Lecture 2: Leadership, Management and Structure

INMS 600 Lecture 2: Leadership, Management and Structure This week we discuss the history, current management structure and leadership practices of the United States Intelligence Community (IC). This will be at the wave top level and intended to orientate you on the foundations and general history of the Intelligence Community. The real turning point in the management of the IC came after the September 11th attacks when the investigating commission recommended the creation of a National Intelligence Director to oversee national intelligence centers across the federal government. This was due in large part to the shortcomings in coordination, collaboration and intelligence sharing among multiple intelligence agencies and organizations. The focus for the IC in 2020 and continuing into 2021 is the COVID-19 global pandemic and managing and leading it though this crisis. Meanwhile, global threats from near-peer adversaries, and nontraditional state and non-state actors is a challenge. For example, in this week’s reading on 6 principles to get a macro view for the IC | Intelligence Community News“6 principles to get a macro view for the IC” the author describes how conventional and unconventional Hybrid Threats such as the SolarWinds breach are more frequent from state & non-state actors. Management Models Management of intelligence activities is similar to the management of other types of activities. A manager is tasked to accomplish goals by orchestrating the available resources. These includes financial and human capital resources. But, what about the structure and culture of an organization? These are three basic models of management: Unitary Organization: This is a traditional hierarchical structure best illustrated by a corporation with a chief executive officer (CEO) at the helm with whom senior vice presidents (VP) report. Vice presidents report to senior vice presidents. Directors report to vice presidents, and so forth. The structure is formal with defined lines of responsibility. The hierarchy of managers is often described as a ladder. For example, the military services and some intelligence agencies are structured this way but not always. Matrix Organization: This example uses a more horizontal structure and is characteristic of many large engineering firms. In such firms, the VP for engineering may oversee all engineers, but assigns them to various programs according to the needs of the individual programs. Matrix organizations have become 1 more prevalent with the Information Age. Hybrid Organization: This can either blend the elements of the hierarchical organization and a matrix organization or neither. The overall IC exhibits characteristics of this type of organization but is made of many independent parts. It is almost like a franchise operation. Within the IC there are examples of all three types of organizational structures with defined functions and responsibilities, controlling policies, and an integrated budget. For example, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is appointed by the President and the titular head for the 16 government agencies. Because the IC is a government entity, its organization, mission, functions, policies and procedures are determined too often by politics. Many factors bear on the political decisions that are embedded in the laws that govern the Intelligence Community. As the IC evolved after World War II, specific organizations developed and evolved with technical specialties or functional disciplines. The politicization of intelligence has been an issue and a controversial topic. It has driven reforms of the IC in the past and is once again an issue in our nation. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Operations developed the expertise surrounding the spotting, recruitment, vetting, tasking, and running clandestine human sources, including the ability to communicate covertly. CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) became the technical experts for the interpretation of satellite and other imagery (IMINT). These specialty organizations became known as stovepipes. They KH 4 Imaging Satellite managed the process of their specialties from cradle to grave. As intelligence grew in importance, size, and complexity, multiple agencies became involved in each functional and technical specialty. Duplication, redundancy and wasted resources was inevitable. • • • While the Secretary of Defense was the government’s executive agent for SIGINT, NSA vested in carrying out that responsibility For example, NSA focused on signals intelligence (SIGINT) especially the collection, processing, decryption, and analysis of adversaries’ communications. However, the CIA and more significantly the military services were also involved in SIGINT activities. While CIA was the lead HUMINT collection organization, DIA and the military services also conduct HUMINT activities in support of their missions. DIA and the military service intelligence organizations were heavily involved in IMINT for satisfying their own intelligence requirements. IC Budget Management Management and oversight of the IC budget is completely decentralized, and this cannot be understated. What evolved from this duplication was a new management model (a hybrid approach) referred to as functional management. Disagreements among organizations, especially over investment and budget allocations are legendary. It always comes down to the money. Congress often challenged the Executive Branch to better manage its duplicative efforts. A budget is only a plan, and no budget is ever precisely 2 followed. Establishing a budget is one thing, spending funds is another. National Intelligence Program (NIP) - under budgetary control of the DNI and encompasses non-military spending. It covers the programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community oriented towards the strategic needs of decision maker This includes funding for the CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (counterterrorism and counterintelligence) the Department of State Office of Intelligence and Research (ONIR), Department of Treasury Office of Intelligence Support, and Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP). The Defense NIP is focused on strategic-level intelligence for military-related activities and primarily associated with NSA, DIA, NGA and NRO. The programs consist of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), National Geospatial-Intelligence Program (NGP), National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and the Specialized Reconnaissance Program (SRP). • • • • • CCP: Managed by the Director of the NSA, who simultaneously acts as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS). GDIP: Consolidated program managed by the Director of DIA supporting national-level defense intelligence activities do not fall within the other more specific CCP,NGP, NRP and SRP budgets. NGP: Managed by the NGA Director. It funds national-level GEOINT-related activities throughout the IC that range from three-dimensional maps to computerized databases. NRP: Managed by the NRO Director to fund the development and operation of all U.S. programs, and USAF and CIA aerial and space-based overflight operations. SRP: Funds the procurement of special intelligence gathering devices and reconnaissance collection activities. Military Intelligence Program MIP – established in 2005 and combined two military intelligence programs, the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) program. The MIP funds defense intelligence activity intended to support tactical military operations and priorities. It provides funding for the Army Military Intelligence, the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Agency, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM). NIP and MIP designations are simply ways to manage resources. Anything not NIP funded is typically MIP -funded. There are always exceptions, Intelligence-related programs that are not part of the IC include the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). For example, the DHS Office of Intelligence within the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division is not included in the IC because theoretically, ICE activities primarily support the DHS mission to protect the homeland. Disclosure of the aggregate NIP request is mandated by the fiscal 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, but the last two administrations have resisted calls to release individual agency requests since it could potentially harm national security. Intelligence budget requests are debated behind closed doors by a select group of lawmakers on relevant Senate and House committees and approved as a classified annex that is not released to the public. This is sometimes referred to as the black budget The black budget which is related to military research and covert operations. 3 Intelligence Activities IC Functional Management The management model gets even more complicated with the functional managers. Within the IC there are now numerous functional managers for different disciplines. The Director, NSA became the functional manager for SIGINT, with oversight and influence over the allocation of funds and program priorities for SIGINT efforts in the military services, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and CIA. For example, the NRO is the U.S. Government agency in charge of designing, building, launching, and maintaining the IC’s intelligence satellites but affiliated with the DoD. It’s key customers and mission partners include policy makers, the Armed Services, the IC, Departments of State, Justice and Treasury, and civil agencies. All depend on NRO’s unique capabilities. The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) is the functional manager or lead for all counterintelligence efforts by any agency. As a management entity, the NCIX It is the IC lead and serves as the director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) under the ODNI. The NCIX chairs the National Counterintelligence Policy Board, the principal interagency mechanism for developing national CI policies and procedures. 4 The newest functional management formulation surrounds GEOINT – geospatial intelligence (imagery + geographical information). The Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is the GEOINT functional manager. GEOINT activities are conducted outside of NGA by all of the military services, DIA, CIA, the NRO, FBI, and a host of other government agencies – not all of whom are intelligence organizations (e.g., U.S. Geological Survey). For example, the military services have delegated responsibility for assigned geospatial areas and topics, but this process is managed by NGA authority. The functional management model does not give the functional manager total management control. Much depends on cooperation and collaboration. Functional management is a compromise between organizational management prerogatives and technical management of similar functions. It is a proven and successful process. Leadership Principles Leadership is a complex phenomenon. There are many models of leadership—leadership that applies to national leaders leading policymakers and decision makers in conducting the affairs of nations on the world stage has strategic implications. Political leaders leading the public to a consensus on the domestic affairs of a nation have a different task from business leaders leading employees to contribute to growth and prosperity. Many write about the differences and it is valuable to consider leadership in different fields. A leader in the corporate field would likely be held to standards distinct from a leader in a national security intelligence organization. The business of law enforcement has a different culture and mission than the business of certain entities such as the NGA in the Intelligence Community. To discuss management and not leadership would miss an important aspect of examining the governance of intelligence activities. How is leadership different from management? • “You manage things, you lead people.” - RADM Grace Hopper (USN Ret.), computer pioneer • “Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designed can replace it.” - General Omar Bradley • “The manager focuses on systems and structure; the leader focuses on people.” - Warren Bennis, University Professor and Distinguished Professor of Business Administration and Founding Chairman of The Leadership Institute at the University of southern California. • “If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, and become more, you are a leader.” – President John Quincy Adams • “Leaders work on the culture of the organization, creating it or changing it. Managers work within the culture of the organization." - Edgar H. Shein, "Organizational culture" in J. Thomas Wren, ed. The Leader's Companion 5 • “You do not lead by hitting people over the head – that is assault, not leadership.” – General Dwight D. Eisenhower • The Army, in Leadership for Senior Leaders (Field Manual 22-103), defines leadership as an art rather than a science or set of things to do. Leadership cannot be reduced to a doctrine, with associated tactics, techniques and procedures or checklists. Consider the relation of power to leadership. American political scientist Joseph Nye captures several types of power which you will understand intuitively. One cannot lead without power and that leadership is a power relationship between leaders and followers. • Coercive Power: Based on fear and relates primarily to the ability of the leader to punish the subordinates for non-conformity. • Reward power: Relates to the ability of the leader to provide positive rewards, such as income or other benefits, to people who cooperate. • Legitimate Power: Relates to the position of the leader in the organizational hierarchy. • Expert Power: Based on unique expertise or skills in particular areas that are regarded as important to subordinates. • Referent Power: the power of personality and relates to the leader’s ability to be admired because of one or more personal traits. Many authorities on leadership believe that the power position of the leader with regard to subordinates is a critical factor in determining leader effectiveness. Nye recognized that to lead effectively, leaders often need to use a combination of both hard and soft power. In the military you salute the rank and not the person. There is also the ever-present issue of the succession of leaders. In corporations, the Boards of Directors are focused on who will follow this leader and the next. However, government organizations are less methodical in some ways. As we progress through this course on managing intelligence activities, keep in mind the importance of leadership to effectively manage sensitive activities. Every leader or manager needs to be mindful of the future personnel needs of their organization. Organizations are dynamic; they Former DIA Director LTG Ashley 6 change. The workforce is fluid; employees quit, retire, or die. Succession management, to adjust to change or compensate for the loss of critical personnel, is the responsibility of the current leader. Understanding all the stakeholders in the intelligence community was challenging enough. There is a new 18th member, the U.S. Space Force. Its mission is to monitor threats to U.S. satellites and other space- based assets. This is threat-driven as the space capabilities of Russia, China and other nations grow as US reliance on space expands and becomes more vulnerable. The decision to expand the IC was a leadership decision intended to improve the IC’s ability to keep pace with expanding threats. Management of the Intelligence Community The management history of the Intelligence Community is complex. As you read the material this week, do not be alarmed if you do not understand everything you read. After the 9/11 attacks, several investigations resulted in stinging condemnations of how the federal government managed its intelligence activities. Besides the 9/11 Commission, Congress issued a joint House-Senate report on the attacks and how US intelligence failed in its responsibility to provide adequate warning. The 9/11 Commission proposed a fundamental change in the management of the Intelligence Community. It highlighted the management problems encountered by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who despite Executive Order 12333, had only limited management authority over actual spending for intelligence in organizations and departments other than the CIA. The Commission proposed creating a supernumerary official – a Director of National Intelligence to oversee all intelligence including the CIA and activities containing elements of the Intelligence Community. The joint House-Senate report endorsed this recommendation and it was a centerpiece of the subsequent legislation in 2004. The DNI works closely with a President-appointed, Senate-confirmed Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence to effectively integrate all national and homeland security intelligence in defense of the homeland and in support of U.S. national security interests. Note that the response to the 9/11 failure was to reorganize the structure of the Intelligence Community. Whereas the 9/11 Commission report, the joint House-Senate report, and others discussed reforms other than reorganization. This reflects the limited power of government, and especially the legislature, to effect change but it reflects political reality. The DNI concept was adopted instead of establishing a centralized Department of Intelligence largely because intelligence serves so many customers in various departments. Intelligence is a service industry, to apply a private sector concept. It represents a greater centralization than did the DCI management concept and is a compromise between centralization and decentralization of intelligence functions. The challenge for the DNI begins with formal authority and at the level of execution. 7 Mission Management A partial compromise between centralized management and decentralized operation of intelligence activities is the mission manager concept instituted by the DNI. The mission manager is the go-to official for a specific subject or problem set. There are mission or National Intelligence Managers (NIMS) for regional threat actors such as Iran and North Korea; and for functional threats such as terrorism and espionage. NIMS are more facilitators or overseers than managers. Under the DNI charter they have no management authority to execute operations other than conducting studies and analyses. Fundamental management authorities remain with line agency heads. Stovepipes versus Integration Often decried are the stovepipe organizations within the Intelligence Community – the National Security Agency for signals intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for human intelligence, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) for space-based reconnaissance and collection. The allegation is that these organizations do not share intelligence with other agencies as a matter of policy and bureaucratic ownership. Stovepipes were created because they were an efficient, and often more effective approach in conducting often technically, challenging tasks. • • • President Kennedy directed the coordination of competing CIA, Air Force, and Navy space intelligence efforts due to their significant costs. This resulted in the creation of the NRO which focused on space reconnaissance and resourced with technical experts to successfully manage this mission. The integration of separate service Cryptologic efforts into the National Security Agency created a capability to effectively exploit many foreign communications. The concentration of computing power and technical knowledge at NSA created a critical mass that has served the nation well since 1952. The need for expertise in human intelligence operations may differ somewhat from technical sources, but the recruitment, vetting, and management of foreign agents requires a level of expertise not easily achieved. CIA has often been accused of not sharing human source intelligence for bureaucratic political purposes. The counterargument for restricted dissemination of a HUMINT source is the need to protect that source. The organization of government activities is governed by politics. Reacting to the latest crisis or scandal is an American characteristic and increasingly a national pastime. Directing organizational change is one of the few publicly visible actions that Congress, and the White House can take when public pressure mounts to fix something. 8 As you read the materials this week, consider your own application of the concepts of leadership and management in your own agencies. If you have any questions, let me know. The only bad question is the one not asked. I am here to facilitate knowledge and if you don’t understand something let me know. Have a good week. 9