Florida v JL

HEADING: FLORIDA V. J.L. - UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT - 529 U.S. 266 (2000) 1) STATEMENT OF FACTS. [parties] J.L. is a 15-year old juvenile imputed for unlawful possession/carriage of a concealed guns; the State of Florida represents the Police Corp. [material facts] Police of Miami received an anonymous tip that a man matching J.L.’s description (African-American male with a plaid shirt) had a gun concealed in a bag, while he was standing at a bus stop with two other men. Two police officers reached the bus stop according to the tip, and although they did not see any gun, nor any potentially criminal behaviour, they exited their car and stopped J.L. The officers conducted a pat-down search for weapons and during the frisk, the officers ascertained that the J.L. was carrying a handgun. As a consequence, J.L. was arrested for unlawful possession of concealed weapon. 2) PROCEDURAL HISTORY: - (1) The trial court granted the motion to suppress submitted by J.L. (2) The appellate court reversed. (3) The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the appellate court’s ruling and held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment (as the trial court). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 3) QUESTION PRESENTED: Under the Fourth Amendment and under Terry v. Ohio, might a police officer stop and frisk an individual based merely on an anonymous tip that such individual may be carrying a gun? 4) HOLDING No. Without further support on indicia of reliability of the tipster, an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun does not justify a stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment. 5) REASONING (GINSBURG – per curiam) (i) PRECEDENT / PRACTICE: TERRY (REASONABLE SUSPICION) AND ITS LIMITS. On the one hand, based on the unique danger presented by armed suspects for the police agents and for the community [balance theory], in Terry v. Ohio, SCOTUS carved out an exception highlighting that stop (when suspect is acting suspiciously) and frisk (when there is danger for safety/crime might be committed) could be conducted without the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and according to the reasonable suspicion; nevertheless, this exception is limited and is not aimed at provoking any further erosion of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore the “reasonable suspicion” test shall be applied to the facts of the case at stakes to verify whether it can be configured. (ii) ROLE OF TIPS: Distinction between the informants giving the tip (known or anonymous): (A) [known informant] police always receive tips from a known informant; in these cases, officers can evaluate the informant’s credibility and – potentially – even hold the informant accountable for false allegations. Therefore, such tip might be even sufficient to configure a reasonable suspicion under Terry rule; (B) [anonymous informant - scrutiny] contrariwise, when police receive tips from an anonymous informant, police have no means of similarly assessing the credibility of said informant. An anonymous tip cannot be taken in serious consideration unless there is additional support/corroboration to ensure that the tip has “sufficient indicia of reliability” to create reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. HOW A TIP CAN BE CORROBORATED (example from the court’s reasoning)? a) [PREDICTIVE BEHAVIOR] If a tip includes a prediction about the suspect’s future activity, officers may be able to develop reasonable suspicion by confirming that the prediction came true. b) [INDEPENDENT POLICE WORK] additional suspicious circumstances arose as the result of the independent investigation on the police based on the anonymous tip. 1 c) (iii) Possible examples of indicia of reliability: (A) prediction about a suspect's future conduct; (B) an informant with the same voice calls on successive nights to inform police about criminal activity that occurs each night; (C) the informant risks his anonymity to make the tip; (D) police can use recording or tracing technology to identify the informant. ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS [Focus on key element: anonymous tip – solely - does not play a role]. Therefore, anonymous tips must be closely scrutinized. In this case: (iv) (A) [NO information on predictive behavior] In this case, the anonymous tip was merely DESCRIPTIVE OF INNOCENT BEHAVIOR and NOT PREDICTIVE. Therefore such anonymous tip did not possess sufficient indicia of reliability to create reasonable suspicion, as the the tip involved in the present action could have been provided by "any pilgrim on the roadway” [NOTE. SCOTUS cites Butts v. State: motion to suppress a gun, cocaine, heroin, because the tip did not create a reasonable suspicion justifying detention]. (B) [NO chances to ascertain credibility] The police thus had no way of assessing the informant's knowledge or credibility. Even though the tip accurately described J.L. and his location, this does not demonstrate the informant's knowledge of criminal behavior. REFUSAL OF THE “FIREARM-EXCEPTION” THEORY: even in some States (example Pennsylvania) police power for stop and frisk is meant to be “expanded” in those cases involving carriage of concealed firearms, SCOTUS deems that said exception may endanger the protection granted under Fourth Amendment. In fact, in many States, it is not forbidden to carry concealed firearms as long as subject to a valid license [requisite of the DANGER shall be taken into account] and stop and frisk shall be therefore unreasonable. IN CONCLUSION: The judgment of the Florida State supreme court is reversed. 6) DISSENTING OPINION (OVERTON): in summary, there should be a lower standard of “reasonable suspicion” when the investigation is addressed to discover and seize firearms. In fact, the search for a gun carried and concealed by a juvenile is never unreasonable. In this sense, cases as WEBB, HETLAND and CLIPPERS shall control and govern the case at stake. 7) RULE OF LAW: An anonymous tip that a person may be carrying a gun does not justify a stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment unless there is additional corroboration to ensure that the tip has “sufficient indicia of reliability” to create reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. 2