Gender Identity Bettcher's Multiple Meanings Position

Explicate Talia Mae Bettcher’s conception of the “multiple meanings position” of the concept of gender identity. What problems does this position overcome? ​ The debate as to whether transgender women are ‘real women’ has been around for decades, however, it has gotten more prevalent recently. In the book ‘Philosophy of Sex’ published in 2013, Talia Mae Bettcher, a transgender author, published her dissertation regarding transgender women and what it means to be a woman in the context of gender identity. In this book, she discusses two positions: the single-meaning and multiple-meaning positions. She argues against the single-meaning position (stating that the term ‘woman’ has one single definition) because it results in individuals assuming gender’s dominant meanings (i.e. the gender you’re assigned to at birth is the gender you should align with, displaying traits associated with that gender) while abolishing the definitions that resist this (234). The two models Bettcher discusses, i.e. the ‘Transgender Model’ (transgender individuals don’t fall into the binary categories of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ and they challenge these categories) and the ‘Wrong Body Model’ (transgender individuals are born into the ‘wrong body’) both assume that gender/sex has only one dominant meaning and this results in transgender individuals having to validate their existence and justify that they are a man/woman. ​ Hence, Bettcher provides the notion of the multiple-meaning position, stating that gender identity has multiple meanings - resistant and subcultural ones - in which transgender individuals are not required to defend their identities (241). By doing this, Bettcher accommodates “trans people who see themselves as situated in a binary category while avoiding the pathologizing and naturalization of gender identity” (234). The multiple meanings position allows for the language of gender to be widened and ‘a transgender woman’, for example, becomes a basic statement instead of an eligibility (240). This means that ‘woman’ applies undoubtedly to transgender women and they do not have to ‘prove’ anything because being a transgender woman is not a type of qualification. Put simply, “all trans women count as women and do so paradigmatically, not marginally” (242) and when we say this, we also mean that “being a trans woman is a sufficient condition for being a woman” (241). Therefore, the term ‘woman’ applies to non-transgender and transgender women and from this, arises a completely new standard for who ‘counts’ as a woman. Hence, a new definition of ‘woman’ is created – one which differs from those applying only to cis women (241). There is an abundance of coinciding definitions of being a woman, some of these can be more progressive and inclusive, and these definitions can vary based on how different cultures view gendered practices (240). Therefore, adopting a multiple meaning position, as Bettcher suggests, is crucial when it comes to understanding gender identity in the context of transgender women. ​ Furthermore, Bettcher’s multiple meanings position overcomes certain problems that she describes in her composition. For example, she states that this position enables the ‘hidden biases’ of gender to disappear. By ‘hidden biases’, Bettcher implies that when a 1 transgender woman says that she is a woman, individuals complying with the dominant meaning of ‘woman’ may object to her self-identification. In this case, the hidden bias of ‘woman’ is this: when an infant biologically identifying as a male is born, he is wrapped in blue garments, told to play with cars and trucks, and then is socially expected to develop into a mature adult male. However, if this young boy goes on to become a transgender woman, she is faced with rejection from cis men and women. This is a form of hidden gender bias present in everyday life that isn’t seen as anything out of the ordinary, yet has a profound impact on the transgender individuals who are left feeling alienated due to society’s incorrect assumption that gender and sex always correspond to each other. Since the self-identity of transgender individuals doesn’t conform to any single model, they can often feel socially invalidated and Betccher’s proposition allows this problem to be subdued to a large extent. Her position also “allows us to avoid the difficulties that plague the family resemblance account” (242) because this account specifies all transgender women to be counted as women paradigmatically and this definition of counting as women does not exist due to political decisions arising as a result of transgender women being considered ‘difficult cases’, but rather it is due to the “metaphysical (philosophical) facts”. These metaphysical facts are in agreement with what the terms ‘woman’ and ‘man’ mean when they are used in transgender subcultures (243). In these subcultures, if the enforcers contradicts transgender women being ‘real’ women, then they would be just as incorrect as if they were saying that non-transgender women are men (243). Moreover, Bettcher’s viewpoint also evades the difficulties present in semantic contextualism (243). Semantic contextualism states that the relevant standards of a specific situation is what guides whether or not a transgender woman is a woman (238). This is problematic because it renders the enforcer correct while undermining the transgender woman’s assertion and leaving no space for philosophical or metaphysical arguments (239). I will explain how Betccher’s position avoids this problem by examining the objections (that her account is similar to semantic contextualism) and her responses to these objections. The first objection provided is that although the enforcer would be wrong in denying a transgender woman being a woman (according to trans subculture), he would be correct in saying this from the dominant culture perspective; and because the transgender woman can’t say that the enforcer is wrong, this will trivialize her self-identity claim (243). Bettcher replies to this by saying that trangender women can say that the dominant gender system is founded on incorrect beliefs regarding gender and gender practices, which can be damaging and oppressive and thus, they can dismiss the whole system (243). In other words, the transgender woman can reject (on a philosophical basis) the whole gender system circulated by dominant culture, despite agreeing to not counting as a woman in dominant culture (243). The second objection raised is that a transgender woman counting as a woman is determined by politics, whereas a non-trasngender woman counts as a woman irrespective of political decision (243). To this, Bettcher states that political descisions should not be the 2 sole basis of transgender women not counting as women and cisgender women being counted as women (244). In other words, a trans woman being a woman-R (‘woman’ in the resistant definition) and not a woman-D (‘woman’ in the dominant definition) is not a political matter, but a metaphysical matter. Bettcher continues: the real issue is that a non-transgender woman can ‘profit’ off of beliefs that marginalize transgender women (244). As a matter of fact, cis woman accepting the notion about what is included as a woman-D is not about the fact that she is a standard/model woman whereas a transgender woman is not, rather it is a result of privilege (244). Therefore, Bettcher’s notion of the multiple meanings position isn't derived from semantic contextualism, rather, it resolves the issues that challenge that exposition. Finally, I’d like to incorporate my evaluation of Bettcher’s argument favouring the multiple-meanings position. I believe her arguments to be incredibly powerful in justifying her position and I completely agree with it because her position fundamentally alters what is thought to be the only meaning of the word ‘woman’. No longer can transgender women be dismissed under the category of ‘woman’ – Bettcher’s position forces individuals to see that simply accepting that ‘woman’ has one meaning and thus marginalizing an entire group of individuals results in the restriction of human rights and freedom. The multiple-meanings position is a subtle yet insightful concept to alter how human beings view gender identity in an effort to advance justice and equality for not only the transgender community, but also for every individual who finds themselves margianzlied for not conforming to the gender binary asserted by society. In her argument, Bettcher discusses how a transgender woman counts as a women paradigmatically, not marginally (242). This is something that makes her account much stronger, in my judgement since this means that transgender women who have not undergone surgical or hormonal treatments to appear more like the conventionally accepted woman, they still count as a woman. This takes away the singular meaning of the word ‘woman’ – which is what Bettcher is trying to emphasize with her dissertation. My interpretation of this is that with Bettcher’s concept, the term ‘woman’ can apply to any individual who self-identifies as a woman. This is an incredibly powerful alteration that allows transgender women to be not be ‘somehwat’ cotegorized as women, rather they are a quintessential example of a woman. Bettcher wants transgender women to not have to justify their identity in society and I believe her multiple-meanings position makes this possible for transgender women. In re-defining gender terms such as ‘man’ and ‘woman’, Bettcher make an excellent case for promoting justice for the transgender community. Another area I find especially compelling in Bettcher’s prose is in her avoidance of semantic contextualization because in the multiple-meanings position, there is no plausible scenario in which a transgender woman does not ‘count’ as a woman. This allows Bettcher to inherently reject that ‘woman’ – and by extension – ‘gender’ has only a single meaning that governs society. Due to this, if dominant culture adopts Bettcher’s compelling position, we will undoubtedly be immensely closer to a society that values freedom, equality, and 3 individuality. That being said, it is crucial to note that a transformation as powerful as this involves destroying the presumed connection between one’s gender and sex along with the biases we have affiliated with them over time. I believe these presumptions and affiliations are largely avoided by Bettcher’s position, thus making her argument highly persuasive to me. Reference Bettcher, T. M. (2013). Trans Women and the Meaning of Woman. Rowan & Littlefield. 4