Dr.Tate Interview Questions

● ● ● Her initial presentation on her research methodology: ○ WOLA - Washington Office on Latin America ■ In the late 1990s, she took the photo of the FARC poster in the Putamayo region with “living under many laws” ○ Her interest in drug policy was forced upon her via US interests ■ If you wanted to talk about Columbia at this time, you had to discuss drugs ■ The discussion of the drug trade as a certain problem and threat, not a human rights concern or of environmental impacts ○ “The nature of coca production makes it an attractive crop for farmers.” ■ The farmers themselves can produce the paste, she compares it to making jam, it becomes shelf-stable and refined with a higher market value ○ Convergence of human rights and counter-narcotics concerns in Columbia, no concerns in Washington about ariel fumigation because of the widespread certainty that drug production is bad and those involved in the process should not be awarded the basic human rights and environmental concerns because they were “involved” ○ Columbian tourist statement at a point after a de-escalation of conflict, “the only risk is wanting to stay” ○ Access in southern Columbia was difficult, but a surprise was access as well at the State Department and Congressional Offices ■ How could I find access to these spaces as a political anthropologist? ■ The limited access she had influenced the research she was able to complete, closed doors ■ Was able to get into some meetings with Columbian activists as a translator ■ She had access to Beers and his works because he was then out of power at the time in the Bush administration and was proud of his work with Plan Columbia ■ The role of declassified documents received was essential, used as field notes from officials in those meetings ■ Conscious of how her presence not only impacts her own safety, but more importantly the safety of those around her Which origin story was the most impactful … ○ Counter-insurgency logic could not be openly articulated because of the Cold War era ○ Even then, there was little appetite for the US to become involved in the conflict because the US interests were not connected, which is why the argument of counter-narcotics was crucial to be involved in the region ○ Peace through pacification ○ Strategic ambiguity comes into play because of the pivots that can be undergone to appeal to different audiences Is there a potential for the US to change policies and outlooks on the War on Drugs … ○ The zero-tolerance policy had its moments and is being challenged today more than she could have imagined at the start of her career ○ The notion of decriminalization and legalization of drugs across the US is no longer entirely unimaginable ○ In terms of foreign policy, it is harder to predict where the shifts are going to happen, there doesn’t seem to be a lot of appetite for moving away from zerotolerance policies, whether this is inertia or political disinterest is unclear ○ ● ● There isn’t an appetite in the reformation of the State Department currently for innovative drug policy [MY QUESTION!] (Which she said was a great question…) Building on the notion of policy debates in the contemporary US’s relentless orientation towards the present in a way stands in the way of long-term, effective, and responsible policy in Columbia historically, and even today? ○ If we consider the history of militarization in the US and the ongoing ways in which militarization has dominated both domestic and foreign policy ○ It is hard to imagine a situation where the US was not involved in military ○ There is a lot of discussions currently as to a fundamental shift in the US where the militarization is not at the core, again it is not clear how this will apply to the foreign affairs of the United States ○ An explanatory, justification logic as to why activists were unable to push a different more diplomatic narrative ○ “It is hard to imagine the way that the constellation of different involved actors at the time of conception could have led to a different result with Plan Columbia.” With President Biden’s endorsement of Columbian fumigation initiatives … ○ “The way public collective imaginary of drug traffickers has moved into becoming a central justification logic for these kinds of programs … as we move to a more public health model of understanding drug use and addiction in the US there has been a movement of understanding drug use … lack of blame for addiction but placing blame on traffickers and producers” ○ The policies and logic of drug policy needs a villain somewhere, therefore it falls on the traffickers and villanizes them, “it builds on the idea that the real enemies are the drug traffickers who are all-powerful and wealthy, we have to protect ourselves” ○ We have our beliefs and then build these conceptions of them and how to address them with policy and our thoughts ○ Affective politics, how US collective conversations about policy have even changed since her book’s publication in 2015, in 2016 it’s clear how affective political beliefs persist ○ There are always two tracts in politics: ■ The expert track: those on the ground who know what is going on and are informed, can make effective policy that best addresses issues in regions ■ The affective political track: emotionally loaded out of fear/anger/disgust, building movements, and large groups to combat political situations, this is domestically focused currently though ○ Biden administration has however brought focus to human rights violations and environmental concerns on a global scale without an exception to Latin America