The Radicalism of the American Revolution

Précis: The Radicalism of the American Revolution Previous scholarship has labeled the American Revolution “conservative” because, unlike other revolutions before and after, it did not end in political chaos and blood baths. Historian Gordon Woods agrees, but he argues that the American Revolution was radical in at least one respect: the revolution melted the bonds that held colonial society together and remolded them into something completely new and distinctly American. In describing the emergence of this radical phenomenon, Wood builds upon Bernard Bailyn’s inquiry into the ideological origins of the American Revolution and places them in the social arena to show how ideology fundamentally reshaped a monarchial society into colonial republicanism, and, ultimately, into an American democracy that lasts to this day. Once upon a time, before the Revolution started, all was English-minded throughout the British realm. Wood points out that the British empire was unique in that the people there embraced notions of liberty, much more than, say, the French. The English people enjoyed their liberty, and took comfort knowing that liberty was safeguarded in established English law, customs, privileges, and a natural authority vested in the crown. In addition, Wood states that English custom divided the populace into two groups. On top were the patricians, those who had titles as “gentlemen” and exemplified the greatest qualities of mankind. They were usually wealthy, but always virtuous, honorable, and had a calling to greatness to serve the public in a scrupulously disinterested manner. Once in office, these virtuous citizens patronized their friends and supporters and filled other available offices with likeminded public servants. Wood points out that those patricians did not regard the patronage system as a selfish means of rewarding friends. Rather, supporting their peers was their duty and serving the public was a constant personal sacrifice – one that obliged them to fulfill seats of power with other civic-minded elite. As a result, only the “best and the brightest” were qualified to serve in office, and the public (and government) could always count upon the most respectable of leaders to get the job done. The social hierarchy was not just a psychological perception. These well-bred individuals were legally defined, with different laws and punishments that separated them from the masses. The rest of population consisted of George Washington described as the “grazing multitude.” Although the majority of the population, they were the cattle that grew their own grass to much on, but were grateful that the patricians generously allowed them to graze upon the land. The masses were in a state of constant disarray and needed the guidance of their gentlemanly superiors to survive in society. Indeed, Wood even suggests that eighteenth century sensibilities equated the plebs as children, thus mirroring the patriarchal system in English homes. Just as fathers knew best when ruling their households, dispensing property, and dictating to their kids, the patricians were likewise duty-bound to help the self-interested plebeians muddle through life. Like children, the plebeians occasionally rebelled against the socially superior adults, but their strikes were always reactionary and traditional in goal. As the eighteenth century progressed, evolving notions of republicanism upset everything, dissolving the social bonds that had held together the monarchical society. To a certain extent, republicanism was always there, as it grew out of the Enlightenment, which in turn, descended from classical antiquity. For instance, eighteenth century devotees of republicanism embraced the idea that public offices should be held by disinterestedpatricians rather than by those who belonged to the masses, an inheritance from the Roman Republic. In Great Britain, the notions of republicanism were stilted in the reserved manner of English tradition. However, Wood points out that in the colonies, republicanism thrived. Wood explains that the colonies differed considerably from the mother country (and the rest of the world), and as result, republicanism flourished. The colonists were diverse in not only nationalities but also in religion. In addition, many were political dissenters and rebel-rousers, dissatisfied with the English status quo. All seemed to have varying degrees of loyalty to the king and acceptance of his sovereignty. The questionable loyalty also extended to the British nobles from whom the king drew his support. In contrast to the mother country, the colonies had neither a traditional aristocracy nor a destitute urban population; colonists tended to cluster in the middle of the social order. Since colonial society was in a state of flux, social mobility was more possible than it was in England. Indeed, members of the aspiring gentry thought they were gentlemen, while the commoners believed that through hard work and pre-American know-how they too could become gentlemen. Wood adds that other colonial movements altered the traditional patrician/plebian relationship. With the possibility to ascend the social ladder open to them, many colonists began to question their parental (and paternalistic) authorities. The Great Awakening drew colonists out of a religious slumber and convinced them to challenge the existing religious hierarchy. Wood further speculates that the abundance of literature on proper parenting in the decades before the American Revolution demonstrates that the patriarchal system was also under attack as parents wondered why their children were so uppity. Many began to theorize the idea of a social contract for the first time: people chose to remain subservient to the patricians, and if an ambitious commoner wished to advance his station in life, he was free to re-write the contract. Unfortunately for the British, this idea of a social contract between equals did not exempt the crown. Under a social contract, the monarch was nothing more than a legal entity, nor did his authority derive from a natural mandate. Thus, during and after the revolution, the colonists grew up. They realized that their mother country was oppressing them and viewed British attempts to control them as a violation of their liberties. Hence, the rebels rewrote the social contract in blood. The revolutionaries saw the British patricians (and loyalist collaborators) as corrupt; their patronage was hardly disinterested, and their “warm friendships” a bit too hot to handle. In waging war, the Founding Fathers wanted to save the spirit of the old system and restore government to a conglomeration of pure, gentlemen-run institutions that protected and advanced the public welfare. Ideally, these virtuous social super-men would create a Republic without the corrupted self-interest that marred the British crown. Things didn’t work out that way. The common people, perhaps a bit drunk with liberty once they had a taste, were more interested in mass equality than in deferring to a ruling gentlemen class. The public equated any assertion of “social superiority” with the hated aristocracy they had just overthrown. Many in the population believed they were equal to any so-called gentleman. They were only separated by a set of circumstances that allowed the rich to attain wealth. With a little luck and effort, everyone could become gentlemen. Wood argues that the Constitution was the Founding Fathers’ effort to incorporate some of the masses’ concerns into the ideal government, but once the mob had been given an entrée to participate in government, the government became tainted with “self-interest” and private agendas had a backdoor into the idealized civic-minded government. When the Constitution was ratified, it appeared that the Anti-federalist opposition had lost the battle, but, with the benefit of hindsight, Wood observes that the Federalists were already on the retreat. Proponents of the Constitution came to admit that the ideals associated with virtuous gentlemen running the country were, at best, “sentimental claptrap.” At worst, such ideals became an open invitation for accusations of harboring monarchist sympathies. In the book’s climax, Wood recounts how the emergence of Jacksonian democracy in the late 1820s ushered in a new era for everyday folk, as a “man of the common people” President legitimized the working man’s clamor for more direct participation in government through popular democracy. A self-interested spoils system, rather than patrician patronage, became the method by which one could advance any ambitions for prominence. Wood paints the surviving Founding Fathers in a state of slight despair as the nineteenth century progressed. The bottom had ambitions to move up the social ladder, while upper-class reformers sought to elevate the masses through reform and culture. Ultimately, however, it seemed that nearly everyone met in a middle class – and to stand idle and study the classics while others worked hard was considered unproductive, and even un-American. Wood illustrates this with Thomas Jefferson who, in his waning years, struggled to promote higher learning in gaining support for his University of Virginia. Liberty had run amok, as increases in labor strikes, rowdy b’hoys in the theaters, escalating crime and alcoholism all suggested that nineteenth century Americans reveled a bit too much in freedom. Republicanism worked too well, Wood concludes, and its lasting legacy makes republicanism’s triumph that much more radical.