University:
Boston University
Course:
CAS PO 502 | Political Analysis
Academic year:

2024
Views:

399

Pages:

25
Author:

vielay3og

Value functions for permissive norms G (T̃ ) = 1 + α + β · [δ · G (T̃ ) + (1 − δ) · EG ] G (T ) = 1 + α − c + β · EG (19) (20) G̃ (T̃ ) = 1 + α + β · [δ · G̃ (T̃ ) + (1 − δ) · EG̃ ] (21) G̃ (T ) = 1 + α − c + β · [δ · G̃ (T ) + (1 − δ) · EG̃ ] (22) EG = π 0 · [σA · G (T ) + (1 − σA ) · G (T̃ )] +(1 − π 0 ) · [(1 − σD ) · G̃ (T ) + σD · G̃ (T̃ )] − α EG̃ = π 0 · [σA · G (T ) + (1 − σA ) · G (T̃ )] +(1 − π 0 ) · [(1 − σD ) · G̃ (T ) + σD · G̃ (T̃ )] − α. Proposition: Let αc · (1 − β · δ) ∈ (σD , (1 − σA )). Then for any λ > 0 there is an s sufficiently large such that permissive norms are consistent at π1 if and only if π1 < π̂ ∈ (0, 1). Heads Up politician acts π0 voting occurs π1 Markov transition π2 π00 Belief Updating Suppose political norms are PERMISSIVE Consider a new entrant leader Citizens prior probability of the G state is π0 . If the entering leader transgresses, then: either the state is G and the entrant is inherently autocratic, or the state is not G and the leader is not inherently democratic. The updated probability of being in G conditional on transgressing is thus π1 (T , π0 ) = π0 · σA . π0 · σA + (1 − π0 ) · (1 − σD ) (23) Since there is transgression, the true state is revealed by the leader’s fate. The updated probability conditional on this fate is π2 = 0 if the leader remains in power and π2 = 1 if the leader is deposed. These beliefs remain for the incumbency of that leader. If the entrant does not transgress (i.e. political norm-defying behavior is observed) then: either the entrant is a democratic type or citizens are in G state and the entrant is not an inherent autocrat. The updated probability of being in G conditional on non-transgression is therefore π1 (T̃ , π0 ) = π0 · (1 − σA ) . π0 · (1 − σA ) + (1 − π0 ) · σD (24) Since there is no transgression, no information is revealed by the leader’s fate so that π2 = π1 . These beliefs remain for the incumbency of the leader. Once this leader leaves power, the prior for the next leader is: π00 = s · π2 + (1 − s)λ. (25) Therefore if this leader had transgressed we would have π00 ∈ {π 0 , π 0 }, where π 0 ≡ (1 − s)λ and π 0 ≡ s + (1 − s)λ. If this leader did not transgress then we would have π00 = f (π0 ) ≡ s · π0 · (1 − σA ) + (1 − s)λ. π0 · (1 − σA ) + (1 − π0 ) · σD (26) f is an increasing concave function with a unique fixed point, π0∗ ∈ (0, 1). For priors below, continued non-cheating raises beliefs regarding the probability that the voters are in G . For priors above π0∗ , the effects of the Markov process dominate and beliefs are revised down even though non-cheating is observed. These beliefs reach π0∗ asymptotically. π1 (T̃ , π0 ) π0 π0 f (π0 ) π1 (T, π0 ) ∗ π0 0 π0 1 π0 π0 f (π0 ) π π∗ π̂ π0 π1 (T, π0 ) π 0 ∗ π π0 0 π0 π0 1 Great Leaders, Critical Junctures, Institutionalization Proposition: Let αc · (1 − β · δ) ∈ (σD , (1 − σA )). Then for any λ > 0 there is an s sufficiently large such that 0 < π̂ < π ∗ . Irreversibility Good leaders Bad leaders Implications 1. Democratic Capital “This provokes the question of what makes democracies more or less stable, which is where our second idea comes in. Consolidation of democracy requires that citizens learn to cherish and respect democracy as a method of government. A common perception of democracy as a valuable form of government will not pop up overnight, or in a vacuum. Rather, a gradual appreciation of democracy can be envisaged as an accumulation of a stock of civic and social assets that takes place through a country’s learning from its own historical experience or from its neighboring countries. We refer to this consolidation process as the accumulation of ”democratic capital”. Persson and Tabellini (2006 p.2) 1. Democratic Capital Huntington’s “two turn over test” Democracy becomes consolidated when an electoral regime is fully entrenched and capable of delivering free and competitive elections. Consolidation occurs if . . . “the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election. ” 1. Democratic Capital Starting at any beliefs such that permissive norms are consistent, a long enough sequence of democratic leaders will render them inconsistent. “Rational” citizens will oppose a transgressing leader after enough inherently democratic leaders have preceded Not because the state is gripped, but because they think that there is a high enough chance that the state is gripped that a rational leader would never act autocratically Consequently deposing the current leader will, with a high enough probability, usher in a better one Of course, the idea that two different sorts of motivations may underpin opposition to autocrats is not new: “ . . . the usual recourse is to suggest that for democracy to be self-enforcing, the public, or some significant part of it, must be motivated to protest or even rebel if democracy is threatened. . . . People might have this motivation either because they have internalized democratic norms or culture - a commitment to the “rules of the game” or because they expect that they will be materially worse off if dictatorship prevails.” Fearon (2006) What is new is the demonstration that these two motivations are linked, and how they can be activated by leaders. 2. Institutionalization “New ideas do not achieve political prominence on their own; they must be championed by “carriers”, individuals or groups capable of persuading others to reconsider the ways they think and act . . . the process of institutionalization – that is, how ideas become embedded in organizations, patterns of discourse, collective identities and so forth and manage to outlast the original conditions that gave rise to them.” Bernham (1998) The “moral”, self-sacrificing, acts of the inherently democratic leaders change (are embedded in) the institution. Up to π̂ leaders materially gain from transgressing. The institution does not constrain transgression. After π̂ leaders materially lose from transgressing, as they are deposed. The institution works. 3. Critical Junctures “. . . critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which the structural (that is, economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are significantly relaxed for a relatively short period, with two main consequences: the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest are potentially much more momentous . . . those moments when the freedom of political actors and impact of their decisions is heightened . . . ” Cappoccia and Keleman (2007), p 343. “We need to develop, in other words, a framework for predicting when the “formative moments” in history will occur–for understanding when political spaces will open up and the possibilities for ideational or cultural shifts will arise. ” Rothstein (1992) 3. Critical Junctures A “critical juncture” occurs for the leader entering at π close to but below π̂ 4. Great Leaders Related literature headed “Historical Institutionalism”. An attempt to provide . . . “a theoretical bridge between men who make history and the circumstances under which they are able to do so.” Thelen and Steinmo (1999 p. 12) 4. Great Leaders A great leader is an inherently democratic type entering at a critical juncture. Able to transgress – e.g. violate term limit, suspend election, etc. Chooses not to (perhaps because of inherent commitment to democratic ideals) Examples? US – George Washington, Latin America – Manuel Bulnes (Chile 1841), Jose Figueres (Costa Rica 1948) Africa – Kerekou (Benin 1991), Nelson Mandela (South Africa 1994) Matthieu Kerekou Marxist/Leninist Military ruler of Benin 1972-1991 Convenes ‘National Conference’ dialogue precipitated by economic woes Presidential Election held in 1991. Loses runoff to Soglo (world bank economist) and cedes power (first African president to lose office after election defeat) Contests election in 1996. Wins runoff against Soglo. Soglo cedes power. Stands for re-election in 2001 Wins against Soglo (irregularities in election) Hits constitutional age limit in 2006 The Economist May 16th 2006: “So far, however, his promise to give up power has to be taken at face value. Benin’s democracy-loving people should make him stick to his word: it could be the former general’s greatest legacy.” Investigates possibility of amending constitution “Since then, democracy has implanted itself strongly in the minds of Benin’s citizens. ‘Our history is so terrible, with coups and years of problems, that now we all care about democracy very deeply,’ says one of them.” He stands down Manuel Bulnes (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1999) Military hero of Peruvian/Bolivian war victory President in 1841 Deliberately eschewed role of charismatic leader Dismantled much of military (his power base) Favored growth of national guard (more closely controlled by political patronage) Precipitated coup from disgruntled officers mostly from his native Concepcion Put down by Bulnes himself who turned against military colleagues Stepped down at end of term, turned over government to career civil servant. Ushered in long period (upto 1973) of “relatively” democratic governance and peaceful transitions in Chilean politics Jose Figueres (Costa-Rica President 1948) Picado/Calderon invalidated 1948 presidential election which Ulate had won. Figueres lead military coup deposing government becoming provisional president (1948-1949) Figueres disbanded military Implemented elections after 18 months “The role of Jose Figueres in institutionalizing democracy in Costa Rica a century later presents some interesting parallels. After his army of liberation overthrew the fraud-ridden and communist ridden electoral regime he was in a position to ‘do anything he wanted, including setting up a personal dictatorship.’ Instead he administered honest parliamentary elections, which his party lost badly, accepting the defeat of his proposed constitution . . . and then transferring power to the conservative victor . . . whose party had blocked his legislative agenda . . . ” Diamond, Hartlyn and Linz (1999, p.34) George Washington Lipset (1963) “There seems little question that Washington was a charismatic leader. But his refusal to take full advantage of his potential charisma, he withdrew from the presidency while seemingly in good health, doubtless pushed the society faster toward a legal-rational system of authority than would have been the case had he taken over the charismatic role in toto and identified himself with the laws and the spirit of the nation.” Conclusions A consistent way of conceptualizing: Democratic Capital, Institutionalization, Great Leaders, Critical Junctures To do: More sophisticated norms Transitions the other way Windfall gains to office Chile 1973: a perception that there were very high short-term gains to power, and that these were more important than the protection of democracy . . .