24.01 S16 Kant’s Categorical Imperative

Kant’s categorical imperative Recap What makes an action morally valuable? ◦ Not just the effects. Butterfly effect. ∗ Even if it does have good effects. ◦ Not just performing it. Drunk driver accidentally honking horn. ∗ Even if it has positive expected value. ◦ Not just intentionally performing it. Self-interested shopkeeper. ∗ Even if it is in accordance w/duty. ◦ Not even performing it because it brings you joy, or because you feel compelled to. The lover of humanity gets depressed. ∗ Even if it should be encouraged. ◦ It’s morally valuable because the agent performs it for the right reason = from the motive of duty = out of respect for the moral law The nature of the the moral law Recall: categorical imperatives vs. hypothetical imperatives. ◦ Seems like the moral law must be categorical. ∗ If it weren’t, couldn’t we just “opt-out”? In other words: if it weren’t, couldn’t we just stop caring about the antecedent? ◦ How is it categorical? Whatever it is, it must flow from something that holds unconditionally—of necessity—for those whose to whom it applies: ∗ The rational faculty Roughly, think of it like this: every law of morality will be of the form, if you are a rational agent, do this. For rational agents, the condition here—“if you are a rational agent”—is met necessarily. These equalities are Kant’s. You might like right reasons picture without the duty/law stuff. 2 Formulation 1 of categorical imperative Big Question for any more theory: ◦ Why are the laws of morality binding? Why can’t we opt-out? Specifically for Kant: ◦ How can reason categorically bind us to act in a certain way? Why can’t we opt out of reason’s demands? Amazing analogy! ◦ There are requirements of theoretical reason that apply categorically: No ‘if’s about it! ∗ Some theoretical requirements Don’t believe contradictions. Make only inferences for which you have justification. There is no opting out. Although of course you could fail to be rational. ◦ Analogy: practical reason can do the same. ∗ A practical requirement: hypothetical case You intend to bring about X, and you learn that to bring about X, you must do Y. Practical rationality says you must either: Give up your intention to bring about X. OR Intend to do Y. → A practical requirement: categorical case (Formulation 1) “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” [In more accessible terms: whatever you do you should act for reasons that could serve as acceptable reasons for anyone—to act otherwise is to act inconsistently.] · Example maxim: whenever one has an exam and doesn’t feel like studying, she shall copy off her neighbor’s work. There is no opting out! Although of course you could fail to be rational. 421. From Sayre-McCord p. 5. From p. 3 of Sally’s last handout. · Counter-example maxim? whenever one has an exam and doesn’t feel like studying, and everyone else is well-prepared, and she can do it without being caught, she shall copy off her neighbor’s work. Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Very Brief Selective Summary of Sections I and II. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2000. © University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. All rights reserved. Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: with On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns. 3rd Edition. Translated by James W. Ellington. Hackett Publishing, 1993. © Hackett Publishing. All rights reserved. 3 Formulation 2 of categorical imperative ◦ Key quotes 428. ∗ Value of rational beings: “man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to an arbitrarily used by this or that will.” ∗ Rational awareness of this value. “[Man] must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end.” ◦ Formulation 2 “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” 429. [In all action one should respect others, and oneself, as sources of value and never simply as instruments for one’s own purposes.] From lecture notes of Sally’s from another class. ∗ This formulation prohibits the cheat-only-if-others-are-prepared Distinction: maxim. ∗ This seems like some sort of trick! Where did formulation 1 come · Consistency in conception. · Consistency in willing. from? What does it have to do with formulation 1? Here’s a way to think about it: Following lecture notes from Langton. 1. As rational beings, we are autonomous deliberators. 2. To treat a rational being as a mere end is therefore to subvert that being’s rational capacity for autonomous rational deliberation. 3. But if I will that subversion of others, then by Formulation 1, I will that subversion of myself. 4. Willing to subvert my own will is irrational. 5. Therefore, Formulation 2. A worry from last class Is immorality irrationality? As we’ve seen, the underlying rationale for Kant’s approach is that the source of morality is in reason or rationality. ◦ Could it really be that those who are (im)moral are (im)moral because in some important sense they are acting (ir)rationally?? Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: with On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns. 3rd Edition. Translated by James W. Ellington. Hackett Publishing, 1993. © Hackett Publishing. All rights reserved.