Lecture 2: General Issues I

17.584, Civil-Military Relations, Spring 2003 Lecture 2: General Issues I Week II Summaries B. Lasswell, Harold, “The Garrison State,” The American Journal of Sociology 46 (1941): 455468. Lasswell hypothesizes that in the future, the world of the garrison states will prevail— power to the specialists of violence. They will acquire skills of civilian management, rule autocratically, equalize income for solidarity. It’s a probability, not inevitability. Comte, Spencer: Cultivation of duty, propagandize army youth, compulsory labor service for unskilled workers and enemies of elite. Meritocratic recruiting for officers. Elite will prevent full utilization of production for consumption purposes—what democratic values can be preserved? Respect for human dignity. D. Friedburg, Aaron, “Why Didn’t the United States Become a Garrison State?” International Security 16 (4) (1992): 109-137. Despite threats, the openness of the US political system ensured limits on the power of the state over the economy. The US is a contract state not a garrison state. The strategy of deterrence and a reliance on nuclear weapons required less force than maximum, even if it was a lot. This was a capitol-intensive defense. There were alternative ways— Soviet: massive, protracted all out war vision; US: Universal Military Training and reaction to it (Congress). As Eisenhower moved towards nuclear retaliation and doctrine of short war, there was less need for man power in industrial policy. Also, the program of industry dispersal dissipated by the late 50s. From FDR on, there was a reliance on private businesses for increments (Stimson). It wasn’t a perfectly free enterprise but close. USSR was the garrison state that sapped economy and society. Lecture Suggestion for paper at end: which mechanisms are operating in empirical cases and why they developed and work in one case but not in another? Norms: Rule that makes some things unthinkable. 7 days in May 1962 contemplated coup. Not persuasive, even less today. Parallel Civilian Hierarchy – Enemy at the Gates. Draft – Congressman Wrangler supports it today. Janowitz, Charles Moskos. Military Ethos: to each his own – the “normal” theory. Cohen and Adelman article against this conventional wisdom. Bush messed up in the Gulf War I and should have told the military to go into Baghdad instead of letting military sign the armistice. Counter-critique: Johnson micromanagement. Didn’t Bush I fail to decide whether to let Saddam into power, too? Doesn’t it seem like the civil-military split? Bush senior says the coalition wouldn’t support it but hoped Hussein would fall—not smart to let him crush rebellions. Ethnic Social Conflict Petersen’s Master’s paper – graph – 1979 Data looked at officer corps, ranks, and services. Three is the best score for being representative of ethnic make up of population. 0 is the worst and 9 is the best (3+3+3). Recruiting policy is how much the state is involved in recruiting. 0-9 scale. 9 being the most involved/exclusionary. If there are only 2 or 3 groups, the state almost always intervenes to equalize or exclude #1 or #2 cluster. The more groups, the less likely the state will intervene. Petersen’s Master’s paper – graph – 1979 Data looked at officer corps, ranks, and services. Three is the best score. Posen: security dilemma within multiethnic states. Garrison State Article on TIA project and Congress reaction. Lasswell excerpt on pharmacology – LSD experiments in the United States. Lasswell was the most prominent political scientist of his time. Air power destroys distinction between soldiers and civilians for geographically safe states like the United States (if only he knew nuclear weapons would come). 1961 Piece more obscure. He still believes a Freudian craze is possible. Herman Kahn (model for Dr. Strangelove) – The Wizards of Armageddon. Elaborate civil defense system to allow first strike threats. Tit-for-Tat is not credible. Kahn lectures on Thermonuclear War and distributing radiation meters to control panic. Similar situation today with the terror war. International Threat (key independent variable) Casual Threat Æ Garrison State. Friedberg – strategy of deterrence vs. war fighting. Why was this chosen? Minimal cost. Eisenhower was serious about balancing the budget and getting reelected. Societal norms and fiscal policy concerns. Austin was most threatened during ’49-’53 (McCarthyism), but was less of a threat after the Korean War. Capitalism: private companies make arms and they will put brake on states (weakened by the fact that they didn’t make them all along?) USSR Communist Party. Garrison state mentality. No societal norms against compulsion. Opposite. No worry about elections or fiscal policy. Perception of timeout perhaps higher in the USSR during WWII. Would the US be the same if the USSR were in Canada’s place? Desch Reading Independent Variables Threat International Æ Domestic Intervening Variables Doctrine, Leaders, Æ Civil>Military or Civilmilitary, but if the terror war is perceived as a domestic threat as well, the National Guard can’t be used internally.Intervening variables decide indeterminate boxes. Total war doctrine favors military. Desch is a “hard core” realist. Structure and ideas determine the outcome. US Doctrine Powell doctrine: overwhelming force, exit strategy, quicker, support American people. Bush towards preemption? Lack of clarity on domestic insurgency, secession, etc. if civil and military agree. Domestic threat should be L. Hi if mil threatened. But why doesn’t military revolt when western states cut down after the Cold War? It’s ridiculous to consider only the international factors and lump rich demographic and poor African states together. Eric Lobbs piece in IS: it matters if military itself divided by domestic conflict or not.