US Hegemony and Imperialistic Activity from the Shores of Tripoli to Iraq, 1787–2003

Waves of Empire US Hegemony and Imperialistic Activity from the Shores of Tripoli to Iraq, 1787–2003 abstract: Is there a relationship between the global hegemonic position of the US on the one hand, and imperialistic activities such as war-making, sending troops abroad, colonial annexation and/or temporary military occupation? In an attempt to offer a preliminary answer to this question, this article offers a novel longitudinal analysis of US imperialistic activities from 1787 to 2003, and shows that America’s imperialistic activity has been punctuated by waves of high amplitude and frequency. The article also shows that each of these waves correspond to different phases in America’s career. Specifically, they are associated with America’s movement from regional to hemispheric to global dominance and, ultimately, to its decline from its prior hegemonic status. The analysis offers preliminary support for a new theory of the relationship between hegemony and imperialistic activity. Introduction Various views on ‘American empire’ have proliferated since America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. The views run between two poles. At one end, popular writers such as Max Boot and Niall Ferguson suggest that America’s recent interventions into the Middle East are neither surprising nor negative. Not only are they necessary for the ‘war on terror’, they are also the proper manifestations of America’s hegemonic status. As the US remains the world’s unrivaled economic and military power, it should use its power for good – just as the British did during their period of hegemony. ‘Afghanistan and other troubled lands today’, declares Boot, ‘cry out for the enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets.’1 In this view, the danger with America’s current foreign policy is not too much empire but too little. If the US were to disavow its hegemonic status and refuse ‘its own imperial role in the world’, liberal democracy, human rights and free markets around the globe would suffer (Ferguson, 2003, 2004). In short, the world needs an American empire. America’s hegemonic status in the world provides the natural conditions for it. At the other end of the spectrum lie more critical assessments of America’s intervention, exemplified in recent commentary by David Harvey and Immanuel Wallerstein, among others. The view here is that the US is not in fact hegemonic. Hegemony refers to the relative economic preponderance of a state over the world economy, and in this light the US has been on the path of decline since the 1970s. While it remains economically and politically powerful, the US has lost the relative position of dominance it enjoyed after the Second World War, and economic growth in the European Union and Asia has presented unprecedented economic competition. It would follow that America’s interventions into the Middle East cannot be the natural expression of American hegemony, much less of a cohesive and benign empire. They would instead manifest the irrational militarism of the Bush regime or, perhaps, the structural tendencies of a military hyperpower with all means at its disposal and everything economically to lose (Harvey, 2003; Mann, 2003; Wallerstein, 2002a, 2003b). These two views differ in their normative stance on empire. They also differ in their definition of hegemony. But regardless of the differences, together they raise an implicit question. How, if at all, is hegemony connected with imperialistic activity? Is there an association between a state’s hegemonic status on the one hand and, on the other, decisions by that state to reach beyond its borders and intervene into other territories? Pro-empire commentators imply that hegemonic status leads naturally to imperialistic activity. Critics of American empire like Harvey and Wallerstein, however, imply the opposite: imperialistic activity follows not from hegemonic maturity but from hegemonic decline. Together, these views posit a hypothetical association between hegemony and imperialistic activity but neither make the hypothesis explicit or explore it. Is there an association between the stages of a hegemon’s larger career and its decision to annex new land, temporarily occupy foreign countries and/or send troops abroad?2 In this article I provide a preliminary answer to this question by conducting a historical analysis of the entirety of America’s imperial career. It is a long career, to be sure. The US has traditionally sent troops abroad to wage wars or protect interests. It has also occupied foreign countries and annexed new territories as colonies. After all, the US marines’ famous hymn, ‘From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli’, refers to occupation of Mexico City in 1847 and the deployment of troops against the Barbary States in 1805. Rudyard Kipling’s poem ‘The White Man’s Burden’ was penned not for Kipling’s British compatriots but for America’s overseas colonial empire after 1898. Even George W. Bush, when he spoke to Philippine legislators in 2004, conjured America’s previous overseas activity, claiming that just as the US had seized the Philippines from Spain and democratized it, so too might it spread democracy in the Middle East. What would the invasion of Iraq look like if we situated it within all of America’s interventions since the late 18th century? Would such a historical investigation offer any insights into the relationship between America’s imperialistic activity and its rise and perhaps its fall as a hegemon? While there are a number of ways to broach this question, this article takes the necessary first step and adopts a broad longitudinal approach using original data on 256 imperialistic interventions from 1787 to 2003. This approach allows me to construct a tentative story about America’s hegemonic career and its resort to imperialistic activity. The evidence adduced will reveal patterns overlooked in existing scholarship and in extant discussions of American empire. I show, first, that America’s imperialistic activity has been punctuated by waves of high amplitude and frequency. Second, each of these waves correspond to different phases in America’s career in the world-system. They correspond with America’s movement from regional and hemispheric dominance to global hegemony and, ultimately, to America’s relative decline from hegemony. In short, I show that the US has more often resorted to imperialistic activity not amid its hegemonic maturity but rather amid its rise and fall as a hegemonic power. I begin, though, with an overview of the concepts and theory that guide my empirical analysis. What do ‘hegemony’ and ‘imperialistic activity’ mean? Conceptual and Theoretical Frame Empire, Hegemony and Imperialistic Activity The concepts typically deployed in current discussions on American empire – such as ‘empire’, ‘hegemony’ and ‘imperialism’ – are multivocal. For purposes here, I cultivate a rudimentary set of distinctions. The first is between empire and hegemony. Existing definitions of hegemony tend toward two poles: (1) relative preponderance over the world economy, such that there could be historical periods when there is a single hegemon (as opposed to periods of hegemonic competition) and (2) political (and/or cultural) dominance over the geopolitical system of states (Arrighi et al., 1999: 26–8; Boswell, 1995: 2–4; Kindleberger, 1973). These definitions are distinct: the first is essentially economic, while the second is primarily political and akin to the category ‘world leadership’ (Modelski, 1978; Modelski and Thompson, 1988). Still, the economic definition has been used most widely. Even scholars who identify hegemony in political terms argue that political and cultural domination tends to follow from economic domination in the world-system (see Boswell, 1995: 5–6). And the emphasis on economic power remains most true to the spirit of Gramsci’s founding theory of hegemony. As Arrighi et al. (1999: 26–8) note, in Gramsci’s conception, dominant economic elites have the means to also cultivate political dominance. Therefore, hegemony as I use it here refers to relative preponderance over the world economy. Empire is different analytically. Empire is ‘a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy – the effective sovereignty – of the other, the subordinate periphery’ (Doyle, 1986: 12). Political control can be formal (i.e. territorially based) or informal (through client regimes, financial loans, market control, etc.). In either case, empire is not the same thing as hegemony (Boswell, 1995: 12). A state can have an empire but not dominate the world economy.3 Similarly, a state can dominate the world economy without being an empire. While hegemons might tend toward empire, there is no logically necessary connection. The second distinction is between imperialism and imperialistic activity. Imperialism refers to the process of establishing or maintaining an empire (Daalder, 1968; Doyle, 1986: 1). It therefore presumes empire and would include any activity that helps establish or maintain an empire. Imperialism could then include everything from colonial annexation to the expansion of an economic system. Indeed, early theorists of imperialism such as Lenin (1939) theorized imperialism as the expansion of western capitalism (see also Brewer, 1990). What I call imperialistic activity is different. By this I refer to the exertion of influence by one state over other states or territories through formal political control or overt uses of force. I use this term to separate the political dimensions of imperialism from their economic dimensions. Imperialistic activity therefore includes formal colonial annexation (such as US annexation of the Philippines in the early 20th century) or temporary military occupation (such as in Iraq since 2003). It also includes wars and various other exertions of force – from the sending of troops abroad for various missions, humanitarian or not, to air strikes, to provisions of military support to another state. Imperialistic activity is thus similar to imperialism, but it does not include all of the processes associated with imperialism. As opposed to informal tactics like economic sanctions or financial loans and unlike covert political operations, it is a more blatant attempt to control the activities of another state or processes in that other state. Imperialistic activity therefore involves various types of overt military intervention, territorial annexation and temporary colonial control. The distinction between imperialism (and its associated term ‘imperialist’) and imperialistic activity is useful in several respects. First, it captures the activities that are discussed in current debates over American power in the world today. Activities that I define as ‘imperialistic activity’ tend to occupy current discussions about American power in the world since 11 September 2001, and they are typically posited as somehow related to hegemony. Therefore, I differentiate imperialism from ‘imperialistic activity’ and focus on the latter to keep my analysis in line with contemporary discussions and their implicit theories. Second, the term imperialism is too unwieldy. It typically includes an almost infinite number of activities, including any economic policies and processes that can be judged to advance the state’s interests. The term ‘imperialistic activity’ is preferable because its activities are more easily observable.4 Finally, as imperialism refers to the process of establishing an empire, to call an activity ‘imperialist’ or a part of ‘imperialism’ presumes the establishment of an empire. It would then lead to almost endless debates about whether the motive behind a particular activity is to create an empire, and such debates over the meanings and motives of any single activity by a state would run the risk of foreclosing an empirical analysis of a state’s activities over long periods of time. To avoid this problem, the concept imperialistic activity is useful. As opposed to imperialism, which demands a judgment about whether a single activity is motivated by the goal of creating an empire, I use the term imperialistic so as to not render such an a priori judgment or presume motives. Imperialistic Activity and Hegemonic Status If empire is not the same thing as hegemony, and if imperialism is not the same as imperialistic activity, at stake in current debates on America’s ‘empire’ today is the relationship between them. Most pro-empire commentators suggest that empire, hegemony and imperialistic activity are logically and historically intertwined: American empire refers to American hegemony, and imperialistic activity follows (Boot, 2001; Ferguson, 2003; Ignatieff, 2003). This echoes the Realist position in studies of international relations that argues that nations with unrivaled global power are inevitably expansionist (Layne and Schwarz, 1993). Others suggest a different view: hegemony and imperialistic activity are not in fact connected, at least when it comes to the US. This view does not deny that previous hegemonic powers such as Britain initiated imperialistic activity during their reign; it simply suggests that the US is fundamentally different from such prior hegemons. Due to its unique democratic values, the US since the Second World War through today has turned to a system of free trade and a policy of ‘reluctant’ intervention rather than resorting to imperialistic activity (Ikenberry, 2001). A third view, however, can also be derived. This view sees imperialistic activity as characteristic of a hegemon’s fall rather than its maturity. This thesis remains implicit in existing theory and research, but it can be deduced from various interrelated literatures nonetheless. One literature connects wars between core states to long cycles in the world-system. In this view, when a single core nation dominates the world economy, the global political system is relatively stable. These are hegemonic periods, moments when a single core hegemon leads the pack (Boswell, 1995: 2). On the other hand, when the system lacks a single hegemon – that is, during ‘multicentric’ or ‘multipolar’ periods – there is a tendency towards instability and conflict (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik, 1995: 7). It follows that as hegemons fall and as rivals emerge, the probability for global war or militarized conflict between contenders increases (Arrighi et al., 1999; Boswell and Sweat, 1991; Mearsheimer, 1990). Global war or militarized conflict between contending core or competing states is not the same thing as imperialistic activity. Historically, most imperialistic activity has been directed at weaker or peripheral states. But we could nonetheless extend the premise of this theory and hypothesize a relationship between hegemonic cycles and the imperialistic activity of a single state. That is, during hegemonic periods, the hegemon would be less inclined to resort to imperialistic activity. Enjoying economic dominance, the core hegemon provides ideological leadership and political stability in the world-system by constructing alliances, using diplomacy and advancing free trade. There is less need for overt uses of coercion. Even if the hegemon has a vast military apparatus, its existence would serve as a threat not always deployed. But during multicentric periods, when contenders to hegemonic status rise in power and the hegemon’s economic dominance begins to decline, the hegemon will become more willing to turn to imperialistic activity. With a decline in the hegemon’s relative economic standing, global competition for privileged access to markets, resources or territory increases, and the hegemon becomes more willing than before to undertake imperialistic activity in an effort to retain or regain its waning power.5 Another related literature connects cycles of hegemony in the worldsystem to colonial expansion (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 1979: 463). Research by Boswell (1989), expanding upon Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980), provides key insights here. This research examines rates of colonization in the world-system from 1640 to 1960. It shows that, historically, periods of hegemonic competition have been associated with ‘an acceleration of colonization’ by major powers (Boswell, 1989: 192). The late 19th century, for instance, was marked by increasing challenges to British hegemony from rivals, which in turn led to an increase in colonization. The ‘scramble for Africa’ can be understood as a result of this dynamic. The alternative side of this coin is that, during periods of hegemonic stability when a single core state enjoys unqualified economic dominance, there is a relative decrease in colonization. The hegemon promotes a global free trade regime, for example, because it enjoys a comparative advantage and disavows colonization as a strategy of accumulation (Boswell, 1989). Colonization is only one form of imperialistic activity, but this research on colonization nonetheless offers another basis for hypothesizing that all forms of imperialistic activity by a state (rather than only colonization) would also increase during periods of hegemonic competition. That is, when a state faces unprecedented economic competition, imperialistic activity of all sorts would become more likely than before. Rather than employing diplomacy or relying upon free trade, the declining hegemon might not only turn to territorial expansion but also the deployment of troops, temporary military occupation, or the provision of military support to weaker allies or clients to realize its goals. This possibility for different types of imperialistic activity besides formal colonization would seem especially appropriate given changes in the global political climate. As formal colonial empires have become comparably discredited over the last century, core states seeking to extend political and economic control would be more likely to use other means besides colonial annexation. Boswell (2004: 519) intimates this possibility in a passing note: ‘The more equal the economic competition becomes as the hegemon declines, the more likely it is to use its superior military force for narrow national gains through imperial goals, rather than through the universal goals associated with hegemony.’ In short, the foregoing literature enables us to hypothesize associations between hegemonic status and imperialistic activity. According to the hypothesis, the US’s imperialistic activity does not naturally follow from hegemonic status. Nor is imperialistic activity uniformly absent because of America’s unique culture of democracy and liberalism. Instead, the hypothesis suggests that we must historicize imperialistic activity and relate it to stages in a hegemon’s career. More specifically, it would posit that hegemonic maturity correlates with less imperialistic activity on the part of the hegemon, while periods of hegemonic competition (and hence the relative decline of the hegemon) correlate with comparably more imperialistic activity. A final literature relating to this thesis derives from recent commentaries on the ‘new American imperialism’ by Harvey (2003) and Wallerstein (2003b). These commentaries first draw upon a wealth of research showing that (1) the US reached hegemonic maturity beginning in the immediate post-Second World War period but (2) its position has declined since the 1970s. This ‘widely acknowledged’ decline of US economic hegemony is evidenced on multiple fronts, displaying patterns of decline akin to the fall of prior hegemons (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik, 1995: 18). The US has lost its relative dominance in manufacturing; its trade deficit has consistently increased since the 1970s while the number of American firms dominating key industries around the world has steadily decreased; foreign investment into the US has increased as never before; and whatever economic growth the US has experienced since the 1970s has been driven by the financial sector rather than by manufacturing (Bergesen and Sahoo, 1985; Boswell, 2004; Chase-Dunn et al., 2002; Du Boff, 2003; Wallerstein, 2002a). The turn to finance is a typical index of a hegemon’s fall (Arrighi, 1994; Arrighi et al., 1999; Bergesen and Sahoo, 1985; Brenner, 2002; Wallerstein, 1984). Thus while the US still retains the largest share of world GDP, its economic dominance relative to contenders has been challenged; hence its hegemonic status has been on the path toward decline.6 To be sure, East Asia has been the fastest growing economic area in recent decades, even excluding Japan, while America’s rates of growth have fallen off (Arrighi, 1994; Corden, 1990). The rise of the EU as a competitive economic entity has posed further challenges. In 2003, the US took up 28 percent of world GDP, but the EU has 30 percent. This distribution is significantly different from 1950, when the US’s share was 50 percent; and it is not unlike the distribution of world GDP shares among contending core states in the late 19th century, when Great Britain entered its autumn (Boswell, 2004: 520–1; Du Boff, 2003: 1).7 Harvey (2003) connects America’s decline to the invasion of Iraq. Drawing upon Luxemborg’s theory of the ‘dual character’ of capital accumulation, Harvey suggests that the invasion of Iraq marks an attempt at ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in the absence of hegemonic control. By taking Iraq and its oil reserves, the US could keep control over a key resource that hegemonic competitors will need if they wish to continue their rise. The US’s unrivaled military power in the post-Cold War period feeds the dynamic. As the US enjoys military dominance but not economic hegemony, it is relying upon the former to thwart impending doom in the latter. Harvey therefore concludes that America’s intervention in the Middle East is reflective of a historical moment akin to the late 19th century, when the British economy faced novel competition from contenders like Germany and the US, and when the British responsively heightened their imperialistic activity. The ‘new imperialism’ looks more and more like the old imperialism. Wallerstein (2003a, 2003b) adds a different causal mechanism but suggests the same association between decline and imperialistic activity. Wallerstein does not contend that the war with Iraq was simply about oil; he rather claims that America’s decline has given new warrant to an expansionist and unilateral set of policies espoused by the most recent Bush administration. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, America’s relative decline and the threat of economic competition had been handled by successive presidents through the Washington consensus and diplomacy, with the goal of establishing an alliance of semi-equals under US leadership (hence the Trilateral Commission and the G7). But the ‘warhawks’ of the Bush administration, galvanized by September 11, espouse a different view: they seek a unilateral empire to regain control over the world economy. The invasion of Iraq was a way of demonstrating strength in the face of American weakness and intimidating its competitors – not least those in the EU. These commentaries on Iraq help us hypothesize an association between hegemonic decline and imperialistic activity, but they are preliminary. Critical issues remain. First, we need to better probe the timing of America’s imperialistic activity. Harvey and Wallerstein suggest that the invasion of Iraq manifests America’s decline, but nearly all research concurs that the decline began much earlier, i.e. in the 1970s. According to the thesis of decline and imperialistic activity, we would expect increased imperialistic activity to begin decades before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and even before 1991 when the first invasion of Iraq occurred. Second, we need to better explore the period before America’s decline. If decline precipitates imperialistic ventures, we would expect fewer imperialistic ventures during America’s period of hegemonic maturity (1945–1970s). Neither Harvey nor Wallerstein explore this issue. Finally, what about America’s imperialistic activity in its pre-hegemonic career? If imperialistic activity follows from hegemonic decline, what about America’s invasions of Caribbean and Central American states in the early 20th century, or the Mexican–American War in the 19th century, long before the US consolidated its hegemonic position? Can these activities also be understood in relation to our thesis of hegemonic decline and imperialistic activity? In short, while existing research and theory offer the basis for our hypothesis on hegemonic decline and imperialistic rise, further research is necessary. Specifically, we would have to take a longitudinal approach to America’s imperialistic activity, locating it in relation to America’s prehegemonic period, its period of hegemonic maturity, and then its period of decline since the 1970s. Such an investigation has yet to be conducted. My analysis offers a first step. Data: Imperialistic Activity, 1787–2003 Testing possible associations between imperialistic activity and phases in America’s career demands time-series data to see when the US has been more likely to initiate imperialistic activity. At minimum, the data should show: (1) all types of imperialistic activity – declared wars, territorial annexation, temporary military occupation, the deployment of ground troops or air forces and (2) the year in which the activity was initiated. With these data, we would be able to examine degrees of imperialistic activity over time. For example, we could look for years in which there was comparably more activity than other years. If there were years in which there was no activity but other years in which there were, say, two or three discrete instances of intervention, we would be able to conclude that the latter years represent increased imperialistic activity. We could then see if there is an association between imperialistic activity and phases in America’s hegemonic development. Did the US engage in more imperialistic activity in some phases rather than others? It follows that the data need not specify the duration of the intervention, the number of troops or resources involved in the activity. First, these dimensions might have more to do with factors besides historical phases in a state’s hegemonic career. They might, for example, reflect the amount of local resistance to the intervention, the relative amount of military resources available, or various other events. If the US military first intervenes and later escalates troops or resources, does this reflect the hegemonic status of the US, a contingent military strategy for winning the war, or unexpected local resistance? Second, comparing resources or troops over time would not be informative because of the historical development of military technology. The use of 1000 ground troops in the year 1825 is not comparable to the use of 1000 troops in 1983, because the advances in military infrastructure mean that fewer troops might be necessary in the latter intervention, even if the troops were sent for the same kind of mission (and even if the proportion of troops to local population was the same). Finally, and most importantly, measuring the number of troops or amount of resources involved does not cover all types of imperialistic activity. Colonial annexation, for example, does not always require the deployment of ground troops (it has happened simply by treaty between two powers) and air strikes on another country would not necessitate the use of ground troops either. In short, at stake in my analysis is not the duration of the activity or the amount of resources involved, but whether and when imperialistic activity occurred at all. The issue is the decision on the part of the government to reach and act beyond its borders – either by the deployment of troops, the use of air strikes, sending military support or temporary military occupation. Admittedly, focusing upon the decision to initiate activity does not take into account differences between the types of activities. But the decision to engage in imperialistic activity is nonetheless the best measure for my purposes. First, the decision to intervene marks a willingness on the part of the state to exercise overt power in areas beyond its borders. Despite the differences between the types of actions taken, this is an important act. The state could have had other options – it might have sought to realize its goals through diplomacy, covert actions or economic means. Compared with these other possibilities, the decision to annex territory, occupy a foreign country or send troops for battle are all part of the same category indexing willingness on the part of the state to reach beyond its borders and overtly try to control the affairs of other countries. Second, due to measurement issues noted earlier, without isolating the decision to intervene and using that as the key indicator it would be difficult to put imperialistic activities into a single class for addressing the issue at stake. At stake are possible relationships between hegemonic status and the willingness to reach beyond one’s borders. As the amount of resources used might not reflect hegemonic status but instead be spurious with the strategic decision of a single military general or the amount of local resistance posed, focusing on the decision to intervene offers a rough control for these factors. While focusing on the decision to intervene has limitations, it is a practical and useful measure for conducting a long-range historical analysis. Even then, collecting time-series data on all imperialistic activities by the US is not an easy task. Scholars have tracked wars or particular kinds of military operations, but they have not yet compiled a full database on all imperialistic activity.8 My attempt to construct a comprehensive database begins with a list complied by the State Department and Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Library of Congress (Collier, 1993). This list is useful as a start because it covers ‘instances of the use of United States forces abroad’ from 1798 to 1993. It represents ‘a judgment as to which US armed interventions overseas represented major military actions’ and provides, for each action, a date and a very brief description (US Congress, 1970: 15). The actions include official and undeclared wars, naval operations and uses of air force, troop deployments and land invasions, and provision of direct military support to other nations. However, the list does not cover: (1) annexation of territory and/or colonial rule or (2) activity from 1994 to 2003 and prior to 1798. I fill these gaps using other sources. Using secondary sources, I added activities prior to 1798 and all territorial annexations and colonial occupations (Eblen, 1968; Hensel and Mitchell, 2003; LaFeber, 1989).9 To fill the gap from 1994 to 2003, I used data collected by the Federation of American Scientists, which covers all cases of American military deployment beyond US borders around the world from 1991 to 2003.10 The result is a total of 256 separate instances of imperialistic activity taking place across 216 years. The data can in turn be divided into two main types. The first is timeseries data revealing the number of discrete instances that were initiated per year. This roughly measures the willingness of the US to engage in imperialistic activity for any given year. The second database contains information on each instance: not only the year initiated but also the place of intervention and form of intervention based upon the description provided in the original lists. Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview. Table 1 breaks the instances into six main categories: official or declared wars; temporary military occupations (over one year); ground troop invasions or deployments (excluding declared wars and occupations); naval and/or air operations (e.g. bombing, naval attacks); use of troops, naval or air Table 1 Forms of American Imperialistic Activity, 1787–2003 Form No. Percentage Official wars Temporary military occupations Ground troop invasionsa Naval and air operations Provision of military support Territorial annexation and formal colonial controlb 5 32 151 27 15 26 2 12.5 59 10.5 6 10 Total 256 a b Excluding official wars. Includes establishment of protectorates (1). Table 2 Regions of Intervention Africa Asiaa Caribbean and Central America Europe and East Europe Middle East and North Africa (high Islamic concentration) North American continent and Mexico Pacific South America Southeast Asia Total a 100 Includes Japan, China, Korea, India and Russia. No. Percentage 18 39 65 21 7 15.2 25.4 8.2 35 29 21 18 10 13.7 11.3 8.2 7 3.9 256 100 force as military support to another country or movement in that country; and, finally, territorial annexation and formal colonialism (the latter excluding temporary occupations). Table 2 then breaks the data down by the world region in which they occurred, showing that imperialistic activity has been extensive, covering various regions of the world and multiple countries. For the time-series data I should clarify that by ‘discrete’ instances I mean to separate the decisions by the US to conduct an imperialistic activity. For example, the US declaration of war against Germany that was part of the Second World War is coded as one instance; the occupation of Germany afterwards is counted as another instance. I do not count all of the many subsequent military actions and battles occurring during the Second World War because they are all part of the initial decision to go to war. Alternatively, acts of military occupation or annexation that might have come after the war are counted separately. Winning a war is one thing; the decision to then occupy the territory (as the US did with Germany and Japan) or annex it, is a significantly different decision. One can win a war and then leave, as the US did with Iraq in 1991; or one can win a war and then take further actions that require different decision-making processes by the president or Congress. The latter was the case with the Spanish–American War of 1898. Congress declared war (one instance), but after victory it took separate decisions to then annex former Spanish territories (another instance). It also took a separate decision to occupy Cuba. Waves over Time It is now time to examine the data in more detail. Consider the total number of imperialistic activities initiated per year (Figure 1). The data raise three overarching points. First, while there are some years in which no new imperialistic activity was initiated, successive years when no activity was initiated are few. For example, there are only four periods when no activity was initiated over four consecutive years or more: (1) 1787–92; (2) 1877–81; (3) 1923–31; (4) 1935–9. Second, the activity is punctuated by periods of high frequency and amplitude. For instance, there are clear periods of successive or uninterrupted activity; that is periods where, each year, a new intervention was initiated: 1812–20; 1840–6; 1851–60; 1910–22; and 1980–2001. Additionally, accompanying and surrounding these periods are years of high amplitude. From 1812 to 1827, for example, there were at least four years in which there were two instances of intervention; from 1898 to 1926 there were at least six years in which the amplitude was at least three; and so on. If we consider both frequency and amplitude, we can roughly locate four waves of imperialistic activity; that is, periods of comparably high frequency (majority of C B D A Figure 1 Counts of Imperialistic Activity over Time years having activity) and high amplitude (two or more instances per year). These waves together add up to 185 instances of a total 256: close to three-quarters of all of America’s imperialistic activities from 1787 to 2003. In between these waves we find periods of comparably less activity (Figure 2). If we look at all of the waves together we come to the third and final point. The waves are all high in frequency and amplitude relative to other periods but they differ from each other, revealing a slow rise and relative decline in imperialistic activity over the course of American history. There is a slow increase in amplitude over time, from Waves A and B to Wave C. Wave C, from 1898 to 1926, marks a peak period. Then from Wave C to the final Wave D (1981–2003) there is a relative decline. In short, over America’s career, there has been a slow increase in imperialistic activity, peaking in the years 1898–1914, and then a relative decrease. The only hitch to this larger trend is that the decline of activity marked by Wave Waves (high frequency and amplitude) Low activity (low frequency and amplitude) 1787–1809 A. 1810–25 1826–39 B. 1840–70 1871–97 C. 1898–1926 1926–80 D. 1981–2003 Figure 2 Waves of Imperialistic Activity D does not suggest a trend toward cessation. The final wave is lower in amplitude than the peak period of 1898 to 1926 (Wave C), but it is much higher in frequency and amplitude than the first two waves. During Wave A there were no years in which more than two events were initiated, and the wave is broken by a couple of troughs. But during Wave D, the amplitude is higher and there is an uninterrupted succession of imperialistic activity. Thus, if there has been a relative decline in imperialistic activity after the peak in the early 20th century, imperialistic activity has leveled off at a relatively higher amplitude than when imperialistic activity began in the early 18th century. Lest we be hasty, we should more closely probe these waves. What exactly do they represent? Do they each represent a concentrated imperialistic tendency or something else altogether? It is tempting to attribute the waves to a single event, such that the waves are but a series of interrelated instances prompted by the event. For instance, at first glance, each of the waves appear to coincide with major wars. In my coding scheme, a war regardless of its extent or duration is coded as a single instance, but any single war could in turn be related to various other instances. For example, the first part of Wave C (1898–1926) began with the Spanish– American War, which in turn led to other activities, e.g. the acquisition of Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam from Spain, as well as the occupation of Cuba. Similarly, Wave A coincides with the War of 1812 against the British; Wave B with the Mexican War (which in turn led to the annexation of Texas); and the final Wave D includes the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003, not to mention the occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the invasion of Afghanistan after September 11. If the waves are attributable solely to single events such as wars, they would not be of much interest. They would indicate little else than the historical rhythm of inter-state conflict. Or they would express a single contingent event (e.g. September 11). But this is not the case. First, not all major periods of war led to related increases in activity. After the Second World War, the US occupied Germany and Japan, but it did not then proceed to intervene in other countries with the same frequency or amplitude as it did after the much smaller war with Spain in 1898. Second, not all of the instances constituting the waves are directly related to or aimed at a single state. During Wave A, the US not only waged war with the British on the North American continent, it also attacked Algiers, landed troops in Tripoli and sent forces to Cuba and Puerto Rico. During Wave C, the US seized Spain’s former colonies, but it also sent an expedition to China in 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion. It also acquired Samoa, took control of Panama and landed forces in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Nicaragua. In short, the waves are not simply contingent upon a single event or accidental. Instead, they indicate periods when the US has been comparably more willing to engage in overt activity in a variety of places, by various means, and arguably for multiple purposes besides defeating a single enemy amid war. They are waves of imperialism, akin to what political scientists otherwise call periods of ‘extroversion’ as opposed to introversion: a period of foreign policy orientation marked by ‘a nation’s willingness to bring its influence to bear upon other nations . . . outside its borders’ (Klingberg, 1952: 239; 1996). The same point relates to understanding the so-called ‘new imperialism’ manifested by the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Harvey, 2003). The data here show that this new imperialism is not so new. It is not, for example, simply a result of the war on terror since September 11; nor does it reflect the presumed ‘warhawks’ in the administration of George W. Bush (see Wallerstein, 2002a: 66). Our longitudinal analysis suggests that America’s recent imperialistic activity in the Middle East cannot be isolated in this way. It is rather part of a larger wave that began in the 1980s, long before September 11. The Gulf War of 1991 is part of this wave; but so too are ground troop deployments and/or naval operations in Somalia, Zaire, Bosnia, Haiti, Nigeria, Libya and Saudi Arabia, among other instances. Together, these activities manifest a period of increased extroversion on the part of the US that is irreducible to the post-September 11 era or to the administration of George W. Bush. This is a point that would go unnoticed unless we take the longitudinal view offered here. Without seeing this activity in relation to the prior period of low frequency and amplitude and to prior waves of imperialistic activity, we might easily overlook it. Detecting the most recent wave, therefore, offers preliminary support to our thesis on American economic decline and imperialistic activity. As noted, Harvey (2003) and Wallerstein (2003a) have suggested that imperialistic activity is associated with America’s economic decline since the 1970s. But neither have made explicit or demonstrated the logical extensions of the claim: (1) that US imperialistic activity was less during America’s period of hegemonic maturity and (2) that imperialistic activity should have increased not since 2003 but much earlier – that is, following the beginning of decline in the 1970s. Our data reveal that both have happened. First, as the US enjoyed unqualified hegemonic dominance after the Second World War, its imperialistic activity was comparably less in frequency and amplitude than in previous or later periods. As a hegemon, the US relied less and less upon overt coercion. In this sense the Korean and the Vietnam wars figure as exceptions that prove the rule. Second, the subsequent decline in America’s relative economic position since the 1970s and the concomitant rise of hegemonic contenders have coincided with a new wave of imperialistic activity. Compared with the prior period of hegemonic dominance, the US has engaged in more imperialistic activity more often. I return to this issue later. But first, to obtain a richer contextual understanding of hegemonic status and imperialistic activity we would also have to consider the previous waves in America’s career. The data suggest that the US may have decreased its imperialistic activity during its period of hegemonic maturity, and it may be increasing it amid its relative demise, but how can we make sense of its pre-hegemonic activities, that is, the previous waves in the 19th century and early 20th century? A closer look at the data, contextualized within the rhythm of America’s national development and world-system politics, offers some insights. In particular, it leads us to a critical corollary to our hegemonic competition thesis. That is, increased imperialistic activity is not only associated with the relative decline of a hegemon, but also with the rise to power of any given hegemon. Regarding America’s career more specifically, this means that the earlier waves of imperialism accompanied a three-fold movement: the first wave marks America’s rise to regional domination, the second wave corresponds with its rise to hemispheric domination, and the third wave in the early 20th century marks America’s rise to global hegemony. In the next section I elaborate this through a closer analysis of the pre-hegemonic waves. Waves in America’s Pre-Hegemonic Career The earliest wave in America’s pre-hegemonic career, beginning c. 1810, marked America’s attempt to secure regional dominance, first by controlling contiguous territory and casting off threats from rival European powers on the American contingent. The War of 1812 with England was part of this wave, and one of its direct results was the seizure of Pensacola (1814). The US also occupied Oregon territory, which had been claimed by Russia and Spain. It further occupied parts of Spanish Florida and took Amelia Island (1812) with the explicit goal of preventing occupation by any other power. Fittingly, near the end of this wave, President Monroe gave his 1823 annual message later known as the Monroe Doctrine. Monroe bragged that over the previous decades the US had acquired vast new territories and had ended interference by Britain, France, Russia and Spain. He concluded: ‘the American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers’ (Crapol, 1979: 414). This early wave was also aimed at securing mercantile power in America’s immediate region. Merchants had seen threats to their activities beginning in 1808, and trade with Latin America and Caribbean countries offered some hope – that is, as long as the Spanish and British could be kept out and freebooters contained (LaFeber, 1989: 81). Fittingly, many of the interventions in this period took place in the Caribbean (Cuba, Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo) and they involved troop landings to chase down or suppress ‘freebooters’, pirates, or ‘marauders’ (US Congress, 1970: 50–3). Other instances in this wave took place much further across the seas, such as the attacks on Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. But in fact most imperialistic activity during this wave took place within the region. Of the 19 instances constituting the wave, seven occurred in the Caribbean and nine occurred on the continent, including Mexico (see Table 3 later). A period of regional stability followed. The US first entered into treaties with Britain and Russia and remained comparably unfettered by European political interference. It likewise entered its period of ‘nascent industrialization’, developed its cotton trade and began building its railroad complex (Agnew, 1987: 39–43). True, these developments involved massive settlement westward. But for the most part, these decades mark a period of relative introversion. Overt uses of force and military occupations of new territory declined in amplitude and frequency. As opposed to 19 instances during the 15 years constituting Wave A from 1810 to 1825, there were only seven instances during the 14-year period of 1826 to 1839. Secondary studies of the period affirm the comparably introverted state of affairs. Andrew Jackson did not refer to foreign relations in his inaugural address of 1829 and took a ‘relatively moderate attitude toward France’ and its activities on the continent (Klingberg, 1952: 240). The US also declared neutrality in the war between Texas and Mexico (1835–6), rejected the request of Texas for annexation (1837–8) and settled boundary disputes with Britain through compromise settlements (1837–42) (Klingberg, 1952). In other words, the US first employed imperialistic activity to establish control in the region. Once it established its control, it was able to solidify it through treaties and compromises that no longer demanded imperialistic exertions. According to Agnew (1987), the next period beginning in 1840 marked America’s ‘era of national industrialization’. But my data also show that this period, from 1840 to 1870, marked the second wave of imperialistic activity with a total of 52 instances. While the previous wave marks America’s rise to regional dominance, this wave represents America’s consolidation of hemispheric dominance. Only 10 of the 52 instances involved activities in or around contiguous territory on the continent. The US occupied Texas and then annexed it; went to war with Mexico and occupied Mexico City (hence the line from the marines’ hymn, ‘the Halls of Montezuma’) and took the Gadsen territory (1853), Oregon (1846) and purchased Alaska from Russia (1867). The other instances occurred outside the continent but nonetheless represent the consolidation of hemispheric dominance. For example, interventions into the Caribbean and Latin America doubled in number from the first wave. This suggests that the US, having secured mercantile control, sought to expand it westward, looking for profitable passageways to the Pacific through Nicaragua and Panama. The Gadsen Purchase from Mexico was part of this endeavor; and American forces were deployed in Nicaragua at least twice. Merchants also intensified their interest in places like Cuba and Santo Domingo, leading to various instances of force in those areas.11 The US also looked to the AsiaPacific area as never before. The majority of instances in this second wave took place there (22 instances), while none had taken place during the first wave. America’s continental expansion and dominance over the hemisphere, therefore, was part and parcel of the drive for the Asia market (Graebner, 1983). Indeed, popular magazines noted in 1852 that the ‘far west’ was not only about California but also ‘the isles of the Japanese Empire’ and ‘the shores of China’; while Secretary of State William Seward argued that exports to Asia would help make the US ‘the great power of the earth’ (LaFeber, 1989: 129–32). Thus, attempts to get Japan to open up to American goods in the 1850s led to various naval demonstrations of naval force; and troops were deployed on various occasions to Formosa, Korea and China. Similarly, just as Walt Whitman’s 1860 poem ‘The New Empire’ suggested that the Pacific would become the ‘vast highway’ to Asia, various instances of American force took place in the Pacific (LaFeber, 1989: 130). The American navy moved into Samoa, Fiji and Drummond Island in the early 1840s – which in turn led to military attacks upon native islanders. The US also annexed small uninhabited islands in the Pacific during the 1850s and 1860s, including the Midway Islands, Baker Island, Jarvis Island and the Johnston Atoll. While the first two waves accompanied America’s movement from regional to hemispheric dominance, these developments in turn set the stage for the third wave (Wave C) from 1898 to 1926. This began America’s rise to global hegemony. Indeed, as the US had come to dominate the hemisphere, and as its economy made the decisive turn toward modern industrialization, it had likewise become a contender for global dominance. This period also coincides with Britain’s demise and increased hegemonic competition from other European powers like Germany. As is well known, the first corollary of this multicentric period was an increase in colonization around the world by both Britain and its competitors. But my data suggest a related process: as European powers scrambled to colonize amid their economic contest, so too did the US join the contest and resort to increased imperialistic activity. Fittingly, during this wave, the US finally seized the Panama Canal and began its modern era of colonization. It took Puerto Rico, Guam, Samoa and the Philippines as formal colonies while also occupying Cuba. Additionally, as Table 3 shows, imperialistic activity reached further down from the Caribbean into Latin America and accelerated its activities in the Asia-Pacific region. All the while it decreased Table 3 Imperialistic Activity: Wave Period and Region Africa Asia-Pacific Caribbean, Central and South America Europe and East Europe Middle East and North Africa North American continent and Mexico Total (=185) 1810–25 1840–70 1898–1926 1981–2003 1 0 3 22 1 22 10 2 7 1 1 14 1 2 35 3 5 7 7 20 9 10 2 0 19 52 68 46 its activities on the contingent and contiguous areas. In other words, once the US consolidated its regional and hemispheric control, it no longer resorted to force in those areas and instead looked further outward to new frontiers.12 Preliminary evidence suggests that this wave was indeed important for establishing America’s later hegemonic position in the world. After 1898, the US markedly increased its military capacities. In the aftermath of the Spanish–American War, while it began to occupy its colonies, the US rationalized its military apparatus and extended its naval power. Prior to that, the American military was in sore need of reform and expansion, and the war gave military proponents opportunity to insist upon increases in military expenditure. Expenditure did increase, even before the First World War was portended (Kennedy, 1987: 247–8). Further, the occupation of Guam, Samoa and the Philippines gave the US a critical military position in the Pacific and Asia, making it an ‘Asiatic power’ (Kennedy, 1987: 246). Troops that invaded China in 1900 and afterwards came from the bases in the Philippines; while naval ships rested in Guam, Hawaii and Samoa. Economically, the wave was arguably just as important. The construction of the Panama Canal, for example, facilitated unprecedented movement of capital, not to mention warships. With the canal, the distance between New York and San Francisco by boat shrank from 13,615 miles to 5300 miles (LaFeber, 1989: 230). We can look at other figures for further affirmation of this story. If the first waves were concomitant with America’s rise to global hegemony, we would expect a corresponding increase in its national capacity relative to other nations. The best measure for such capacity is the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). Based upon annual values for six measures of capacity for war mobilization (total population urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel and military expenditure) from 1816 to 2001, the index is a composite score given to each nation that reflects the nation’s capacity relative to other nations in the world-system. When put longitudinally alongside America’s imperialistic activity, we first see that after each of the first three waves there is a slight jump in the score (see Figure 3). We also see that, in the longer run, the score increases along with increases in the amplitude of imperialistic activity. This measure is not a measure of hegemony: hegemony is relative preponderance over the world economy, while the CINC measure is the capacity for resource mobilization (which includes war capacity rather than only economic-productive capacity). But it does serve as one indication that imperialistic activity was part and parcel of America’s rise to global hegemony. Hegemonic Maturity and Restraint If imperialistic activity has accompanied America’s rise to hegemony, what happened during America’s period as a hegemon? Existing research has already noted various characteristics of America’s period of hegemonic maturity beginning after the Second World War. For example, in 1953, even after most of Europe’s wartime damage had been repaired, Europe’s share of world manufacturing output was 26 percent, while the US’s share 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 No. imperialist interventions Figure 3 a 2003 1994 1985 1976 1967 1958 1949 1940 1931 1922 1913 1904 1895 1886 1877 1868 1859 1850 1841 1832 1823 1814 1805 1796 1787 0 CINC*10 US Imperialistic Activity and the Composite Index of National Capability a CINC score multiplied by 10 for graphic representation. was 45 percent. Ten years later, in 1963, these proportions remained the same (Chase-Dunn et al., 2002: 14; Kennedy, 1987: 368). The US in this period was the undisputed economic hegemon. My data disclose a correlate to this period of American hegemony: the US engaged in comparably less imperialistic activity than before (the early 20th century) and later (the 1980s–2003). Consider the 34-year period marking hegemonic maturity, from 1946 to 1980. During this period, the US initiated 25 discrete imperialistic actions. In contrast, during the prior 34 years, before the US entered the Second World War, it initiated 46 imperialistic activities. And from 1980 to 2003, an even shorter period than the period of hegemonic maturity, the US initiated 46 imperialistic activities as well (Table 4).13 But if the US engaged in comparably less imperialistic activity during this period, how exactly did it exert power in the global system? We can pinpoint four interrelated means, all of which are different from the use of coercion or colonialism. The first was ideological leadership. Historically, hegemons emerge in the wake of global war, such that the world looks for new political leadership that might offer a ‘vision of the world’. As Wallerstein puts it: ‘The Dutch offered religious tolerance (cuius regio, eius religio), respect for national sovereignty (Westphalia), and mare liberium. The British offered the vision of the liberal state in Europe moving towards constitutionalism and political incorporation of the “dangerous classes”, the gold standard, and the end of slavery. The United States offered multiparty elections, human rights, and (moderate) decolonization, and free movement of capital’ (Wallerstein, 2002b: 358; see also Arrighi, 1994: 65–6). To this we might add that the US offered a model of industrialization and economic ‘development’ that helped to make it ‘an object of respect, acclaim, and imitation’ (Modelski, 1978: 228). True, the US engaged in covert operations during this period, but the fact of covert activity would attest to the point. In its attempt to stand as an ideological leader upholding liberal ideals, the US likely turned to covert machinations so as to prevent blemishes on its ideological leadership. Second, the US operated through diplomacy and a global political network of support. For example, the US constructed a network of alliances with industrialized countries, in part enhanced by opposition to the Soviet Union. Just as the Dutch forged an alliance with England Table 4 No. of Imperialistic Activities Initiated by the United States, 1907–2003 Years 1907–40 1946–80 1981–2003 Historical phase Number Pre-hegemony Hegemonic maturity and beginning of decline Decline 46 25 46 against the French, and just as the British forged an alliance with France against Russia, Austria and Prussia, the US created the US–Japan Defense Treaty and NATO against the Soviet Union and its allies (Wallerstein, 2002b: 358). Even the US’s relations with the Soviet Union had key characteristics of diplomacy. The Yalta Agreement, according to Wallerstein (2003b), served as one basis for relative political stability in the worldsystem. The fact that the Cold War period was marked by a ‘long postwar peace’ rather than continual disruption and war attests to the effects of such diplomacy (Kegley, 1991; Waltz, 1979). Furthermore, the US constructed a network of clientelism with regimes in the so-called ‘developing’ world. The support given by the US to dictatorial regimes (from the Shah in Iran to Marcos in the Philippines, from the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua to Mobutu in Congo) is the most notorious of this network (Afoaku, 2000). One might plausibly argue that the US subcontracted the use of direct coercion to these regimes rather than having to employ coercion itself. It had even, in the immediate postwar years, financed the remnants of the British empire for similar ends (Louis and Robinson, 1994). In any case, it is clear that such relationships and associated arrangements served as a key mechanism for US power in this period. They meant that Washington moved ‘into a position from which it could control the essential framework of world affairs just as fully as London had for much of the nineteenth century’ (Smith, 1981: 183–4). The third dimension was related: financial power. To solidify its alliances, the US created bilateral and multilateral trade agreements as well as providing critical support for international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. It simultaneously constructed series of aid packages, from the Marshall Plan for Japan and Europe to military and financial aid to the developing world. As Mandelbaum (1988) notes, this was a general policy of ‘providing support to friendly states to help keep them in order and defend American interests in their regions while minimizing the presence of the American military’. Under Nixon’s rule, for example, the US sold arms to Iran, ‘which the Nixon administration hoped would serve as a surrogate for the United States in the Persian gulf’ (Mandelbaum, 1988: 178). At the same time, those outside of the network or those who were recalcitrant within it were subjected to financial discipline or economic sanctions. Indeed, the use of economic sanctions by the US and its allies increased significantly in the post-Second World War period. Financial power in this sense served as a ‘substitute’ for direct military intervention or war (Pollins, 1994). This manifests what Lake (1991: 113) calls the ‘first face of hegemony’; that is, the use of positive and negative sanctions rather than direct coercion. All of the foregoing exercises in power, fourth, were part and parcel of the proliferation of US troops and military bases around the globe, beyond the initial outposts created in the Caribbean and Pacific during America’s pre-hegemonic stage. In many cases, the US was allowed to establish military bases in other countries in exchange for economic support and aid. In any case, the proliferation was profound. As a 1970 report by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations noted, the US by the mid-1960s ‘was firmly committed to more than forty-three nations by treaty and agreement and had some 375 major foreign military bases and 3,000 minor military facilities spread all over the world’ (quoted in Sandars, 2000: 9). This proliferation would affirm Modelski’s (1978: 229) seminal description of how matured hegemons operate. Rather than expanding territorially in the imperialist mode (i.e. colonial annexation), hegemons mobilize large resources and complex networks that require nodes, or bases, but which are ‘explicitly designed to minimize territorial entanglements’.14 To be sure, America’s global military network might have enhanced the possibility for imperialistic activity but, given the fact that less imperialistic activity was initiated in this period, the threat of force was likely the prop of America’s political power rather than direct, repeated and consistent coercion. In light of the foregoing discussion, it would be fitting to conceive of American power in this period as a sort of informal imperialism. Rather than relying upon military deployments, occupation or colonial annexation, American empire from 1945 onward involved – as contemporary British observers such as Lord Beloff noted – ‘the propping up of states and regimes through advice and assistance, and in the last resort military guarantees’ (quoted in Sandars, 2000: 11). In this sense, American power in this period was very similar to British power during England’s phase of hegemonic maturity in the mid-19th century. As Robinson and Gallagher (1953) noted long ago, Victorian Britain preferred to exercise world power not through colonial conquest but financial loans, military support to weaker states and diplomacy. The historian Stephen Howe (2003) suggests that Robinson and Gallagher may have been prompted in their analysis of the British informal empire by their observations of American power in the post-Second World War period. As William Roger Louis wrote in 1986: ‘Robinson and Gallagher’s Victorians would have recognized the methods of post World War II Americans’ (quoted in Sandars, 2000: 11). Admittedly, we should not overestimate the parallels between the British and American periods of hegemonic maturity.15 American military power since 1945, for example, has been much greater than British power during the 19th century (Modelski and Thompson, 1988; Russett, 1985: 211–12). Still, the fact that the US enjoyed such superior military force but nonetheless engaged in comparably less imperialistic activity than before or later suggests a critical parallel with the British case. Regardless of military capacities, the period of America’s hegemonic maturity was marked by less rather than more imperialistic activity. Hegemonic Fall and Imperialistic Rise Signs of change emerge when we examine America’s activities from the 1980s through today. In contrast to the hegemonic maturity phase, imperialistic activity has increased, suggesting a new wave of activity. The wave began with interventions into Panama, Grenada, El Salvador, Honduras, Bolivia, Chad, Sinai, Egypt, Libya, the Persian Gulf and Lebanon in the 1980s. The wave then proceeded through the 1990s and included interventions into Iraq, Somalia, Kuwait, Zaire, Bosnia, Croatia, Haiti, Sudan and Nigeria, not to mention the most occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq.16 While the frequency and amplitude of imperialistic activity identify this recent wave, the type of imperialistic activity is also notable. I coded all the different types of activities into two main categories: (1) expansionist-aggressive and (2) policing. The first category includes military occupations, territorial annexations, official wars, the deployment of troops for combat and air strikes. The second category, ‘policing’, includes the use of naval, air or ground troops for evacuation, protection of citizens, humanitarian assistance, election supervision, patrolling and military advising or support.17 If we examine their distribution over time, we find that the current wave is different from the imperialistic activities during America’s period of hegemonic maturity while also standing very similar to America’s previous waves (Table 5). Prior to America’s period of hegemonic maturity, imperialistic activity was almost evenly divided between expansionist-aggressive and policing activities. Then, during America’s period of hegemonic maturity, the relatively few instances of imperialistic activity that the US had in fact initiated tended towards policing. Finally, amid the last wave, from 1981 to 2003, there was a decline in policing activities and a corresponding increase in the proportion of expansionist-aggressive activities. This reveals a parallel to the past: the Table 5 Type of Imperialistic Activities over Time, 1907–2003 Activity type % (No.) Years 1787–1945 1946–80 1981–2003 Historical phase Pre-hegemony Hegemonic maturity and beginning of decline Decline Expansionistaggressive Policing Total 53 (98) 24 (6)0 47 (88) 76 (19) 100 (186) 100 (25)0 54 (25) 46 (21) 100 (46)0 most recent wave is akin to previous waves of heightened imperialistic activity during America’s pre-hegemonic career. It also suggests a notable contrast with America’s period of hegemonic maturity. Not only has the US increased its imperialistic activity in terms of frequency and amplitude as it has experienced economic decline, its imperialistic activities have become more and more aggressive. Finally, this suggests another parallel with the British cycle. Just as the British expanded their imperialistic activities amid unprecedented economic competition and relative decline in the late 19th century, so has the US since in the early 1980s, just after the economic crises of the 1970s and the beginning of America’s relative decline.18 Is this association between hegemonic decline and increased imperialistic activity spurious? While my analysis does not offer proof of causation, this question is still worth considering. We might wonder, for example, whether the emergence of the most recent wave simply reflects the end of the Cold War. It might be the case that the US was restrained to initiate imperialistic activity from 1945 onward because it feared the Soviet threat and because it likewise remained true to the Yalta Agreement. It would then follow that the end of the Cold War, and hence the end of the Soviet threat, rendered American power unfettered, such that the US increased its imperialistic activity as a direct result. Cold War politics would then explain both the relative lack of imperialistic activity since 1945 as well as the emergence of the most recent wave. There is obvious merit to this argument. As Bacevich (2002) suggests, the end of the Cold War surely enabled the US to use its military power with less fear of retaliation than during the Cold War. Still, there are reasons for not reducing the recent wave to the end of the Cold War. First, Cold War politics did not fully restrain American power from 1945 to 1989. Interventions into Korea and Vietnam, among other instances, show that the US was indeed willing to engage in imperialistic activity despite the military threat of the Soviet Union. But, Korea and Vietnam could stand as exceptions that prove the rule. As noted, there was comparably little imperialistic activity during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in terms of frequency and amplitude. But the fact that the US engaged in imperialistic activity at all suggests that the Soviet threat was not a full restraint upon American power. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the recent wave of high amplitude and frequency in imperialistic activity began before the fall of the Soviet Union. The wave began in the early 1980s, not the 1990s. It is true that some of the activities in the 1980s took place in America’s traditional sphere of influence, such as the deployment of troops to Grenada in 1983 and the invasion of Panama in 1988. But many others also took place outside the western hemisphere (not least in the Middle East, as I show shortly). If not Cold War politics, we might further wonder whether the increases in imperialistic activity simply reflect increased political instability in the world. The claim here would be that the 1980s saw increased inter-state conflicts and wars, internal political crises, civil wars and associated political violence, and the US responded in equal measure, acting as little else than a global policeman responding to calls for order (see, for example, Haas, 1994). To test this claim we can examine data on ‘Major Episodes of Political Violence’ from 1946 to 2004. Collected by the Center for Systemic Peace, the dataset includes all instances of intra-state and inter-state violence, from armed conflicts and wars between states to insurgencies and civil wars within them. If America’s recent wave was only due to such events, we would expect relatively stable levels of intrastate and inter-state disputes, crises and political violence from 1945 to the 1980s. This would correspond with America’s relatively low level of imperialistic activity. We would then expect an increase from the 1980s until today, thereby suggesting that America’s recent wave reflected the increase. But the data do not show these characteristics (Figure 4). First, there was a steady increase in political violence from 1945 to the early 1990s rather than a relatively stable level of political violence from 1945 to 1980. Furthermore, there was a steady decrease from 1990 to 2003. This decrease does not correspond with US imperialistic activity either. If the US acted as the world’s policeman from 1945 to 2003, it did not respond according to the opportunities presented. 70 Instances of political violence (no.) 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1945 Figure 4 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 Intra- and Inter-State Political Violence, 1945–2003 1990 1995 2000 A final characteristic of the recent wave is worth noting. Specifically, most of America’s imperialistic activity during the most recent wave has taken place in the Middle East, whereas previous waves have taken place elsewhere. Out of the 46 activities from 1981 to 2003, close to half were in the Middle East and/or North Africa. The fact that the US has become increasingly dependent upon oil since 1945 is well known. The notion that the US, due to such dependence, has been increasingly concerned with political stability and allies in the Middle East follows. The data are therefore notable. Earlier I showed that the first three waves took place in regions associated with the phases in America’s growth toward hegemonic maturity. The US first initiated activity on the continent, then increasingly turned toward Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia. The fact that the final wave is marked by increased interventions into the Middle East suggests a logical extension. If the US has reached outward amid its rise to hegemonic maturity, so too has it increasingly reached into the Middle East amid its fall from hegemonic maturity. This might be a further index of America’s increasing desperation amid its relative demise. As Harvey (2003) notes, control over oil would serve as a counterweight to the rise of the EU and Asian powers that have emerged as serious contenders to American hegemony. Further, control over the Middle East would provide the US with ‘a powerful US military bridgehead on the Eurasian land mass’ that would in turn give it a ‘powerful geostrategic position in Eurasia with at least the potentiality to disrupt any consolidation of a Eurasian power’ (Harvey, 2003: 85). In other words, while the US’s recent wave has appeared amid its fall from hegemonic maturity, it might likewise manifest a last-ditch effort by the US to ward off impending doom – acts of desperation amid the threat of demise. This, of course, remains a speculation. Further research would be necessary to validate it and explore causal mechanisms. But the correlation between increased imperialistic activity in the Middle East before September 11 and America’s relative fall from hegemonic maturity suggests that such research would not be unfounded. Conclusion Unlike existing talk of the ‘American empire’, the preceding analysis has put America’s recent overseas ventures into a historical frame, thereby showing previously occluded associations between phases in America’s career on the one hand and its imperialistic activity on the other. Admittedly, the analysis has been broad. The broad scope had been necessary for a historical overview of imperialistic activity, but it has also impeded a more intensive analysis. For one thing, I have not differentiated between types of hegemonic competition. The moments of competition during America’s earliest pre-hegemonic waves (in the 19th century) might not have been associated with economic competition alone but also territorial competition (or some complex articulation of the two). Further, our analysis has not explored causal mechanisms. It has found an association between stages in America’s hegemonic career on the one hand and, on the other, the frequency and amplitude of imperialistic activity, but it has not fully explored the causal mechanisms leading from one to the other. Clearly, more research is needed on this. We might focus upon specific instances of imperialistic activity; trace the perceptions of policy-makers that might have shaped them; and the connections between economic rise or decline on the one hand and specific imperialistic activities on the other. Still, such examinations of causal mechanisms would be possible only after first acknowledging the historical associations disclosed in this article. If future research is needed, this study has laid the groundwork by locating patterns typically overlooked. My analysis has likewise opened up the possibility for comparing US dynamics with the dynamics of other empires. For example, a look at existing studies of British global power suggests associations between phases in Britain’s hegemonic career and imperialistic activity such as the kind I have found here. As noted earlier, the British were less inclined to engage in overt imperialism during their period of hegemonic maturity and instead preferred to rely upon client regimes. However, they embarked upon a new wave of aggressive imperial activities in the late 19th century, just as they began to decline in hegemonic status due to new competition from Germany, the US, and later Japan and Russia. As Paul Kennedy suggests, these were new ‘imperialist measures to ward off decline’ (Kennedy, 1984: 38). It remains to be seen whether my framework can also be applied to other countries and their imperialistic practices beyond the US and Great Britain.19 Even if we bracket issues of causation and comparison, however, the analysis as it stands offers a significant amendment to current claims about the US and its imperialistic activity. As noted in the introduction, one claim is that hegemony naturally carries imperialistic impulses, and that this is a good thing for world stability and order (Ferguson, 2004). The evidence adduced in this article suggests the reverse relationship: rather than engaging in more imperialistic activity amid hegemonic maturity, the US has engaged in comparably less. When the US has engaged in more imperialistic activity, it is associated with its rise to and fall from hegemony. The other dominant claim is that the US has been a traditionally ‘reluctant’ superpower due to its ‘democratic culture and institutions’. Supposedly, this ‘reluctant character of American hegemony is seen in the absence of a strong imperial impulse to directly dominate or manage weaker or secondary states’ (Ikenberry, 2001: 204). Our examination, however, has shown the limits of this claim. While we have found that the US has indeed appeared ‘reluctant’ to engage in imperialistic activity, this reluctance is historically specific – particular to the period of hegemonic maturity from 1945 to the 1970s. To confuse this specificity with an ostensibly essential American ‘culture’ or national character runs the risk of mistaking particulars for universals and history for some kind of national essence. It would belie the historical waxing and waning of America’s imperialistic activity since America’s founding. Notes For helpful comments and/or encouragement, the author wishes to thank Patricio Abinales, Julia Adams, Emily Barman, Michael Mann, George Steinmetz, audiences at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association (San Francisco 2004), the Social Science History Association (Chicago 2004) and the International Institute of Sociology (Stockholm 2005), and two anonymous reviewers. Full responsibility lies with the author. Research assistance has been provided by Masayo Nishida and Huibo Shao, with funds from the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Illinois and the College of Arts and Sciences at Boston University. 1. Max Boot quoted in Boston Sunday Globe (23 March 2002: H1). 2. Existing studies show connections between a state’s hegemonic status and its promotion of free trade (Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, 1979; Gilpin, 2002). They also show correlations between hegemonic competition, economic cycles in the world-system and global war (Gilpin, 1981; Goldstein, 1988). But they have yet to fully explore possible associations between a state’s hegemonic career on the one hand and, on the other, decisions by that state to reach beyond its borders and intervene into other territories. 3. This would be the case, for example, with the US beginning in the late 19th century. After the Spanish–American War in 1898, the US constructed a formal colonial empire by seizing Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam, yet this empire did not mean that the US had reached hegemonic maturity. 4. Data on covert activity, for example, are not readily available; and operationalizing effective economic control is far too difficult a task for analyzing the entirety of a country’s imperial career. 5. We might even hypothesize that it is such increased activity that serves to precipitate conflicts between contenders and eventually lead to war. In this case, imperialistic activity amid hegemonic competition might be one of the causal mechanisms connecting hegemonic competition to the outcome: war between hegemons and contenders. 6. Some scholars have rejected the notion that the US has been in decline (Nye, 1990; Russett, 1985; Strange, 1987). However, this scholarship tends to: (1) focus upon political or military power rather than economic power, (2) place weight on America’s leadership in certain industries like finance (which then 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. overlooks Arrighi et al.’s [1999] point that financial capital marks the dusk of a hegemon’s career), or (3) not examine hegemony relationally and instead focus on economic power in absolute terms. When looked at relationally and in strict economic terms, even critics of the declinist school admit that the US has suffered serious economic decline since the 1970s (Corden, 1990; Russett, 1985: 210–11). A good recent review can be found in Pigman (2002). While it is true that America’s large share of the world economy at 28 percent dwarfs the share Britain had during its prior period of hegemony (at around 9 percent in 1870), this does not include Britain’s colonies. Once we include even just India, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, Britain’s share of world GDP was 21 percent in 1870, much closer to America’s current share (Boswell, 2004: 523). Political scientists have examined major wars since 1815 but wars do not exhaust imperialistic activity. Others have tracked uses of force by the American military since 1945 but this only covers a limited time period (Kaplan and Blechman, 1978). The data on militarized disputes collected as part of the Correlates of War Project (COW) cover disputes and their outcomes among various nations from 1815 onwards, including the US, but not all imperial activities follow from dispute. Nor do these data offer a workable description of types of imperialistic activity (they do not distinguish between naval operations, ground troop invasions, temporary military occupations, colonial annexation, etc.). The list includes some ‘Indian wars’ on the North American continent but only if they took place outside America’s national borders at the time. The data are available at: www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/index.html By 1855, in fact, ‘America’s commerce with Cuba had doubled during the previous decade, becoming seven times greater than Great Britain’s and even four times larger than Spain’s – which owned Cuba’ (LaFeber, 1989: 135). These three early waves during America’s pre-hegemonic career were accompanied by America’s rise to dominance at different spatial scales at the subglobal level (regional, then hemispheric). Therefore, the lesser activity in between the waves would correspond to relative stability and freedom from competition at those scales. As my preceding narrative suggests, this was the case. After the US established its regional dominance, for example, it no longer resorted to imperialistic activity at that spatial scale because its dominance at that regional scale was secured. This finding is buttressed by existing research by Tillema on one type of imperialistic activity in this period: the ‘open and direct use of military force’. Looking at the period from 1945 to 1971, Tillema reports that the US used direct military force only four times: South Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. Tillema finds this remarkable because in the same period there were more than 100 conflicts threatening governments into which the US could have intervened but did not (Tillema, 1973: 5). A similar point is registered by Cumings (1999: 289), who characterizes American foreign policy in this period as a ‘mundane . . . and mostly unremarked daily life of subtle constraint’. 14. Modelski’s theory of ‘world powers’ prefigures later theories of hegemonic states. This description applies to more than military power for Modelski, but I would suggest it is an apt description of US military power in the postSecond World War era. 15. In terms of economic policy, for example, scholars note that hegemons prefer free trade policies, but they also debate whether British and American free trade policies during their respective periods of hegemonic maturity were more different than not (O’Brien, 2002; Stein, 1984). 16. The sum of these interventions contrasts not only in terms of amplitude and frequency but also in the character of the activity. Prior to the 1980s, for example, most of the few activities initiated by the US involved the use of troops to evacuate American citizens from foreign countries amid local turbulence 17. To determine these types I referred to the descriptions of the operations provided in the Federation of American Scientists’ lists and the list by the State Department (Collier, 1993; US Congress, 1970). 18. Admittedly, the two periods are not exactly the same. As Britain experienced decline and economic competition, it resorted to colonization. In contrast, America’s recent wave involves various types of imperialistic activities, but long-term colonization is not one of them. Still, we should not expect the two periods to be exactly the same. Every hegemon operates within the confines of its particular global climate (Boswell, 2004). Today, the US operates in a climate where colonization is not as acceptable as it was in the late 19th century. 19. The comparison with Great Britain is the most appropriate because only Great Britain had also attained hegemonic status in the modern period, and my discussion is restricted to those states that have achieved hegemonic status and engaged in imperialistic activity. 36