Chapter 3 6. A positive proposal: General Transmission Having criticized Strong and Ought Necessity, and the Sufficiency principles, I now suggest a positive proposal: General Transmission: If there is reason for one to E, and there is positive probability, conditional on one’s M-ing, that one’s M-ing, or some part of one’s M-ing, helps to bring it about that one E’s nonsuperfluously, then that is a reason for one to M, whose strength depends on the reason for one to E and the probability, so long as the reason for one to E is not explained by an application of General Transmission to reason for one to achieve some distinct E’. Observe, first, that General Transmission meets our desiderata; it is, essentially, Means Probabilize Nonsuperfluously plus a proviso. Second, General Transmission is informative: it says something not only about whether some reason is transmitted, but also about how much reason is transmitted and what it depends on.34 Third, General Transmission is comprehensive: it says whether reason transmits to any kind of means (not simply, say, necessary or sufficient means).35 Finally, General Transmission implies, as a special case, the one principle that survived criticism: namely, Weak Necessity. One might find it a shortcoming of General Transmission that it tells us nothing about the instrumental transmission of ‘ought.’ But I suspect that this is as it should be. The problems with Ought Necessity and Sufficiency discussed earlier suggest that there may be no interesting generalities about the instrumental transmission of ‘ought.’ Perhaps all we can say, in general, is that reasons transmit in the way that General Transmission describes, and that ‘ought’ depends on reasons (perhaps in the way that Refrain Reasons-Ought and Relevant Reasons-Ought suggest). Whether, in any given case, the reason transmitted from an end to means will ensure that the ‘ought’ that accompanies the end will also accompany the means may just depend on the specifics of the given case. The reason for the italicized “Intransitivity Proviso” is a problem explored by Millsap (ms. a) (who credits it to Simon May and Kenny Easwaran) and Bedke (2009: 679 n. 12) (who credits it to Jamie Dreier). In an earlier version of Millsap’s example, Kenny has reason to prepare a display on the life of Marie Antoinette, which requires that he bake a loaf of bread and a cake. General Transmission might well imply that Kenny has reason to bake a loaf of bread. One means to that is to bake a normal loaf. Another is to bake a mega-loaf, which is very likely to leave no flour left to bake a cake, and so to prevent Kenny from preparing the display. Applying General Transmission with E = baking a loaf, it might well be that Kenny has the same reason to bake a mega-loaf as to bake a normal loaf. However, applying General Transmission with E = preparing the display, Kenny will presumably have much less reason to bake a megaloaf as to bake a normal loaf. Intuitively, it is the latter conclusion, not the former, which is correct. The Intransitivity Proviso reflects this, by saying that reason for a means to a means is transmitted directly from the “ultimate” end, not from the means to which it is a means.36 Some might urge a second, “Silencing Proviso”: “…and the reason for one to refrain from M-ing is not overwhelmingly more weighty than the reason that there is, or would otherwise be, for one’s M-ing.” This would accommodate an objection that is often raised against transmission principles. Suppose the end is slightly improving college policy, which, at least at first glance, is something that I have reason to do. The only roadblock is the kindly old don who is sure to veto any proposed change. Suppose there’s a positive probability, conditional on poisoning the don, that I change college policy and poisoning the don helps to bring this about in a nonsuperfluous way. General Transmission implies that there is some reason for me to poison the don—although obviously overridden. But some will say that reason for the means is “silenced.” Yes, when means carry some moderate cost, reasons for them may be overridden. But when means are overwhelmingly costly or objectionable in this way, there isn’t even any reason to be overridden. Transmission in such cases is simply blocked.37 Like many others, however, I find the objection unpersuasive. I grant that it is odd to say that there is reason to poison the don. And I grant that a fully virtuous agent would not treat the improvement to college policy as a reason for poisoning the don. That thought would not so much as enter into his deliberations. But I doubt that we should conclude from these observations that there is no such reason. As Millsap (ms. a), Raz (2005b: 3), and Bedke (2009: 684–686), observe, a point made by Schroeder (2004, 2005, and 2007) seems to explain why it is odd to say. It is a violation of the Maxim of Relation of Grice (1989) to say that there is a reason, when, as one knows, it is very weak or vastly outweighed. And, to entertain the thought, at least in the context of live deliberation, does indeed indicate a vice. (Doesn’t it go without saying, or thinking, that the agent shouldn’t kill the don, in which case entertaining thoughts about the reason for doing so is idle? So why is he entertaining thoughts about them? Is the verdict somehow not obvious to him? Or is he somehow tempted to defy it?) But, as Seidman (2005) observes, the viciousness of entertaining the thought is compatible with its truth. It similarly indicates a vice of one kind to entertain lascivious but true thoughts, during wedding vows, that sex with the officiant would be pleasurable, and a vice of another kind to entertain distracting but true thoughts, during oral argument, that it is time to treat oneself to a new judicial robe. Thus, I find it more natural to conclude that, when taking some means is opposed not simply by reasons that would be moderately overriding, but moreover by overwhelmingly strong reasons, this makes it odd (or vicious) to cite (or contemplate) reason for the means, than to say that it somehow blocks transmission of reason. But for those who are troubled by the objection, the option of adding the Silencing Proviso is there.38 7. Implications: No reasons to be instrumentally rational At least for the sake of argument, suppose that the cases against Strong and Ought Necessity, and against the Sufficiency principles, and for General Transmission, have succeeded. What then follows for appeals to principles of instrumental transmission to show that “narrow-scope” reason or ‘ought’ for the consequent F “detaches” from “wide-scope” reason or ‘ought’ for a material conditional (one E’s ⊃ one F’s)? Recall that detachment threatens the claim of Broome (1999) that, in general, one ought to be instrumentally rational: that is, that one ought to see to it that (one intends at t to E and believes at t that intending at t to M is a necessary means to E-ing ⊃ one intends at t to M). For it scarcely seems to follow from the facts that one intends to start World War III and that one believes that intending to launch this missile is necessary for starting World War III, that one has “detached,” “narrow-scope” reason to intend to launch the missile, let alone that one ought to. Setiya (2007) and Schroeder (2009), revisiting an observation of Greenspan (1975), advocate: Ought Detachment: If one ought to make it the case that (one E’s ⊃ one F’s) and one cannot alter the fact that one E’s, then one ought to F. According to Ought Detachment, Broome’s (1999) claim implies that if one could not alter the intention and means-end belief above, one ought to intend to launch the missile. However, Setiya’s and Schroeder’s arguments for Ought Detachment rely on Ought Necessity, which we have questioned. So it not clear that we have grounds for accepting Ought Detachment. To a similar purpose, Raz (2005a) argues for: Weak Detachment: If one has reason to make it the case that (one E’s ⊃ one F’s), then one has reason to F, which he takes to follow not from the Facilitative Principle, but instead from the more basic and general idea that: “People have reason to do what will bring them into conformity with the reasons that apply to them” (2005b, 3). Bedke (2009) argues that something similar follows from his “Instrumental Principle.” If they are right about this, then we need no auxiliary assumptions, about unalterable intentions or anything else, to refute Broome (1999). If there were reason to be instrumentally rational, there would always be reason to intend to M, for any M whatsoever. But, first, the case for Weak Detachment rests on questionable principles. Since Bedke’s Instrumental Principle entails Weak Sufficiency, it would seem to be falsified by the phenomenon of superfluity. The “more basic” idea of Raz’s quoted above also seems falsified by superfluity. Presumably we do not have reason to do what superfluously brings us into conformity with what we have reason to do. Second, there is an argument against Weak Detachment. Rippon (2011: 12) notes that Weak Detachment seems to prove too much. There are arguably some wide-scope reasons: for example, that I have reason (I am in France ⊃ I speak French). Now suppose that I’m not in France; I’m in the USA, surrounded by English monolinguists. Weak Detachment implies that I have reason to speak French. But intuitively I have no reason at all to do this. Nevertheless, I believe that we can derive from General Transmission analogues to Ought and Weak Detachment that vindicate Setiya’s and Schroeder’s, and Raz’s and Bedke’s, lines of argument. Let us make two plausible assumptions. First, one’s F-ing helps to bring it about that (one E’s ⊃ one F’s). Second, when the probability in General Transmission is one, then the reason for the means is of the same weight as the reason for the end. Then General Transmission implies: Strong Detachment: If one has reason to make it the case that (one E’s ⊃ one F’s), and, in every possible outcome, one E’s, then that is a reason of the same weight to F. This is because, when the antecedent holds, F-ing helps to bring about the end nonsuperfluously in every outcome in which one F’s. Strong Detachment implies that if in every possible outcome one has the intention and means-end belief above, and if one has reason to be instrumentally rational, then one has at least as much reason to intend to launch the missile, which seems absurd enough.39 General Transmission also validates: Restricted Weak Detachment: If one has reason to make it the case that (one E’s ⊃ one F’s), and there is positive probability, conditional on one’s F-ing, that one’s F-ing helps to bring it about in a nonsuperfluous way that (one E’s ⊃ one F’s), then one has some reason to F.40 This seems to suffice for Raz’s and Bedke’s purposes. It entails that if at some possible outcome intending to launch the missile is not superfluous to being instrumentally rational, and if one has reason to be instrumentally rational, then one has reason to intend it. Moreover, Restricted Weak Detachment handles Rippon’s counterexample, even if we grant the (perhaps dubious) claim there is a wide-scope reason to see to it that (I am in France ⊃ I speak French). When we suppose, in entertaining Rippon’s counterexample, that I am not in France, we are in effect shifting to a context in which there is no (epistemic41 or historical) probability that I am in France. But, in that case, the material conditional (I am in France ⊃ I speak French) is already guaranteed to be satisfied, which makes speaking French a superfluous means to satisfying it (as Rippon 2011: 15 n. 31 in fact observes). And Restricted Weak Detachment does not say that reason transmits to the consequent when satisfying the consequent is a superfluous means to satisfying the conditional. So it does not follow from Restricted Weak Detachment that, when I am not in France, I have reason to speak French. In other words, Rippon’s case simply exemplifies the general point that reasons don’t transmit to superfluous means, as General Transmission says. In reply, it might be said that if we add the Silencing Proviso of section 6 to General Transmission, then Strong Detachment and Restricted Weak Detachment will inherit it. Since the reasons to refrain from intending to launch this nuclear missile are presumably overwhelming, no reason transmits to intending to launch it. Alternatively, one might appeal to Schroeder’s pragmatic point to question the intuition that it is absurd for reason to transmit to intending to launch it. However, other bootstrapping cases will escape this reply: namely, cases in which the there is weaker reason for intended end than for some alternative, but not so much weaker that the reason for the intended end is “silenced,” or becomes pragmatically odd to cite. Presumably, we cannot insist that whenever there is stronger reason for an alternative, the reason is silenced, or becomes pragmatically odd to cite, on pain of denying that there are ever overridden reasons, or pragmatically acceptable mention of them. 8. Conclusion: Is instrumental transmission a myth? I close by noting a further implication of General Transmission: namely, that it may pave the way for the conclusions, first, that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as instrumental transmission and, second, that whatever truth there is in the vicinity is just a consequence of a certain kind of decision theory. We have been supposing that there are reasons for ends. But where do these come from? On a value-based view, at least some reasons for ends are presumably provided by valuable states of affairs. And on a desire-based view, all reasons for ends are provided by desires for states of affairs. So says: General Production: If S is a valuable (or desired) state of affairs, and if there is positive probability, conditional on one’s X-ing, that one’s X-ing, or some part of one’s X-ing, helps to bring about S “nonredundantly”—that is, helps to bring about S when S would not have obtained if one had not X-ed—then that is a reason for one to X, whose strength depends positively on the value of (or strength, depth, etc. of desire for) S and the probability. The need for “nonredundantly” can be seen from a variant of the Twoways case. Here a different doctor has already given the patient Drug 1. Has Twoways reason to give Drug 2? Suppose that the valuable state of affairs is simply that the patient’s pain is relieved, it does not matter who brings it about. (In some cases the value of a state of affairs may depend on who brings it about, but this is not such a case.) Although there is some probability that Twoways helps to bring it about that the patient’s pain is relieved, there is no probability that Twoways helps to bring this about nonredundantly. So General Production says, as seems intuitive, that he has no reason to give Drug 2. Crucially, nonredundancy differs from nonsuperfluity. The redundancy of an action with respect to a state of affairs is a matter of whether that state of affairs would have obtained (by one’s agency, by someone else’s agency, by natural causes, etc.) even if one had not performed that action. By contrast, the superfluity of an action with respect to an end is (roughly) a matter of whether one would have achieved a given end (by, specifically, one’s own agency) even if one had not performed that action. “Now assume that General Production explains all reasons for ends,” one might challenge. “Then wouldn’t it also explain all reasons for means, without needing any help from General Transmission? Suppose there is reason for an end. By assumption, this will be because it helps to bring about some valuable (or desired) state of affairs. But then any means to that end will also be likely to help to bring about that valuable (or desired) state of affairs. And if so, won’t General Production imply there will be a reason for those means too? General Production, thus, explains General Transmission. The latter becomes, as it were, minor theorem of a kind of decision theory.42 Indeed, to be more accurate, instrumental transmission is not so much explained by General Production, as explained away. For now the reason for the means is simply that it helps to bring about a valuable state of affairs. Reason for the end appears nowhere in the explanation. It simply drops out. Of course, we can still say that whenever there is reason for the end, there is also reason for the means. But we can also say, with equal justice, that whenever there is reason for the means, there is reason for the end. The idea of instrumental transmission—that there is reason for the means because there is reason for the end—is an illusion.” This conclusion—that instrumental transmission is a myth—may be less damaging to the argument of this paper than it might at first appear. We could change General Transmission to accommodate it. We would rewrite “…then that is a reason…” as “…then there is also a reason …” So revised, General Transmission would still be a useful truth. It would still help, for example, to clarify the debate over “detachment.” And it would be a neglected truth, overlooked, in particular, by proponents of extant transmission principles. The fact that this revised General Transmission would be a minor theorem of decision theory would not change this. However, I have doubts that the challenge succeeds. First, at least on a value-based view, the initial assumption of the challenge is far from obvious. On a value-based view, one might deny that all reasons for ends are provided by the value of states of affairs, and so explained by General Production.43 For example, I may have reason to honor or respect something of value, whether or not doing so brings about a valuable state of affairs.44 Second, even if all reasons for ends were explained by General Production, there would still be reasons for means that were not explained by General Production. The trouble is that, paradoxically, something can be a means to the end of helping to bring about a valuable (or desired) state of affairs nonredundantly (and so, intuitively, reason can transmit to it) without itself helping to bring about that state of affairs nonredundantly (and so without, as far as General Production is concerned, any reason transmitting to it). Suppose that the valuable (or desired) state of affairs is my being in the house, regardless of how this comes about. In every outcome in which I enter by the front, if I hadn’t, I would have entered by the back. As we saw in section 4, entering by the front is not a superfluous means. So, according to General Transmission, I have reason to enter by the front, as seems intuitive. However, my entering by the front is a redundant means, because in every outcome in which I enter by the front, even if I hadn’t entered by the front, the state of affairs of my being in the house (it matters not how) would have obtained. So, according to General Production, I would have no reason to enter by the front, which seems false.45 In sum, even when one’s end is one’s helping to bring about a valuable or desired state of affairs (whose value or status as desired does not depend on how it comes about), we still need to think of means as helping to bring about that end: one’s bringing about that state of affairs oneself. We can’t bypass the reason for end, and treat the means simply as something that helps to bring about the obtaining of that valuable or desired state of affairs. So, contrary to the challenge, reasons for ends don’t drop out of the explanation of reasons for the means. This suggests, to my mind, that we should keep General Transmission in its original form and, more generally, that instrumental transmission is not a myth. But what is perhaps more remarkable is not that this challenge can be countered, but that it could be raised in the first place. That is itself surprising—or at least surprised me. If nothing else, it testifies to the importance of getting clear about the principles governing (to put it neutrally) the relations between reasons for ends and means. Whatever comes of the challenge, I hope that this paper is some means in furtherance of that end.