University:
Boston University
Course:
CAS PO 502 | Political Analysis
Academic year:

2024
Views:

42

Pages:

20
Author:

ke1ra3p2uaper

The Emergence of Democratic Accountability Introduction Institutions depend on formal rules (are there elections? is there universal franchise?) But they are much more than that Also depend upon interpretation of rules Generally many grey areas. Interpretation of these by population as a whole, by political actors, determine how these institutions operate. What is inappropriate behavior? What triggers mass disapproval? some self-enriching, promoting relatives, politicized appointments to non-executive (bureaucratic, legal) branches, What are the set of inviolable citizen’s rights? What is a transgression of those? Considerable variation across countries, within countries across time, in answers to these questions One approach to understanding that variation: What is appropriate depends on equilibrium being played between political leader and citizens Multiplicity of equilibria endemic to models of political support (E.g., Weingast 1997, Myerson 2006) Interesting as possible explanations for the stability of different de facto outcomes for similar de jure institutions But these models typically tell us little about the transition Democratization, “Emergence”, Democratic transitions Transitions are external to the model (sunspots) Here: Take multiplicity as our starting point Try to understand sequence of events that move a population from one type of equilibrium to another I.e., try to provide some structure to these transitions These events will end up looking a lot like (providing a formal underpinning for) factors that informal literatures have highlighted “Democratic capital”, “critical junctures”, “great (wo)men”, “institutionalization” The story here: (Couched in terms of corruption) Natural sense in which multiplicity of equilibria WRT corruption Rational citizens expect politicians are all corrupt, don’t hesitate to support corrupt politicians, a new entrant would also be corrupt Rational voters expect politicians to be clean, don’t tolerate the corrupt, a new entrant has incentive to be clean But a population of citizens can be gripped by an idea The idea of “ideas” being important is not new: “It is impossible to develop any meaningful theory of political development without treating ideas as fundamental causes of why societies differ and follow distinct development paths.” Fukuyama (2011, 442) For example: Corrupt politicians should not be tolerated “Voters have had enough of corruption and are not going to put up with it any more” . . . Nitish Kumar, (Bihar Chief Minister), Patna Daily 2011 How widely spread is this idea? No citizen knows for sure, but they have beliefs. If citizens believe that most other citizens are intolerant of corruption, they expect politicians to avoid it Replacing a corrupt incumbent will then likely lead to a non-corrupt successor Politicians have better information about the state than citizens (know better how widely spread is intolerance of corruption) Politicians change citizens’ beliefs via their actions Citizens observe actions, and update beliefs about the state (how widely held is the idea) When citizens believe the idea is likely to be widely held, they punish corrupt incumbents Incentives for office then induce rational politicians to be non-corrupt An explanation for: ‘Critical Junctures’ characterize the points at which a politician’s behavior directly alters the constraints facing future politicians ‘Great Leaders’ are those individuals performing moral (non-corrupt) acts at a critical juncture Institutionalization: a leader’s ideals become embedded in institutions; constraining future leaders New ideas do not achieve political prominence on their own; they must be championed by ‘carriers,’ individuals or groups capable of persuading others to reconsider the ways they think and act. . . What is really being investigated here is the process of institutionalization-that is, how ideas become embedded in organizations, patterns of discourse, collective identities and so forth and manage to outlast the original conditions that gave rise to them. Bernham 1998 Directly Related Literature Electoral Incentives and Corruption (Effects of districts/voting rules on corruption incentives/reelection probabilities) Myerson (1993),Ferejohn (1986) Persson, Tabellini, Trebbi (2003) Democratic constraints and citizen coordination Weingast (1997), Myerson (2006) Leadership as equilibrium selection Acemoglu and Jackson (2011) From here: 1 A stationary model featuring permissive and non-permissive equilibria 2 An extension allowing for ‘ideas’ to matter 3 Use results to provide explanation for “ ” terms The Model There are N (large) infinitely-lived citizens and a single leader in power in each period t ∈ {1, 2, ...}. A new leader produces a per-citizen consumption normalized to value 1 in his/her first period of power, An incumbent leader produces per-period consumption of 1 + α, where α > 0. When entering office, the leader decides whether to “act legitimately” or “transgress” Citizens know whether a leader has transgressed or acted legitimately Transgressions are a diversion of resources or rights away from the citizens; per citizen consumption is reduced by c > 0 per period. Politicians are drawn from a pool and are one of three types autocratic, democratic, or rational. Democratic types never transgress, autocrats always transgress, and rational types transgress if and only if there are appropriate incentives to doing so. The proportion of democratic types is σD , the proportion of autocrats is σA , with the remaining proportion being rational types. A politician’s type is their private information. A strategy for politicians is a choice between transgression and legitimate acts: a ∈ {T , T̃ }. A non-elected politician gets a per-period payoff normalized to zero, a politician in power that acts legitimately gets a positive per-period payoff of u(T̃ ), and a politician in power that transgresses gets a per-period payoff of u(T ) > u(T̃ ). All agents discount the future using a factor of β ∈ (0, 1). A politician is willing and able to stand for power again next period with probability δ. Many possible equilibria Characterize a sub-set conforming to those with stable political “norms” Political Norms are captured by {φ(a), ρ}, where φ(a) is the probability that an incumbent remains in power in the next period conditional on action a, ρ is the probability that an entering new leader will transgress. Citizens take {φ(a), ρ} as fixed and decide whether to acquiesce or challenge an incumbent. Politicians take {φ(a), ρ} as fixed and decide whether to transgress or not. Timing Leader Acts Citizens choose whether to oppose or support Majority support implies leader retains power (subject to continuing) Majority oppose implies leader deposed, randomly draw new from pool Incumbent (or New leader) acts again For citizens, the value to retaining a transgressing incumbent is V (T ) = 1 + α − c + β[φ(T ) · V (T ) + (1 − φ(T )) · V̄ ] (1) and to retaining a legitimate acting incumbent is V (T̃ ) = 1 + α + β[φ(T̃ ) · V (T̃ ) + (1 − φ(T̃ )) · V̄ ], (2) V̄ = ρ · V (T ) + (1 − ρ) · V (T̃ ) − α. (3) where Benchmark: All citizens decide support based on value functions Citizens always support a legitimate acting leader (since V (T̃ ) ≥ V̄ ). Citizens support a transgressor if V (T ) ≥ V̄ : ρ ≥ ρ∗ ≡ 1 − α · (1 − β · φ(T̃ )). c (4) Leaders decision Value to transgression satisfies U(T ) = u + T + β[φ(T ) · U(T )] (5) Value to non-transgression satisfies U(T̃ ) = u + β[φ(T̃ ) · U(T̃ )]. (6) Rational politicians transgress if U(T ) ≥ U(T̃ ): φ(T ) ≥ φ∗ ≡ φ(T̃ ) − T (1 − βφ(T̃ )) . u·β (7)