Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, II The voluntary: Why do we care about the difference between voluntary and nonvoluntary? Because it makes sense to praise and blame, honor and punish, only what is voluntary. But why should (e.g.) blame depend on what is voluntary? 1. Desert: We only deserve blame for what is voluntary. Unfair to blame us for what isn’t voluntary. 2. Education: Only blame for what is voluntary can be expected to influence our behavior, e.g., by deterring or—probably more important for Aristotle—educating us. An action is nonvoluntary iff it happens: i. either under force, ii. or by reason of ignorance. Some (but not all) nonvoluntary actions are also involuntary. An action is involuntary iff the agent does it: i. either under force, ii. or by reason of ignorance and later regrets it. The rough idea seems to be that: An action is involuntary iff it is nonvoluntary and the agent did not want to do it. If he had to be forced to do it, then presumably (although not necessarily) he didn’t want it. And if he was ignorant, but after learning of his mistake regrets it, then he didn’t want it. Why this second distinction? Suppose someone does something vicious (in the sense that it is something that only a vicious person would knowingly do). Insofar as we are judging whether that person is vicious, it is not enough to be told that he acted nonvoluntarily. He might have been perfectly willing to do it (in which case he is vicious), or completely unwilling (in which case he is not). Force: The moving principle is outside and the person contributes nothing, e.g., being carried off by the wind, or by the tyrant’s henchmen. Why should force make it inappropriate to blame or praise someone? 1. Desert: Doesn’t deserve it, somehow unfair. 2. Education: Pointless, since a better character won’t overcome compulsion. The threat of determinism: But wait: Isn’t all action forced? As we will see, Hobbes will say, in effect, that when the agent “acts,” this is because tiny bits of matter, including those of which the agent’s body are composed, are moving and colliding in various ways. But this is just what is going on when the agent is carried off by a wind. At bottom, there’s no real difference. This sort of worry simply doesn’t get off the ground for Aristotle. For him, there is a perfectly metaphysically respectable sense in which the person is the origin of his own action: namely, that there is a principle that behaves independently of the principles governing the matter left to itself. This is true of every nature, such as that of a plant. If voluntary action is simply the expression of our human nature, then there’s nothing mysterious or supernatural about it, anymore than the growth of a plant is mysterious or supernatural. The case of the wind is different: there, this principle isn’t in play; the matter of the agent’s body is just acted on by external forces. Force: hard cases 1. Are actions done out of fear of the greater evil forced? After all, we don’t blame people for them. E.g., a tyrant threatens to kill your children unless you do something base. • No: In the relevant sense—namely, at the time of action, or taking into account the conditions the agent faced—these actions are voluntary. The moving principle is in the agent himself. • Question: If these actions are voluntary, then why don’t we blame them? • Reply: Because, at the time of action, they were the right thing to do. Indeed, we might praise them. 2. Are wrong actions that are beyond human nature to resist forced? • No: If they issue from human nature, then the moving principle is certainly in the agent! • Question: If these actions are voluntary, then why don’t we blame them? The answer here can’t be that they are right, because they are wrong. • Reply: 1. Desert: People don’t deserve to be blamed, somehow unfair. 2. Education: Pointless: there is no way to educate human nature to do things that are beyond human nature. 3. Are actions done from the attraction of pleasure or noble objects forced? • No: then all actions would be compelled. • Question: Doesn’t this just beg the question against determinists, who hold that all actions are forced? • Reply: Again, determinism isn’t on Aristotle’s radar. From his perspective, to claim that all actions are forced is patently absurd; it’s equivalent to saying that there are no possible circumstances under which human nature expresses itself. By reason of ignorance: Meant to contrast with: 1. Actions done because of ignorance of general principles (“ends”), e.g., “Don’t kill people for money.” Instead, the ignorance is of particular facts of the situation (“means”). 2. Actions done “in ignorance” of particular facts. Aristotle gives the examples of drunkenness and rage, but does not explain the difference between “by reason of” and “in.” Conjecture: The “in ignorance” cases are cases in which the agent is responsible for his own ignorance. In “by reason of” cases, by contrast, the agent is not responsible for the ignorance. Thus, it is accurate to claim that the reason for the action really was ignorance, not the agent’s earlier missteps. Why should acting by reason of ignorance make it inappropriate to blame or praise someone? 1. Desert: Unfair? But why is it fairer to blame someone for ignorance of general principles than for ignorance of particular facts? 2. Education: Pointless. There is no way to educate someone so that it will never happen that he is ignorant of some particular facts, in a way in which he could not have helped. Argument against the Socratic View: The Socratic argument (e.g., in the dialogue Protagoras) 1. Everyone does what he thinks is good. 2. Therefore, if one does something bad, it is only because one falsely believes that it is good: i.e., because one is ignorant of what is good. 3. If one acts because of ignorance, then one acts involuntarily. 4. Therefore, all bad actions are involuntary. Aristotle’s replies: 1. Wrongdoing involves ignorance of ends, but involuntariness requires ignorance of means. 2. Implies that right actions are voluntary, but wrong actions are involuntary. This is absurd, because if something is up to us to do, it must also be up to us not to do. Aristotle’s final definition: An action is voluntary iff: i. “that of which the moving principle is in the agent himself… ii. he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action” But: • What about sweating? Moving principle is in the agent, and he may know he’s doing it. • This classifies actions “in ignorance” as nonvoluntary, since the agent is not aware of the particular circumstances. Vice is voluntary: Aristotle argues that: Vice is voluntary. By this, he doesn’t mean that the vicious person can now voluntarily change. Indeed, Aristotle thinks there isn’t much the vicious person can now do about it. Instead, he means that: one’s present vice was the foreseeable effect of one’s past voluntary actions. This is more than saying that: one becomes vicious through voluntary actions, which Aristotle argued earlier. It also requires that: one knew (or was negligently ignorant) that one would become vicious through those voluntary actions. He seems to think that this condition is met: “Not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states of character are produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person.” Is this plausible? (Indeed, later he concedes: “but though we control the beginning of our states of character the gradual progress is not obvious.”) Why does Aristotle need to argue that vice is voluntary? In order to show that: It makes sense to blame people for their vices? But why defend this claim? That is, why isn’t it enough to defend the claim that: It makes sense to blame people for their vicious actions? Perhaps Aristotle thinks that this claim is in danger too, on the grounds that: It makes sense to blame people for their vicious actions only if their vice is voluntary. But then why does Aristotle assume that? First, it seems doubtful that Aristotle is assuming that: If a factor contributes to a vicious action, then it makes sense to blame someone for that vicious action only if that factor was voluntary. This assumption threatens to make nothing voluntary. Lots of nonvoluntary factors contribute to vicious actions. Second, why doesn’t Aristotle just say that one’s vicious actions here and now are voluntary because here and now the principle is in one and one knows what one is doing? Isn’t that what we ought to conclude from his own account of the voluntary? 1. Perhaps Aristotle is worried that someone might reply, on the vicious person’s behalf, that he does not know what he is doing, as a drunk person does not know. Hence, Aristotle’s reply: even if he does not know what he is doing, he is responsible for that ignorance. But: Why doesn’t Aristotle simply reply that, whether or not the vicious person is responsible for his ignorance about the ends, his vicious actions are still voluntary? After all, it’s only ignorance of the means that makes actions nonvoluntary. 2. Perhaps Aristotle is worried that there is no point in blaming the mature for vice, unless it could help someone avoid vice. Of course, it cannot help the mature avoid vice. But can blaming the mature help the young avoid vice? Only if the young can see a connection between what they are doing now and the vices that they might acquire. But if they can see this, then vice is voluntary.