Environmental Economics

2.964: Economics of Marine Transportation Industries Lecture Notes: Environmental Economics Economics of Environment Positive Economics Normative Economics What is / was / will be What ought to be (description) (optimization) Environment treated as an asset: - inputs of raw materials & energy - source of benefits & amenities - sink for wastes 1. Efficient Use of Environmental Resources How much of an environmental asset should be used? (normative) Criterion 1: static efficiency: MAX net social benefit from utilization - like efficient production decision P Cost (supply) of environmental good -> Opportunity cost (max cost) Demand for environmental good (marginal benefit) Q net . benefit Net benefit = willingness to pay (utility) – social cost Maximum net benefit = Pareto optimal decision Marginal Benefit = Marginal Cost Criterion 2: dynamic efficiency - takes account of changes over time (timing of B + C) Æ present value PV(Bn ) = Bn (1+r)n r = discount rate Dynamic efficiency: max PV of net benefits over time Æ implies PV(marginal net benefit from last unit in each period) equal Positive discount rate Æ 1 unit of benefit is more valuable today than tomorrow Scarcity Constraints on “depletable” supply -> present consumption affects future consumpion (not necessarily “non-renewable”) “marginal user cost” = PV(forgone opportunities at the margin) Fossil fuel example: market must consider extraction & MU costs Sustainability “What level of fossil fuel consumption is sustainable?” Sustainability criterion (Rawls): future generations should be left no worse off than present How can this be if dynamic efficiency allocation Æ more consumption now? Æ Need to transfer (save) some present benefit for future. How? Invest. Property Rights For market mech. to achieve efficient outcome (allocation), need property rights structure that conveys: 1. universality (all resources privately owned) 2. exclusivity (all B + C accrue to owner only) 3. transferability 4. enforceability (secure from seizure/encroachment) Self interest Æ max surplus Æ efficient allocation P 1 = variable cost 2 = producer surplus Revenue = P x Q = R Profit = R – TC = R – 1 – fixed cost = 2 – f.c. S Short run: prod. surplus = 2 = profit + f.c. Long run: no f.c. (all costs variable), so prod. surplus = profit 2 1 D Q Perfectly competitive, no scarcity: L.R. profit = L.R. producer surplus = 0 With scarcity, ownership: L.R. prod. surplus = profit + scarcity rent ≠ 0 Scarcity rent arises from: 1. Nature of resource (land) 2. Marginal user cost in depletable resources P M.U.C. (due to reduced resource in future) taken into account by owner Æ P above MEC scarcity rent Scarcity rent is an opportunity cost, appropriated by owner of resource. MEC + MUC = P MUC MEC D 2. Failures MUC = marginal user cost MEC = marginal extraction cost Q P Externalities Harbor: port + resort hotel Port uses harbor for waste Resort hotel wants clean water MCS MCP D (no pollution control, damage) Q What leads to this? - $ Improperly designed property rights o Recall: universaility + exclusivity: everything owned, all B + C accrue to owners only o Common property resources: not exclusively controlled by single agent o Air + water are legally treated as common property resources Fishery: scarcity rent MC + MUC MC, AC AP = demand MP Q* Qm fishing effort Efficient level: MC = MP : Q* w/o property rights: indiv. Fishers: AC = AP scarcity rent dissipated stocks drawn down Unlimited access destroys incentive to conserve Public goods - Consumption indivisibility Fully accessible to all National defense example: - “free rider” problem - Private supply not necessarily zero, but less than efficient What price? Varies among consumers – no way of knowing Æ “complexity” Imperfect market structure Monopoly/cartel – inefficient allocation, production, pricing Discount Rates Private discount rate may be > social discount rate. Why? Discount rate = cost of capital = risk free + risk premium - risk free is the same - risk premium > for private o Why? Risk caused by government Private decisions -> faster exploitation than socially optimal Government Failure Interest groups – protective legislation “rent seeking” - increasing net benefits to group at expense of society - Regulation/liability