 Conclusion Every bit as severe as they looked, student “Brownshirts” were committed to the ideals of a völkisch Germany, to be “renewed” through political activism and militant nationalism. In contrast to traditional university ethics of disinterested, liberal scholarship, Weimar students increasingly sought involvement in the chaotic political situation of the nation. Rather than observe standards of objectivity, they advocated for a “new science” that was romantic, subjective, and experiential. This new educational philosophy served another purpose—employment. Uniquely marginalized by the economic distress of the post-war period and rapidly losing opportunities for the highstatus white-collar positions they felt they deserved, melding the concept of the student with the worker offered potential relief. Idolizing the fallen men of the First World War, the revolutionary nationalism that sparked the fervor of students was increasingly militaristic. Völkisch, militant, and promising economic support, Nazism appealed to coming-of-age youth. Whereas the stereotypical university student was apolitical, detached, and middle-class, young men during the Weimar Republic reconstructed their own identity to be the hard-working “political student-soldier.” This identity was powerful. As put by Steinberg, “While state and party directives defined the Nazi university objectives, student initiative carried the process a great deal further.”217 As with the book burning in 1933, National Socialism within the university was not merely 217 Steinberg, Sabers and Brown Shirts. 180. 68 thrust upon students by men in positions of power—it was spread, consumed, and stoked by the students themselves. 69 Bibliography “Ash on Remy, ‘The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University’ | H-German | H-Net.” Accessed December 18, 2018. “Book Burning.” Accessed December 8, 2018. Braatz, Werner E. “Two Neo-Conservative Myths in Germany 1919-32: The ‘Third Reich’ and the ‘New State.’” Journal of the History of Ideas 32, no. 4 (1971): 569–84. “Bundesarchiv - Picture Database:” Accessed May 3, 2019. Fritz K. Ringer. The Decline of the German Mandarins. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. Fritzsche, Peter. Germans into Nazis. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998. Giles, Geoffrey J. “A Political Fringe Group.” In Students and National Socialism in Germany, 14–43. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Guérin, Daniel. The Brown Plague: Travels in Late Weimar & Early Nazi Germany. Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1994. Hecht, Jennifer Michael. “Vacher de Lapouge and the Rise of Nazi Science.” Journal of the History of Ideas 61, no. 2 (2000): 285–304. Heidegger, Martin. Ponderings: Black Notebooks. Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016. 70 Heidegger, Martin, Peter Trawny, and Martin Heidegger. Überlegungen: Schwarze Hefte. Gesamtausgabe. IV. Abteilung, Hinweise Und Aufzeichnungen / Martin Heidegger, Band 94-96. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014. Jäckh, E. “Zur Vorgeschichte der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik.” Zeitschrift für Politik 13 (1924): 16–19. Jarausch, Konrad H. Students, Society, and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of Illiberalism. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982. Kater, Michael H. Studentenschaft und Rechtsradikalismus in Deutschland 1918-1933: eine sozialgeschichtl. Studie z. Bildungskrise in d. Weimarer Republik. 1.-3. Tsd. Historische Perspektiven ; 1. Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1975. ———. “The Myth of Myths: Scholarship and Teaching in Heidelberg.” Edited by Steven P. Remy. Central European History 36, no. 4 (2003): 570–77. ———. The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983. ———. “The Work Student: A Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Early Weimar Germany.” Journal of Contemporary History 10, no. 1 (January 1975): 71–94. Kershaw, Ian. The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. 4th ed. London : New York: Arnold ; Copublished in the USA by Oxford University Press, 2000. Kitchen, Martin. A History of Modern Germany, 1800-2000. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2006. Korenblat, Steven D. “A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the Deutsche Hochschule Für Politik, 1920-1933.” Central European History 39, no. 3 (2006): 394–430. 71 Krebs, Gerhard. “Moeller Van Den Bruck: Inventor of the ‘Third Reich.’” The American Political Science Review 35, no. 6 (1941): 1085–1105. . “Liberation of Germany; Nuremberg IMT; Early Nazi Struggles for Power; Reichstag Meeting; Boycott; Book Burning; Hitler Youth Meeting - Collections Search - United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.” Accessed December 8, 2018. Mann, Golo. Reminiscences and Reflections: A Youth in Germany. 1st ed. New York: Norton, 1990. Marquardt, Virginia Carol Hagelstein, ed. Art and Journals on the Political Front, 1910-1940. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1997. Mosse, George Lachmann. Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. 1. publ. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Noakes, Jeremy. “The Ivory Tower Under Seige: German Universities in the Third Reich.” Journal of European Studies 23, no. 4 (September 1993): 371–407. Pahl, Georg. Eine gewalitgie Studenten-Demonstration für das Bekenntnis zur akademischen Freiheit fand vor der Universität in Berlin statt. July 1929. Photograph. Sachklassifikation/C {Weimarer Republik 1919-1933}/Ca {Staat/Politik}/Ca 300 {Parlamentswesen und Parteien *}/Ca 350 {Demonstrationen} Sachklassifikation/C {Weimarer Republik 1919-1933}/Cc/Cd {Gesellschaft}/Cd {Kulturelles Leben *}/Cd 600 {Schule und Erziehung}/Cd 620 {Hochschulen und Universitäten}/Cd 625 {Studenten und Dozenten}. Bundesarchiv. Paulsen, Friedrich. The German Universities. Translated by Frank Thilly and William W. Elwang, 1906. 72 Phillips, Henry Albert. Germany Today and Tomorrow. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1935. Remy, Steven P. The Heidelberg Myth: The Nazification and Denazification of a German University. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002. Ringer, Fritz. “A Sociography of German Academics, 1863-1938.” Cambridge University Press on Behalf of Central European History 25, no. 3 (1992): 251–80. Rossol, Nadine. Performing the Nation in Interwar Germany: Sport, Spectacle and Political Symbolism, 1926-36. Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. “SA | Definition, History, & Facts.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed May 2, 2019. Safranski, Rüdiger. Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998. Schröder, Gerhard. “Der deutsche Student.” Der Deutsche Student 1 (1933): 1–2. Sluga, Hans D. Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993. Steinberg, Michael Stephen. Sabers and Brown Shirts: The German Students’ Path to National Socialism, 1918-1935. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Nazi Book Burning. Accessed December 8, 2018. Veit, Fritz. “Academic Freedom in Germany before and after 1933: Under the Republic of Weimar and under Hitler.” Peabody Journal of Education 15, no. 1 (July 1937): 36–44. Weber, R. G. S. The German Student Corps in the Third Reich. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986. 73 “Weimar Elections 1928 to 1932.” History Learning Site. Accessed May 2, 2019. Weinreich, Max. Hitler’s Professors: The Part of Scholarship in Germany’s Crimes Against the Jewish People. Second. Yiddish Scientific Institute, 1946. Weitz, Eric D. Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2007. “When Books Burn: Lists of Banned Books, 1933-1939.” Accessed December 8, 2018. Widdig, Bernd. Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany. Weimar and Now 26. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Zorn, Wolfgang. “Student Politics in the Weimar Republic.” Journal of Contemporary History 5, no. 1 (1970): 128–43. 74