Democracy, Income, and Environmental Quality (Tables)

Table 1: Determinants of Global Sulfur Emissions, 1960-2000 Model Va ria ble Democracy Level 1 2 3 4 -14.040*** (1.577) 2.190*** (0.219) -0.103*** (0.010) 0.160** (0.065) 0.021*** (0.004) -0.018*** (0.003) 19.983*** (3.635) -0.002*** (0.0003) -13.669*** (1.592) 2.123*** (0.222) -0.099*** (0.010) 0.139** (0.065) 0.016*** (0.004) -0.018*** (0.003) 19.366*** (3.645) -0.001 (0.003) -0.002*** (0.0003) -13.683*** (1.592) 2.125*** (0.222) -0.099*** (0.010) 0.139** (0.065) 0.016*** (0.004) -0.018*** (0.003) 19.390*** (3.648) 5 OECD DAC -0.003 (0.006) -0.003*** (0.001) 18.674 (25.691) -0.951 (2.757) -0.002 (0.098) -0.653*** (0.120) 0.031*** (0.006) -0.045*** (0.006) -93.112 (79.489) 6 Non-OECD DAC -0.007** (0.003) -0.001*** (0.0004) -9.749*** (1.719) 1.536*** (0.243) -0.071*** (0.011) 0.208*** (0.070) 0.015*** (0.005) -0.011*** (0.003) 10.877*** (3.959) EKC Level Stock Full $134 $10,577 4789 147 0.19 0.0000 $132 $12,699 4753 147 0.21 0.0000 $132 $15,691 4752 147 0.21 0.0000 790 21 0.77 0.0000 3962 126 0.15 0.0000 -0.002 (0.003) Democracy Stock Income Income squared Income cubed Illiteracy Urban population Trend Constant -13.596*** (1.581) 2.105*** (0.220) -0.098*** (0.010) 0.144** (0.065) 0.020*** (0.004) -0.019*** (0.003) 19.196*** (3.641) Turning Points Observations Countries R-squared Prob >F 1 $135 2 $12,852 4899 150 0.17 0.0000 Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables lagged by one year, except for Democracy Stock, which is lagged by two years. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 21 Table 2: Determinants of Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 1960-2001 Model -2.4615*** (0.7005) 0.4762*** (0.0961) -0.0227*** (0.0042) -0.0061*** (0.0019) 0.0092*** (0.0029) -2.5465*** (0.7054) 0.4850*** (0.0971) -0.0230*** (0.0043) -0.0055*** (0.0019) 0.0109*** (0.0030) -0.0004** (0.0002) -2.5418*** (0.7055) 0.4828*** (0.0972) -0.0228*** (0.0043) -0.0040* (0.0021) 0.0105*** (0.0029) 0.0004 (0.0017) 1.3691 (1.6668) 0.0004 (0.0017) 1.545 (1.6748) 0.0014 (0.0018) 1.4505 (1.6759) 0.0014 (0.0018) 1.4167 (1.6795) -0.0038 (0.0037) 55.4482 (61.7677) 0.0044** (0.0021) -2.4977 (1.8610) 7 Full w/oil prices 0.001 (0.0018) -0.0003* (0.0002) -2.5021*** (0.7051) 0.4770*** (0.0971) -0.0225*** (0.0043) -0.0041* (0.0021) 0.0104*** (0.0029) 0.0255** (0.0130) 0.0008 (0.0018) 1.3168 (1.6722) 1 $31 2 $38,702 5211 159 0.39 0.0000 $33 $38,740 5093 156 0.39 0.0000 $33 $40,813 5094 156 0.4 0.0000 $33 $41,153 5093 156 0.4 0.0000 809 21 0.62 0.0000 4284 135 0.39 0.0000 5093 156 0.4 0.0000 Va ria ble Democracy Level 1 2 3 4 EKC Level Stock Full 0.0001 (0.0018) Democracy Stock Income Income squared Income cubed Illiteracy Urban population 0.0005 (0.0017) -0.0004** (0.0002) -2.5270*** (0.7073) 0.4807*** (0.0974) -0.0227*** (0.0043) -0.0040* (0.0021) 0.0104*** (0.0029) 5 OECD DAC -0.0031 (0.0041) -0.0003 (0.0006) -21.852 (19.4490) 2.7501 (2.0396) -0.1102 (0.0711) -0.0236** (0.0104) 0.0129*** (0.0050) 6 Non-OECD DAC -0.002 (0.0019) -0.0004** (0.0002) -0.779 (0.7965) 0.2211** (0.1125) -0.0103** (0.0051) -0.0019 (0.0022) 0.0100*** (0.0031) Oil prices Trend Constant Turning Points Observations Countries R-squared Prob >F Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. All independent variables lagged by one year, except for Democracy Stock, which is lagged by two years. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 22 The results for CO2 are deeply troubling from a scientific and policy perspective. The results follow a similar logic as those for sulfur, but the first turning point comes earlier in the development process and the second later. As in the case of sulfur, one would look at these results and hypothesize that at the outset, countries are apt to reduce their per capita emissions as they substitute coal and petroleum for biomass fuel wood. But very soon (at less than $35 in per capita income in 1995 prices), emissions begin to rise and continue to do so as the use of coal and petroleum becomes more intense. The next turning point does not occur until per capita incomes reach somewhere in the $38,000-42,000 range, where a nation will be more likely to adopt pollution control technologies to reduce per capita emissions. If one estimated a generous 2.5 percent GDP per capita average annual world growth rate looking forward, it would take at least seven decades for world CO2 emissions to “turn around” under this model. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change argues that the world must begin to reduce emissions by 2020. 6. Discussion Contrary to earlier studies on this topic, this paper argues that, for the most part, there is no strong relationship between a country’s current regime type (democracy level) and environmental quality. Instead, we find that a causal relationship between democracy and environmental quality is more likely to emerge when we view democracy a long-run, cumulative phenomenon. We believe that this result makes sense not only empirically, but also theoretically. It takes time for the machinations of democracy to yield tangible instrumental gains (outside of their own intrinsic benefits). Democratic history is typically replete with tales of intermittent progress, punctuated by occasional setbacks but more characterized by incremental advances that build upon each other to promote social welfare over the long run. Democracy can help improve the environment, but only if given time to promote mechanisms of accountability, facilitate information, foster associational life, spur international cooperation, and promote institutional development. 23 These findings have important implications for both theory and policy. From a theoretical perspective, Payne’s initial and landmark insights into the relationship between democracy and the environment should be broadened. Indeed, as Payne indicates, in democracies citizens are better informed about the environment, can better express their concerns about the environment, can organize amongst each other around those concerns, and finally put pressure on governments to improve environmental conditions.35 However, our results imply that these factors are not likely to exert their effects overnight, that they are likely to take some time to develop. A nation with a longer history of freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom to vote will be more apt to make significant improvements in environmental quality than a nation that has just undergone a transition. If citizens can witness that their predecessors have raised demands concerning environmental problems, organized around those problems, and successfully pressured policymakers to make change, they will be more apt to build on the movement of the past. Civil societies need to build momentum over time, norms need to be developed to support greater demands for environmental quality, political competition needs to be routinized, and government institutions need capacity strengthening before we should expect to witness significant and lasting reversals of environmental degradation. There are two major policy implications of this study. First, we must underscore the fact that factors beyond the level of a nation’s income determine environmental quality. This paper adds to the growing number of studies that have shown that growth in per capita income alone will not automatically improve the environment. Put simply, the world cannot afford to wait for the problem to fix itself (more precisely, for economic development to generate the ability and incentive to clean up the environment), especially in the case of carbon dioxide. We must find other levers to 35 Payne 1995. 24 bring to bear on the problem, especially political levers. In this particular case, we find that democracy matters, and that it matters in a particular (time-dependent) manner. On the other hand, this paper implies that simply transitioning into a democracy will not automatically change environmental problems overnight. Our results indicate that it may be unreasonable to expect a brand new, fledgling democracy to have the capacity to reverse what may be decades or more of environmental degradation. But with concentrated effort on the part of democratic and international actors to allow the press and civil society to flourish, and to establish the most appropriate government institutions, laws, and social norms that go along with respecting the environment, substantial progress can be made over time. 25 7. References Barrett, Scott and Kathryn Graddy. 2000. Freedom, Growth, and the Environment. Environment and Development Economics 5 (4):433-456. Beer, Caroline. 2007. Long-term Democracy and Gender Equality. 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