US-Mexico Border Militarization Prior to 9/11

“Prevention Through Deterrence”: US-Mexico Border Militarization Prior to 9/11 A Historical Analysis of Policies and Operations Allison Brown HIST 5400: Migration, Mobility, and the Borders of Belonging Dr. Hampton December 18, 2022 Introduction On a visit of a joint delegation to the US-Mexico border in 2022, Senator Ted Cruz in a joint statement with Senator Jon Cornyn released the following statement, “Our [Texas] communities suffer from the rampant influx of drugs and illegal immigration, and we suffer from the crime that accompanies it. We must do more as a country to secure our borders, but at the very least we cannot backslide by removing the current Remain in Mexico policy that is helping our Border Patrol agents manage the hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants coming to the border every month. And it’s not just a humanitarian and drug crisis – there are documented cases of convicted criminals and suspected terrorists trying to exploit our open border. For Americans to have real confidence in our government’s ability to keep our nation safe, we need to see a secure southern bord1eD” r. epictions and discourse of the border as one with “rampant influxes of drugs and illegal migration” with crime threats are certainly not new terms in the vocabulary of the press and politicians. But when did discuss surrounding the U.S.-Mexico border shift so strongly to one of the threats and national security? And how did the notion of “prevention through deterrence” develop in the US government (USG), and what impacts did the militarization of the border have on migration and mobility? This essay will seek to understand when and why the border became militarized, the impacts of three different policies: the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the Immigration Act of 1990, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. By evaluating these policies with the criteria of seeking to understand how the border 1 was militarized through policy and legislation supported by agency action while comparing these policies to the previous Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) first formal border control strategy of “prevention through deterrence,” which was utilized on the border. With this broader understanding of federal policies and the INS strategy, this essay will then briefly analyze two different USG operations on the border: Operation Gatekeeper (California, 1994) and Operation Safeguard (Arizona, 1999) to view how policies of the USG through the INS policies implemented at the border. To conclude, this essay will offer closing thoughts about how these policies and operations help to construct the modern discourse and debate surrounding the militarization of the US-Mexico border. To start, a definition of militarization or militarism in necessary. BaceviT chhein N ew American Militarism (2005) established the working term of “military metaphysics” defined as “a tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of finding a solution except through military mean2 s.T”hese military metaphysics as argued in the USG or INS or federal agencies related to immigration could then perhaps lead one to construct the US-Mexico border as an example of military metaphysics and increased militarization as the region during the 1990s increased its militarization and process for receiving undocumented or “illegal” or “alien” migrants from south of the US-Mexico border. While discussing border militarization, this essay refers to the systematic increase or intensification of the US-Mexico’s border security apparatus described in policy and actualized in day-to-day enforcement and operations. In a myriad of ways, the US-Mexico border increasingly during the late 1980s and into the 1990s transformed from a transnational region of intermittent screening and quotas to a 2 space of permanent enforcement, vigilance, and increasing violence. In some ways, the USMexico border has become an imagined conflict zone where the wars on drugs, crime, and illegal immigration all intersect. Such conditions and perceived conflict culminate into a zone where threats such as those aforementioned make the border an area where militarization seemed necessary to “secure the border” as opposed to previous periods in US-Mexico migration and immigration history. Militarization in the late 1980s and 1990s replaced quotas and regular screening policies, and instead opted for “prevention and deterrence” as violent practices developed in policies and were acted upon individual officer and agent discretion. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 Turning to begin examining policies which impacted the militarization of the US-Mexico Border, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 laid the groundwork as one of the first federal policies which began to define illegal and illegal workers and work status in the US. The IRCA altered US immigration law by making it illegal for corporations, business entities, or individual contactors to hire illegal migrants with knowledge of those migrant’s status and established strict financial and other penalties for companies which employed illegal migrants. The act also legalized most undocumented migrants who had arrived in the country prior to 1982, which is mostly how the IRCA is recalled in immigration history and celebrated at the time with a signing of the IRCA by President Reagan at the Statue of Liberty. President Reagan as well in a series of executive actions following the IRCA would address undocumented children, access to medical care for undocumented migrants among other changes. However, with all of this considered, the IRCA is noted as a failure for addressing the increasing numbers of migrants from the US-Mexico border and in many ways set the stage for 3 increased militarization as the IRCA in the perspective of some failed in curbing numbers and called for a new way to decrease the number of migrants. During 1986-1989, the years following the passage of the IRCA (1986-1989), illegal immigration decreased by a small amount before 3 returning to pre-IRCA levels of undocumented migrants entering the Va US. rious different studies reflect that the initial decrease was due to circular immigration which is defined as “previously undocumented immigrants who illegally crossed back-and-forth between the U.S. and Mexico continually being able to do so legally, subsequently avoiding apprehe4nsion.” Multiple scholars have also found that neither the amnesty provided under the IRCA or the potential for a future amnesty program, encouraged illegal immigration in the long-term and did not actively work to counter deterrence measures already in 5place. Regardless of this distinction in deterrence and amnesty with the IRCA, it’s failure to address and decrease the number of illegal migrants caught criticism from policymakers, the press, and some US citizens’ sentiments. Many attribute this failure to a lack of determinants for immigration. A study conducted in 2007 in the Hinckley Journal of Politics found the IRCA when “relative [to] US wage levels, labor market flexibility, probability, and cost of crossing the border, ability to find work, demographic changes, political turmoil, demand for labor in growing sectors, existing immigration networks and family relationships” did not adequately create deterrents for illegal migrant6s. The same study also highlights how the attempts to create 3 4 employer fines and sanctions did not work, as many employers continued to hire illegal migrants as they calculated the risks of fines to be worth it given the cost disparity in wages for illegal migrant workers. When considering the IRCA and how it contributed to the militarization of the USMexico border, immigration policies have an effect on border apprehensions and migratory patterns. Regardless if the IRCA worked to counter deterrence efforts though, it is also critical to note that external factors and determinants that exist outside of US policies strongly contribute to migratory flows and subsequent legal or illegal immigration which follows. Following the IRCA, as the focus became stronger on more tough physical border restrictions, migrants only relocated where their illegal immigration occurred, moving to less-monitored areas which were more rural and introducing new immigration tactics such as “coyotes” and underground tun7neling. The Immigration Act of 1990 The Immigration Act (IA) of 1990 was a new president’s attempt at addressing the continual concerns of border security and loopholes previously discovered from the IRCA. President Bush signed the IA into law early on in his presidency, and in many ways set the stage for his immigration policies and reflected the broader debate of border security occurring during the US at the start of the 1990s. The IA served as an encompassing reform and changed precedents set by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. The IA made numerous changes to reforms and processes for legal migration which did try in some ways to better the immigration process into the US. The IA significantly reduced the number of legal visas and ways into the US. Congress with this act also created the temporary protected status visa which 5 was created to ideally provide visas to migrants who are temporarily unable to return to their own country because of ongoing armed conflict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary condition, this especially benefitted migrants from El Salvador at the time.8 The IA increased overall immigration to allow 700,000 migrants to come to the US per year for the fiscal years 1992–94, and 675,000 per year in the years fol9loTwhieng. temporary protection services visas led to the largest number of migrants being admitted during this period with upwards of 20 million legal migrants entering the country. Perception of these increased numbers of migrants in the US, both documented and undocumented however stoked more concerns in the public discourse about the “open border” and illegal immigration causing unsafe living conditions, especially in states bordering Mexico. This discourse of more legal migrants coming into the US because of the IA called for more strict borders and an enhancement of border security as “influxes” of illegal “aliens” was a perceived threat to security. At this time in the early 1990s, there is a revival in some ways, although this narrative was never gone, of the narrative that migrants from the US-Mexico border presented a criminal threat which needed to be dealt with as such at the policy level. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Regarding the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) President Bill Clinton on it’s signing stated that the legislation strengthened "the rule of law by cracking down on illegal immigration at the border, in the workplace, and in the criminal justice system — without punishing those living in the United States legal1l0y.H”owever, both modern 6 political scientists and historians alike challenge this notion, and criticize the IIRIRA as being overly punitive and worsening the physical violence at the US-Mexico border. The IIRIRA “[elimated] due process from the overwhelming majority of removal cases and curtailing equitable relief from removal" and has contributed to the “the expansion of aggravated felonies, creation of the 287(g) program, reduction in due process rights, and intensified funding of border militarization.” 11 Ultimately, with the passage and implementation of the IIRIRA, all noncitizens, regardless of legal status and including long-term legal permanent residents, became subject to removal and greatly expanded the offenses that could lead to formal dep1o2 rtation. Those who are proponents of the IIRIRA argue that the act closed many of the loopholes formed by the previous IRCA and IA and worked to better close gaps in immigration policy ideas and their implementation, with a specific focus on the physical US-Mexico border and the lack of enforcement or less strict policies there. Undeniably, the ultimate goal of the IIRIRA from policymakers was to deter further illegal immigration into the US. Statistically speaking however, the IIRIRA was yet another failure in US immigration policy attempting to curb illegal immigration.13 IIRIRA created a number of new policies which would redefine removal processes and develop expedited and stipulated removals with the redefinition of what a public charge was to allow for easier deportations for the USG after policy implementation. After the IIRIRA, the penalty for public charges and felony charges was changed so that any crime with a penalty of one year or longer would be considered an aggravated felony which could even be 7 applied retroactively, so if a change in the law deems a new category of offense an aggravated 14 felony, any non-citizen previously convicted of that offense can then face remo sAvalb. oth Goodman discusses in “The Deportation Machine: America's Long History of Expelling Immigrants” (2020) and Coleman’s “The Walls Within: The Politics of Immigration in Modern America” (2021) argue, often prevention and deterrence can also be enacted inside the borders the US as well as the US-Mexico border, and certainly the changes the IIRIRA made to deportation policies allowed for easier exportation as an attempt at prevention through deterrence. With regards to specific changes to the US-Mexico border, the IIRIRA gave the US Attorney General the authority to construct barriers along the border and authorized the construction of a secondary layer of border fencing to further develop physical deterrents through the increases in security to the border itself. Constructions of the physical border in California were paused in 1994 due to concerns of environmental stakeholders, however these concerns were mostly ignored by the USG which moved forward with an appropriation of $12 million of for multilayered fencing starting near San Diego, California and extending east for the initial 14-mile border fence in this regio1n5 .In additional to the first of it’s kind in California in terms of structured border security, the IIRIRA allocated additional technology and funding for the INS Border Patrol. Included in this allocation were "fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, fourwheel drive vehicles, sedans, night vision goggles, night vision scopes, and senso16r T un hi tss.” 8 was also the first of its kind in terms of appropriations which display a direct level of appropriations for an increase in militarized technology. IIRIRA also required that the number fully armed and active duty border patrol agents would increase by at least one thousand "in each of the fiscal years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 20170T 1h .” ese newly authorized and appropriated border patrol agents were to be placed in areas of know high numbers of migrants crossing along the border as a means of physically dettering or preventing immig18ration. With this increase in funding for border patrol agents and militarized technology, the IIRIRA appropriated consistent funding which was automatic year by year which supported prevention through deterrence. Simply put, from reports made by the GAO (Government Accountability Office), the IIRIRA and a strong shift to prevention through deterrence increased the number of migrants who died which attempting to cross into th1e9 U ThSis . shift has also drawn concern from outside the USG with NGOs and humanitarian groups criticized prevention through deterrence as not only inherently violent, but a violation of human rights and unconstitutional.20 In many ways, the IIRIRA is the culmination of increasing militarization shown in the ICA and the IA and is a response to the USG and perceived citizens’ concerns about physical safety. As loopholes were perceived by policymakers and others, the seeming only choice to provide a “safe border” was with a sharp increase in militarization at the US-Mexico Border and by promoting prevention through deterrence. 9 Operation Gatekeeper (California, 1994) Operation Gatekeeper was a measure implemented by the Clinton Administration through the United States Border Patrol INS that attempted to slow immigration through the border near San Diego, California prior to the implementation of IIRIRA 1996 which created a physical border. According to the INS, the goal of Gatekeeper was "to restore integrity and safety to the nation's busiest border.21” Gatekeeper occurred in three different phases. The first focused on the specific region of the border stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the San Ysidro Port of Entry near San Diego and resulted in a sub-operation in May 1995, Operation Disruption. This first phase ran reconnaissance operations to attempt and target “coyotes” and polleros and established checkpoints on highlights inside the U22S Phase . two in October 1995 established the first immigration court at the San Ysidro Port of Entry where the court was able to expedite hearings and deportations of undocumented immigrants attempting e23ntPh ry.ase three introduced IDENT, a new automated biometric identification system to digitally “identify repeat offenders” and "criminal aliens.” During this phase of Gatekeeper, the Border Patrol also made closer relations with local law enforcement agencies to work more closely to track and detain illegal migrants, especially “coyotes” and polleros. The efficacy of Operation Gatekeeper was debated extensively and the topic of a number of Congressional hearings The Department of Justice, the INS, and the Border Patrol maintained 10 that Operation Gatekeeper was a success in curbing immigration into California. Some members of Congress and others sharply criticized the program and declared it a failure in accomplishing its goal of decreasing immigration into the US at the border near San Diego. Noam Chomsky, a prolific scholar of the militarization of the US-Mexico border as well as the militarization of US policies towards LAC argues that Operation Gatekeeper was the most visible "militarization of the US-Mexican border" at the time and also argues that because the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would have increased illegal immigration into the US after its implementation, the same year as Operation Gatekeeper, and Gatekeeper was a 24 proactive measure to attempt to slow predicted future illegal immigration. Operation Safeguard (Arizona, 1999) In 1999, Operation "Safeguard 99" was established in the Tucson Border Patrol Sector as part of the INS National Strategy to secure control over increased immigration following the IR and IIRIRA to seemingly further address gaps in border security and migration gaps on the southern border. This operation, initially conducted in 1994 conducted on a smaller scale both in El Paso, Texas and San Diego, California sought to shift the flow of illegal migration which in some ways shifted migration traffic through different areas in a theoretical approach not dissimilar to the balloon effect in the ways which it redistributed migration and migratory patterns. Primarily during Operation Safeguard, the militarization of the border was only increased with an additional authorization and appropriation of funds from the US Congress and increased powers in authority from the INS for prevention and “eradication” efforts. In addition to the changes of regional focus for Operation Safeguard, additional funds continued to be 11 allocated for border security efforts. The overall mission for Operation Safeguard was to address the number of migrant deaths and casualties trying to cross the US-Mexico border as a result of policies such as the IIRIRA and Operation Gatekeeper. Regionally specific, this operation attempted to counter the number of casualties in the West Desert Corridor or the “Corridor of Death” in the deserts commonly used for migration across Mexico and Arizona where typically migrants are attempting to cross in deathly high temperatures and conditions impossible to navigate safely for passage into the US. Operation Safeguard increased the Border Patrol’s presence along the border by at least 150 previously affiliated agents and officials. These agents specially came from the division of the (Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC) which only further contributed to the militarization of the border in terms of working units which had previous conflict-zone experi25e O nce pe. ration Safeguard also increased the numbers of posts which Border Patrol agents would be stationed and created new posts which INS agents would take place along the US-Mexico border. For the first time to help cover and “guard: this larger region, the Border Patrol also issued an additional number of surveillance vehicles and devices to monitor the region throughout strategic locations. 26 An interesting aside as well is that the USG was not alone in the polices and implementation of Operation Safeguard. Both the USG and Mexican government in some ways ere involved in running strategic media campaigns in attempts to deter potential migrants from trying to cross the border. The campaign warned against the inherent risks of the journey and the risks which individuals and families posed in the dangerous migration as a reason to forgo the journey. 12 The overall efficacy of Operation Safeguard is difficult to determine for both historians and political scientists alike. NGOs and other entities only believed the operation further pushed illegal migrants to take more dangerous paths for migration with an increasingly monitored and militarized border.27 However, regardless of these concerns a specific data point to the USG came regarding the near-quarter-drop of arrests from the Border Patrol and INS from October 2008 to March 2009. Regardless of this decrease in arrests and deterrence, as a result of increased migration, the USG saw a number of increased deaths from Operation Sa28feguard. Operation Safeguard, as argued by its proponents., increased training for INS and Border Security agents which helped to decrease the number of illegal immigrants crossing the USMexico border. Regardless, the operation increased the overall trend of increasing violence at the border which proved time and time again to be more concerned about the number of migrants, legal or illegal, crossing into the US rather than the implications of those lives and the overall viability and longevity of a militarized border and migration system. Conclusion In brief, border militarization is a complex, multidimensional issue with layers of historical context and modern applications which further complicate the issues in discourse, policy, and operations. The militarization of the border through policy or actualized process continues to this day and the context with which these decisions are made are a direct reflection of the polices and operations discussed in this essay. Through increased militarization through these three policies and two operations, it is evident during these times perhaps the USG values 13 other priorities and self-interest over the longevity and success of migration from the US-Mexico border. Moving forward, it is of no doubt that the regular occurrences of debate and discourse on the US-Mexico border will center around criminality and the “legal” immigrants which pass through the militarized process. All things considered, the militarization of the US-Mexico border is often overlooked when considering migration policies and their impact on the US homeland and national security. In many ways, this essay has addressed past policy discourse and operations for an analysis that shows an increase in militarization which has only continued to amplify since 1999 into the 2000s with the threat of terorist actiicty post-9./11. In many ways again to the aftershocks of the IRCA, IA, and IIRIA, as well as other operations, migration policy is always influx and a discourse that is wrought with debates about national security and the safety of the homeland of the US in a way which invokes past migration policies. Analyzing the past in a post-9/11 world as well as briefly considering US migration policy in the aftermath, it perhaps is increasingly clear prevention through deference is a policy which actualized in de facto practices and operations which lead to increased militarization and violence on the USMexico border. These realizations are in no way new to historians and political scientist, but perhaps offer a methodology of a framework of migration policies and operations from the past which shape the US’ current policies and understandings of an inherently complex and violent migration system upwards from the US-Mexico border. 14