Intermediated Loans - A New Approach to Microfinance Pt 3

32 Date of Disbursal Table 1: Credit Loan Amount∗ (Rs) 2000 2660 3538 4705 6258 8323 Arm of the Intervention Duration Interest Amount (Rs) 120 days 120 120 days 160 120 days 212 120 days 282 120 days 375 120 days 499 1 October 2010 2 February 2011 3 June 2011 4 October 2011 5 February 2012 6 June 2012 To continue . . . ∗ : Conditional on Full Repayment of Earlier Loan Cycle Amount to be Repaid (Rs) 2120 2820 3750 4988 6633 8823 Table 2: Agent Characteristics Number Average Age Agent Hindu (percent) Agent General Caste (percent) Agent Occupation (percent) Cultivator Business Service Other TRAIL 24 39.71 91.67 91.67 GRAIL 24 41.29 87.5 83.33 4.17 95.83 0 0 66.67 16.67 8.33 8.33 Table 3: Sample Sizes in Each Village TRAIL and GRAIL: TREATMENT CONTROL1 CONTROL2 GBL: TREATMENT CONTROL1 CONTROL2 Number of Recommended Households Households Recommended and Receiving Credit Households Recommended and Not Receiving Credit Households Not Recommended 30 10 10 30 Group survived until lottery and eligible for credit (Sample at group level: 2 groups) Group survived until lottery but not selected through lottery (Sample at group level: 2 groups) Random sample of households who did not form group 10 33 10 30 34 TRAIL Mean SD Number of Households 276.04 201.59 Number of Potato Cultivators 164.63 130.30 Total Landless 15.96 18.98 Total 0 − 1.25 113.88 103.22 Total 1.25 − 2.50 25.58 16.27 Total 2.50 − 5.00 10.88 7.39 Total 5.00 − 12.50 1.38 1.79 Total Above 12.50 0.00 0.00 Total refers to total number of potato cultivators GRAIL Mean SD 252.21 238.36 160.75 168.39 27.96 75.63 99.67 78.00 24.63 25.20 12.83 17.11 1.17 1.95 0.04 0.20 GBL Mean SD 346.42 374.90 208.29 237.94 12.83 17.00 149.96 213.76 31.54 21.92 11.58 8.65 2.38 3.27 0.00 0.00 Table 4: Randomization Difference TRAIL - GRAIL 23.83 3.88 -12.00 14.21 0.96 -1.96 0.21 -0.04 Difference TRAIL - GBL -70.38 -43.67 3.13 -36.08 -5.96 -0.71 -1.00 0.00 Difference GRAIL - GBL -94.21 -47.54 15.13 -50.29 -6.92 1.25 -1.21 0.04 35 Male Head Non Hindu SC ST OBC Household Size Age of Household Head Married Head Head: More than Primary School Head: Cultivator Head: Labourer Head: Resident Landholding Landless Purchased on Credit Bought from Agent Borrowed from Agent Worked for Agent Received GP Benefits ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1 TRAIL Mean SD 0.96 0.19 0.19 0.40 0.26 0.44 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 4.89 2.27 48.07 12.45 0.92 0.28 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.99 0.12 0.75 0.92 0.18 0.38 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.30 0.59 0.49 GRAIL Mean SD 0.95 0.21 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.42 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 4.95 2.38 48.13 11.98 0.92 0.28 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.98 0.13 0.73 0.95 0.18 0.38 0.30 0.46 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.29 0.63 0.48 GBL Mean SD 0.93 0.25 0.15 0.35 0.31 0.46 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25 5.02 2.34 48.30 13.08 0.91 0.29 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.98 0.15 0.76 1.05 0.20 0.40 0.38 0.48 . . . . . . 0.64 0.48 Difference TRAIL - GRAIL 0.01 0.04 *** 0.04 ** 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.07 *** 0.30 *** 0.13 *** 0.01 -0.04 * Difference GRAIL - GBL 0.02 ** 0.01 -0.08 *** 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.16 0.01 0.00 0.05 ** -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 *** -0.02 Difference TRAIL - GBL 0.03 *** 0.05 *** -0.04 ** 0.01 -0.02 -0.13 -0.23 0.01 0.03 0.04 ** -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 *** Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Treatment Differences. Household Characteristics 36 Male Head Non Hindu SC ST OBC Household Size Age of Household Head Married Head Head: More than Primary School Head: Cultivator Head: Labourer Head: Resident Landholding Landless Purchased on Credit Bought from Agent Borrowed from Agent Worked for Agent Received GP Benefits ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1 TRAIL Mean SD 0.94 0.23 0.22 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 5.00 2.50 49.93 13.02 0.90 0.30 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.26 0.44 0.98 0.12 0.90 1.07 0.18 0.38 0.34 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.15 0.36 0.09 0.28 0.55 0.50 GRAIL Mean SD 0.94 0.23 0.16 0.37 0.22 0.42 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 5.03 2.61 49.21 12.69 0.90 0.31 0.47 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.98 0.15 0.84 1.14 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.27 0.61 0.49 GBL Mean SD 0.94 0.24 0.16 0.37 0.28 0.45 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.23 5.15 2.58 51.49 12.93 0.89 0.32 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.25 0.44 0.98 0.13 0.96 1.24 0.16 0.36 0.36 0.48 . . . . . . 0.61 0.49 Difference TRAIL - GRAIL 0.00 0.06 *** 0.03 0.00 -0.02 * -0.03 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.08 *** 0.27 *** 0.11 *** 0.01 -0.06 ** 0.00 -0.06 ** -0.15 -1.56 ** 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -0.02 Difference GRAIL - GBL 0.00 0.00 -0.05 ** 0.03 0.08 -0.12 -2.29 *** 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.12 * 0.03 -0.10 *** Difference TRAIL - GBL 0.00 0.05 *** -0.02 Table 6: Descriptive Statistics and Treatment Differences in Non-Recommended Households. Household Characteristics 37 TRAIL Male Head Non Hindu SC ST OBC Household Size Age of Household Head Married Head Head: More than Primary School Head: Cultivator Head: Labourer Head: Resident Landholding Landless Purchased on Credit Bought from Agent Borrowed from Agent Worked for Agent Received GP Benefits GRAIL Male Head Non Hindu SC ST 0.23 0.41 0.44 0.22 0.21 2.50 13.02 0.30 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.12 1.07 0.38 0.48 0.47 0.36 0.28 0.50 0.23 0.37 0.42 0.22 0.94 0.22 0.26 0.05 0.05 5.00 49.93 0.90 0.47 0.50 0.26 0.98 0.90 0.18 0.34 0.32 0.15 0.09 0.55 0.94 0.16 0.22 0.05 Non Recommended (NR) Mean SD 0.96 0.15 0.24 0.05 0.99 0.16 0.27 0.05 0.06 4.73 45.28 0.94 0.51 0.49 0.37 0.99 0.52 0.19 0.40 0.41 0.25 0.13 0.65 0.19 0.35 0.42 0.23 0.11 0.37 0.44 0.22 0.23 1.87 10.97 0.23 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.12 0.54 0.39 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.33 0.48 0.04 *** -0.06 ** 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.28 ** -4.65 *** 0.05 *** 0.04 -0.01 0.11 *** 0.00 -0.38 *** 0.01 0.06 *** 0.10 ** 0.10 *** 0.04 ** 0.11 *** Difference R - NR 0.02 * -0.01 0.01 0.00 Continued . . . Recommended (R) Mean SD Table 7: Differences between Recommended and NonRecommended Households. By Treatment 38 OBC Household Size Age of Household Head Married Head Head: More than Primary School Head: Cultivator Head: Labourer Head: Resident Landholding Landless Purchased on Credit Bought from Agent Borrowed from Agent Worked for Agent Received GP Benefits GBL Male Head Non Hindu SC ST OBC Household Size Age of Household Head Married Head Head: More than Primary School Head: Cultivator Head: Labourer Table 7 Continued. 0.28 0.33 0.48 0.23 0.27 1.87 11.61 0.24 0.50 0.49 0.49 Difference R - NR -0.02 * -0.21 -2.66 *** 0.05 *** -0.01 0.11 *** 0.00 0.01 * -0.29 *** -0.03 0.08 *** 0.03 *** 0.05 *** 0.03 * 0.05 * -0.03 * -0.04 ** 0.08 *** 0.02 * 0.02 -0.36 *** -8.30 *** 0.05 *** -0.06 * -0.10 *** 0.17 *** Continued . . . 0.92 0.12 0.35 0.06 0.08 4.80 43.22 0.94 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.94 0.16 0.28 0.04 0.06 5.16 51.52 0.89 0.48 0.49 0.25 0.24 0.37 0.45 0.19 0.23 2.58 12.95 0.32 0.50 0.50 0.44 Recommended (R) Mean SD 0.04 0.20 4.83 1.98 46.54 10.64 0.94 0.23 0.45 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.99 0.09 0.55 0.51 0.16 0.37 0.35 0.48 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.66 0.47 Non Recommended (NR) Mean SD 0.07 0.25 5.03 2.61 49.20 12.69 0.90 0.31 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.98 0.15 0.84 1.14 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.27 0.61 0.49 39 Head: Resident Landholding Landless Purchased on Credit Received GP Benefits ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1 Table 7 Continued. Non Recommended (NR) Mean SD 0.98 0.13 0.96 1.24 0.16 0.36 0.36 0.48 0.61 0.49 Recommended (R) Mean SD 0.97 0.17 0.43 0.48 0.27 0.45 0.40 0.49 0.70 0.46 Difference R - NR -0.01 -0.53 *** 0.12 *** 0.04 0.09 *** Table 8: Crop Profit (Potato) Landholding Landholding Squared (1) 4,400.838** (1,965.295) 4,655.443*** (1,684.349) Jyoti Pokhraj Chandramukhi Constant (2) 4,102.377** (1,997.313) 4,815.714*** (1,699.500) 951.012 (1,158.940) -4,700.906*** (1,338.829) 1,099.339 (1,534.366) 6,864.762*** (1,216.564) 2,352 Yes 7,104.621*** (440.869) Observations 2,352 Village Fixed Effects Yes ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1 Standard errors clustered at the household level in parentheses Sample restricted to households with atmost 1.5 acres 40 Table 9: Informal Interest Rate TRAIL GBL (1) (2) Control 1 -5.307*** -5.205*** (1.667) (1.578) Landholding -2.425 -3.881** (1.568) (1.852) Constant 33.359*** 36.521*** (1.573) (1.558) Observations 411 364 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 41 Table 10: Selection: Recommendation/Group Formation TRAIL 0.069 (0.055) 0.194*** (0.037) 0.029 (0.055) 0.222 (0.134) -0.232** (0.093) -0.021 (0.318) -0.184 (0.319) 0.276*** (0.063) -0.362*** (0.074) -0.354*** (0.117) 0.306 (0.188) -0.005 (0.078) Buy from Agent Borrow from Agent Work for Agent Landholding Landholding squared Non hindu Non Hindu × Agent Hindu SC SC × Agent Hindu ST ST × Agent Hindu OBC OBC × Agent Hindu Purchased on credit 0.070** (0.030) 0.031 (0.030) 0.250 (0.155) Received GP benefits Constant Total Effect Non Hindu Household, Hindu Agent SC Household, High Caste Agent ST Household, High Caste Agent OBC Household, High Caste Agent Head Cultivator, Agent Business Head Cultivator, Agent Cultivator Head Labour, Agent Business Head Labour, Agent Cultivator 10.91*** 2.40** 0.10 0.44 4.32** GRAIL 0.084 (0.054) 0.163 (0.097) 0.067 (0.044) 0.173 (0.195) -0.139 (0.128) 0.221 (0.176) -0.375* (0.190) -0.019 (0.049) -0.021 (0.061) -0.189*** (0.045) 0.203 (0.126) 0.010 (0.037) -0.122 (0.137) 0.112* (0.055) 0.024 (0.038) 0.280** (0.120) GBL -0.187 (0.168) 0.025 (0.100) -0.178 (0.195) 0.023 (0.081) 0.046 (0.153) 0.135 (0.134) 0.043 (0.050) -0.008 (0.033) 0.898*** (0.136) 4.85** 0.58 0.01 0.78 3.29* 15.74*** 0.02 6.38** Continued . . . 42 Table 10 (Continued) GRAIL GBL 1,050 1,038 24 24 Yes Yes TRAIL Sample Size 1,031 Number of Villages 24 Village Fixed Effects Yes Linear Probability Estimates Standard errors clustered at village level in parentheses Sample restricted to households with at most 1.5 acres ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1 Regressions also control for age, gender, educational attainment, and primary occupation of the household head and interactions with the primary occupation of the agent, and household size 43 Table 11: Takeup Cycle1 All TRAIL/GRAIL GBL 0.052 0.011 0.175 (0.068) (0.075) (0.118) Landholding Squared -0.039 -0.032 -0.086 (0.025) (0.024) (0.053) TRAIL 0.067 0.063 (0.069) (0.048) GRAIL -0.005 (0.075) Hugli -0.117** -0.168** -0.044 (0.059) (0.072) (0.138) TRAIL = GRAIL 1.85 Number of Households 718 480 238 Marginal Effects from Probit Regression Standard errors in clustered at the village level in parentheses ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1 Regressions control for age, gender, educational attainment, and primary occupation of the household head, household size, religion and caste of the household, landholding, household access to credit and household access to GP benefits Landholding 44 Table 12: Takeup/Continuation: Cycles 1 - 4 Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3 Cycle 4 Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3 Cycle 4 Landholding 0.052 0.048 0.046 0.015 (0.068) (0.067) (0.075) (0.078) Landholding squared -0.039 -0.035 -0.039 -0.025 (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.026) TRAIL 0.067 0.037 0.093 0.112 (0.069) (0.078) (0.083) (0.080) GRAIL -0.005 -0.048 0.001 -0.013 (0.075) (0.085) (0.090) (0.085) Hugli -0.117** -0.149** -0.175*** -0.164** (0.059) (0.061) (0.067) (0.069) TRAIL = GRAIL 1.85 2.30 2.41 4.10*** Number of Households 718 718 715 681 Marginal Effects from Probit Regression Standard errors in clustered at the village level in parentheses ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1 Regressions control for age, gender, educational attainment, and primary occupation of the household head, household size, religion and caste of the household, landholding, household access to credit and household access to GP benefits 45 Table 13: Repayment Cycle 3 Cycle 3 0.031 (0.039) Landholding Squared -0.015 (0.010) TRAIL 0.073** (0.033) GRAIL 0.021 (0.020) Hugli -0.028 (0.038) TRAIL = GRAIL 4.10*** Average Repayment in GBL 0.87 Number of Households 557 Repayment Rate is 100% in all treatments in Cycle 1 Marginal Effects from Probit Regression ∗∗∗ : p < 0.01,∗∗ : p < 0.05,∗ : p < 0.1 Standard errors in clustered at the village level in parentheses Regressions control for age, gender, educational attainment, and primary occupation of the household head, household size, religion and caste of the household, landholding, household access to credit and household access to GP benefits Landholding 46 Figure 1: Loans by Lender Category 47 Figure 2: Informal Interest Rate and Landholding 48 Figure 3: Interest Rate, Landholding and Production Function Interest Rate (Informal Market) Rs(a)-a/ps 1.5 Landholding (a) R’s(a) 1 /ps 1.5 49 Landholding (a) Figure 4: Individual Expected Surplus and Social Cost of Project ps Rs(a)-a pr Rr(a)-a ρI 1.5 Landholding (a) R’r(a) R’s(a) 1/pr 1/ps 1.5 50 Landholding (a) Figure 5: Informal Interest Market 51 Figure 6: Selection: Recommendation/Group Formation 52 Figure 7: Takeup and Continuation over Cycles Takeup conditional on being eligible 53 54 Repayment conditional on being eligible and continuation Figure 8: Repayment over Cycles References Attanasio, O., B. 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