The Political Contestation of Non-Market Strategy (Figures)

! Figure 1: Quarterly Proportion of PAC Contributions Refunded Around Corporate Boycotts ! Figure 2: Refunded Contributions Before and After a Boycott Announcement ! Table 1: Summary Statistics of Treatment Sub-Categories 1 Boycott: More Media Attention 2 Boycott: More Claim Legitimacy 3 Boycott: Parent Company 4 Boycott: High Status 5 Boycott: Unregulated Industry 6 Boycott: Low Impression Management 7 Boycott: Concession Mean 0.280 0.645 0.665 0.793 0.429 0.227 0.226 S.D. Min Max 0.450 0 1 0.479 0 1 0.473 0 1 0.476 0 1 0.406 0 1 0.496 0 1 0.420 0 1 1 2 3 4 0.2121 0.0383 0.0657 0.1285 0.1383 0.3064 0.1006 0.0618 -0.0282 -0.0058 0.0364 0.0865 -0.2299 0.0681 -0.0519 -0.1882 0.3449 -0.0116 5 6 0.0102 0.0626 0.0762 ! Table 2: Summary Statistics and Correlations Variable Mean Min Max SD 1 Total PAC Contributions 25,686.66 -5,500 413,000 47,211.29 2 Refund Percentage 0.022 0 0.875 0.0767 3 Regulated Industry 0.203 0 1 0.402 4 Reputation 4.464 0 8.83 3.363 5 Corporate Political Alignment 0.208 -1 1 0.751 6 ROE 0.00543 -12.039 4.798 0.557 7 Logged Employees 3.841 -4.71 7.649 1.604 1 2 3 4 5 6 1.00 0.056 1 0.014 0.025 1 0.277 0.084 0.057 1 0.045 -0.077 0.088 0.105 1 0.034 0.022 0.062 0.073 0.029 1 0.335 0.11 -0.037 0.406 0.129 0.026 ! Table 3: Comparison of Pre-Treatment Variables for Treatment and Matched Samples Pre-Treatment Variable Total PAC Donations Percentage Refunded Reputation Corp. Political Alignment ROE Logged Employees Logged Assets Treatment Sample Mean SD 24323.35 46070.17 0.022 0.085 4.54 3.39 0.167 0.771 0.186 0.192 3.976 1.49 9.442 1.793 Matched Sample Mean SD 26000.05 47047.87 0.025 0.08 4.38 3.33 0.192 0.736 0.215 0.207 3.695 1.72 9.163 1.692 T-test 0.71 0.73 0.63 0.74 0.88 0.08 0.11 ! Table 4: Difference-in-Differences Models Exploring the Effect of Being Boycotted on Political Campaign Contributions Model 1: Logged PAC Contributions Model 2: Percentage Refunded Treatment: Boycott -0.754 (0.493) -0.00448 (0.006) Period 0.269 (0.178) -0.00866+ (0.005) Difference Estimator (Treatment x Period) -0.500* (0.245) 0.0161* (0.008) 2.083** (0.708) 0.181* (0.088) 0.728** (0.258) 0.0095 (0.209) 1.353*** (0.179) 0.00495 (0.005) -0.000537 (0.001) -0.0120** (0.004) 0.00145 (0.002) 0.00308* (0.001) 0.00246*** (0.001) Year Fixed Effects Quarter Fixed Effects State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant 0.887 (1.634) -0.0193+ (0.010) N 812 812 Variables Controls Regulated Industry Reputation Corporate Political Aligment ROE Logged Employees Log Total PAC Contributions + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 ! Table 5: Models Exploring Boycott-Specific Mechanisms of Nonmarket Disruption Variables Boycott: More Media Attention Boycott: Less Media Attention Dif: Boycott More Media Attention Dif: Boycott Less Media Attention Model 1: Media Attention Model 2: Claim Legitimacy -0.00874 (0.007) -0.00399 (0.006) 0.0339* (0.014) 0.0112 (0.007) Boycott: More Claim Legitimacy -0.0022 (0.007) -0.0081 (0.007) 0.0212* (0.010) 0.00655 (0.007) Boycott: Less Claim Legitimacy Dif: Boycott More Claim Legitimacy Dif: Boycott Les Claim Legitimacy Boycott: Targeted a Main Company -0.00426 (0.006) -0.00483 (0.007) 0.0200* (0.008) 0.00816 (0.010) Boycott: Targeted a Subsidiary Dif: Boycott of Parent Company Dif: Boycott of Subsidiary/Brand Period Model 3: Locus of Attack (Parent/Subsidiary) -0.0067 (0.004) -0.00865+ (0.005) -0.00854+ (0.005) Continued on Next Page ! Table 5, continued Controls Logged Total PAC Donations 0.00240*** (0.001) -0.00965 (0.009) 0.00524 (0.005) -0.000562 (0.001) -0.0119** (0.004) 0.00124 (0.002) 0.00317* (0.001) 0.00229*** (0.001) -0.0096 (0.008) 0.00473 (0.005) -0.000523 (0.001) -0.0121** (0.004) 0.00095 (0.002) 0.00321* (0.001) 0.00239*** (0.001) -0.00877 (0.008) 0.00421 (0.005) -0.000539 (0.001) -0.0120** (0.004) 0.00158 (0.002) 0.00303* (0.001) Year Fixed Effects State Fixed Effects Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant -0.0175+ (0.010) -0.0207* (0.010) -0.0201* (0.010) N 812 812 812 Quarter Prior to an Election Regulated Industry Reputation Corporate Political Alignment ROE Logged Employees + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 Table 6: Models Exploring Target-Specific Mechanisms of Nonmarket Disruption Model 4: Status Boycott: High Status Boycott: Low Status Dif: Boycott High Status Dif: Boycott Low Status Boycott: Regulated Industry Boycott: Unregulated Industry Dif: Boycott Regulated Industry Dif: Boycott Unregulated Industry Boycott: High Impression Mgmt Boycott: Low Impression Mgmt Dif: Boycott High Impression Mgmt Dif: Boycott Low Impression Mgmt Boycott: Concession Boycott: No Concession Dif: Boycott Concession Dif: Boycott No Concession Model 5: Model 6: Industry Reg. Imp. Mgmt Model 7: Concession -0.00237 (0.006) -0.00901 (0.006) 0.00929 (0.009) 0.0294** (0.010) -0.00729 (0.009) -0.00386 (0.006) 0.00839 (0.009) 0.0181* (0.009) 0.00371 (0.008) -0.0104+ (0.005) 0.0121 (0.010) 0.0211* (0.009) 0.00808 (0.006) -0.00229 (0.006) 0.0241+ (0.012) 0.00839 (0.007) Continued on Next Page ! Table 6, continued Period -0.00853+ (0.005) -0.00865+ (0.005) -0.00833* (0.004) -0.00522 (0.004) 0.00240*** (0.001) -0.00843 (0.008) 0.00546 (0.005) -0.0120** (0.004) 0.00161 (0.002) 0.00292* (0.001) 0.00244*** (0.001) -0.00897 (0.008) 0.00902 (0.007) -0.0120** (0.004) 0.0016 (0.002) 0.00317* (0.001) -0.000437 (0.001) 0.00243*** (0.001) -0.00919 (0.009) 0.0051 (0.005) -0.0120** (0.004) 0.00147 (0.002) 0.00278* (0.001) -0.000697 (0.001) 0.00245*** (0.001) -0.00905 (0.009) 0.00525 (0.005) -0.0118** (0.004) 0.00101 (0.002) 0.00279* (0.001) -0.000546 (0.001) Year Fixed Effects Quarter Fixed Effects State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Constant -0.0235* (0.009) -0.0210* (0.010) -0.0230* (0.010) -0.0179+ (0.010) N 812 812 812 812 Controls Logged Total PAC Donations Quarter Prior to an Election Regulated Industry Company Political Aligment ROE Logged Employees Reputation + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001