Priority of life U S Response to Atrocities in East Asia During World War II

Priority of Life: U.S. Response to Atrocities in East Asia During World War II A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in History. ________________________ ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements............................................................................................................ iv Abstract .............................................................................................................................. vi Introduction......................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 – Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Approach to a War-Torn World....................... 13 Chapter 2 – A Muted Response: Roosevelt’s Reaction to Japanese War Crimes ............ 38 Chapter 3 – What Was Next: Postwar Planning From Roosevelt to Truman................... 71 Chapter 4 – The Blind Eye: Chinese Atrocities................................................................ 87 Chapter 5 – The Justification: U.S. War Crimes ............................................................ 101 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 117 Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 122   iii iv say, having all of the answers, and keeping things in perspective. To my grandparents and family for making my education possible, and teaching me that learning is life-long. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, I thank my mother, Susan Marcus. I cannot express how thankful I am for everything she has done for me over the past twenty-two years, from editing almost every paper I have ever submitted, to taking care of me during Tech weeks. For every 4 am phone call, I am eternally indebted to you. I love you with all my heart. v Abstract The Second World War is infamous for unprecedented crimes against humanity. Most infamous was the German systematic execution of 12,000,000 Jews, Roma, homosexuals, blacks, and other minorities during the Holocaust; these German actions received most of the attention both in the aftermath of World War II and by current scholars. Atrocities also took place in the East Asian and Pacific theatres, but were afforded less attention and scholarship. The human rights violations that did receive contemporary and scholarly attention were those committed by the Japanese. Atrocities committed by the Allies, specifically China and the United States, were all but ignored by scholars and entirely neglected during the war years. This thesis examines the attention—or lack thereof—that the Roosevelt administration paid to the war crimes in East Asia during World War II. In doing so, it seeks to understand the assumptions under which the Roosevelt administration operated, the priorities of the Roosevelt administration, the administration’s wartime response to atrocities, how it planned to address the atrocities in East Asia during the postwar period, and what conclusions can be made regarding the nature of the Roosevelt administration’s policies given its response to these atrocities. This thesis argues that in order to maintain the priorities of a Europe-first approach to the war and protection of American lives, operating under the assumptions expressed in American exceptionalism and the Just War theory and imbued with a sense of racial and cultural superiority, the Roosevelt administration turned a blind eye toward atrocities in East Asia and justified violence committed by the Allies. vi Introduction The Second World War is infamous for unprecedented crimes against humanity. Most infamous was the German systematic execution of 12,000,000 Jews, Roma, homosexuals, blacks, and other minorities during the Holocaust; these German actions received most of the attention both in the aftermath of World War II and by current scholars. Atrocities also took place in the East Asian and Pacific theatres, but were afforded less attention and scholarship. The human rights violations that did receive contemporary and scholarly attention were those committed by the Japanese. Atrocities committed by the Allies, specifically China and the United States, were all but ignored by scholars and entirely neglected during the war years. This thesis examines the attention—or lack thereof—that the Roosevelt administration paid to the war crimes in East Asia during World War II. In doing so, it seeks to understand the assumptions under which the Roosevelt administration operated, the priorities of the Roosevelt administration, the administration’s wartime response to atrocities, how it planned to address the atrocities in East Asia during the postwar period, and what conclusions can be made regarding the nature of the Roosevelt administration’s policies given its response to these atrocities. This thesis argues that in order to maintain the priorities of a Europe-first approach to the war and protection of American lives, operating under the assumptions expressed in American exceptionalism and the Just War theory and imbued with a sense of racial and cultural superiority, the Roosevelt administration turned a blind eye toward atrocities in East Asia and justified violence committed by the Allies. The first chapter is an analysis of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s policies throughout his presidency, specifically regarding the emergence of war in East Asia. It explores the conflict between Roosevelt’s personal belief in internationalism and the U.S. public’s isolationist attitude following the Great Depression. The chapter examines Roosevelt’s general responses to atrocities and highlights the vastly different ways in which the Roosevelt administration responded to European and East Asian war crimes. The Roosevelt administration utilized public relations campaigns in order to sway public sentiment into closer alignment with Roosevelt’s personal beliefs. These beliefs were reflected in the broader assumptions of the Roosevelt administration, most significantly the importance of a Europe-first policy fueled by a racialized view of the world coupled with the conviction that the United States should assist other nations to follow in its footsteps. The second chapter describes war crimes committed by the Japanese during the war and analyzes the Roosevelt administration’s responses. During the war, Japan was known for committing terrible crimes against humanity, including civilian massacres, the forced prostitution of the comfort women system, brutal treatment of prisoners of war, medical experimentation, and use of biological and chemical warfare. Made aware of these atrocities through the media, the U.S. public became infuriated with the Japanese and would have preferred fighting Japan. Roosevelt, however, believed that Germany was the greater threat and suppressed discussion of Japanese atrocities during a public relations campaign. Although the U.S. government was aware of some Japanese actions that the public did not have access to, Roosevelt refrained from responding forcefully, maintaining his Europe-first policy. 2 The third chapter further explores Japanese war crimes, focusing on the Roosevelt administration’s planning for how to handle Japan in the postwar period. This third chapter focuses as well on the reality of how the successive Truman administration dealt with postwar Japan. The Roosevelt administration adhered staunchly to the Europe-first policy to the point of almost entirely ignoring Japan during the war and planning solely dismemberment of Japan after its surrender. Although the Truman administration proclaimed it followed Roosevelt’s policies and global views, in actuality it approached the situation with much greater nuance. Under the Truman administration, the United States participated in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, the Asian equivalent of the Nuremburg Trials in Europe, in which Japanese leaders were tried in court for their wartime leadership. At first, the trials were distinctly successful; however, by 1947 with the Communists appearing to be winning the Civil War in China, the United States abandoned all previous postwar plans and shifted its focus to rebuilding Japan and suppressing the Chinese Communists. The fourth chapter is an analysis of the Roosevelt administration’s response to Chinese atrocities. The majority of Chinese human rights violations were perpetrated by Chinese on other Chinese, thereby demonstrating the willingness of the Nationalist Chinese government to sacrifice its citizens in order to achieve its priority of stopping its enemy. It was differences in priorities such as this that created a tense working relationship between the United States and China; the United States did not approve of the choices of the Chinese government but because the Roosevelt administration felt the need to unilaterally support its Asian Ally, it did not respond to Chinese atrocities such as gross mistreatment of Chinese military and civilians and scorched earth tactics. 3 The final chapter grapples with atrocities committed by the United States military and government within the context of the East Asian war. It chronicles actions of U.S. ground troops in the Pacific, the bombing of cities including the use of atomic bombs, and Japanese-American internment within the United States. The choices of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations regarding these atrocities demonstrated the administrations’ adherence to the Just War theory and prioritization of preserving American lives over Asian lives, especially over Japanese lives. Of these actions, the U.S. government has offered restitution for only the Japanese-American internment, signaling the decades-long support of the U.S. government for the choices Roosevelt made during the war. This thesis finds that the Roosevelt administration acted on very clear priorities for its involvement in the Second World War. Among these were the importance of defeating Germany as soon as possible, upholding the Just War theory, protecting American lives, supporting the Allies, and creating a democratic Great Power in Asia in the postwar period. Underlying and informing these priorities was racial hatred of the Japanese. More often than not, the desire to protect human rights around the globe was the first goal to fall by the wayside. Underscoring the Roosevelt administration’s priorities, its response to atrocities in East Asia during the Second World War, whether by Ally or Axis, was limited and restrained regardless. When discussing matters of warfare, it becomes necessary to differentiate between war crimes, atrocities, crimes against humanity, and genocide. A war crime is any action that defies international humanitarian law, a set of guidelines first set out by 4 the Hague Convention in 1899. The State Department defined war crimes in a message to the British Ambassador in Washington on 18 October 1945: policy of the United States in regard to the apprehension and punishment of war criminals in the Far East. 1. The term ‘war crimes’ . . . includes: . . . B. Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include but not be limited to murder, ill-treatment, or deportation of slave labor, or for any other purpose of civilian population of, or in, occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war . . . plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. C. Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war . . . in execution of, or in connection with any crime defined herein whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.1 Because war crimes are inherently perpetrated by the enemy and defined by the victor, actions taken by the victor are not prosecuted as war crimes, muddying the application of the term with reference to all actions which could be deemed war crimes had the outcome of a war been different. Among the many international laws governing warfare, two instances of the Geneva Convention are especially worthy of note: first, the 1925 Geneva Convention, which prohibits use of bacteriological warfare,2 and second, the 1929 Geneva Convention, which dictates the guidelines for the treatment of prisoners of war and makes methods such as torture and rape warfare illegal.3 “Genocide” was a term coined by Raphael Lemkin to describe the enormity of the Holocaust.4 The term was then utilized in the 1949 revision of the Geneva Convention, in which it states that Any of the following five acts, if accompanied by the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, constitutes the crime of genocide: (a) Killing members of the group; 1 Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover Up, Revised Edition (New York: Routledge, 2002), 199. 2 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1925: (In Two Volumes): Volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), 87-88. 3 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1929: (In Three Volumes): Volume I (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), 336-363. 4 Samantha Power, “A Problem From Hell,” (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 42. 5 (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.5 Although some events discussed in this thesis have been argued by scholars to constitute genocide, this thesis will not use that terminology. In summary, this thesis will utilize primarily the terms “atrocity” and “human rights violation,” only occasionally using the term “war crime,” and then only with reference to those acts that were prosecuted in court after the war. The scholarship on the U.S. response to human rights violations during World War II focuses almost entirely on the European war, leaving an all-too noticeable void regarding the Pacific war. In fact, similar crimes against humanity were perpetrated in East Asia by the Japanese army and atrocities were also committed by Allied Chinese and U.S. forces. This thesis is an attempt to fill the hole in current scholarship by marrying two differing areas of study: analyses of specific war crimes in East Asia during the war years and studies of the Roosevelt administration’s foreign policy. Roosevelt’s foreign policy is surprisingly under-examined. Robert Dallek’s authoritative Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945, was first published in 1979 and has not yet been replaced as the main text on the subject. Dallek maintains that, throughout his presidency, Roosevelt was an internationalist who, due to public pressure, at times masqueraded as a nationalist. Dallek’s tome is a well-researched and vigilant study of Roosevelt’s choices throughout his entire presidency. Dallek includes a veritable biography of Roosevelt, a thorough analysis of his rise to public 5 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1949: Volume II: The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1975), 387. 6 office, domestic, economic, foreign, and military policy until his death, correlating the actions of the U.S. government to the personal actions and feelings of Roosevelt. However, Dallek’s ambitious work is too dense for the average reader. More recently published, Warren F. Kimball’s The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman, responded to the gap in scholarly writing on Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Kimball presents a more three-dimensional understanding of Roosevelt, and concedes Dallek’s point that “Roosevelt’s consistency, shrouded as it was in rhetoric and tactical maneuverings, is striking.”6 Kimball fails to discuss the Far East, and recognizes the gap, asking “all things considered, why was Poland more important than China?”7 There is a small group of historians dedicated to uncovering the human rights violations of the Japanese army during World War II. John Dower posits that “in the postwar milieu, where defeated Japan was immediately subordinated to U.S. authority and . . . resuscitated as America’s rearmed and preeminent cold-war ally in Asia, sanitizing the Japanese past quickly became a collaborative Japanese American undertaking. . . . Japanese war crimes were covered up to serve American interests.”8 In discussing the Pacific war, many historians cite Dower’s 1986 War Without Mercy, a study of the influence of race in the war in East Asia, as the leading text in drawing attention to the intricacies of the Pacific war.9 It was not until the mid-1990s that historians turned their focus to war crimes in East Asia. 6 Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), 4. 7 Kimball, The Juggler, 95. 8 John W. Dower in foreword to Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), xvi. 9 John W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). 7 The Japanese army’s numerous atrocities against soldier prisoners of war first piqued scholarly interest. Gavan Daws’s Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific, published in 1994, was the first text to delve into the subject. Yuki Tanaka’s Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II quickly followed and has remained the leading text on Japanese war crimes to this day.10 In a foreword to Tanaka’s Hidden Horrors, Dower wrote that “Yuki Tanaka’s signal accomplishment, however, lies not merely in reconstructing these events but rather in trying to comprehend why, in an earlier generation, his countrymen performed such atrocious deeds.”11 Tanaka’s book became a template for future historians: all significant works in the past twenty years have been devoted to understanding the psychology of the perpetrators of war crimes, with both historians and psychologists writing on the subject. Notably, much of the source material on Japanese war crimes is in the form of oral history and testimonies taken from both survivors and perpetrators. While War Without Mercy brought attention to the war with the Japanese in academic circles, it was Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II that brought the topic into the public eye.12 Published just a year after Hidden Horrors and capitalizing on the public’s fascination with the Holocaust, Chang not only redirected awareness not only to the Pacific theatre but to a slightly different temporal space; her documentation of the massive loss of life when Japan overtook thenChinese capital Nanking in 1937, marking the beginning of World War II in East Asia, reminded the public that the war had begun two years before Germany’s declaration of 10 Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific (New York: William Morrow, 1994); Tanaka, Hidden Horrors. 11 John W. Dower in foreword to Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, xv. 12 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: BasicBooks, 1997). Chang is not an historian; she was trained as a journalist. 8 war and that China and Japan had been engaged in low-level fighting since Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Little discrepancy exists in the reporting of the existence and facts of the people, places, and events of the Japanese war crimes: the Japanese used POWs as test subjects for medical experiments; created laboratories across China for the sole purpose of creating biological and chemical weaponry; forced women into prostitution to service their soldiers; murdered hundreds of thousands of civilians in the Nanking Massacre in 1937-1938. Although the facts are undisputed, historians must answer why the war crimes took place. Laurence Rees attempts to understand what led the Japanese army to engage in such actions, concluding that “a combination of cultural belief and geographical and historical circumstance caused Japanese society to evolve . . . to a point where the very human desire to belong, to fit in, to be part of the group that had been elevated to an all-embracing quasi-religion,” where the need to conform created a public willing and ready to follow military fanatics.13 The primary work focusing on biological warfare is Sheldon H. Harris’s Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-1945, and the American Cover-Up. As the title implies, Harris adds the layer of the American policy of concealment, an angle Harris states has been “studied exhaustively over the past fifty years” by “Japanese, Chinese, and some Western scholars.”14 Harris accurately describes the differing perspectives of the West and the East regarding Japanese biological warfare and all East Asian war crimes. Although East Asian scholars have produced a significant amount of 13 Laurence Rees, Horror in the East: Japan and the Atrocities of World War II (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2002), 11. 14 Harris, Factories of Death, 313. 9 work, very few Western scholars have joined the conversation, and few East Asian works have been translated into English. Few scholars focus on the Tokyo War Crimes Trials proceedings, but most scholars who focus on Japanese war crimes discuss them at length. James Burnham Sedgwick’s Masters Thesis "Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East, 1945-1951: Apathetic and Insignificant?"15 focuses on war crimes trials by individual nations in addition to the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. The limited number of works on East Asian atrocities demonstrates the continuing focus of scholars on the European war. Chinese-perpetrated atrocities have received far less attention than Japanese and U.S. human rights violations. Scholarly analyses of Sino-American relations mention in passing, if at all, the 1938 flooding of the Yellow River, and even more rarely give evidence of the brutal treatment toward and by the Chinese army. Literature on Chinese policy in general are significantly more critical, confronting the complexities of Chiang’s decisions regarding the Chinese soldiers and citizenry and attempting to understand the basis for his choices rather than merely condemning or supporting him unilaterally. The scholarly blind-eye toward Chinese mistreatment of its troops and Chinese military mistreatment of civilians further illustrates the continued priority placed on the European sphere first, the Pacific sphere second, and the Chinese ground war third. The proliferation of Euro-centric analysis demonstrates the impact of cultural norms not only on the policymaking of political leaders but on the historical interpretation of foreign policy for half a century to come. Rana Mitter asks: “Why did China’s wartime history 15 James Burnham Sedgwick, "Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East, 19451951: Apathetic and Insignificant?" University of Canterbury, School of History, 2004, http://hdl.handle.net/10092/2628. 10 fade from our memories, and why should we recall it now?” and rationalized that Chinese wartime history “disappeared down a hole created by the early Cold War, from which it has only recently reappeared.”16 Memory of Asian history in the United States after World War II was eclipsed by Euro-American interactions, the Cold War, and the rise of Communism in China. Scholarship on U.S. atrocities is recently-burgeoning. Scholars such as Lisa Yoneyama in her article "On the Unredressability of U.S. War Crimes: Vietnam and Japan” report the existence of American atrocities in East Asia and the Roosevelt administration’s deliberate indifference to them.17 Most other scholars focus specifically on either Japanese-American internment or the atomic bombs. Some scholars frame these atrocities in ways meant to be reminiscent of Axis atrocities in order to increase the perceived weight of the issue, as in John Howard’s Concentration Camps on the Home Front. These scholars intend to foster awareness of the choices of the U.S. government as atrocities on the same level as those perpetrated by the Axis. Other scholars are less critical, and attempt to explain the intentions of the Roosevelt administration rather than pass judgment. This thesis attempts to bridge the existing gap in scholarly analysis between the Roosevelt administration’s foreign policy during World War II and war crimes in East Asia during World War II. It will discuss the war crimes perpetrated in East Asia by both Asians and the U.S. military as well as the general foreign policy of Roosevelt’s administration. It will analyze the Roosevelt administration’s specific policy and 16 Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 10. 17 Lisa Yoneyama, "On the Unredressability of U.S. War Crimes: Vietnam and Japan," Amerasia Journal 31, no. 2 (August 2005): 140-144. 11 response to the atrocities in East Asia in both the private and public spheres, especially as compared to the administration’s policy and response to similar violations of human rights perpetrated in Europe. It is hoped that documentation of the Roosevelt administration’s deliberate blind eye to brutality in East Asia will ensure that the United States will not again ignore atrocity, wherever in the world it occurs. 12 Chapter 1 – Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Approach to a War-Torn World In order to analyze the response of the U.S. government to atrocities in East Asia during World War II, it is first necessary to understand the global political atmosphere leading up to and during the war as well as the general policies of the Franklin Roosevelt administration. Roosevelt was at his core an internationalist; more specifically, Roosevelt was a constant European internationalist and an Asian internationalist when it suited his goals. It is within this framework that the Roosevelt administration’s apparent unconcern for the war in East Asia in favor of attention to the European war comes to light. Because of this focus, the policies of the Roosevelt administration with regard to human rights violations in East Asia were minimal, and paled in comparison to his concern for those in Europe during the war. Franklin Delano Roosevelt is one of the most beloved presidents in U.S. history. Roosevelt spent the early years of his life looking up to his cousin, President Theodore Roosevelt, and assumed leadership roles from a young age. Robert Dallek anecdotally described that “once, when his mother chided him for ordering his playmates around, [Roosevelt] replied: ‘Mummie, if I didn’t give the orders, nothing would happen!’”1 After completing high school in 1900, Roosevelt went on to Harvard College and Columbia University, studying for a career in law. In 1905, Roosevelt married his similarly influential and renowned counterpart Eleanor Roosevelt.2 The ever-optimistic Roosevelt always had his eye on public office, hoping to follow in Theodore Roosevelt’s footsteps, 1 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 5. 2 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 4-5. 13 and was elected to state legislature in New York in 1910.3 From the start, Roosevelt was imbued with the understanding that the United States was integral to world affairs; the extent of Roosevelt’s commitment to the sanctity of human rights throughout the world, however, is up for debate. Throughout the nineteen-teens and World War I, Roosevelt pushed for increased internationalism and increased transparency of the U.S. government. In an attempt to ready the U.S. public for war, in 1914 Roosevelt stated that “the country needs the truth about the Army and the Navy instead of a lot of soft mush about everlasting peace which so many statesmen are handing out to a gullible public.”4 However, Roosevelt’s desire to remain in public office and his adherence to strong foreign affairs were in conflict. Following the Great War, the American public entered a decades-long isolationist stance fueled by the Monroe Doctrine and respect for neutrality. The isolationist sentiments of the public were validated by Congress’s refusal to join the League of Nations in 1919 despite the desires of then-President Woodrow Wilson that the United States act as the leader of the peaceful world.5 In response to public support for isolationism, Roosevelt, at this time Assistant Secretary of the Navy, significantly calmed his internationalist streak, adopting a domestically-minded policy instead, and rarely advocating for overseas policy changes. The 1929 crash of the stock market, marking the beginning of the Great Depression, further focused all political activity, as well as all public interest, on domestic matters. With his decision in 1932 to run for president, Roosevelt completely renounced public 3 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 7. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 10. 5 David F. Schmitz, The Triumph of Internationalism: Franklin D. Roosevelt and a World In Crisis, 19331941 (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), xix. 4 14 discussion of foreign policy. In order to win the presidency, “Roosevelt believed it best to say nothing about foreign affairs for as long as possible,”6 although he personally adhered to the importance of an active foreign policy. This type of public maneuvering was classic to Roosevelt’s political approach: Warren Kimball remarked that “by his own admission, [Roosevelt] was disingenuous, deceptive, and devious; but he had a policy,” and would use these characteristics to achieve his goals.7 Roosevelt’s political ideology was shaped significantly by Wilsonian thought and nineteenth-century American ideals. The concept of American exceptionalism, the idea that the United States was special and must lead the world in its enlightened, democratic way of nation building shaped Roosevelt’s conceptualization of the United States as a world actor and was reflected in his foreign policies. American exceptionalism was, perhaps, the tragic flaw of the Roosevelt administration: the hubris inherent in the belief that the United States could assume world leadership coupled with the assumption that all nations wanted to be Americanized democracies were fundamentally flawed. Furthermore, Roosevelt was a liberal internationalist, meaning he opposed isolationism and believed that in order to fulfill American exceptionalism the United States had to actively intercede in non-democratic situations around the world, engaging in intervention, nation building and, essentially, democratic proselytizing. Warren Kimball called this Roosevelt’s “desire to create a liberal world.”8 Liberal internationalists considered United States a major, leading world power that must be involved in the global community for the benefit of both the United States and the “backward peoples 6 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 18. Kimball, The Juggler, 7. 8 Kimball, The Juggler, 13. 7 15 around the globe.”9 These beliefs informed perhaps the most important guiding element of Roosevelt’s presidency: that of national security. Throughout his presidency, each of Roosevelt’s choices were rooted in the fundamental belief that they were necessary to defend the United States. In some instances, the Roosevelt administration was willing to compromise its morals in the name of national security. Cultural factors also shaped the policies of the Roosevelt administration. As Robert Dean asserted with reference to U.S. Cold War foreign policy, but nonetheless universally applicable, “all meaning is dependent on context,” or, in other words, that the actions of the Roosevelt administration cannot be understood without also understanding the social and cultural atmosphere from which the decisions came.10 This context can be understood as ideology, a term defined by Michael Hunt as “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduced the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.”11 Imbued with ideologies, or cultural contexts, policymakers “could bring order . . . to events that would otherwise have been indecipherable.”12 It is therefore necessary to examine the influence of cultural phenomena in governmental decision-making. One major social factor that shaped Roosevelt’s view of the world was a racially and culturally hierarchical view of the world. This concept is best described as what literary critic Edward Said dubbed “orientalism.” In Orientalism, Said discussed the phenomenon of the Orientalist school of academia, the study of the Orient, or, in other 9 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 9 Robert Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001), 3. 11 Michael Hunt, quoted in Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950-1957 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 8. 12 Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam, 9. 10 16 words, the lands lying East of Eastern Europe and West of North America. “The Orient,” as a unified idea, Said argued, “was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences.”13 As such, the academic study of the Orient produced a particularly Eurocentric model in which Western powers were hegemonic over the people and places of the Middle and Far East. Westerners came to understand the world as fundamentally based in Western-ness. Orientalism, as a Western-created belief, “otherized” the Orient with its terminology of savageness, dirtiness, primitiveness, and oddity to describe the people and choices of Oriental nations. The theories of racial and cultural hegemony of the West provided in Orientalism significantly assist in understanding Roosevelt’s choices regarding the Asian war. The war in East Asia was perpetrated by what Roosevelt and his administration saw as an unchanging and inherently savage people, Japan, and victimized what was seen as an inherently meek and naïve nation, China. John Dower explained that these cultural stereotypes were perpetuated in propaganda; “headlines, photographs, newsclips, and cartoons,” used symbols and images of Japanese atrocity, “catch-phrases” such as “‘divine emperor,’ ‘world conquest,’ [and] ‘kamikaze’”, and racialized language such as “‘regimented,’ ‘treacherous,’ ‘fanatic,’ [and] ‘bestial.’”14 Dower demonstrated that the ideology of racial and cultural superiority was pervasive and thus shaped the public and government’s conceptions of the Japanese aggressors. Because acts of war so inhumane were in line with the Western conception of East Asia, the Roosevelt administration did not find it necessary to act. 13 14 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 1. Dower, War Without Mercy, 28. 17 In contrast, instilled with the Eurocentrism of the era, the U.S. government believed that the European war and atrocities perpetrated by the European Axis powers demanded intervention because they were out of character. Dower further explained that on the Anglo-American side . . . [the stereotype] of contrariness or mirror opposites . . . can be seen in the depiction of Japan as a thoroughly militaristic, repressive, irrational nation. Westerners who accepted this, and there were few who did not, commonly also accepted with little question the counterstereotype of modern Euro-American civilization as fundamentally peaceful, democratic, and rational.15 While there is history of racial characterization of Germany as barbarous dating back to Ancient Rome, the modernization of Germany alongside other Western European nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries significantly shifted the Western view of Germany. Europeans were expected to fulfill the role of sophisticated, peaceful world leaders; Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy broke from this tradition, a severe indiscretion in the opinion of the Western world. The language used to refer to the Axis aggressors further informed the U.S. public and demonstrated the U.S. government’s Eurocentrism: Allies almost always referenced “Nazi” war crimes rather than identifying the German nation. In contrast, aggression in East Asia was attributed to “the Japanese” as a whole.16 Having accepted Western racial and cultural supremacy, the Roosevelt administration was uninterested in crimes against humanity in East Asia during World War II. Nineteen-thirty-one, to nineteen-thirty-three was a turning point in the twentieth century for world events. On 18 September 1931, Japanese troops invaded Manchuria, China’s farthest northeast province, marking the beginning of World War II in East Asia. In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt was elected President of the United States for the first time, 15 16 Dower, War Without Mercy, 29. Dower, War Without Mercy, 34. 18 and would follow this election with three more, the first and only president to break the then-unwritten two-term limit. In 1933, Adolph Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, and founded the Third Reich. Both Japan and Germany left the League of Nations, thereby officially splitting from the global adherence to peace and moving towards the Second World War.17 Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the relationship between Japan and China became unprecedentedly tense; the countries had embarked on a path of intensive—and competitive—modernization, feeling pressured by the West to conform. By 1931 Japanese leadership determined that expansion was necessary to modernization; seizure of neighbor and seemingly less-advanced China soon ensued. Low-level fighting began in East Asia following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Mukden Incident of 18 September 1931, in which the Japanese army manufactured an event meant to spark a war with and begin colonization of China.18 With this act, Japan broke the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which various nations, including Japan and the United States, pledged to forgo warfare as a political maneuver.19 Michael Hunt commented that “the seizure of Manchuria convinced American confrontationists that Japan had become a direct, disturbing threat to the United States.”20 In January 1932, Japan proclaimed Manchuria an independent state renamed Manchukuo.21 Warren Kimball noted that, in colonizing a part of China “the Japanese, who saw themselves as doing only what the Europeans had done for a century or more in 17 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 68, 75. R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History, 3rd ed. (Boston: Prentiss Hall, 2011), 247. 19 Michael H. Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy: An International History Reader (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 62-63. 20 Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 62. 21 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 248. 18 19 China, were condemned internationally. Hypocrisy, cried the Japanese. We’ve changed, answered the Europeans.”22 In direct response, President Herbert Hoover immediately met with Secretary of State Henry Stimson, and they agreed upon a policy of nonrecognition of Japanese occupied territories, known as the Stimson Doctrine, a policy Roosevelt adopted after assuming the presidency a year later.23 As president, Roosevelt also began to strengthen the U.S. Navy, preparing for a collision with Japan. Yet Michael Hunt demonstrated “while FDR agreed that Japan had violated international morality and international law, he still concluded that domestic economic crisis and public antipathy to even a hint of another foreign war dictated a nonconfrontational approach to Japan.”24 Following the tenets outlined by Hunt, over the course of his first term Franklin Roosevelt focused on pulling the United States out of the Great Depression. Although this seemed to be solely nationalistic, Robert Dallek argued that Roosevelt “believed that American economic well-being would ultimately depend on the return of economic health abroad through the cooperative action of all the major trading powers, including the United States. He also saw an unbreakable link between prosperity and peace; there could not be one without the other.” An economically healthy United States would be a first step in negotiation peace in war-torn East Asia and Europe.25 The Roosevelt administration prioritized economics over responding to atrocities as well: Laurence Rees argued that Western nations, the United States included, cared “more about their own economic self-interest than the international enforcement of 22 Kimball, The Juggler, 11. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 27. 24 Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 65 25 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 20. 23 20 universal standards of human rights.”26 Publicly, Roosevelt emphasized domestic issues, recognizing a U.S. public entrenched in the neutral, nationalistic, isolationist, noninterventionist foreign policy of the nineteenth century which was, as David Schmitz explained, “reinforced by disillusionment with American participation in World War I, the failure of the Versailles Treaty, a growing peace movement, and the related problems of wartime loans and the economic crisis that culminated in the Great Depression.”27 Throughout the first six years of his presidency, Roosevelt’s foreign policy focused on the Western Hemisphere and Europe. Roosevelt was committed to maintaining the Good Neighbor policy, which he originally set forth in 1933.28 The intention of the Good Neighbor policy was to enable Latin American countries to function as independent nations while retaining the ability of the United States to intervene in the name of democracy and dominance in the hemisphere. At the same time, Roosevelt recognized a need to address the growing conflict in East Asia. In 1936, Imperial Japan first allied with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, marking the marriage of what are now seen as the two most dangerous nations of the twentieth century.29 Full-scale war did not erupt until 7 July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, a battle between Chinese and Japanese troops in Wanping, China. Although the war between Japan and China remained undeclared throughout, a formality often noted by U.S. government officials at the time, this event is now seen as the official beginning of both the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II.30 26 Rees, Horror in the East, 155. Schmitz, The Triumph of Internationalism, xix. 28 Schmitz, The Triumph of Internationalism, 26. 29 Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 63 30 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: 1938 (In Five Volumes): Volume III: The Far East (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1954), 201. 27 21 In a belated response to the outbreak of undeclared warfare, Roosevelt made his famous “Quarantine Speech” on 5 October 1937, in which he called “war . . . a contagion” that needed to be quarantined, invoked principles of national security, and reinforced his belief that world affairs dictated U.S. stability: it was a problem of “world economy, world security, and world humanity.”31 Very few steps were taken to realize the ideas outlined in the Quarantine Speech.32 Rather, the speech served as a public relations tool to fuel public anger towards Japan in an effort to ready the public for the war Roosevelt saw on the horizon.33 The Roosevelt administration chose not to declare official neutrality; while this allowed trade to continue between Japan and the United States, it also meant that the United States could legally support China, perhaps the most important support given the Asian Ally by the United States.34 Hunt noted that throughout the Sino-Japanese conflict, “the [American] public saw a victimized China in desperate need of help from its traditional friend, the United States. Japanese, on the other hand, increasingly figured as violent, subhuman brutes bent on smashing civilized values,” exemplifying the racial and cultural hierarchy assumed by the Roosevelt administration.35 Focused on Latin America and Europe, Roosevelt’s tactic in East Asia was one of non-provocation: “As interpreted by the State Department, the administration’s objective was to avoid all initiatives in the Far East.”36 Even so, Japan’s increased militancy 31 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: With A Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt: 1937 Volume: The Constitution Prevails (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), 410. 32 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 149. 33 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 151. 34 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 146. 35 Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 64-65 36 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 76. 22 worried him, and Roosevelt quietly ordered expansion of the U.S. Navy.37 At the same time, Roosevelt contradictorily advocated disarmament and international naval limitation of Britain, Japan, and the United States. “By championing disarmament, he silenced his critics in Washington and simultaneously put the responsibility for an arms race on Japan.”38 This continued the disparity between Roosevelt’s publicly stated and private international goals: although Roosevelt publicly advocated peace, his political actions were not necessarily in same interest. In this way, Roosevelt maneuvered blame for a potential arms race and subsequent war onto Japan, all the while supporting increased naval armaments of the United States. Throughout its conquest of China, Japan was especially brutal, often blatantly executing war crimes. In December 1937, two such war crimes took place. On 12 December, Japanese aircraft attacked the U.S. gunboat the Panay while it was in Chinese territory. The next day, the Japanese massacre of the Chinese capital Nanking, a six-week long slaughter of between 40,000 and 300,000 civilians and unarmed soldiers, began. Both incidents were quickly forgotten by the American public.39 In December 1938, just after Japan’s declaration of its intention to create a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, the U.S. government began sending aid to Chiang Kai-shek’s40 Nationalist government in China to aid China’s fight against Japan. By 1939, the Roosevelt administration had a clear understanding of Japanese goals in East Asia: U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, “nothing in international affairs can be more mathematically certain . . . than that Japan is not going 37 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 75. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 88. 39 Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 65 40 In general, this thesis will use Pinyin style when transcribing Chinese names and will list family name first. In instances where an older style of transcription is more commonly accepted, that style will be used. 38 23 to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China, now or in the future, has not the slightest intention of doing so and could be brought to do so only by complete defeat.”41 Yet, Roosevelt remained focused on Europe. Economic and materiel aid was the main form of U.S. involvement in Asia throughout the war.42 The Roosevelt administration began economic support of China partially in the hopes that it would destabilize the budding friendship between Chiang’s government and the Communist U.S.S.R., then an enemy of the United States. As with most of his wartime policies regarding China, Roosevelt was more concerned that postwar China not become Communist than about conditions in China. Roosevelt stated that the Chinese needed “to stand on their own feet without complete dependence on Japan and Europe,”43 demonstrating his belief that China should be the main defense against Japan in Asia as a way to protect American lives, to safeguard American economic interests, and to bolster China as a Great Power in Asia. The U.S. public agreed. Public opinion surveys in 1939 demonstrated that while seventy-four percent of the public supported China, only six percent were willing to go to war against Japan.44 It was not until after World War II was declared in Europe that the Roosevelt administration began to take the Japanese conquest in East Asia more seriously. The Nazi threat in Germany was also readying itself for war. In 1935, Germany began remilitarizing,45 and three years later Germany began absorbing its neighbor 41 Grew to Hull, 1 December 1939, “American-Japanese Relations,” in George T. McJimsey, ed, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7: U.S.-Japanese Relations: Trade Relations and the Sino-Japanese War, 1938-1940 (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 2001), 462. 42 Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 66 43 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 94. 44 Michael Schaller, The United States and China: Into the Twenty-First Century, 3rd ed (New York: Oxford University Press 2002), 51. 45 Professor David Schmitz, “Chronology of Events,” 4 February 2013. 24 nations by force. This new European threat solidified the U.S. public’s isolationism;46 the Asian aggression beginning in 1931 earlier had no effect. Unwilling to engage the aggressor, the United States diplomatically opposed territorial expansion but did not limit Germany’s economic access to the United States,47 following a strategy of diplomatic disapproval often used with regard to Japan, as well. After Germany overtook Austria in the Anschluss on 12 March 1938, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met with the German leadership at the Munich Conference to try and create “peace for our time.”48 However, the Munich Conference was soon seen as a failure when Germany invaded Poland. Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on 1 September 1939.49 In response to this declaration of war, Roosevelt stated in a fireside chat that “this nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well,” suggesting the American public to diverge from the pervasive isolationist, neutral mentality.50 Revisions to the neutrality laws allowed for a cash-andcarry system in which the United States would sell supplies to countries who could pay cash for and retrieve supplies themselves; this system became one of the most important ways the United States supported Britain during the war while remaining neutral. Roosevelt did not intend to stay in the presidency for four terms. On 16 July 1940, Roosevelt asked Senator Alben Barkley to read a statement that “the President has never had, and has not today, any desire or purpose to continue in the office of President, to be 46 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 97. David F. Schmitz, Thank God They’re On Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 113. 48 Professor David Schmitz, “Crisis of the 1930s,” 4 February 2013. 49 Professor David Schmitz, “Chronology of Events,” 4 February 2013. 50 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: With A Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt: 1939 Volume: War—And Neutrality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), 461. 47 25 a candidate for that office, or to be nominated by the convention for that office.”51 However, Roosevelt did not trust a change in leadership while the United States teetered on the brink of war and the rest of the world already mired deeply in what became the Second World War. Roosevelt accepted the nomination for a third term just three days later, warning that the nation faced a struggle of “the continuance of civilization as we know it versus the ultimate destruction of all that we have held dear—religion against godlessness; the ideal of justice against the practice of force; moral decency versus the firing squad; courage to speak out, and to act, versus the false lullaby of appeasement,” and reassuring that “so long as I am President, I will do all I can to insure that foreign policy remain our foreign policy.”52 Roosevelt laid out the essential elements of this policy: “it was my clear duty . . . to preserve our neutrality, to shape our program of defense, to meet rapid changes, to keep our domestic affairs adjusted to shifting world conditions, and to sustain the policy of the Good Neighbor.”53 Although this sounds straightforward, it was less clear to what extent Roosevelt adhered to this policy and to what extent this policy was maintained in private government dealings. The signing of the Tripartite Pact between Tokyo, Berlin, and Rome on 27 September 1940 officially merged the European and East Asian wars. The Tripartite Powers threatened that if the United States opposed any one of these Axis powers that “they would unite in ultimate action against the United States.”54 With the Tripartite Pact, the Roosevelt administration began to conceptualize the war in East Asia and the war in 51 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: With A Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt: 1940 Volume: War—And Aid to Democracies (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), 292. 52 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 302. 53 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 294. 54 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 241; Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 634. 26 Europe as one world-wide conflict, a rhetorical concept Roosevelt called upon. A message to Joseph Grew in 1941 demonstrates Roosevelt’s understanding of the nature of the conflict as one war intertwined with American interests: “I believe that the fundamental proposition is that we must recognize that the hostilities in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia are all parts of a single world conflict. We must, consequently, recognize that our interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East.”55 The Allied forces—Great Britain, France and, later, the USSR—took on the Fascist Axis aggressors—Japan, Germany, and Italy. Roosevelt declared U.S. neutrality, recognizing the public’s fear that economic misfortune would be exacerbated by involvement in the war. Roosevelt, however, understood that the United States was now on the path to war and, through a meticulous public relations campaign, set about bringing the American public to agreement with his personal belief in liberal internationalism. Hunt identified that Roosevelt’s “public comments were by late 1940 and early 1941 closely aligned with his private views, as revealed by his exchange with the American ambassador in Japan.”56 Two speeches, within ten days of each other over the 1941 New Year, exemplify this best. Roosevelt’s “Arsenal of Democracy” speech was delivered as a fireside chat on 29 December 1940. Roosevelt, aware of public sentiment, cast his speech in terms of public nationalist attitudes: “This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on national security.”57 National security was a staple justification of the Roosevelt administration. Rhetorically, Roosevelt connected the cause of war with the cause of nationalism, aligning his public relations campaign to secure public support 55 Roosevelt to Grew, 21 January 1941, in George T. McJimsey, ed, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 9: U.S.-Japanese Relations, January-December 1941 (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 2001), 11. 56 Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 66. 57 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 633. 27 for war with an appeal to the public’s sense of nationalism. Realistically, by 1941 Roosevelt legitimately worried for the safety of American assets in Europe and East Asia, and believed that the arguably inevitable war was necessary to protect U.S. economic interests abroad. Roosevelt went on to declare: “We must be the great arsenal of democracy,” uniting the dissemination of democracy with militarism.58 This was a key element to the Just War theory, an ideology adopted by the Roosevelt administration linked to American exceptionalism; under the Just War theory, any war (and thus violence) waged in the name of American exceptionalism, democracy, and promulgation of the American way was inherently valid. On 6 January 1941, Roosevelt delivered his “Four Freedoms Speech.” In this annual address to Congress, Roosevelt expanded on the ideas introduced in his 29 December public speech, describing four democratic freedoms he believed the United States must bring to the world: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.59 With these speeches Roosevelt hoped to bring the still-isolationist U.S. public closer to accepting the inevitability of war, emphasizing that war in Europe or Asia did, in fact, affect the Western Hemisphere. Roosevelt warned that technological developments in naval and air power closed the buffers of the Atlantic and Pacific, and insisted that “frankly and definitely there is danger ahead.”60 Despite his belief that war was imminent and despite significant pressure from the Allies for the United States to enter the war, the Roosevelt administration refused to become involved unless forced by a direct act of war by an aggressor. Roosevelt told his 58 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 643. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 672. 60 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 636. 59 28 advisor, Henry Morgenthau, that he was “waiting to be pushed into this situation.” Morgenthau explained that Roosevelt meant “he wanted to be pushed into the war rather than lead us into it.”61 Indeed, Henry Stimson later noted that Roosevelt waited to be pushed into war “so that there should remain no doubt in anyone’s [the U.S. public’s] mind as to who were the aggressors”;62 Roosevelt’s response had more to do with a domestic public relations campaign than it had to do with relations with Japan itself. The United States gave economic assistance to the Allies such as Lend-Lease aid to Great Britain and China, and imposed economic sanctions against the Axis including the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States in July 1941, thus cutting off Japan’s oil supply.63 Roosevelt believed that financial aid to China was his best course of action, and indeed, economic response “turned out to be the most potent American weapon, and it supplied, contrary to Washington’s intention, the single strongest push toward war.”64 However, Joseph Grew was wary of the Japanese response to limited actions such as these.65 In a letter to Roosevelt in December 1940, Grew noted: It is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that if we take measures “short of war” with no real intention to carry those measures to their final conclusion if necessary, such lack of intention will be all too obvious to the Japanese who will proceed undeterred, and even with greater incentive, on their way. Only if they become certain that we mean to fight if called upon to do so will our preliminary measures stand some chance of proving effective and of removing the necessity for war.66 61 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 265. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 310. 63 Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Compiled with Special Material and Explanatory Notes by Samuel I. Rosenman: 1941 Volume: The Call to Battle Stations (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), 48-51; Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 67. 64 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 273; Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 67. 65 “Ambassador Joseph C. Grew Warns Against Economic Sanctions, 1939,” in Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914 (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2010), 124. 66 Grew to Roosevelt, 14 December 1940, in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 773. 62 29 Even so, by as late as July 1941, the Roosevelt administration hoped to avoid war. Joseph Grew repeatedly suggested offering the Japanese a modus vivendi and continued negotiations,67 allowing the Roosevelt administration to focus on Germany.68 In an act that set the tone for postwar planning throughout the Second World War, Winston Churchill and Roosevelt met off the coast of Newfoundland to identify their ideals for the world after the war. The document, produced on 14 August 1941, became known as the Atlantic Charter, and was one of the most important documents in guiding Allied actions throughout the war. It championed ideals against territorial aggression, for self-determination, the right to trade and economic prosperity, international collaboration, and access to public waters. In a nod to human rights, the Atlantic Charter proposed that “after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny” all countries should be able to achieve “freedom from fear and want,” a direct reference to Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech from January 1941.69 The Allies and the Roosevelt administration expected the trigger that would push the United States to war to come from Germany. An incident between a German submarine and the American destroyer Greer in September 1941 prompted Roosevelt to announce a policy of “shoot on sight” in the Atlantic.70 The difference in Roosevelt’s response to the Greer incident from his response to Panay illustrates the contrasting stances of the U.S. government to the two theatres of war. Surprisingly, the incident that pushed the U.S. into war came from the Japanese. After years of growing tensions, 67 Grew to Hull, 1 December 1939, “American-Japanese Relations,” in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 472. 68 Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy, 67. 69 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States; Diplomatic Papers: 1941: (In Seven Volumes): Volume I: General; Soviet Union (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1958), 368. 70 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 287. 30 Roosevelt sent Emperor Hirohito a last-ditch personal appeal to avoid war on 6 December 1941;71 a Japanese “surprise offensive” ambushed the U.S. military base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, the next morning, killing 2403 Americans and creating 1178 casualties.72 Responding to what was effectively a Japanese declaration of war on the United States, Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war on Japan and its allies, the Axis powers in Europe, on 8 December 1941, famously calling the attack on Pearl Harbor “a date which will live in infamy,” and immediately invoked the rhetoric of victory, claiming that “we will gain the inevitable triumph—so help us God.”73 With such confidence, Roosevelt began to plan for the postwar world just after Pearl Harbor. Already in motion, Roosevelt moved to create an international organization of united nations for world security, and over the course of the next two years would lay out the framework for the United Nations organization as well as postwar territorial redistribution.74 In his postwar planning, Roosevelt devoted significantly more effort to European matters than to matters in East Asia. Roosevelt refused when his advisors counseled him to give a public speech outlining the long history of Japanese atrocities, arguing that in order to reach more people the message should be brief and cover only the Pearl Harbor attack.75 Instead, Roosevelt related the lengthy history of relations between the United States and Japan in a message to Congress on 15 December 1941. In keeping with his focus on Europe, Roosevelt framed Japanese aggression as “following the Nazi pattern,” implying that the 71 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1941 Volume, 511-513. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 311; Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1941 Volume, 515. 73 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1941 Volume, 514, 515. 74 “Draft Constitution of the International Organization,” 26 March 1943, Sumner Welles Files (hereafter SWF), Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park (hereafter FDRL). 75 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 312. 72 31 last decade of Japanese brutality was prompted by European affairs and that Japan was operating as a Nazi puppet.76 An abbreviated version was of Roosevelt’s speech was delivered as a fireside chat two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, in which Roosevelt discussed not only Japanese atrocities but also German and Italian war crimes. Roosevelt appealed to the ideology of national defense and Just War: “When we resort to force, as now we must, we are determined that this force shall be directed toward ultimate good as well as against immediate evil. We Americans are not destroyers—we are builders. We are now in the midst of a war, not for conquest, not for vengeance, but for a world in which this Nation, and all that this Nation represents, will be safe for our children.”77 On 11 December 1941, in accordance with the Tripartite Pact, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.78 Although it had been Japanese action that drew the United States into the World War, Europe remained Roosevelt’s priority. Roosevelt referenced European events to orient the public and, when listing the aggressors, always began with Germany and Italy. So, too, the Declaration by United Nations on 1 January 1942, by the United States, Great Britain, USSR, China and many more justified their defense “to preserve human rights” in general but discussed only “the struggle for victory over Hitlerism,” a clear reference to Europe.79 One reason for Roosevelt’s focus on the European war was the Nazi slaughter of twelve million; the Roosevelt administration did not identify a comparable justification for entering the war in East Asia, and thus Japanese atrocities were not discussed publicly to the same extent as the Holocaust. The U.S. government and public was shocked by 76 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1941 Volume, 546. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1941 Volume, 530. 78 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1941 Volume, 532; Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 312. 79 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 320. 77 32 news of the atrocities of the Holocaust, which reached the Allied governments by July 1941.80 The Allies were unwilling to risk the loss of European land or life, emphasizing the need to defeat the Germans and Italians; loss of Asian land and lives seemed less crucial in comparison to the threat of Mitteleuropa promoted by Hitler. The Manhattan Project, the program that created the atomic bomb, today associated with the war against the Japanese, was designated to be used against the Germans to halt the Holocaust, and even employed the help of scientists who had fled Axis-occupied countries, such as Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr.81 Throughout the war, the United States allotted minimal manpower to the war in the Pacific and East Asia. This was in part because the Roosevelt administration believed that the European threat was both more dangerous and more important. However, it was also because Roosevelt saw the East Asian war as a minor war theatre fought by the Chinese, out of sight and out of mind of the U.S. public. Because Roosevelt wanted China to be the major Ally in the East Asian region, minimizing the need for direct U.S. involvement, China became “the favorite ally,” a country separate from Communism, imperialism, and fascism.82 China’s alternative democracy became known as the Third Way, an extension of the American exceptionalist ideology. Roosevelt also embarked on a rhetorical public relations campaign in an effort to sway the public to agree with the government that the European war warranted first priority. In the rhetoric of this campaign, Roosevelt almost never directly referenced 80 David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 20. 81 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 470; Wilson D. Miscamble, C.S.C. The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6. 82 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 329. 33 Japanese atrocities, Japan by name, or East Asian countries in general. Aggressors were discussed with vague generalizations using terminology of the “Axis” or specific references to Hitler or Mussolini. This began immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and is evident in Roosevelt’s 6 January 1942 State of the Union address, in which he unambiguously asserted that “the dreams of empire of the Japanese and Fascist leaders were modest in comparison with the gargantuan aspirations of Hitler and his Nazis.”83 In this way, Roosevelt harnessed the public outrage toward Japan and channeled it toward his war of choice. Robert Dallek, discussing Roosevelt’s rhetorical choices, corroborates this argument: “to gain a national consensus for fighting fascism overseas, Roosevelt could not discriminate between Germany and Japan; both had to be opposed at the same time.”84 This campaign continued throughout the war. Despite Roosevelt’s efforts, the American public remained focused on Japan, fueled by the memory of Pearl Harbor. In response, in February 1942 the Roosevelt administration interned 110,000 Japanese citizens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry living on the West coast in what Roosevelt called “concentration camps.” As described by Dallek, “most of them lived in mass discomfort and psychic distress throughout most of the war.”85 While the Roosevelt administration passed laws to contain Japanese within the United States, existing laws prohibited Chinese from entering the United States. The Chinese Exclusion Act, passed in 1882, severely limited the number of Chinese allowed to immigrate to the United States. By 1943, Michael Schaller argues, “with China and the 83 Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Compiled with Special Material and Explanatory Notes by Samuel I. Rosenman: 1942 Volume: Humanity on the Defensive (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), 33. 84 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 531. 85 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 335. 34 United states [sic] allied against the avowedly racist Germany and Japan, Chinese exclusion became an embarrassment.”86 Roosevelt persuaded Congress to lift the exclusion act; Congress increased the quota to a staggering 105 immigrants per year.87 The unwillingness of the U.S. legislature to take in the persecuted Chinese recalls its similar unwillingness to accept Jewish refugees from Europe. Although the latter is discussed at length by scholars, the former is all but ignored. Both instances illustrate the priority of the U.S. government on American lives above all others. By 1943, it was clear to the Roosevelt administration that the tide had turned in favor of an Allied victory and Roosevelt began to prepare the U.S. public for a lengthy war against Japan.88 Even so, governmental focus remained on Europe. At the Casablanca summit in January 1943, one memorandum citing the immediate and nearfuture plans of the Allies set out five goals, the first four of which discussed fairly specific aims in the European theatre. The last goal stated only “to carry out operations in the Pacific and Far East which would throw back Japanese forces and support China.”89 In a fireside chat on 28 July 1943, Roosevelt euphorically told the nation that “the first crack in the Axis has come. The criminal, corrupt Fascist regime in Italy is going to pieces,”90 and in September Italy surrendered to the Allies.91 In December, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, General Secretary of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin and 86 Schaller, The United States and China, 21. Schaller, The United States and China, 21. 88 Roosevelt to Congress, 1 March 1945, “Address Of The President To The Joint Session Of The Congress Delivered In The Well Of The House Chamber Upon His Return From The Crimea Conference March 1, 1945, at 12.30 p.m., e.w.t. Radio Broadcast,” in George T. McJimsey, ed, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 14: The Yalta Conference, October 1944-March 1945 (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 2003), 636-637. 89 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 372. 90 Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Compiled with Special Material and Explanatory Notes by Samuel I. Rosenman: 1943 Volume: The Tide Turns (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), 333. 91 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 413. 87 35 Roosevelt met in Tehran to plan for the end of the war. The Big Three agreed that only unconditional surrender from the Axis would be accepted. Notably, Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek was not present at Stalin’s request; Roosevelt and Churchill had met with Chiang in Cairo just before the Tehran Conference, but many of the conclusions drawn in Cairo were overturned in Tehran. On 6 June 1944, the D-Day offensive on the beaches of Normandy began pushing the German army out of Western Europe.92 By then, Roosevelt’s declining health began to affect his ability to lead the United States.93 In one of his last efforts as president, Roosevelt met again with Churchill and Stalin at Yalta in February 1945, this time to discuss the postwar world.94 Although by then active fighting was predominantly in the Pacific, the Big Three still did not focus on Japan, discussing East Asian matters only as they affected European affairs. There was only one meeting of the conference that focused on Japan (Japan was the third and last subject to be discussed), and the meeting notes state only that “no report was written up on this Conference.”95 The three leaders were in virtual agreement regarding the future of the East Asian war, making discussion simple; however, this easy agreement was in part due to the unequal importance of Europe for the leaders, and the leaders had less to argue about regarding the outcome in East Asia. In the most important success of the summit, Stalin committed to entering the war against Japan within three months of the end of the European war.96 Although this is often seen as demonstrative of American commitment to the war in East Asia, it was in 92 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 454. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 481. 94 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 508. 95 Memorandum of Yalta Conference, 11 February 1945, “Eighth Formal Meeting,” in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 14, 414. 96 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 15. 93 36 actuality another maneuver by Roosevelt to forestall sending U.S. ground troops across the ocean, a priority seen throughout the war. As late as 1945, Roosevelt clung to a Eurocentric view of the war. In a press conference on 23 February 1945, Roosevelt laid out his general approach to the Second World War. Roosevelt was asked: “Can you say anything about the importance of the Pacific War? The American people have been wholly preoccupied with the war in Europe . . . . Do you think the country realizes they face a long, hard war in the Pacific?” Roosevelt responded clearly, albeit casually: “That’s a hard thing to say. [The Japanese] blow hot and then cold. . . . But our strategy is clear: first clean up Germany, then go after Japan just as hard as we and the British can possibly do so.”97 The Battle of Iwo Jima was fought from February to March, and on April 1, the Battle of Okinawa began, just the final two in a long line of island-hopping battles between the Japanese and United States drawing the Allied force closer and closer to the Japanese home islands. Roosevelt’s health was deteriorating rapidly, and on 12 April 1945, Roosevelt died of a massive cerebral hemorrhage at the age of sixty-three.98 He did not live to see the German surrender on 8 May 1945, and did not have the opportunity to choose whether to use the atomic bomb. His successor, Harry Truman, did have the choice, and dropped the bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945, respectively.99 On 15 August, Emperor Hirohito proclaimed Japan’s unconditional surrender to the Allies, bringing the end to World War II.100 97 Samuel I. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Compiled with Special Material and Explanatory Notes by Samuel I. Rosenman: 1944-45 Volume: Victory and the Threshold of Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), 561-562. 98 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 528. 99 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 85, 90. 100 Daniel Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity: The Secret Genocide of Axis Japan’s Germ Warfare Operation (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc., 2004), 176. 37 Chapter 2 – A Muted Response: Roosevelt’s Reaction to Japanese War Crimes During the Second World War, the Japanese Army committed some of the most inconceivable human rights violations to date. The Japanese frequently massacred civilians, including children and the elderly, most notably during the Rape of Nanking. In part because of international response to the disregard for human rights during the Nanking massacre, the Japanese government created official brothels that utilized predominantly kidnapped Korean, Filipina, and Dutch women and girls known as “comfort women” for the Japanese soldiers. In reality, the women and girls were victims of forced prostitution. The Japanese Army also engaged in scientific research regarding biological and chemical warfare, using civilians and prisoners of war for medical experiments. The Japanese Army then infected Chinese cities with deadly epidemics. In addition to medical testing, the Japanese treated POWs terribly. Prisoners of war were subjected to death marches, went without medical treatment, food, and water, and experienced brutal torture. The United States government was aware of these atrocities, but the Roosevelt administration chose to keep details hidden from the public for the majority of the war in East Asia. The response of the United States government, public, and scholars to Japanese war crimes has been uneven. From 1931 until the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, Roosevelt publicly condemned Japanese violations of human rights, but was unwilling to devote U.S. Armed Forces to take action against the atrocities. After the beginning of the war in Europe, the Roosevelt administration stopped discussing Japanese atrocities publicly. This public relations tactic was designed to focus the U.S. public on the European war. The Roosevelt administration planned to address the atrocities with war 38 crimes trials after the war, alongside trials of Nazi German leaders. After the death of Franklin Roosevelt and the end of the European war in May 1945, more details of Japanese atrocities came into public view within the United States. The trials that took place during the Truman administration to bring Japanese war criminals to justice will be analyzed in the next chapter. In short, while they seemed to be in-depth and focused on bringing Japanese war criminals to justice, the U.S. economic and political agenda clouded the proceedings. Japanese atrocities drove U.S. public opinion: in 1946, Allan Nevins wrote: “Probably in all our history no foe has been so detested as were the Japanese. The infamy of Pearl Harbor was enough; but to it were soon added circumstantial accounts of Japanese atrocities at Hong Kong, Singapore, and . . . in the Philippines.”1 Yet, after the war ended, the atrocities quickly faded from the public mind as postwar mentality shifted to the Cold War and anti-Communism. Scholars have recounted Japanese war crimes as if they were unique to the Japanese armed forces or to armies of the era; in fact, both Axis and Allied armies acted in many similar ways. Before discussing Japanese atrocities during World War II and the U.S. response, it is imperative to understand the history of Japan leading up to the Second World War. Elements of Japan’s national history and identity alongside the external pressures exerted on Japan by other global powers beginning as early as the nineteenth century shaped the Japan that was able to commit the war crimes of World War II. While the roots of the 1930s and 1940s Japanese mentality do not excuse Japanese actions, they serve to explain how such war crimes were possible. 1 Allan Nevins, “How We Felt About the War,” in Jack Goodman, ed., While You Were Gone: A Report on Wartime Life in the United States (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 13. 39 The trajectory of Japan in the pre-war era was directly influenced by the United States and the European West. The Tokugawa Shogunate, a Western-described militaryrun bureaucracy and the last feudal government of Japan, held power from 1600 to 1867. In 1853, U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew Perry went to Japan under the direction of President Millard Fillmore with the intent to open Japan to trade and interaction with the West, pushing Japan into internal crisis.2 Within fifteen years, Perry’s voyage proved more fruitful than the Fillmore administration may have intended: lower level samurai led a coup in 1867 and toppled the Tokugawa Shogunate, leaving in its wake an oligarchy under the Meiji Emperor, a government scrambling to prove itself equal to its Western counterparts. Just one year into his reign, the Meiji Emperor “ignited a revolution to transform a patchwork of warring fiefdoms into a modern, powerful Japan,” known as the Meiji Restoration.3 The Japanese Emperor was elevated to deity-like status, industrialization quickly modernized the perceived-backwards country, Japan began to mimic Western nations by expanding outside its borders, the traditional spiritual beliefs and practices were re-envisioned as a national and state-centered Shintō religion, and Japan engaged in global trade and international relations.4 Within just over a decade from 1894-1905, the small island nation was victorious over both China and Russia in the First Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, respectively, significantly elevating Japan’s global status. Power transferred to the Taishō Emperor in 1912 after the death of the Meiji Emperor and then in 1926 to the Showa Emperor, known more commonly by his personal name, Hirohito. Japan continued its push for militarization, industrialization, and modernization. Expansionism gained 2 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 21. Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 21. 4 Schaller, The United States and China, 27. 3 40 momentum as it garnered support from the right-wing ultranationalists who urged the domination of Asia.5 These many changes in Japanese ideology culminated in the 1931 invasion of Manchuria, beginning the Second World War. In mid-1937, the Japanese government again toppled, and Prince Konoye Fumimarô took the helm as premier.6 For centuries, Japan’s culture has been defined by its warriors, and World War II was no exception. During the Tokugawa Shogunate, bushidō, or the “way of the warrior,” was officially created, outlining a code of conduct for Japanese samurai that required chivalry and extreme loyalty to the Emperor.7 The language of bushidō, if not the original ideology, remained intact through the governmental changes of the nineteenth century; bushidō was corrupted as the industrial shift to the military came about after the Meiji Restoration.8 One way bushidō lived on was through the Japanese soldiers’ reluctance to become prisoners of war. Iris Chang noted that “the Japanese surrendered at the rate of only 1 per 120 dead,” far less frequently than their German counterparts.9 The Japanese believed it was their duty to fulfill gyokusai, or “glorious self-annihilation,” by “inflict[ing] as much damage as possible on the enemy, even if there was no hope of winning the battle,” and then dying.10 This reluctance to surrender combined with dedication to the Emperor was also the key element in Japan’s use of kamikaze suicide pilots.11 Japanese soldiers were also instilled with the concept of geri. Laurence Rees explained that “geri is often translated as ‘duty’. . . . In Japan geri is defined only by the 5 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 27. Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 75. 7 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 206-210. 8 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 206-210. 9 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 20. 10 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 195. 11 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 20. 6 41 group. Ethical values are what the leadership say are ethical values—and in the 1930s that meant the emperor was a god and the Chinese were subhuman. Japanese schoolchildren learnt these corrupted values and were told they were honourable.”12 The desire to conform to group definition of morals directly correlated to the prevalence of Japanese war crimes during World War II. Rees further noted that “it needed only a group of ardent militaristic nationalists to make of this society a powerful, fanatical weapon, able to produce an army capable of great crimes.”13 In discussing the actions of Japanese researchers of biological warfare, Sheldon Harris reiterated Rees’s conclusion: “For them, ethics were not an issue. They knew right from wrong. In their minds, however, advanced research was not to be inhibited by ethical or moral restraints.”14 Harris explained that the Japanese justified their means with militant nationalism and devout commitment to the Japanese Emperor. Roosevelt recognized this flawed logic and discounted Japanese opinions. On 20 February 1941, Roosevelt sent a “private and confidential” memorandum to Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles regarding a message from Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke to Japanese Ambassador to the United States Nomura Kichisaburō. Of the message, and demonstrative of Roosevelt’s mindset regarding Japanese leadership, Roosevelt stated that the message “seem[ed] to me to be the product of a mind which is deeply disturbed and unable to think quietly or logically.”15 War crimes perpetrated by the Japanese Army were born of devotion to the Emperor and the desire to conform alongside the Japanese belief in racial and national 12 Rees, Horror in the East, 147. Rees, Horror in the East, 11. 14 Harris, Factories of Death, 56. 15 “PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR HON. SUMNER WELLES,” 20 February 1941, SWF, Major Correspondents, Box 151, FDRL, 1. 13 42 superiority, much like its German counterpart. As explained by Yuki Tanaka, the Japanese hoped that by persecuting white victims “the old ‘pecking order’ would be reversed—that non-Japanese Asians would come to see whites as inferior, subjugated people and the Japanese as the ‘natural’ leaders of Asia.”16 The goal was to elevate the Japanese as the leaders of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and unseat the white population from its place of power colonizing Asia and as world leaders. In viewing the less-Westernized Asian countries as inferior, the modernized, Westernized Japan under Hirohito began to view the world through a racially hierarchical lens of its own. The Japanese waged the Second World War as a war of purification of the Asian race and culture.17 Although the Japanese expected other Asians whose countries Japan had occupied to accept the Japanese with open arms, the Japanese invaders were more often hated than supported.18 Chinese survivor Jin Zihui revealed the racialized perception of the Japanese prevalent among those under Japanese occupation: “The devils came. . . . The devils, flouting law and morality, invaded our native place. . . . We were at home so that our eyes saw and our ears heard the actual violent deeds of the devils. We gnashed our teeth in hatred.”19 Eerily parallel to Jin’s memory, and corroborating his claims, Nagatomi Hakudo, a Japanese veteran, recalled: Few know that soldiers impaled babies on bayonets and tossed them still alive into pots of boiling water. . . They gang-raped women from the ages of twelve to eighty and then killed them when they could no longer satisfy sexual 16 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 38. Dower, War Without Mercy, 9. 18 Dower, War Without Mercy, 7. 19 R. Keith Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness: Refugees During the Sino-Japanese War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 98. 17 43 requirements. I beheaded people, starved them to death, burned them, and buried them alive. . . . I was truly a devil.20 Although the Rape of Nanking is often seen as a stand-alone instance of horrific Japanese brutality, the actions taken by the Japanese army at Nanking were not abnormal in comparison to behavior both before and after the Nanking incident. The actions of the Japanese ground troops were, in many cases, sanctioned by the Japanese government. One tactic implemented in Northern China, known as the “three-all” policy called for the Japanese troops to “loot all, kill all, burn all.”21 Similarly, during the Rape of Nanking, a Japanese unit was given the command that “ALL PRISONERS OF WAR ARE TO BE EXECUTED. METHOD OF EXECUTION: DIVIDE THE PRISONERS INTO GROUPS OF A DOZEN. SHOOT TO KILL SEPARATELY.”22 This type of carnage against civilians is the atrocity for which the Japanese during World War II are most remembered. The mass killing and rape of civilians was remembered by victims, perpetrators, and observers. These memories speak for themselves. Three thousand villages were massacred in Pingdingshan in 1932.23 Feng Xingfa, remembering the burning of his village, Qiaosi, in 1938, noted that “bodies of those who had been killed . . . [were] exhumed, collected, and buried in a public mass tomb . . . commonly known as ‘the thousand-person pit.’”24 In 1942, one Chinese man noted in his diary: “June 15, 1942—In Lianhua, Japanese soldiers killed a woman who resisted their attempts to rape her.”25 An 20 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 59. Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 215. 22 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 41. 23 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 62. 24 Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness, 5. 25 Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness, 96. 21 44 attack by the Japanese Navy on Shanghai left thousands of Chinese civilians dead.26 Sheldon Harris noted that after the war, Soviet soldiers stumbled upon another mass grave of 10,000 bodies. “The grave was filled with Chinese and Mongolian men, women and children. Some of the dead were still warm, clear evidence that they had been killed in the course of the hasty Japanese retreat from the city.”27 The massacres were no secret: slaughters were reported from all Japanese-occupied countries.28 Japanese air raids on the Chinese wartime capital, Chongqing, began in May 1939, when it was reported that “on May 3, 673 deaths were recorded, and 1,608 houses destroyed . . . [and] on May 4, 3,318 people were killed, and 3,803 houses destroyed.”29 The bombing continued until August 1941; Japan sent 218 bombing missions into China and killed 11,885.30 Japanese bombing campaigns were not intended to destroy military infrastructure, but rather were meant to demoralize the Chinese.31 Keith Schoppa attributed the level of brutality to “embitterment about and desire for vengeance over Chinese resistance,” which was far stronger than the Japanese had initially expected.32 Even so, the Rape of Nanking stands above and beyond other Japanese disregard for civilian life. At the time, it was posited that “in all modern history surely there is no page that will stand so black as that of the rape of Nanking;”33 little was it known that the Nanking Massacre would be overshadowed by the Holocaust in less than a decade. Fearing a Japanese invasion, the Chinese government fled Nanking in October 1937, 26 Schaller, The United States and China, 43. Harris, Factories of Death, xviii. 28 Dower, War Without Mercy, 43. 29 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 3. 30 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 3. 31 John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerkwerker, eds., The Cambridge History of China: Volume 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 567. 32 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 262-263. 33 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 140. 27 45 relocating its military command to Wuhan and administration to Chongqing.34 Just a few weeks later in November 1937, Japanese forces pushed into Nanking. They convinced the Chinese soldiers protecting the city to lay down their arms by promising good treatment if they surrendered, and then killed the unarmed soldiers. The Japanese forces officially took control of the Chinese capital on 13 December, and began killing civilians in their systematic search for hidden Chinese soldiers.35 The Japanese also destroyed the city itself, burning churches, embassies, department stores, shops, mansions, and homes, and occupying banks, government buildings, and warehouses.36 After this, Japanese carnage ravaged the city for eight weeks, and lesser brutality continued for months.37 For the first, but not only, time during the war, the Chinese government fled the Chinese capital as citizens descended into panic and fear.38 Statistics vividly describe the enormity of the event: the official tally of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East after the war cited more than 260,000 noncombatant deaths, while other estimates cite up to 350,000.39 In comparison, the death tolls of each of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands during the Second World War did not exceed the deaths from this single massacre in the Chinese capital.40 The death toll of the U.S. firebombing of Tokyo totaled less than half of the Nanking massacre.41 Together the deaths by the end of 1945 from the atomic bombs do not surpass those at Nanking.42 During the carnage, Japanese soldiers also raped between 20,000 and 34 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 125. Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 23, 4, 46. 36 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 160, 46. 37 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 159. 38 Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness, 14. 39 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 4. 40 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 5. 41 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 6. 42 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 6. 35 46 80,000 women.43 Iris Chang’s description of just some of the acts that took place during the Rape of Nanking is vivid and chilling: Chinese men were used for bayonet practice and in decapitation contests. . . . Many soldiers went beyond rape to disembowel women, slice off their breasts, nail them alive to walls. Fathers were forced to rape their daughters, and sons their mothers, as other family member watched. Not only did live burials, castration, the carving of organs, and the roasting of people become routine, but more diabolical tortures were practiced, such as hanging people by their tongues on iron hooks or burying people to their waists and watching them get torn apart by German shepherds. So sickening was the spectacle that even the Nazis in the city were horrified, one proclaiming the massacre to be the work of “bestial machinery.”44 Chang’s horrific tale goes on to recount civilian victims nailed to boards and run over by tanks, crucified, stripped of their skin, frozen, burned en masse, and more.45 Accounts exist of Japanese soldiers slicing fetuses from the bellies of pregnant women.46 The types of butchery abound. In response to the international condemnation of the Rape of Nanking, with particular attention to the physical act of rape, the Japanese government expanded their already-blossoming comfort system of forced prostitution. It is confirmed that the Japanese Army brothels existed as early as 1932 in Shanghai, created just after the occupation of Manchuria, but these were often staffed by Japanese prostitutes.47 By 1937, the Japanese government supported the creation of official Army comfort stations in an effort to mitigate the rape of Chinese civilians for which Japan was receiving international criticism. Indeed, after the establishment of the comfort system, rape reports 43 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 6. Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 6. 45 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 87-88. 46 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 91. 47 George Hicks, The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 45. 44 47 declined dramatically, seemingly validating the Army’s and government’s actions.48 The Japanese government also hoped that establishing comfort stations would pacify Chinese civilians, fearful of rape by Japanese soldiers.49 However, the comfort system did not eradicate rape; it only relocated it. George Hicks referred to the comfort system as a legalized, “officially-organised [sic] system of rape by the Imperial Japanese Forces.”50 The comfort system was established regardless of the respect for virginity in many Asian cultures; the Japanese government and Army was aware that the women and girls forced into prostitution would be condemned within their societies.51 As Japan occupied more and more territory, it broadened its pool of women and girls from which to create comfort women. Still, Japan drew heavily from its colony of Korea: eighty percent of the comfort women were Korean.52 Other women were Chinese, Formosan, Southeast Asian, Filipina, or captured female Allies, mostly Dutch nurses. The vast majority of the Japanese Army’s sexual slaves were between 14 and 18 years old.53 Japanese military leaders saw the women as commodities and tools. Early shipments of comfort women were documented as “military supplies,” although the documents were destroyed by the Japanese government before the postwar war crimes trials.54 The women were intended to function as a leisure activity for the soldiers in order to better ready them for battle, as it was believed that sex before combat would ward against casualties.55 Japanese soldiers used sex as stress relief from combat and from 48 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 45. Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 94. 50 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 11. 51 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 267. 52 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 11. 53 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 17. 54 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 99. 55 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 95; Hicks, The Comfort Women, 32. 49 48 mistreatment from Army higher-ups:56 Japanese soldiers were predominantly farmers, factory workers and criminals who endured physical and verbal abuse from officers.57 Accounts from the comfort women themselves are graphic and haunting. One Chinese survivor remembered that “I had a big room with a double bed. . . . I was forced to have sex with ten to twenty men a day. As a result I was continuously raw. Red raw. Sex was excruciating. . . . But I had to be gentle and serve every soldier well. If I didn’t perform well, I would get beaten.”58 A Dutch comfort woman corroborated: “We were made to understand that we were here for the sexual pleasure of the Japanese. . . . Trying to escape was useless. We were in this house for only one purpose: for the Japanese to have sex with us. We were enslaved into enforced prostitution.”59 In addition to taking women prisoners as comfort women, the Japanese Army committed numerous atrocities against soldier prisoners of war. During the war, few outsiders knew of the atrocities against POWs, making it more possible for the Japanese army to mistreat their prisoners.60 While some prisoners endured death marches and medical testing, the day-to-day life of the prisoners was similarly awful. Throughout the war, the Japanese captured 140,000 POWs, many of whom remained prisoners for more than three years, the entire engagement of the United States in the war.61 The Tokyo War Crimes Trials following the war determined that 132,134 Allied prisoners were taken hostage by the Japanese; 35,756 of them died, an enormous twenty-seven percent death 56 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 32-33. Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 263. 58 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 13. 59 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 93. 60 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 273. 61 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 17; Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 2. 57 49 rate. In comparison, of the 235,473 Allied prisoners held by Germany and Italy, only four percent died.62 Although the Japanese were bound by the 1907 Hague Convention and 1929 Geneva Convention governing the work POWs could do, the Japanese disregarded their international commitments. The Japanese had ratified the Hague Convention, and although they had not ratified the Geneva Convention, the Allies required that Japan abide by it during the Second World War, and the Japanese agreed.63 The Conventions allowed POWs to work on non-military operations as long as they were paid equal wage to the captor nation’s army.64 The Japanese Army, however, put POWs to work on military operations and refused them pay. Allied POW workers constructed the BurmaSiam railroad, what Gavan Daws called “the biggest sustained POW atrocity of the Pacific war,” made famous in the fictional movie Bridge on the River Kwai.65 This blatant disregard for the Geneva Convention was sanctioned by official Japanese policy.66 Beyond defying the Geneva Convention, the Japanese Army brutalized their prisoners of war. Prisoners were denied medical treatment, and many suffered from tropical diseases including malaria, dysentery, beriberi, pellagra, scurvy, cholera, and tropical ulcers.67 Gavan Daws recounted that the Japanese drove [the POWs] towards mass death. . . . They beat them until they fell, then beat them for falling, beat them until they bled, then beat them for bleeding . . . . They starved them. When the International Red Cross sent food and medicine, the Japanese looted the shipments. They sacrificed prisoners in medical experiments. . . . Those who survived could only look ahead to being worked to death. If the war had lasted another year, there would not have been a POW left alive.68 62 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 70. Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 17. 64 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 16. 65 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 18-19. 66 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 70. 67 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 23. 68 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 18. 63 50 Many of the diseases were brought on by malnutrition. One group of POWs received no more than one ounce of rice and a small loaf of bread measuring two by two by four inches for a day.69 Other prisoners were used as guinea pigs for diet experiments. One survivor remembered being fed nothing but boiled cassava root during an experiment, only to be returned to “the old starvation standard—less than ½ lb cooked rice per day with a pint of soup; or, for some days, 1 small sweet potato or ½ coconut per meal.” There were only nine survivors of the cassava root experiment.70 Prisoners were also forced to endure various methods of torture. Prisoners of war were sometimes punished by being placed in a “punishment cage” for up to forty days (although there was officially a thirty-day limit by Japanese Army protocol). The largest punishment cage measured 4.5 x 2.7 x 2.7 meters, and as many as seventeen prisoners would be detained in one cell at a time.71 Other tortures were meted out by the Kempeitati, a special branch of the military policy. Their methods of torture included one similar to water boarding: a prisoner’s face would be covered with cloth and smothered with water. This would continue until the prisoner’s stomach was full of inhaled water, at which point the Kempeitati would jump on the victim from a chair. Another torture, known as “rice torture,” consisted of stuffing a starving victim full of uncooked rice and then forcing him to drink massive amounts of water causing the rice to expand, creating excruciating pain for the prisoner. Prisoners would be coated with wet sand before being beaten with a paddle in order to do greater damage to the victim’s skin.72 Yuki Tanaka argued that “guards were not in fact punishing POWs for infringements of regulations in 69 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 59. Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 150, 151. 71 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 35. 72 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 26-27. 70 51 such cases but merely harassing and tormenting them to satisfy their sadistic impulses. Such harassment worsened as the war continued.”73 A few specific incidents warrant mention. After the fall of the Philippines to Japanese forces in April 1942, much of Douglas MacArthur’s army was captured along with many Filipino forces. In what is known as the Bataan Death March, the prisoners were forced to walk 100 kilometers with little sustenance, and were often given the “sun treatment,” being kept in the sun with no water or shade for hours at a time.74 Of the POWs captured, 16,000 Filipino and 2,000 Americans died during the march.75 Some of these died due to the elements; many more were killed outright for lagging behind. Soldiers were bound together and bayoneted from behind under the direct orders of Nara Akira, a Japanese general who had graduated from Amherst College and the United States Army’s infantry school at Fort Benning.76 Other prisoners at the Sandakan POW camp in North Borneo underwent similar abuse. Twenty-five hundred Australian soldiers were forced to walk 260 kilometers over the course of two death marches; only six survived.77 In many instances, prisoners were killed because there was not enough food available. Perhaps, had the Kempeitati used the rice treatment less often, more rice would have been available for feeding prisoners. Prisoners of war were also subject to medical experiments. The racially- and nationally-based dehumanization of other Asians and white soldiers in the eyes of the Japanese Army seemed to justify the use of humans for inhumane research. Studies were conducted regarding dehydration, starvation, frostbite, air pressure, animal-to-human 73 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 37. Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 77. 75 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 15. 76 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 75. 77 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 8. 74 52 blood transfusions, as well as medical testing regarding the Japanese research in biological and chemical warfare.78 John Murphy, one of the nine survivors of the cassava root diet experiment, recalled that he, along with the other eight survivors, were then used to test for immunity to malaria: “Captain HIRANO used a needle containing approximately ten cc’s of blood which was obtained from one of the Japanese soldiers [who had malaria]. . . . Nothing was done towards treating the men who were subjected to the tests and it was apparent that more interest was in . . . the final results of the test.”79 Indeed, victims of Japanese medical experiments were watched carefully, but were never saved by medical intervention. Medical testing of POWs was primarily used for research regarding biological and chemical warfare. In 1939, Japanese medical researchers approached the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research in search of yellow fever samples. Although the Japanese researchers were turned down, the Roosevelt administration took it as a warning sign that the Japanese were interested in biological warfare and the State Department launched an investigation into the matter, expressed in a 1940 report.80 Unfortunately, they were right; the Japanese became the first country confirmed as using officially sanctioned, scientifically manipulated germ warfare in history, and killed 580,000 people through germ attacks and human experiments during WWII.81 Although the Japanese government did not initiate biological weapon research, it was aware the research was taking place: Japanese scientists approached the Japanese 78 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, xix. Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 151-152. 80 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, 184, 202. 81 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, xviii, xii. 79 53 military and government proposing the idea.82 Ishii Shirō, a Japanese physician who graduated from Kyoto University, initiated Japan’s search for biological weaponry. After returning from a trip to Europe in 1930, Ishii approached the Japanese government about starting a research facility for biological warfare; Ishii was given carte blanche to begin biological testing and paid Y200,000 annually.83 Under the guise of the cleverly named Epidemic Prevention Laboratory, Ishii began his research in Tokyo in 1932. Ishii took advantage of Japan’s newly occupied province of Manchuria, creating the most wellknown of the Japanese biological warfare factories, Unit 731, known as the Tōgō Unit, utilizing Ishii’s own nom de guerre, or more surreptitiously known as the Water Purification Bureau. Ishii’s objective was to utilize biological warfare to “depopulate, make miserable, and demoralize the Chinese people”84 through epidemics in key areas, intentions that closely align with those outlawed in the 1949 Geneva Convention regarding genocide.85 From the inception of his plans, Ishii intended to use human lab rats; this was his rationale for establishing Unit 731 in the remoteness of Manchuria. The most infamous Japanese units involved in human testing and biological weapons research were known as Unit 100, Unit Ei 1644, Unit 565, Unit 516, and Unit 2646;86 at least twenty-six such departments were created throughout China and the Southwest Pacific, all of which were under Ishii’s control.87 It was no small secret: more than 20,000 physicians and scientists were involved in the endeavor.88 However, it was not until the mid-1980s that these 82 Harris, Factories of Death, xii. Harris, Factories of Death, 29. 84 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, xiii. 85 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, xiii. 86 Harris, Factories of Death, xxix; Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 145. 87 Harris, Factories of Death, 76. 88 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, xiii. 83 54 human experiments and the research and development of bacteriological weapons were made known to the general U.S. public. Until then, documents on the subject were classified in the U.S. Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff and the Office of the Judge Advocate General as well as other U.S. military organizations.89 As early as 1937, Japanese forces employed chemical weaponry such as poison gas.90 The Japanese first used biological weapons in 1939 against Russian forces on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. The Japanese army contaminated rivers used by the Russian soldiers with the typhoid fever pathogen. In 1940 and 1941, the Japanese again utilized biological warfare. The Japanese Air Force aerially dropped payloads of rice, wheat, wheat chaff, and cotton contaminated with black plague-infested fleas on villages in central China. Within the year, many hundreds of Chinese villagers died. Fleeing the plague, villagers escaped to the countryside, bringing the plague with them and killing thousands more. In some areas, infected persons had only an eight-and-one-third percent chance of survival.91 Resurrections of the black plague epidemic started by the Japanese forces afflicted the region frequently throughout the 1940s and as late as 1959.92 In June and July 1942, the Japanese expanded their repertoire, creating epidemics of cholera, typhoid, and dysentery along with the black plague in Zhejiang province, just south of Shanghai. Notably, this increase in Japanese use of bacteriological weapons was in response to the first U.S. attack on the Japanese mainland, which consisted of the bombing of Tokyo and other cities.93 This retaliation against the Chinese for U.S. actions demonstrates the conflation of the Chinese and U.S. governments in the eyes of the 89 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 135. Harris, Factories of Death, 331. 91 Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness, 285-286. 92 Harris, Factories of Death, 103. 93 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 138. 90 55 Japanese government. This link was made as early as 1937, when Joseph Grew wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that a Japanese official had “reiterated the opinion expressed to me that American-Japanese relations depend largely upon Sino-Japanese relations.”94 Testing for biological weaponry took similar shape to other Japanese medical experiments on prisoners of war. Ishii’s weapons factories, however, expanded their pool of victims to Chinese civilians, including women, children, and infants. Guinea pigs came from anywhere the Japanese Army could find them: China, Russia, Mongolia, Korea, Australia, Britain, New Zealand and the United States were all represented among test subjects.95 Japanese officials claimed that the subjects were paid for their services; in one case, a baby was said to have “volunteered.”96 The human subjects were known among the Japanese researchers as maruta, meaning “logs of wood,”97 a linguistic representation of the how the Japanese dehumanized their captives. The entire list of diseases inflicted upon the test subjects is unknown; the small portion that is known is seemingly endless, and its enormity needs no further explanation: They worked with human subjects on diseases that ranged from anthrax to yellow fever. They researched human reactions to plague, typhoid, paratyphoid A and B, typhus, smallpox, tularemia, infectious jaundice, gas gangrene, tetanus, cholera, dysentery, glanders, scarlet fever, undulant fever, tick encephalitis, songo (epidemic hemorrhagic fever), whooping cough, diphtheria, pneumonia, brysipelas, epidemic cerebrospinal meningitis, venereal diseases, tuberculosis, salmonella, frostbite, and other countless diseases that were endemic to the communities and surrounding regions.98 94 Grew to Hull, March 12, 1937, in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 1. 95 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, xx; Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 145. 96 Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II (New York: Free Press, 1989), 238. 97 Harris, Factories of Death, 48. 98 Harris, Factories of Death, 77-78. 56 Test subjects were taken to individual cells before being infected with a disease by either injection with infected blood or ingestion of contaminated food or water. As with non-biological medical experiments, victims were observed throughout their battles with the disease and researchers would take blood and tissue samples. After a prisoner died of they were dissected and cremated.99 There was nothing humane about the treatment of the test subjects. Sheldon Harris recounted that if the researchers wanted to study the brain, “guards would hold [the test subject] while another guard would smash the victim’s head open with an ax. His brain would be extracted and rushed immediately into the laboratory. The body would then be whisked off to the pathologist, and then to the crematorium for the usual disposal.”100 In the aftermath of the war, Japan did not take responsibility for its wartime actions. Neither the Japanese Army nor the Chinese government under either Chiang Kaishek or Mao Zedong bothered to clean up the chemical and biological weapons factories. From the end of the war until the turn of the century, almost a thousand casualties resulted from accidental encounters with Japanese chemical weaponry that had been left behind; of those, 767 died.101 After its surrender, the Japanese government ordered the destruction of documents regarding the comfort system and POWs, leaving the postwar war crimes trials and later, scholars, little with which to work.102 On 20 August 1945, the Japanese government obscured the comfort system from the eyes of Allied liberators by mandating that “Japanese women in all localities are to be attached to local hospitals as 99 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 138. Harris, Factories of Death, 35. 101 Harris, Factories of Death, 329. 102 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 71. 100 57 nurses. When this message is understood, burn it.”103 In some cases, the Japanese soldiers did not see what they did as criminal; rather, they saw an act such as killing prisoners of war as the logical response to such administrative problems as not having enough food for the number of prisoners being held.104 This is consistent with the initial open hostilities during the Rape of Nanking during which Japanese newspapers made public images of the destruction and atrocities;105 the Japanese government and people felt they had nothing to hide. Japan quickly erased the wartime atrocities from its national memory. The atrocities of civilian massacres, forced prostitution, mistreatment of prisoners of war, and biological warfare are not openly discussed.106 Iris Chang warned that public discussion of Japanese war crimes during World War II could be “career threatening, and even lifethreatening.”107 When the atrocities are confronted, they are excused as acts of individual soldiers rather than as part of a larger, government sanctioned system of abuse.108 Today, Japanese textbooks censor all references to the Rape of Nanking, comfort women, and biological warfare, illustrating the current and pervasive sanitization of cultural memory.109 Monetarily, Japan has not come to terms with its crimes: Japan has not paid one percent of what Germany has paid in reparations, and yet the Japanese government regards itself as having fulfilled its reparation requirements as of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, the treaty does not absolve Japan of payment; rather, it 103 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 152-153. Rees, Horror in the East, 146. 105 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 143. 106 Harris, Factories of Death, xi. 107 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 11-12. 108 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 200. 109 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 12-13; Harris, Factories of Death, xii. 104 58 postponed payment until Japan was financially stable.110 It is unlikely that the Japanese stance on the matter will change. From the beginning, the U.S. response to Japanese war crimes was focused on diplomatic and economic sanctions. After the outbreak of war in Europe, this response became even more muted, a direct reflection of the priorities of the Roosevelt administration. Highlighting German and Italian war crimes convinced the public that the more virulent foe was in Europe; neglect of Japanese war crimes served to give the government leverage in the post-European war phase to fuel the public’s support for protracted warfare after Nazi and Fascist Germany and Italy—whom they had been told were the embodiment of evil in the world—had been terminated. Although the U.S. government rarely specifically discussed the atrocities publicly, it was aware of them. On 28 September 1937, before the Rape of Nanking, the Department of State criticized Japanese atrocities, obliquely threatening that “any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large population engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and humanity.”111 Roosevelt followed up this sentiment with his “Quarantine Speech” on 5 October 1937, in which he backhandedly referenced Japanese atrocities: “Without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind, civilians, including vast numbers of women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air.”112 Roosevelt did not mention Japan or any Asian country by name—but neither did he mention a European one. In the spring and summer of 1939, Roosevelt and Hull asked American companies to impose a “moral embargo on airplane sales to countries bombing 110 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 222. Dower, War Without Mercy, 38. 112 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1937 Volume, 407. 111 59 civilian populations from the air,” an indirect response to the frequent Japanese bombings,113 and in 1940 and 1941 the U.S. government officially embargoed Japan from various war materiel.114 Without question, the Roosevelt administration was aware—and scared—of Japanese aggression. One Japanese war crime directed against U.S. citizens before the declaration of war was the Japanese attack on the U.S. gunboat Panay. U.S. response to the sinking of the Panay was calculated. The Panay incident afforded the Roosevelt administration an excuse to respond to Japanese-perpetrated atrocities in general; instead, Roosevelt chose to downplay the matter.115 Roosevelt needed to respond enough that the U.S. public would feel that justice had been served, but not so strong as to push Japan to war. Roosevelt recognized the public’s commitment to peace and still hoped to shift public sentiment towards entering the European theatre. Roosevelt’s subdued response required only “a. Full expressions of regret and proffer[ing] of full compensation: [and] b. Methods guaranteeing against a repetition of any similar attack in the future.”116 Roosevelt stipulated that film shot by Allied filmmakers in Nanking be cut to delete Japanese bombers shooting at deck level while attacking the Panay because he knew it would incite outrage over the minimalist settlement he had procured with Japan,117 an early element in Roosevelt’s public relations campaign to sway the U.S. public’s focus away from warfare with Japan. Roosevelt’s response to the Panay incident was similar to his also-muted response to the Nanking Massacre, which began the next day. Allied journalists and filmmakers 113 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 193. Schaller, The United States and China, 55. 115 Schmitz, The Triumph of Internationalism, 54. 116 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1937 Volume, 541. 117 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 148. 114 60 who had witnessed the attack on the Panay were in Nanking during the massacre in 1937-1938 and managed to document some of the carnage and report it back to their respective countries.118 Although the U.S. public knew of the massacre at the time, memory of the incident in the United States quickly dissipated, as the loss of lives was too far away for the U.S. public to empathize. Buying into this national memory (or lack thereof), Roosevelt made no public response to the Nanking Massacre. At best was an appeal on 17 January 1938 for Red Cross aid for Chinese civilians; the appeal did not mention the massacre or any other specific incidents, and cited vaguely “extreme distress of millions of civilian people in China.”119 Recognizing the still nationally-centered mindset of the U.S. public, Iris Chang noted that “the sinking of the Panay caused more of an uproar in the United States than all the wholesale rape and slaughter in Nanking combined.”120 Five years later, the Roosevelt administration continued to be aware of Japanese atrocities, such as the Bataan Death March. Even this, which directly affected American soldiers, was kept secret from the public for over a year and a half. Information on the Death March was only released in collaboration with a British statement on Japanese treatment of British prisoners of war. After news of the Death March became public, stories of other Japanese atrocities came out of the woodwork;121 With the go-ahead by the government, stories of abuse were now legitimate. The delayed release of information regarding the Bataan Death March proves the intentions of the Roosevelt administration: 118 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, x. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: With A Special Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt: 1938 Volume: The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), 55. 120 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 146. 121 Dower, War Without Mercy, 51. 119 61 transparency was not the objective, and information was to be used for political gain only. Atrocities were kept secret to maintain public morale, as the Roosevelt administration feared that the U.S. public would interpret the atrocities as evidence of Japanese military success. Recognition of atrocity and deaths—even American ones— was of only secondary significance. Similarly, the killing of Caucasian prisoners in 1943 and 1944 was kept secret for months after Allied governments learned about them.122 Reports of kamikaze suicide missions were kept secret until April 1945, just after the death of Roosevelt, and were released then to obscure the firebombing of Japanese cities which began in November 1944, just one month after the first reports of kamikaze missions.123 The Truman administration adhered to the public relations maneuvers of its predecessor, releasing information in a calculated manner to control public morale. The U.S. government also was well aware of Japanese germ warfare activities, although it initially did not believe the reports. By no later than 1936, the U.S Army’s Signal Intelligence Service cracked the Japanese code.124 In April 1942, the Chinese government produced the Chen Report, a document chronicling Japan’s use of biological warfare in Chinese villages, and distributed it to ten international embassies in Chongqing, the wartime Chinese capital. The report distressed American intelligence officials, but the information was kept secret from the U.S. public.125 In an attempt to publicize the Japanese atrocity, Chiang’s government followed up the report with a documentary and press conference.126 A U.S. study conducted in Hawaii just two months after the release of the Chen Report confirmed both Japanese and German biological 122 Dower, War Without Mercy, 48. Dower, War Without Mercy, 52-53. 124 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 148. 125 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, 185. 126 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, 185. 123 62 warfare activities, but the U.S. government did not take the report seriously for over a year.127 It may have been as late as 1944 before the U.S. government believed these past reports. This turning point came after interrogation of Japanese prisoners captured during the island-hopping campaign, including medical personnel, who corroborated the accounts. Sheldon Harris noted that United States government officials “concluded that it was essential this intelligence be kept a closely guarded secret. . . . It would have a crippling effect on morale on the American home front. . . . Above all else, the secret American BW program could not become public knowledge.”128 For this reason, at no point during the war did the United States government publicly recognize the Chen Report or the Japanese use of human guinea pigs for biological weapons testing.129 Publicly, Roosevelt maintained a calm and Euro-focused façade. He publicly denounced German and Italian territorial grabs, such as the German acquisition of Czechoslovakia in 1939. Japanese occupations were not similarly recognized; for example, there was no public recognition of the Japanese invasion of Indochina in 1940.130 In many instances, Roosevelt’s broad condemnations of German and Italian aggression unspokenly applied to Japan as part of his public relations campaign to shift the attention of the U.S. public to the European war. In an interesting twist, Sumner Welles, then Acting Secretary of State, applied the isolationist Stimson Doctrine to Germany’s partition of Czechoslovakia. Welles reiterated the U.S. government’s “respect for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word, and for non-intervention by any nation in the domestic affairs of other nations; and . . . condemnation of a policy of 127 Harris, Factories of Death, 222. Harris, Factories of Death, 230-231. 129 Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity, 176. 130 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume. 128 63 military aggression.”131 Only after the attack on Pearl Harbor did Roosevelt directly discuss Japanese atrocities, describing the “brutal assault upon the Chinese people” during his speech on the history of relations with Japan.132 In contrast, Roosevelt condemned Japanese atrocities in private communications. In March 1939, the Japanese felt the impact of U.S. response. A memorandum to Secretary of State Cordell Hull referenced a letter to Roosevelt from a Japanese General in which Japan protested that it “deplores British and American attitude toward ‘incident’ in East Asia. [Japan] says that England and U.S. are defeating their own ends in giving moral (and more) support to Chiang Kai-shek.”133 It is unknown to what incident this note referred. Indeed, in mid-1940 the Roosevelt administration still believed that the economic and diplomatic responses had deterred Japanese aggression: “The United States has . . . been able by diplomacy or by measures—including gestures—short of war to . . . exercise . . . some restraining influence on Japan and it is capable of continuing to exercise such influence.”134 Similarly, in a message to Chiang Kai-shek through Chinese government official T.V. Soong on 6 June 1943, Roosevelt recognized Japanese use of chemical warfare, and was quoted as saying that “I desire to make it unmistakably clear that if Japan persists in this inhuman form of [biological and chemical] warfare against China or against any other of the United Nations such action will be regarded by this government as though taken against the United States and retaliation in kind and in full 131 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1939 Volume, 165-166. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1941 Volume, 548. 133 McIntyre to Hull, 3 March 1939, Letter from Lieutenant General Kumashichi Tsukuchi to Roosevelt, in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 275. 134 Unknown author, 4 July 1940, “Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and Certain Problems of U.S. Far Eastern Policy,” in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 579 (emphasis in original). 132 64 measure will be meted out.”135 Thus, it is evident that throughout the war Roosevelt privately recognized and opposed Japanese biological and chemical warfare, although his public response was significantly more limited. Even so, the Roosevelt administration worried only about American bodies and assets. In a speech delivered in October 1939, Joseph Grew complained that “the new order in East Asia has appeared to include, among other things, depriving Americans of their long established rights in China, and to this the American people are opposed.”136 Roosevelt reiterated this priority in a message to Grew on 30 November 1939, in which he called for cessation of Japanese bombings, but only for the benefit of Americans in China.137 By 1941, this mindset was unanimous among upper level U.S. officials. Hull worried that “the Chinese are fighting for their existence,” and failure to defeat the Japanese would “probably increasingly menace the interests of the United States,”138 devaluing Chinese lives in light of the more important U.S. economic interests. By mid-1941, the Roosevelt administration was becoming more willing to take aggressive action against Japan. In a public move, Roosevelt froze Japanese (and Chinese) assets in the United States on 26 July 1941.139 Roosevelt hoped that this would act as “evidence that the United States Government is determined to resist the new threat 135 Roosevelt quoted in T.V. Soong to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Washington, D.C., June 6, 1943, quoted in Harris, Factories of Death, 95. 136 Speech by Grew, 19 October 1939, “Address delivered by the American Ambassador, Joseph C. Grew, before the America-Japan Society, Tokyo, October 19, 1939,” in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 423. 137 Roosevelt to Grew, 30 November 1939, in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 455. 138 Hull to Roosevelt, 5 February 1941, in McJimsey, ed. Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 9, 34-35. 139 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 281-283. 65 to American vital interests in the Pacific.”140 Just days later, on 4 August, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles reflected the U.S. government’s fear that Japanese aggression was creating “a military overlordship of the Japanese Empire,” summarizing that “such a situation as that would inevitably be regarded as intolerable by the United States.” He warned that “whether it came tomorrow, or next month, or next year, or even later, the pursuit of such an objective by Japan would inevitably result in armed hostilities in the Pacific.”141 Later that month, Hull reiterated Welles’s sentiments.142 In a press conference on 26 August, Roosevelt revealed that the U.S. government was willing to “send a military mission to China,” ostensibly for assistance with Lend-Lease activities.143 Yet, Roosevelt publicly adhered staunchly to the U.S. stance of neutrality as late as 28 November, as expressed at a press conference: “Our one desire has been peace in the Pacific, and the taking of no steps to alter the prospects of peace, which of course has meant non-aggression. It really boils down to that.”144 Once the United States entered the war, Roosevelt was more liberal in recognizing atrocities, but limited his references to the Axis generally and framed his comments with European war crimes. Although a presidential announcement in October 1942 does not mention any aggressor nation by name or continent, it is presented in the Public Papers of the President as an announcement of “the Plan to try Nazi War Criminals.” In actuality, the plan only vaguely references “barbaric crimes being committed by the enemy against civilian populations,” and generally promises that 140 Memorandum, No date (late July 1941), in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 9, 231. 141 Memorandum by Welles, 4 August 1941, “Relations between the United States and Japan,” in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 9, 311-312. 142 Memorandum by Hull, 17 August 1941, “United States-Japanese Relations,” in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 9, 344. 143 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 343. 144 Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1940 Volume, 500. 66 “perpetrators of these crimes shall answer for them before courts of law” in the postwar period.145 In November 1943, Roosevelt, in conjunction with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, reiterated the Allied plan for dealing with war criminals. The statement opened by describing “atrocities, massacres, and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces,” and later obtusely referenced “Hitlerite Huns,” applying an originally Asian reference to the European perpetrators. It went on to describe projected treatment of German war criminals, but closed with a short, generalized qualifier: “The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.”146 The format of this statement reflected the ongoing public relations maneuvers of the Roosevelt administration to elevate the brutality of the European aggressors in order to distract the public from their anger in response to Pearl Harbor and focus the nation’s energy first on the war in Europe. During the war, the plight of the comfort women and restitution for the atrocity was not a priority. This may have been because U.S. soldiers used the brothels after liberating territory occupied by the Japanese. George Hicks noted that “some Allied troops after the war took the view that it was excusable to rape Japanese women as a reprisal for the rapes committed by Japanese soldiers.” U.S. troops often took sexual liberties with the inhabitants U.S. occupied lands. No official U.S. Army brothels were created, possibly because the American public would not have condoned their creation.147 However, some informal U.S. Army comfort stations were formed. Hicks further posited 145 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1942 Volume, 410. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1943 Volume, 498, 499. 147 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 83. 146 67 that “given access to an organized brothel, the Americans may not have thought of what they were doing in terms of rape,”148 mirroring the mentality of the Japanese Army. These factors likely contributed to the reason why in postwar trials comfort women were given short shrift; the only trials conducted regarded Dutch comfort women.149 Biological warfare research was initiated by U.S. government in response to Japanese biological warfare, and continued throughout the war, demonstrating the U.S. government’s awareness of Japanese biological weaponry. Both governments moved forward in the study of biological and chemical warfare even though the governments were limited by the 1925 Geneva Convention which forbade the use of both types of unorthodox weapons.150 In the postwar period, biological and chemical warfare was given lackluster investigation and, in the end, during the Tokyo War Crimes Trials the activities of Ishii Shirō’s weapons research and use were relegated as Class B and Class C war crimes, the lesser two categories. These atrocities accounted for only ten minutes of trial time.151 Ishii was let off with a slap on the wrist; he was not arrested and, alongside many of his colleagues, was given immunity in return for reports on his findings of the sadistic medical tests, similar to their German counterparts with reference to nuclear research.152 Sheldon Harris explained, “intelligence value, not war crimes, would be the dominant factor in all discussions concerning the Japanese BW experts.”153 Wanting the results of Ishii’s tests, the U.S. government intentionally suppressed all reference to Japanese biological and chemical atrocities during the war crimes trials. One 148 Hicks, The Comfort Women, 160. Hicks, The Comfort Women, 57. 150 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1925, 87-88. 151 Harris, Factories of Death, 249. 152 Harris, Factories of Death, 247; Williams and Wallace, Unit 731, 235. 153 Harris, Factories of Death, 259. 149 68 interoffice memorandum from July 1947 expressed the government’s position: “In view of the subject’s [Ishii] experiments and activities in Manchuria, further investigation at this point may reveal that subject is a war criminal wanted by the Chinese authorities and/or the U.S. War Crimes Investigation Agencies.” Concerned that Ishii would not give over his findings after the humiliation of a trial, it was concluded that “no information is to be released to any agency as data on subject is classified top secret.”154 Since the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, mixed and growing recognition of Japanese war crimes has flourished. As with many atrocities in both the European and Asian spheres, Iris Chang lamented that “an event that sixty years ago made front-page news in American newspapers appears to have vanished, almost without a trace.”155 This phenomenon occurred with respect to many Japanese atrocities, including mistreatment of prisoners of war which became public knowledge in early 1944, and the Rape of Manila in 1945, which also received contemporary media coverage.156 Much of this suppression came from the U.S. government itself, not wanting the immunity given to war criminals such as Ishii to become public knowledge and intentionally redirecting public attention to the Cold War.157 However, since the 1980s the U.S. public has pushed for greater Japanese accountability. Congressman Pat Williams (D-Mont) argued on 17 September 1986 that veteran POWs of the Japanese were “victims of a terrible secret, born 44 years ago deep in Manchurian Japanese POW camps. Theirs, perhaps, has been the longest and best-kept secret of World War II, long denied by Japan and long 154 Harris, Factories of Death, 288 (emphasis in original). Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 200. 156 Dower in foreword to Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, xiii. 157 Harris, Factories of Death, xv; Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 11. 155 69 concealed by the U.S. government.”158 In the 1990s, a public push for recognition of the suffering of the comfort women briefly flourished, but was only minimally fruitful: documents remained concealed by the Japanese and South Korean governments, making headway impossible.159 Finally, the “Feinstein Bill,” passed in 2000, requires all U.S. government agencies to release information regarding Japanese war crimes during the Second World War. Government agencies have yet to comply.160 158 Harris, Factories of Death, 151. Hicks, The Comfort Women, 220. 160 Harris, Factories of Death, xv. 159 70 Chapter 3 – What Was Next: Postwar Planning From Roosevelt to Truman The U.S. government’s postwar policy toward the East Asian theatre was at times exceptionally focused and at other times embedded in larger policy, particularly with regard to plans for international organization. The proposed universal international organization reflected an imagined postwar world order. The plans outlined the expectations of the United States for a permanently peaceful world, including U.S. responsibility to the world organization, disarmament, and recognition of human rights. Planning for the international organization revealed postwar projections for China, elevating the deeply divided nation to Great Power status. More specific discussion of postwar East Asia centered on territorial issues, including the occupation of Japan, placing Japanese territories under trusteeship, and returning occupied areas to their prewar countries of origin. There were few references to East Asia regarding economic, judicial, and cultural matters; the clearest picture of the State Department’s projections for East Asia in these areas was found in general statements regarding Axis or formerly enemy countries in the postwar era. In many instances, this blurring of German, Italian, and Japanese theatres was, perhaps, the most interesting facet of the postwar planning: to Roosevelt, World War II was one war with one solution and one postwar ideal. Although the United States did not enter World War II until 8 December 1941, the Roosevelt administration had already begun planning about the postwar world and its response to war crimes prior to Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt’s guidelines for the postwar territorial allocation for the world as well as his framework for the United Nations came to fruition during the postwar era. By the end of the war, the Allied governments had turned their attention toward the war crimes committed by the Axis during the war, 71 conducting a series of war crimes trials. Although the trials are remembered most vividly as the Nuremburg Trials of Nazi leaders for the Holocaust, Japanese war crimes were also punished. East Asian war crimes trials, most notably the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, were held: testimonies were given, sentences were meted out, and executions were discharged. However, most war criminals were forgiven in less than two decades, and the trials have fallen out of public memory. The attention given to the Tokyo War Crimes Trials has paled in comparison to the attention given to German war crimes and fails to do justice to the magnitude of the war crimes committed in East Asia. During the war, the U.S. government had more hope for a peaceful Japan than for Germany; in 1940, a government document of unknown origin proclaimed that “there is little we can do about Europe now. But we can still, if we but will, do a good deal about the Far East.”1 The context of Roosevelt’s hopes for Japan was almost exclusively the economic welfare of the United States and was not in response to Japanese disregard for human rights, as was much of the U.S. response to Japanese aggression. By 1943, the Roosevelt administration was less optimistic about Japan than it was three years earlier. In a message to Congress on the progress of the war on 7 September 1943, Roosevelt proclaimed that “Japan obviously is not to be trusted,” a sentiment that was to guide his government’s postwar plans for Japan.2 The U.S. State Department set out to prepare an outline for the postwar world, including Japan’s place within the global sphere. Most of the Department’s efforts focused on German reparations and the reorganization of Europe. However, preliminary 1 Unknown author, 4 July 1940, “Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and Certain Problems of U.S. Far Eastern Policy,” in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 577. 2 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1943 Volume, 396. 72 government planning documents found in the Sumner Welles Papers revealed U.S. intentions for postwar East Asia: a bolstered China through its participation in international organization, a series of trusteeships for the smaller East Asian countries, and an occupied, disarmed, disabled, and disenfranchised Japan. A fundamental thread of the increased importance of human rights ran throughout these objectives. The creation of an international organization to protect human rights predominated the State Department’s plans for the postwar world. The State Department emphasized the importance of international cooperation. In its preamble, one draft of the “United Nations Protocol for the War and Transition Period” stated that “The United Nations [are] resolved to achieve [their goals] . . . through a development of the international organizations of a universal and regional character,” emphasizing that the Allies believed that peace would prevail through international administration.3 The concept of a globally inclusive international organization was highly contested, especially in light of the failure of the League of Nations. It ultimately was determined that “the principle of automatic membership should be applied to the whole of international organization,” because “a citizen is born into his community. He has no choice. He may refuse its privileges but he cannot escape its obligations. He may refuse to vote but he cannot refuse to go to jail.”4 It was determined that former enemy powers would be included in the new organization. For this reason, the restoration of Japan, as well as of Germany, became a major goal of the United States, which now had the intention of 3 “United Nations Protocol for the War and Transition Period,” 3 June 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, FDRL, 1. Note that at the time the term “United Nations” referred to what is contemporarily meant by the “Allies,” and not the currently-recognized international organization of the same name. 4 “Preliminary Memorandum of International Organization,” 5 August 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 191, FDRL, 3. 73 rehabilitating its former enemies so it could join the open international community.5 A report by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace in February 1943 explained that “the Axis nations must be policed for a time and disarmed to prevent future wars; war criminals must be dealt with; property and civil rights of dispossessed peoples restored. But the reconstruction of the world, rather than revenge, should be the guiding consideration of the policy toward the Axis.”6 Disarmament was a major element of the postwar world as envisioned by the State Department. In the 26 March 1943 “Draft Constitution of the International Organization” it was proposed that “the Members of the International Organization undertake to keep the general level of their armaments at the lowest point consistent with internal domestic security and the effective discharge of their international obligations.”7 Disarmament was to apply to all former enemies, Allies, and neutrals alike. However, “the aggressor states must be disarmed so thoroughly as to leave no chance for a war of revenge,” a fear based on the post-World War I resurgence of Germany in the 1930s and projected onto the Japan of World War II.8 The U.S. government was sure that “smarting under defeat Japan will surely try to stage a comeback.”9 A draft article defining the police power of the international organization clarified that “the Members of the International Organization mutually agree to collaborate with the Executive Committee and the Council in the execution of all measures to ensure compliance with arms 5 Fairbank and Feuerkwerker, eds., The Cambridge History of China, 539-540. “THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE,” 17 February 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 192, FDRL, 10-11. 7 “Draft Constitution of the International Organization,” 26 March 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, FDRL, 11. 8 “Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization,” 31 July 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, FDRL, 5. 9 “Summary of Opinion and Ideas on International Postwar Problems,” 4 November 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 190, FDRL, 15. 6 74 limitation agreements and the maintenance of international peace and security,” demonstrating the order of importance of disarmament and security.10 Specific references to territorial plans for East Asia were few and far between. Those that were made remained predominantly unchanged throughout the Welles Papers, demonstrating a fairly consistent policy on the part of the United States. The Roosevelt administration’s postwar policy on European matters, on the other hand, was constantly revised, especially regarding the reorganization of Eastern Europe. Although this could be interpreted as remarkable clarity regarding the plan for Asia, in fact it demonstrates the Roosevelt administration’s failure to truly interact with and understand the needs of East Asia. Because of their more intimate understanding of Europe in general, Roosevelt and his advisors were able to exchange creative ideas for a postwar Europe in a way that they could not for Asia. The few instances of protracted discussion of an Asian territory were fundamentally different from discussions regarding Europe: discussion of Asian territories was inherently unimaginative, and usually oscillated between few oftsuggested options, and almost always retained the pre-war national borders. The future of the dependent areas was of paramount concern to the State Department: “Among the problems that will necessarily engage the attention of the United Nations after victory over the Axis, none is likely to evoke more difficulty than the treatment of dependent areas,”11 especially those “belonging to the defeated enemy nations, in particular Japan and Italy.”12 Postwar plans for countries occupied by Japan 10 “Proposed Draft Article on Police Power,” 14 April 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, FDRL, 1. 11 “Dependent Areas in the Postwar World,” 3 August 1941, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 190, FDRL, 1. 12 “Dependent Areas in the Postwar World,” 3 August 1941, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 190, FDRL, 3. 75 remained relatively unchanged: in a departure from the colonial and mandate system, under a new trusteeship system occupied countries deemed not yet ready for selfdetermination would be placed under international care. In almost every series of documents focused on the formation of the postwar world, whether the subject was territory, economics, or policy, East Asia was discussed second, if at all. The U.S. government emphasized a change in mentality toward dependent places, both in East Asia and elsewhere, and that “the day of the ‘white man’s burden,’ in the nineteenth century imperialistic sense, has gone forever.” Instead, “a new concept of international responsibility for guiding and assisting dependent communities toward self-rule and steadily higher standards of life” was to be implemented under the trusteeship system.13 Japan would be allowed to keep only its territories acquired prior to the first SinoJapanese War, 1894-1895. “Japan would thus lose Manchuria, southern Sakhalin, Korea, Formosa, the Kwantung leased territory, and the Pacific islands placed under Japanese mandate in 1919.”14 This plan signaled the intention to debilitate Japan, a country once seen as capable of leading smaller nations. China was expected to regain control of Manchuria and Taiwan. The Roosevelt administration discussed whether immediate independence or independence following a short stint under trusteeship would best benefit Korea; similar discussion surrounded the Netherlands East Indies and Thailand. The Philippine Islands were to be immediately independent. Various undeveloped regions, including Burma, Malaya, Caylon, and Portuguese Timor15 were to be put under 13 “Dependent Areas in the Postwar World,” 3 August 1941, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 190, FDRL, 7. 14 Subcommittee on Postwar Problems Minutes 20,” 1 August 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 192, FDRL, 1. 15 “An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples,” 21 October 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 193, FDRL, 7-8. Spelling of country names follows usage in document. 76 the trusteeship system in which “China, together with at least the United States and the Soviet Union, would probably cooperate actively in such arrangements for non-Chinese territories,” thus reiterating intent to bolster China as a power in the postwar world.16 Roosevelt believed that a strong China was integral to maintenance of U.S. interests in the Pacific, and was willing to put effort into assuring China’s postwar security.17 One of the few instances of lengthy, spirited discussion of the future of an Asian land concerned Southeast Asia. The State Department was undecided whether France would, or should, regain control of Indochina after the war. The comparatively late date at which plans were solidified demonstrated the relative unimportance of the Pacific theatre to the U.S. Government: a preliminary, one-page document on the future of Japanese insular possessions was produced on 22 September 1942; a more lengthy second document, written a month later, described the generally applicable trusteeship system in greater detail, but proffered only two pages on Far Eastern affairs.18 Thus, a fairly clear future was prophesied for East Asia with little change in policy save for the future of Indochina. Politically, the plan for East Asia was to be similar to that for Europe: occupation by military force. In general, it was determined that “the policing of the aggressor nations should take place under a special regime of a purely temporary character,”19 demonstrating the intention that, after reconstruction, the Axis powers could join the 16 Subcommittee on Postwar Problems Minutes 20,” 1 August 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 192, FDRL, 3. 17 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 428. 18 “Tentative Conclusions of the Security Subcommittee Concerning the Disposition of Japanese Insular Possessions,” 22 September, 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 193, FDRL; “An International Trusteeship for Non-Self-Governing Peoples,” 21 October 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 193, FDRL, 7-8. 19 “Preliminary Memorandum on International Organization,” 31 July 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, FDRL, 5. 77 international organization. One document reflected this goal: “The first requirement for the maintenance of peace and the establishment of order in the Axis countries will be effective military occupation and control by certain of the United Nations.”20 While the document in question specifically referenced European countries, the Subcommittee on International Organization discussed the Axis countries in general, demonstrating the blurring of lines among the different Axis powers that was classic of the public relations campaigns of the Roosevelt administration. The Allies hoped that occupation would engender stable governments, envisioning occupation as including “supervision over the carrying out of surrender and other requirements, aid in the re-establishment of economic life, and the creation of new governments based on the expression of popular will.”21 The importance of human rights was reiterated in the plans for the proposed international organization. The preamble for a draft of the international organization’s constitution from 26 March 1943 stated that “the United Nations . . . Hereby establish and agree to maintain the instrumentalities by which peace and human rights may be assured.”22 A later version included a proposed preamble of the “United Nations Protocol for the War and Transition Period” that stated that “the United Nations . . . agree that a permanent international organization should be established for the maintenance of peace and the advancement of human welfare.”23 Another draft of the constitution put forth that “the United Nations, Having defended by force of arms the principle of peaceful relations 20 “Postwar Program: Europe,” 7 August 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, FDRL, 2. “International Activities In Which the United States Must Participate to Re-Establish and Maintain Peace and to Promote General Welfare,” 9 August 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 190, FDRL, 2. 22 “Draft Constitution of the International Organization,” 26 March 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, FDRL, 1. 23 “United Nations Protocol for the War and Transition Period,” 3 June 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, FDRL, 1. 21 78 between states, and Having subscribed to a common program of human rights, Undertake to establish the instrumentalities by which peace and human rights may be secured.”24 General statements on postwar reconstruction including punishment of war criminals was also universal with regard to the Axis.25 Again, although the U.S. government clearly had Nazi atrocities in mind, the planning documents often spoke of human rights violations by all Axis powers combined. There were infrequent direct references to Japanese human rights violations. The first warning given to Japan regarding wartime atrocities was made on 13 January 1942 as part of “The Inter-Allied Joint Declaration of Punishment for War Crimes.” It stated “that acts of violence . . . inflicted upon the civilian populations have nothing in common with the conceptions of an act of war or a political crime as understood by civilized nations,” condemned execution of hostages, promised “punishment, through the channel of organized justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these [war] crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them, or participated in them,” and vowed to ensure that “(a) those guilty or responsible [for war crimes], whatever their nationality, are sought out, handed over to justice and judged, and (b) that the sentences pronounced are carried out.”26 In one of the clearest recognitions by the U.S. government of Japanese human rights violations and war crimes, the Legal Subcommittee qualified 7 July 1937 the beginning date for which war crimes could be punished. “The offenses listed . . . at any 24 “Provisional Outline of International Organization,” 28 October 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 189, FDRL, 1. 25 “International Activities In Which the United States Must Participate to Re-Establish and Maintain Peace and to Promote General Welfare,” 9 August 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 190, FDRL, 2. 26 Sedgwick, “Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East,” 31. 79 time since July 7, 1937, shall be punishable as war crimes.”27 The document listed as war crimes known atrocities committed by the Japanese: (1) Murder or massacre. (2) Torture of civilians. (3) Deliberate starvation of civilians. (4) Rape. (5) Abduction of women for the purpose of enforced prostitution. (6) Internment or deportation of civilians under inhuman conditions. (7) Looting or pillage. (8) Wanton devastation and destruction of property. (9) Execution of hostages. (10) Deliberate attack upon undefended places. (11) Attack upon survivors of vessels or aircraft which have been abandoned or destroyed. (12) Deliberate attacks upon hospitals or hospital ships, or other offenses against sanitary personnel or the Red Cross. (13) Refusal to give quarter. (14) Starvation or other ill-treatment of wounded or prisoners of war. (15) Other acts, which, by reason of their heinousness, their brutality, their ruthless disregard of the sanctity of human life and personality or their wanton interference with rights of property, are unrelated to reasonably conceived requirements of military necessity.28 Thus, although the immorality of Japanese aggression was often overshadowed by the enormity of the Holocaust, this small recognition by the Legal Subcommittee acknowledged the Pacific theatre and Asian atrocities. The Roosevelt administration did have good intentions; in March 1944 the United Nations created the Investigation of War Crimes Committee with a subcommittee housed in Chungking to investigate Far East and Pacific crimes.29 In July 1945, the Potsdam Declaration outlined in no uncertain terms the Allied intention to penalize Japanese war criminals; the Japanese accepted the Potsdam Declaration on 2 September 1945.30 The Yalta Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin was one of Roosevelt’s last chances to establish his policy toward Japan for the postwar period. During the Yalta Conference, the United States set out as its goals regarding Japan “to 27 “The Punishment of War Criminals: Tentative Draft Provisions,” 12 March 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 193, FDRL, 1. 28 “The Punishment of War Criminals: Tentative Draft Provisions,” 12 March 1943, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 193, FDRL, 1-2. 29 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 169. 30 Sedgwick, “Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East,” 31-32. 80 force the unconditional surrender of Japan by ‘(1) Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength [and] (2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.’”31 It was at Yalta that Stalin committed to declare war on Japan no longer than three months after the defeat of Germany. However, the discussion of East Asia during the Yalta conference focused almost exclusively on wartime issues and did not address Japanese human rights violations or postwar war crimes trials. The framework and postwar planning created by the Roosevelt administration was starkly black-and-white with reference to managing Asia postwar. The Truman administration, on the other hand, was far more nuanced. Although the Roosevelt administration had dictated that in “the immediate postwar period the task will primarily be one of reconstruction,”32 the Truman administration put significant effort into bringing Japanese war criminals to justice and, in fact, “Allied prosecutions in the East were at least as extensive as those in Europe and represented perhaps an even greater effort in international cooperation.”33 While many Allied nations were involved in the trials, including the Netherlands, Australia, the Philippines, and France,34 the nations deemed Great Powers after the war, the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, were meant to take on the brunt of the prosecution. However, the Chinese failed to do so due to internal conflict. The U.S.S.R. was simply disinterested, as it had entered the war against the Japanese only after the dropping of the U.S. atomic bombs and had not endured 31 Memorandum by van Devander, 3 April 1945, in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 14, 711. 32 “OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF POST-WAR POLICY,” 3 January 1942, SWF, Postwar Foreign Policy Files, Box 190, FDRL, 6-3. 33 Sedgwick, “Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East,” 3. 34 Sedgwick, “Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East,” 39. 81 atrocities at the hands of the Japanese. The Philippines was the single largest contributor to war crimes trials in the Pacific war. The Philippines was a U.S. protectorate, and its efforts factored into statistics for the United States: “US war crimes operations in the Far East tried 546 cases and 1,578 accused between 1945 and 1949.”35 Organized similarly to European war crimes trials, East Asian war crimes trials were conducted between October 1945 and April 1951 as part of an international trial known as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, often called the Tokyo Trials, as well as by individual governments regarding lesser war crimes charges perpetrated on the respective nation’s soil.36 War crimes were organized into one of three classes for trial purposes: Class A, for military and political leaders who engaged in “aggressive war,” Class B, for conventional war crimes, and Class C, for “crimes against humanity.”37 “Charges included murder, enslavement or ill-treatment of prisoners-of-war or local civilians; massacre; torture; and unlawful arrest, trial or execution.”38 One problematic element in assessing war crimes is that, as John Dower observed, “the meaning of ‘atrocity’ had itself become ambiguous in an age of wholesale slaughter.”39 The categories originally were delineated for use in the European war crimes trials, but were used much more extensively in the East Asian trials. The first war crimes trials of Japanese criminals were conducted by the United States and began on 29 October 1945.40 The first ever Class A, high-level officer to be tried for war crimes of command responsibility was Yamashita Yomoyuki, tried by the United States in December 1945. 35 Sedgwick, “Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East,” 35. Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 2. 37 Sandra Wilson, “After the Trials: Class B and C Japanese War Criminals and the Post-War World,” Japanese Studies 31, no. 2 (September 2011): 142. 38 Wilson, “After the Trials,” 142. 39 Dower, War Without Mercy, 37. 40 Sedgwick, “Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East,” 34. 36 82 Yomoyuki was sentenced to death on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor. This high-profile, quick trial was intended to show the public that the United States was serious about war crimes trials; however, as a media and public hotspot with ice cream vendors outside, the trial was more of a public relations affair than a war crimes trial.41 Criticisms of the Allied war crime trials in East Asia abound. The trials all but ignored the biological warfare and human testing by the Japanese army under Ishii Shirō in an exchange of immunity for information.42 The comfort women system was completely invisible during the postwar war crimes trials. Emperor Hirohito was given immunity at the request of General Douglas MacArthur.43 The kempeitai, the special police force responsible for the worst tortures of the war were often given exceptions during sentencing.44 Geoffrey Gunn noted that although much of the Japanese war crimes were ethnically, nationally, or racially driven, “prosecution for war crimes in the Pacific region was connected only obliquely with what came, after 1948, to be classified as crimes of genocide of a specific people. Neither, it appears, did war crime investigators go out of their way to profile crimes of this nature.”45 There is significant evidence that the United States suppressed documents related to Japanese war crimes during and after the war and returned some documents to the Japanese after the war to keep their contents hidden, especially regarding biological and chemical warfare.46 In one instance, the chemical files section of General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters were said to have been searched for evidence relating to 41 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 364-365. Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 372-373. 43 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 176. 44 Sedgwick, “Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East,” 43. 45 Geoffrey C. Gunn, “Remembering the Southeast Asian Chinese Massacres of 1941-45,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 37, no. 3 (August 2007): 281. 46 Richard Byrne, “Release of Archives Helps Fill Gap in Files on Wartime Atrocities” Chronicle of Higher Education, 53, no. 20 (January 2007): http://chronicle.com/article/Release-of-Archives-Helps-Fill/31577/. 42 83 Japanese biological or chemical warfare but the searchers were said to have come up empty handed. That may have been true; however, the chemical section is not where the files on Japanese biological and chemical warfare were stored. MacArthur’s headquarters intentionally misled the public.47 Furthermore, POWs were threatened with court martial if they discussed the medical and biological warfare testing they underwent.48 Any one of these elements is a glaring omission; put together, they demonstrate major obstructions in the Allied war crimes trials of the Japanese Army and leaders following World War II. Scholars such as Gavan Daws are critical of the trials’ attention to the suffering of POWs, yet statistics show that “Sixteen percent of the total number of cases tried, involving 17% of defendants, were related to prisoner-of-war camps. These cases produced 27% of the guilty verdicts and 11% of the death sentences.”49 Scholars who focus on specific war crimes bemoan that the Tokyo War Crimes Trials did not afford their area of study enough attention. Statistics demonstrate that, in some cases, an atrocity was covered at length, as is the case with POWs. It is then up to interpretation as to what would have constituted “enough” attention on any one subject. The Truman administration was overwhelmed by the extensiveness of the Japanese atrocities. Dawes noted that “as for specific crimes in the B and C categories, the Allies developed a list of more than 300,000, and they stopped only because they had to stop somewhere.”50 A total of 5,700 war criminals were tried; 2,944 were convicted, and of these 984 were sentenced to death and 475 were sentenced to life in prison.51 Although the amount of trials may seem significant, U.S. actions against war crimes in 47 Harris, Factories of Death, 320. Harris, Factories of Death, 320-321. 49 Wilson, “After the Trials,” 142. 50 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 365-366. 51 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 2. 48 84 East Asia were derailed by the quick shift of attention to the Cold War. Sheldon Harris explained: the Cold War was raging in 1948, and few concerned themselves with Japanese war criminals evading justice. Instead, they worried over Soviet expansionism, the Berlin blockade, runaway inflation in the United States, and, possibly, the beginning of the American civil rights revolution. No one in 1948 was prepared to raise the issue of ethics, or morality, or traditional Western or Judeo-Christian human values in confronting those responsible for the Japanese BW negotiations.52 Immediately following the end of the Second World War, the alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States began to wane, and the United States became increasingly worried about a Communist victory in China. Because of this, the U.S. postwar goal for Japan shifted dramatically from occupation to suppression, retribution and disarmament to rebuilding and reinvigoration, especially in the economic sector. The intention was to establish Japan as a major capitalist force in East Asia to rival the Communist Soviet Union and Communist forces in China, under a policy known as Reverse Course.53 Japan became a major element in the U.S. Cold War policy, in a 180 degree shift from Roosevelt’s wartime assertion that Japan must be minimized in the postwar period. Many Japanese war criminals were let go without trial due to this shift in focus, and many of the criminals were accepted back into Japanese high society.54 After the war crimes trials, the significance of the atrocities and those who committed them faded away. Within the United States, “public interest in European war crimes has not flagged since the end of World War II. But the war crimes committed by Japan . . . have attracted much less attention in the six decades since the war's 52 Harris, Factories of Death, 305. Gunn, “Remembering the Southeast Asian Chinese Massacres of 1941-45,” 289. 54 Sedgwick, “Western Reaction to Allied War Crimes Operations in the Far East,” 39 53 85 conclusion.”55 Of all of the Classes A, B, and C criminals, including those sentenced to life, not one served more than thirteen years of time. By December 1958, all Japanese war criminals were released from custody and re-absorbed into Japanese society:56 beginning just after the war until 1983, all but one leader of the Japanese National Institute of Health had been involved in Ishii’s biological warfare factories.57 The seven Class A Japanese war criminals who were executed now have a monument to their martyrdom;58 the gravity of their actions has been internationally undermined. Internationally, there has been some effort to bring attention to Japanese wartime atrocities. In 1962, the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce began a campaign for restitution from Japan for their war crimes against the Chinese during World War II. After years of argument, Japan acquiesced to the “blood debt” in 1966, offering $25 million in grants and as much again in “quasi-reparations.”59 As recently as the 1990s, women who had been forced into the comfort system lobbied for reparations, backed by the Chinese government; their actions were in vain.60 An exhibit in Los Angeles called The Forgotten Holocaust, chronicling the Japanese atrocities against the Chinese, was created in memoriam of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II.61 As the war crimes have come to greater public attention in recent years, Carol Gluck commented that “we knew less about Asia, less about the Pacific. All the way through we knew less--from the beginning of the war to the end. We didn't care then. We do now.”62 55 Byrne, “Release of Archives Helps Fill Gap in Files on Wartime Atrocities.” Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 373. 57 Harris, Factories of Death, 338. 58 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 375. 59 Gunn, “Remembering the Southeast Asian Chinese Massacres of 1941-45,” 284. 60 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 388-389. 61 Jon Wiener, “Chinese Americans Remember World War II,” Radical History Review no. 67 (December 1, 1997): 123 62 Byrne, “Release of Archives Helps Fill Gap in Files on Wartime Atrocities.” 56 86 Chapter 4 – The Blind Eye: Chinese Atrocities The East Asian war crime that has received the most attention was the Japanese massacre of Nanking in 1937, followed by other Japanese human rights violations. However, Chinese atrocities easily rivaled the death tolls and disregard for human life of the Japanese. Notably, the vast majority of these atrocities were perpetrated by Chinese against other Chinese. While some of these atrocities were part of the civil war in China that was waged simultaneously with the war against Japan, some, such as the 1938 Yellow River flood, were part of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, as the Second World War was known in China. As such, Chinese human rights violations were never seen as “war crimes,” which inherently require perpetration against an enemy people. Chinese atrocities primarily fell into one of three categories: government mistreatment of Chinese soldiers and military, government mistreatment of Chinese civilians, and scorched-earth methods. It is necessary to understand some Chinese history. Until 1911, China was ruled by a centuries-old dynastic system.1 The last dynasty, the Qing, was overthrown in the 1911 Chinese Revolution by Sun Yatsen, who proclaimed the new Nationalist Republic of China.2 However, Sun and his followers were rivaled both by warlords who maintained their pre-revolution control over regions of China and by the Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921 and led by Mao Zedong.3 Chiang Kai-shek, China’s wartime leader during World War II, came to power in 1928.4 Although Chiang was a devout follower of Sun Yatsen, his appreciation of the tenets of Sun’s guiding policy led 1 Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, ed, Twentieth Century China: New Approaches (London: Routledge, 2003), 2. Wasserstrom, ed, Twentieth Century China, 2. 3 Wasserstrom, ed, Twentieth Century China, 2. 4 Wasserstrom, ed, Twentieth Century China, 2. 2 87 him to rule in a more authoritarian manner. Jeffrey Wasserstrom noted that there were “clearly . . . dramatic shifts in meaning as the century ended . . . [regarding] renquan (human rights) and minzhu (democracy).”5 Believing his regime to be representative of democracy, Chiang vehemently opposed the Chinese Communists and spent the decade after his assumption of power opposing the Communists. Although from 1931 on the Japanese were also a major threat to Chiang’s China, Chiang remained significantly more focused on the Communist threat. R. Keith Schoppa explained that Chiang “compared [the Japanese] to a skin disease, whereas the Communists were a disease of the heart. Obviously, a more serious heart problem needed to be treated first.”6 Although the Communists and Nationalists were able to combine forces against the common Japanese enemy, as with the Second United Front beginning in 1937, this union quickly dissolved into civil war once again. Both during the Second World War and within scholarship afterwards, war crimes and atrocities perpetrated by the Allies have received minimal scrutiny. Consistent with Roosevelt’s priorities, contemporary response to and analysis of human rights violations perpetrated by the Allies in East Asia is practically nonexistent. Although the Allies engaged in violations of human rights that were in many cases remarkably similar to those of the Axis that were condemned in the postwar period, the Allies felt justified in their actions and have never been fully admonished for their deeds. The choices of the Nationalist Chinese government reflected the differing priorities of the Chinese from the Roosevelt administration. Even though a partnership between the Nationalists and Communists, known as the Second United Front, was 5 6 Wasserstrom, ed, Twentieth Century China, 12 (emphasis in original). Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 247-248. 88 declared in 1937 and lasted until 1941, Chiang followed a Communist First strategy, aiming to stop the growing Chinese Communist Party over pushing the Japanese invaders out of Manchuria and Northern China. The Communists, however, prioritized the Japanese menace over the civil war with the Nationalists. This decision by the official Chinese government allowed the Sino-Japanese war to continue significantly longer than had the entirety of the Nationalist army, in coordination with the Communist army, focused on defeating Japan. The protracted warfare led as many as 20 million Chinese dead, second only in death toll during World War II to the USSR.7 Quality of life for Chinese soldiers was below sub-par. While some soldiers volunteered or were drafted, the vast majority of soldiers were unconventionally forced into the military. Schoppa explained that “the rich were not drafted but the poor were taken. . . . If local draftees were not enough to fill the quota, passersby were snatched up.”8 This type of conscription became increasingly frequent, especially after 1941.9 Recruits were then treated with methods resonant of Japanese POW treatment. They were tied together, forced to march hundreds of miles, disrobed at night to prohibit desertion, given very little food, and often forced to scavenge water from roadside puddles. Although recruits often became ill from maltreatment, “‘medical treatment was unavailable . . . because the recruits were not regarded as part of the army until they had joined their assigned units.’ . . . Over a million men died on their way to their units,” Schoppa noted, quoting Theodore White, a World War II journalist and historian10 7 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 261. Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 271. 9 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 319. 10 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 271; Fairbank and Feuerkwerker, eds., The Cambridge History of China, 572-573. 8 89 Once the men got to their units, life was not significantly better. Troops often compared their conditions to those of the American advisors alongside them. Schoppa recounted that “Chinese troops stole dogs and ate them because they were starving and because the fat pets the Americans kept ate more meat in a week than a Chinese soldier saw in a month.”11 One report prepared by U.S. army officials documented Chinese disregard for human rights, comparing Chinese army hospitals to Nazi death camps.12 General Joseph Stilwell, the U.S. advisor sent to assist Chiang, also knew of the bad treatment of the Chinese army, describing a “‘God awful’ tale of corruption and inefficiency which ‘no one dares to tell Peanut,’” Stilwell’s snide nickname for Chiang.13 Furthermore, the Chinese government’s decision to wage war against the Communists rather than fighting the invading Japanese placed Chinese soldiers in harm’s way. Schoppa noted that the Nationalist army’s fight against Japan “amounted in reality to nonresistance,” citing that “military commanders in some cases ordered men about to go into battle to lay down their arms and simply surrender.”14 China’s treatment of its own troops is all but invisible in current scholarly writing. It is said that those who are abused become the abuser. In the case of the Chinese military, this was particularly true. The Chinese military has a centuries-long history of mistreatment of Chinese civilians: it is known for seizing shelter and food from unsuspecting noncombatants and leaving villages in worse condition than when it first arrived. These practices prevailed throughout the Second World War. The Chinese army 11 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 271. Schaller, The United States and China, 76. 13 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 386. 14 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 247. 12 90 was more interested in stealing from the Chinese public than it was in defending them.15 Indeed, the Chinese public felt so betrayed by their army that when the Chinese army began to retreat from the Japanese’s Operation Ugô in January 1944, the Chinese public began to attack their own army rather than the Japanese.16 The Chinese government similarly abused its civilians. The Nationalist party frequently carried out public purges of dissenters, especially those suspected of allying with the Communists.17 Chiang’s military choices often flagrantly disregarded public opinion and safety. In these instances, Chinese atrocities reflected Chiang’s inherent lack of caring for the Chinese populace rather than war necessity: Chiang did not respond to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria diplomatically, choosing to maintain relations with Japan, and responded only weakly militarily.18 As explained by Schoppa, “the years from 1933 to 1937 saw the patterns repeated again and again: Japanese aggression, Chiang’s appeasement, mass Chinese reaction, and Chiang’s brutal suppression of the demonstrating population.”19 Beginning in December 1935, students began to rally in an anti-Japanese movement. Chiang’s response to the students, whose views aligned more closely with the United States and Chinese Communists than the Nationalist government, included closing campuses, arresting students, and militarily invading schools.20 One group, the National Salvation Association, attracted more attention from Chiang than they may have anticipated. Chiang had seven of the group’s leaders arrested in November 1936, eliciting a backlash of public support for the students. This incident, Schoppa 15 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 109. Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 322-323. 17 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 57. 18 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 247. 19 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 250. 20 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 254. 16 91 stated, “was a harbinger of what would become known late in the century as ‘human rights’ problems. Even Western intellectuals . . . cabled Chiang’s government asking for the [student] leaders’ release” to no avail.21 As with so many of Chiang’s choices, the arrests backfired, increasing anti-Japanese sentiment among the masses. Chiang also engaged in scorched-earth tactics. Schoppa explained that “the destruction of industrial plants, communication and transportation facilities, agricultural crops, and property of all sorts in order to deprive the enemy of their use . . . while undertaken as acts of resistance against the enemy, after war . . . come to be seen for what they really are—self-inflicted wounds.”22 In December 1937, Chiang ordered the destruction of a recently completed bridge across the Qiantung River that was both a major advance in engineering for China as well as a leap forward for China’s infrastructure.23 Chiang also ordered the burning of cities; he ordered—or at the very least implied—that the wartime capital, Wuhan, should be razed in October 1938, as well as the city Changsha a month later.24 Finally, the “largest single disaster of the War” took place on 8 June 1938, with the intentional flooding of the Yellow River.25 Japanese troops had pushed south into China proper and were quickly approaching Wuhan, where Chiang’s military leadership had fled after the 1937 Nanking Massacre. Chiang was convinced that only massive retaliation would halt the Japanese, and decided to “use water instead of soldiers,” 21 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 254-255. Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness, 239. 23 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 283. 24 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 168; Fairbank and Feuerkwerker, eds., The Cambridge History of China, 556. 25 Diana Lary, “Drowned Earth: The Strategic Breaching of the Yellow River Dyke, 1938” War In History, no. 2 (2001): 207. 22 92 theoretically saving Chinese lives.26 In a historically ironic use of China’s most powerful river,27 Chiang ordered Chinese military troops to destroy the dikes that held back the oftnaturally-flooding Yellow River. The soldiers were forced to do the work with hand tools, as explosives had failed to do the job. Chinese civilians were not given notice of the flood, for fear that the news would leak to the incoming Japanese troops. Rana Mitter postulated that “if the Japanese had committed such an act, it would have been remembered as the prime atrocity of the war, dwarfing even the Nanjing Massacre or the Chongqing air raids in terms of the number of people who suffered.”28 Figures range from 300,000 to 900,000 dead, 2,000 to 5,000 villages destroyed, three provinces flooded, and two to five million refugees created from the flood.29 In contrast, the combined fatalities of the two atomic bombs on Japan totaled around 100,000; the total killed in the Nanking Massacre is reported liberally as around 300,000.30 The impact of the Yellow River Flood did not end with these immediate casualties. Mitter explained that the “toll from Yellow River floods is not so much from quick drowning as from gradual disease and starvation. The river’s filth settles ankledeep on the fields, mothering germs, smothering crops,” affecting the region for nine years after the flood.31 The flooding was also the principle factor in the Henan Famine of 26 Kathryn Jean Edgerton-Tarpley, “From ‘Nourish the People’ to ‘Sacrifice for the Nation’: Changing Responses to Disaster in Late Imperial and Modern China” The Journal of Asian Studies 73, no. 02 (May 2014): 447. 27 The Yellow River, also known as “China’s Sorrow,” flooded often over the centuries. Prior to the twentieth century, Yellow River floods were seen as omens prefacing the need for governmental change and signaling an end to the Mandate of Heaven for the current regime. Chiang, on the other hand, chose to harness the power of the river for the current government, in an attempt to solidify the Nationalist regime rather than undermine it. Lary, “Drowned Earth,” 192. 28 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 163. 29 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 263; Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 162-163; Edgerton-Tarpley, “From ‘Nourish the People’ to ‘Sacrifice for the Nation,’” 448. 30 Chang, The Rape of Nanking, 6. 31 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 162. 93 1942-1943 that claimed three million lives.32 During the famine, Chiang continued to increase taxes to support the war and required that many taxes be paid in grain, dramatically worsening the famine; forced to relinquish the minimal grain they produced in taxes to the government, peasants subsisted on elm bark and dried leaves.33 Chiang’s choice to require grain as tax payment demonstrates his failure to understand the needs of the Chinese citizenry. Chiang would have known what the aftermath of the flood would bring; a natural flood of the Yellow River in 1887 had left a million Chinese dead.34 Recognizing the repugnance of his actions, Chiang immediately blamed Japanese aerial bombing for the breaking of the dikes, and at no point during the war did the Chinese government take responsibility for the flooding.35 Roosevelt did not publicly respond to the massive loss of Asian life, illustrating the U.S. lack of concern for Chinese lives and actions of the Chinese government. Since Roosevelt was operating under Chiang’s report that the Japanese were at fault for the flood, this failure to respond also illustrated Roosevelt’s blind eye toward supposed Japanese war atrocities. Perhaps this was due to Roosevelt’s belief that the flood had not caused much damage: in November 1938, a telegram from the American Consul General in Hong Kong noted that the “refugee problem is stated not yet to have approached serious proportions.”36 In an ironic parallel, Roosevelt gave a speech in Louisville, Kentucky on the same day regarding a “great flood” Louisville had experienced the year before. The First Secretary of the Embassy in China, Laurence Salisbury, informed 32 Edgerton-Tarpley, “From ‘Nourish the People’ to ‘Sacrifice for the Nation,’” 448. Schaller, The United States and China, 73. 34 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 159. 35 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 162. 36 Paraphrase of telegram from American Consul General at Hong Kong (Addison Southard). November 25, 1938, in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 209. 33 94 Secretary of State Cordell Hull that “the [unnamed] Japanese spokesman admits that the Yellow River flood . . . has completely checked the Japanese advance on Chingchow, Honan.”37 Salisbury’s memorandum on the subject, dated 15 June 1938, eight days after the flood, is just a paragraph long. It does not speculate on responsibility for the flood. Salisbury, unlike Chiang, did not seem to believe that the momentary interruption of the Japanese military would halt Japanese advances in China, positing multiple alternative courses for Japanese attacks. Salisbury was correct: just five months later Chiang ordered Wuhan burned before the impending influx of Japanese soldiers reached the city.38 Historians have attempted to understand Chiang’s choice to intentionally kill hundreds of thousands of Chinese. Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley posits that “Chiang’s willingness to bring about a major flood in order to slow the Japanese advance may have derived in part from his conflation of the people’s livelihood and national defense.“39 She draws upon Chiang’s personal writings, in which he noted that “since this livelihood must also be protected, plans for livelihood become plans for the national defense. The people’s livelihood and national defense are thus inseparable.”40 Indeed, a Nationalist slogan of the time was “river defense is national defense; controlling the river is protecting the nation.”41 In this instance, Chiang’s priorities aligned, in a backhanded way, with the priorities of the U.S. government: for both leaders, national security was paramount. It was the manner in which the two leaders sought to secure their nations that differed. Further obscuring the reputation of the Chinese government as a perpetrator of 37 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1938: Volume III, 197. Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 168. 39 Edgerton-Tarpley, “From ‘Nourish the People’ to ‘Sacrifice for the Nation,’” 457. 40 Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory, with Notes and Commentary by Philip Jaffe (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947) in Edgerton-Tarpley, “From ‘Nourish the People’ to ‘Sacrifice for the Nation,’” 458. 41 Micah S. Muscolino, The Ecology of War in China: Henan Province, the Yellow River, and Beyond, 1938-1950 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 36. 38 95 wartime atrocities, Chiang’s administration collaborated in 1937 and 1938 with the International Red Cross for the creation of government-run refugee shelters that reached sixty percent of the refugee population.42 One wonders: did the Chinese government do everything in its power to support its refugee population? Perhaps. Yet, since it was the government that initially created the refugee problem, one also has to question to what extent its response to the aftermath of the atrocity is sufficient apology. The relationship of the Roosevelt administration to the Chinese government during World War II was manipulative and complex. Roosevelt desperately wanted to use China to further U.S. aims in Asia, both militarily against Japan and economically. “Roosevelt thought it best to prod Chiang along the paths best suited to American needs,” noted Robert Dallek.43 However, Roosevelt intended also to bolster Chiang’s regime to cultivate China as the next Great Power in Asia, hoping that Nationalism would represent the Third Way in Asia, countering the Fascism in Japan and Communism in the Soviet Union.44 Furthermore, Roosevelt felt that China should be the main defense against Japanese aggression for two somewhat contradictory reasons: Roosevelt hoped that China taking the lead would increase its credibility as a global power. Yet, Roosevelt’s unwillingness to send U.S. ground troops also shaped this decision. Instead, Roosevelt was willing to use the Chinese army, which The New York Times described as having “inexhaustible manpower,” demonstrating the belief of the U.S. public and government that Chinese forces were limitless.45 Therefore, Roosevelt walked a fine line between 42 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 159. Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 485. 44 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 389. 45 Schaller, The United States and China, 67. 43 96 supporting Chiang’s choices unconditionally, as he would for another Great Power, and exercising control over Chinese affairs. While Roosevelt’s policy included supporting China’s war against Japan, not the Chinese Communists, his primary priority was to keep the United States out of war as long as possible. As such, the Roosevelt administration was unwilling to commit U.S. ground troops to the Chinese theatre, instead hoping to bolster the Chinese’s ability to defend their own country with the help of U.S. advice and air support.46 General Joseph Stilwell was chosen to advise Chiang. However, Chiang consistently undermined Stilwell’s orders, both because of personal animosity between them and the fundamental disconnect in priorities between the two countries.47 It was not until June 1944, after DDay solidly turned the tide on the Western European front that Roosevelt attempted to compel Chiang to focus his efforts on the Japanese.48 Frustrated by Chiang’s stubbornness, in September 1944 Roosevelt authorized Stilwell to take “unrestricted command of all [Chinese] forces.” Indeed, Rana Mitter recognized that Roosevelt intended for “China . . . to be maintained in the war at minimum cost, and Chiang was repeatedly forced to deploy his troops in ways that served Allied geostrategic interests but undermined China’s own aims.”49 Chiang immediately requested that Stilwell be removed from his post.50 Roosevelt acquiesced and replaced Stilwell, illustrating the lengths to which Roosevelt was willing to go to maintain the Chinese alliance. In many instances, the United States government unconditionally supported its East Asian ally’s choices, including atrocities. Because China was vital to Roosevelt’s 46 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 252. Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 277. 48 Schaller, The United States and China, 82. 49 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 13. 50 Mitter, Forgotten Ally, 343. 47 97 understanding of the East Asian war, Roosevelt was unwilling to criticize his ally. China was Roosevelt’s third priority, after the war in Europe and Pacific islands, respectively, and so Roosevelt chose to unquestioningly trust Chiang’s military leadership.51 He made this decision in spite of contradictory reports regarding Chiang’s intentions. Michael Schaller cites two instances, one in which “General John Magruder . . . warned his superiors that Chiang intended to hoard whatever aid America gave him, ‘largely with the idea of postwar military action’” against the Communists,52 and the contradictory statement by Lauchlin Currie, in which Currie expressed support for no-strings-attached aid, stating that “it appears to me to be profoundly in our national interest to give full support to the Generalissimo both military and diplomatic. I do not think we need to lay down any conditions nor tie any strings to this support.”53 Roosevelt would have preferred Chiang to promise that aid would be used specifically toward the war with Japan; Chiang refused, and often increased anti-Communist activity (and not antiJapanese activity) just after receiving a loan from the United States.54 This use of funds confounded Roosevelt who was unable to understand Chiang’s priorities. Roosevelt rhetorically asked Morgenthau “where is the Chinese Army and why aren’t they fighting because the Japanese seem to be able to push them in any direction they want to.”55 This disconnect led to a vicious cycle explained by Warren Cohen: While Stilwell . . . complained about the unwillingness of Chiang’s forces to engage the Japanese, Chiang complained about the minimal amounts of aid he was receiving from the United States. While the Americans refused to contribute more aid until the Chinese stepped up their war effort, the Chinese refused to step 51 Schaller, The United States and China, 69. Schaller, The United States and China, 71. 53 Quoted in Schaller, The United States and China, 71. 54 Schaller, The United States and China, 58. 55 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 491. 52 98 up their war effort until they received more aid. At no time during the war was the circle broken.56 Even so, aid to China continued to flow: a purchase credit of $25 million in February 1939, followed by a slightly smaller credit in April 1940, and a loan of $100 million in October 1940 in response to Japan’s joining the Tripartite Pact in September and recognition of the puppet government it had created in Nanking.57 Chiang used the loan to launch a major offensive against the Communists.58 Lend-lease aid became available in mid-1941, albeit at an incredibly small rate: Schoppa noted that, in true Europe-first fashion, “of the total lend-lease aid given by the United States, China received a paltry 1.5 percent in 1941 and 1942, 0.5 percent in 1943 ad 1944, and only 4 percent in 1945”;59 the increase in 1945 was only connected to the end of the war in Europe on 8 May. With hindsight, it is easy to rebuke Chiang for his naïve retaliation against the Communists while Japan attacked and threatened a “new order in East Asia.”60 However, this criticism would be fundamentally flawed, fueled by the fiction of the importance of a Western-oriented world. Current scholarship, like the Roosevelt administration, opines that the “best” course of action would have been for Chiang to follow the lead of the United States, allowing U.S. advisors such as General Joseph Stilwell to make the best decisions for China—decisions which were, of course, in the interests of the United States. The Roosevelt administration, unable to shift its conception of Chinese goals and purpose, kept Chiang on a leash, albeit a long one. Chiang used the support of the United States to further his own goals of fighting the Chinese Communists and, to a lesser 56 Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, 5th ed (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 142. 57 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 270. 58 Schaller, The United States and China, 58. 59 Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past, 277. 60 Grew to Hull. 29 November, 1938, in McJimsey, Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency: Volume 7, 212. 99 extent, the Japanese. In pursuit of both of these aims, Chiang ordered the persecution of the Chinese citizenry, showing apathy toward deaths of Chinese citizenry. This apathy is disconcertingly similar to that of the Roosevelt administration toward deaths of the Chinese military. Single-minded in its attempts to achieve its own goals, the Roosevelt administration turned a blind eye and did at no point during the war respond to, denounce, or recognize Chinese atrocities. 100 Chapter 5 – The Justification: U.S. War Crimes As in the aftermath of all conflicts, the victor writes the history. In the case of the Second World War, the United States dominated the postwar world. Because of this, the human rights violations perpetrated by the Allies were suppressed, in particular those of the United States. Some measures, such as bombing of cities, that were seen as criminal at the start of the war by the end of the war were commonplace and accepted as legitimate wartime tactics.1 The actions of the Allies were framed in terms of necessary actions rather than atrocity; it was years before scholars shifted their analysis from depicting U.S. actions as imperative mishaps to amoral crimes. Violence and atrocity were explained as not only acceptable, but necessary under the Just War theory: Insisting that the war’s mission was “rescue and liberation” rather than an attempt to secure the U.S.’s geopolitical hegemony across the Pacific, this memory of the “good war” sustains an American myth and enunciates violence and recovery simultaneously, allowing the nation to anticipate and explain that the enemy can be freed and reformed owing to U.S. military violence.2 It has taken decades for the world to recognize the need for redress of U.S. war crimes in East Asia during World War II. In many cases, this redress has yet to occur. Since World War II, U.S. atrocities in the Pacific theatre have come under fire, most often for human rights violations perpetrated by lower military personnel or the choice by Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman, to drop two atomic bombs on Japan in an effort to end the war. This thesis also includes the Roosevelt administration’s internment of Japanese-Americans living on the U.S. west coast as an American atrocity. Although this breach of human rights did not take place on Asian soil or water, it was a direct response to the war in East Asia and affected both Asians in America and 1 2 Rees, Horror in the East, 150. Yoneyama, “On the Unredressability of U.S. War Crimes,” 140-141 (emphasis in original). 101 Americans of Asian descent. As such, this thesis views Japanese-American internment in the United States as an atrocity directly related to the East Asian war and will analyze it alongside atrocities committed in East Asia. Because the U.S. government has remained in support of the vast majority of wartime actions taken by the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, this chapter will employ a slightly different approach from previous chapters: in addition to looking at the response of the U.S. government to an atrocity, it will analyze the response of the U.S. public and international community. Anti-Asian racism was rampant in the United States even before Pearl Harbor. The surprise attack on the U.S. naval base in Hawaii “and the sweeping victories of the Emperor’s troops early in the war, together with a long tradition of racial prejudice towards Asians in general, had produced a virulent hatred and fear of the Japanese that ran through all levels of American society,” explained Peter Schrijvers.3 This racism was visible on the home front, seen in advertisements, articles, movies, songs, and children’s cartoons depicting Japanese as subhuman animals in need of eradication or, at the very least, domestication.4 Government-produced propaganda perpetuated this racism. One propaganda video, Know Your Enemy—Japan, was described by John Dower as “a potpourri of most of the English-speaking world’s dominant clichés about the Japanese enemy, excluding the crudest, most vulgar, and most blatantly racist.”5 This racism was reflected in U.S. troop activities in East Asia. Robert Sherrod, a correspondent stationed in the Pacific, stated that “during the war we learned . . . that 3 Peter Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan: American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific During World War II (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 219. 4 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 219. 5 Dower, War Without Mercy, 20. 102 killing them was easier than teaching them,”6 and atrocities committed by U.S. troops in combat with Japanese troops escalated, driven by the “sheer . . . otherness” of the enemy.7 Atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. Army were born of Japanese atrocities; thirteen percent of troops claimed to have witnessed Japanese human rights violations, while 45 percent knew of them, and soldiers argued that “you had to beat them at their own tricks.”8 In response to the Japanese atrocities, U.S. troops committed their own: one soldier recollected that “I found that any atrocity the Japanese commit can be matched by Americans,” and later “there is but one law here, KILL, KILL, KILL!”9 Recognizing the inequity in response to the atrocities, Charles Lindbergh wrote in his diary: “A Japanese soldier who cuts off an American soldier’s head is an Oriental barbarian, ‘lower than a rat,’ . . . an American soldier who slits a Japanese throat ‘did it only because he knew the Japs had done it to his buddies.’”10 There is significant evidence of U.S. atrocities during the island-hopping campaign against the Japanese Army. Many accounts come in the form of letters home from soldiers. The letters reflect a truly bloodthirsty mindset. One soldier wrote to his mother: Nothing can describe the hate we feel for the Nips [Japanese]—the destruction, the torture, burning & death of countless civilians, the savage fight without purpose—to us they are dogs and rats—we love to kill them—to me and all of us 6 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 222. Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 216. 8 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 221. 9 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 208. 10 Dower, War Without Mercy, 70. This racism was not exclusive to the U.S. conception of Japan; similar stereotypes were used when describing other Asian nationalities, including China. This demonstrates a fundamental difference in approaches to the European and Asian wars: the European war was against one specific corrupt leadership of one country, whereas the Asian war was against a nationality that was characterized by its race which was more broadly understood to apply to over a billion people. Indeed, Roosevelt is quoted as demonstrating the importance of Allied victory in Asia because he did not want to face “1,100,000,000 potential enemies,” meaning all Asians. Dower, War Without Mercy, 7. 7 103 killing Nips is the greatest sport known—it causes no sensation of killing a human being but we really get a kick out of hearing the bastards scream.11 This expression exemplified the race-driven, dehumanizing hatred of the Japanese that motivated soldiers in the Pacific to massacre Japanese soldiers as well as civilians. One poll especially demonstrated this racism: While thirty-eight to forty-eight percent of soldiers “would really like to kill a Japanese soldier,” less than ten percent felt the same way about the Nazis. The inclination of U.S. soldiers to commit war crimes was not only a reaction to the World War, but it was also a product of the racialized understanding of the Japanese as subhuman and inferior. Civilians were targeted as well. American soldiers did not distinguish between soldiers and native civilians, and American soldiers razed entire villages.12 To avoid Allied bombing, civilians, as well as soldiers, often moved around at night, prompting U.S. troops to imprecisely shoot at noises in the night. Mirroring Nazi and Japanese tactics, the U.S. military had extreme disregard for the enemy dead. Massive numbers of bodies made burial “more a question of waste disposal” than a funerary practice: Schrijvers noted that “before long, the hurried bulldozing of shallow mass graves for slain Japanese was a routine operation.”13 This was not the worst treatment of enemy dead. In some cases, corpses were “rebutchered,” or shot repeatedly, looted, urinated upon, and mutilated. Enemy dead’s teeth were made into bracelets; bone was carved into rings; ears were removed as proof of death.14 Women were raped; one Okinawan historian estimates that during the Battle of Okinawa more than 10,000 women were 11 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 207. Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 210. 13 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 208-209. 14 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 209, 210. 12 104 violated by U.S. ground troops.15 It was reported that by 1945, a quarter of the U.S. military saw its purpose as to “simply kill as many Japanese as possible,” including civilians.16 This unofficial mission implicitly rejected American national narratives such as American exceptionalism and the Just War Theory. The U.S. military leadership and the Roosevelt administration knew about the atrocities committed by its ground troops and attempted to quell the violence to a moderate extent. However, this was not humanitarian for the sake of the Japanese, but was to encourage the capture of live prisoners. Demonstrating the priorities of the U.S. soldiers, Schrijvers described that “it took the promise of three days leave and some ice cream to bring in the first live prisoner.”17 Military pamphlets attempted to dissuade soldiers from killing native animals that they often used for target practice.18 Yet, other military documents used racialized imagery, perpetuating dehumanization of the enemy. “Home front officials and publications depicted Japanese and Japanese Americans as insects, vermin, rodents, and apes, and in this way inspired exterminationist fantasies, for who could object to the eradication of lice, spiders, or rats?” questioned Andrew J. Rotter.19 Officers were known to order or indirectly support massacres, and some soldiers who massacred particularly efficiently were honored with public commendations.20 The soldiers’ actions directly reflected the sentiment of the U.S. public, who wanted revenge for Pearl Harbor. The habit of troops to send back to their families souvenirs from their tour of duty in the form of teeth, ears, bones, scalps, and skulls did 15 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 212. Dower, War Without Mercy, 53. 17 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 208. 18 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 212. 19 Andrew J. Rotter, “Atomic Bomb: Wartime Endgame and Cold War Catalyst” in Merrill and Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II, 209. 20 Dower, War Without Mercy, 66. 16 105 not elicit public reprisals, and the trophies were in some cases highly valued.21 Schrijvers explained that in order to cover up the atrocities “military authorities . . . routinely censored photographs from the front lines that showed GIs treating wounded enemy soldiers. Even a photograph of an American interpreter consoling a Japanese child on Saipan was deemed inappropriate for home viewing.”22 The response of the Roosevelt administration to U.S. perpetrated war crimes on the ground in East Asia was contradictory and disunited, in effect giving the government plausible deniability of the atrocities. The U.S. troops experienced extreme culture shock in Asia, adding to their already-existing racialized understanding of the region. One captain declared: “Let’s forget the things we learned as children about fighting wars for the four freedoms . . . Who in here believe that we are? . . . We are fighting now for the earth’s crust.”23 Not only ground troops were involved in atrocities in East Asia; the U.S. government was actively and directly responsible, as well. Throughout the war, Allied powers relied heavily on aerial bombing. As the war came to a close, the United States began what would become a long history of bombing cities. This aligned with the government’s priority of “complete victory at the lowest cost in American lives.”24 The four most memorable instances of the bombing of cities are the Doolittle raids, the firebombing of Tokyo, and the two atomic bombs. The Doolittle raids took place on 18 April 1942: sixteen planes bombed Tokyo. Three years later, the firebombing of Tokyo signaled significant escalation of the tolerance of the U.S. government for bombing of cities. The firebombing of Tokyo took place from 9-10 March 1945. It utilized 334 21 Dower, War Without Mercy, 54, 65. Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 219. 23 Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan, 213. 24 Miscamble, The Most controversial Decision, 14. 22 106 aircraft dropping incendiary bombs and produced a million refugees and between 80,000 and 100,000 dead.25 Notably, there was no backlash among the U.S. public.26 The U.S. decision to drop two atomic bombs on Japan is the most controversial aspect of the Second World War. Although responsibility for the atomic bombs almost always falls on Roosevelt’s successor, Truman, it was Roosevelt who approved the Manhattan project which developed the bomb, and Roosevelt who intended to use the bomb on Germany before the Nazi surrender in May 1945.27 Theoretical development of an atomic bomb began as early as 1940, but it was not until after Pearl Harbor that Roosevelt officially ordered the creation of an atomic bomb by a team of scientists, including exiles from Nazi Europe, led by Robert Oppenheimer. The U.S. government believed invention of a more efficient bomb was not outside logical wartime weaponry development. Indeed, “neither Truman nor [administration members] raised any concerns regarding whether the atomic bomb was a legitimate weapon of war,” Wilson Miscamble noted.28 Lisa Yoneyama, on the other hand, characterized the bombs as “unconventional weapons,” which were illegal.29 After Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, Truman vowed “to continue both the foreign and domestic policies of the Roosevelt administration.”30 This included use of the newfangled weapon Truman learned of only after Roosevelt’s death; the public, and much of both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations were uninformed about the bomb. Truman and his Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, one of the few who knew about the project, believed 25 Dower, War Without Mercy, 40. Dower, War Without Mercy, 41. 27 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 5. 28 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 88. 29 Yoneyama, “On the Unredressability of U.S. War Crimes,” 142. 30 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 20. 26 107 that the atomic bomb “obviated the need for an invasion of Japan, accelerated the conclusion of the war, and saved a vast number of American lives.”31 While Truman was at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the first atomic bomb was tested at Los Alamos. Success led Truman to approve use of the bomb on Japan. On 6 August 1945, the second atomic bomb and first to be used in warfare, known as Little Boy, was dropped over the Japanese military base Hiroshima, killing as many as 80,000 and as many wounded.32 Truman responded by explaining to the public that the bomb had been dropped on a military base “to avoid in so far as possible, the killing of civilians.”33 He also used this same public address to warn Japan that, unless it unconditionally surrendered, more bombs would be dropped. The Japanese government responded by protesting on behalf of the number of civilians harmed.34 Truman warned that civilians would most likely be killed, and encouraged civilians to leave industrial and military areas; however, the message was too late. Before the citizens of Japan were able to receive the message, the second atomic bomb, called Fat Man, was dropped on the Japanese city Nagasaki on 9 August, killing 45,000.35 Six days later, Japan surrendered unconditionally. Radiation from the bombs continued to raise the death tolls from the bombs for months to come. Complicating the view that U.S. atrocities were racially motivated, Andrew J. Rotter argued that “while there is no question that white Americans, at least, exhibited anti-Japanese racism, it is unlikely that racism explains why the United States dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, though 31 J. Samuel Walker, “The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update,” in Michael J. Hogan, ed., America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941 (Cambridge and New York, 1995), 213, in Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 2. 32 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 94. 33 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 91-92. 34 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 94. 35 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 93. 108 perhaps it helped policymakers justify the decision to themselves after it had been made.”36 The Truman administration’s public and private responses to the atomic bombs illuminated the double standard inherent in and pervasiveness of the Just War theory. Truman’s public address unapologetically recognized the civilian casualties characteristic of aerial bombing warfare. It acknowledged that while the administration chose targets in an effort to minimize civilian casualties, it accepted that many civilians would be impacted, if not outright killed. Similar statements made by Axis countries were used to condemn Axis leaders as bloodthirsty and savage. Much like its response to Japanese biological warfare, the U.S. government was more interested in the knowledge that could be gained from the aftermath of use of the atomic bombs than in the ethical dilemma: J. B. Koepili, the Department of State Scientific Advisor noted that “The Atomic Bomb casualty areas in Japan constitute an unparalleled natural laboratory and provide a unique opportunity particularly for pursuing certain long-term phases of the studies. . . . The [State] Department will be glad to . . . further scientific studies in these Japanese areas.”37 The official government stance continues to support the use of the bombs, although there have been some dissenters. Because the U.S. government has consistently supported Truman’s use of the bombs, this thesis will look at the response of the American public in the postwar period to understand American response to this U.S.perpetrated atrocity. Because the United States is founded on alliance with the will of the general populace, the discrepancy between the government’s decision to drop the atomic bomb and the public’s diverse reception of the atomic bomb is particularly revealing. 36 Rotter, “Atomic Bomb: Wartime Endgame and Cold War Catalyst” in Merrill and Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II, 210. 37 Harris, Factories of Death, 321. 109 Truman did not understand the public’s negative response to the atomic bomb since he saw it as an evil equal to or lesser than the atrocities committed by the Axis.38 However, he later had a change of heart, recognizing the previously unfathomable damage done by the bombs and acknowledging that the bombs were a military weapon unlike any other. Unlike the U.S. government, the American public’s response to the atomic bombs was not uniformly positive. Religious groups, in particular, strongly criticized Truman’s use of the bombs. Ironically, Truman identified this as a “double standard of morality,” identifying Pearl Harbor and “their murder of our prisoners of war” as offenses against the United States for which the United States was obligated to respond in kind. Over time, popular culture shifted dramatically to incorporate the atomic bomb into national memory. In many ways, the interpretation was neutral or positive: hot candy became known as “atomic,” music began to use atom and bomb imagery to describe intense feelings of love and sexual prowess, a literary explosion occurred, incorporating the bomb into plotlines, and abstract impressionist painters used the bomb as muse.39 The U.S. public attempted to normalize the bomb into society to avoid backlash against use of the new weaponry. Even so, the fear of the mushroom cloud was overwhelming, especially in young children. “When asked about their thoughts on the next ten years, as part of a survey, two-thirds of American school-children alluded to war, destruction, and a sense of helplessness and despair.”40 Children were indoctrinated into the atomic world in school with safety videos such as “Bert the Turtle,” who taught the children through animated 38 Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision, 116. Alison M. Scott and Christopher D. Geist, eds., The Writing on the Cloud: American Culture Confronts the Atomic Bomb (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1997) v, 107, 95, 73. 40 Scott and Geist, eds., The Writing on the Cloud, 14. 39 110 play and catchy tunes to “Duck and Cover” in the event of an atomic attack.41 Fallout shelters became both a public and private reality. In recognition of the despair of the younger generation, parenting techniques shifted and children were taught that “atomic power was their friend.”42 Even so, scared children grow up to be good peace activists, and the peace activism associated with the Vietnam War was generated by the same generation which grew up under the shadow of the atomic bomb and mushroom cloud. International response to the atomic bombs did not come in the form of condemnation, but in the form of an arms race. The USSR, with whom neither Roosevelt nor Truman shared the secrets of the bomb, worked quickly to develop its own atomic power, which it achieved by August 1949.43 Muted aggression between the Soviet Union and the United States grew into the Cold War, an atomic standoff fueled by mutually assured destruction that lasted as late as the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. The European nations quickly fell into line to gain atomic power, creating the global perception of atomic bombs not as a weapon of criminal proportions, but as one signifying strength and power; it is difficult to condemn something when the great nations of the world all have it. It was not until 2001 that legal cases began in the United States on behalf of victims of the atomic bombs. Although these cases dealt only with Korean victims,44 perhaps the much-needed redress for U.S atrocities is underway. Finally, the East Asian-related atrocity of Japanese-American internment cannot be overlooked. On 19 February 1942, at an eerily similar time to news reaching the Allies 41 “Duck And Cover (1951) Bert The Turtle Civil Defense Film,” YouTube, last modified 11 July 2009, accessed 17 April 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKqXu-5jw60. 42 Scott and Geist, eds., The Writing on the Cloud, 108. 43 Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 91. 44 Yoneyama, “On the Unredressability of U.S. War Crimes,” 142. 111 of Hitler’s creation of concentration camps in Europe, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066.45 This order was not included in the Public Papers of the President, although many other executive orders are.46 By this order, all Japanese or people of Japanese ancestry living on the west coast of the United States, whether American citizens or not, were compelled to leave their homes and enter internment camps indefinitely. One hundred and twenty thousand American citizens were interned.47 Robert Dallek argued that Roosevelt was “aware that his actions violated the Constitution and constituted racial bias against the Japanese. But he undoubtedly justified these actions to himself by seeing them as expedient. Military necessity suggested that these things be done, and he faced no opposition that might have made him think more carefully about these measures.”48 The majority of Americans did not dissent; Pearl Harbor had fanned racial hatred of the Japanese, and the public feared collaboration between Japanese-Americans and the Japanese government. Alice Yang Murray identified anti-Japanese racism as the primary factor in Japanese-American internment, arguing that the U.S. government looked for “a plausible ‘military’ veil, one to shroud the racist assumptions surrounding disloyalty, that they could parade before the highest court in the land,” and found one in Pearl Harbor.49 Japanese-American internment was one of the very few instances in which the Roosevelt administration failed to uphold the sanctity of its citizens’ civil and human rights. In this instance, Roosevelt deferred to the ingrained racial understanding of the situation over respect for citizens’ lives, demonstrating the impact of racial stereotypes on policy. 45 Alice Yang Murray, Historical Memories of the Japanese American Internment and the Struggle for Redress (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 37. 46 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: 1942 Volume. 47 John Howard, Concentration Camps on the Home Front: Japanese Americans in the House of Jim Crow (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 1. 48 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 336. 49 Murray, Historical Memories of the Japanese American Internment and the Struggle for Redress, 45. 112 Although the camps were promoted as meeting the standards of living in the United States, this was not the case. Horse racing tracks were converted into camps, the stables repurposed into family homes.50 Designs were drawn from mass-incarceration facilities and detention centers, surrounded by barbed wire. Meals and bathroom facilities were communal; individual homes did not have running water, and were supplied with only one light bulb and electrical outlet.51 John Howard recognized that “for many Japanese Americans, incarceration caused deep psychological trauma, shame, anxiety, and hardship. Perhaps most importantly, imprisonment foreshortened or foreclosed the most basic human freedoms: speech, association, choice, mobility, and selfdetermination.”52 The Roosevelt administration justified this infringement not only upon the rights of its citizens, but upon human rights in general in the name of national security and defense. The War Relocation Authority (WRA), the government body created to oversee the internment, hired photographers to document the experience. One photographer, Dorothea Lange, was already well known for her photographs of the West during the Dust Bowl and Great Depression of the 1930s. Lange’s photographs survive to this day and, alongside other government-commissioned photographs as well as photographs taken surreptitiously such as those of Toyo Miyatake, make up the visual record of the U.S. atrocity.53 For many years the U.S. government sought to hide and censor the images. Lange was not allowed to take photographs of the barbed wire, watchtowers, armed soldiers, or resistance within the camps. The WRA encouraged her to photograph 50 Linda Gordon and Gary Y. Okihiro, eds., Impounded: Dorothea Lange and the Censored Images of Japanese American Internment (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 142. 51 Howard, Concentration Camps on the Home Front, 70-72. 52 Howard, Concentration Camps on the Home Front, 68. 53 Gordon and Okihiro, eds., Impounded, 21. 113 only the privileged internees, those with better accommodations because of their service to the U.S. government.54 Lange believed that the government wanted a “record but not a public record.”55 Because of these known limitations, Lange’s images must be viewed as depicting only a partial story, the story that the U.S. government wanted to remember. It was not until 2006 that a collection of her documentation of the internment camps was published.56 Although schools recently have begun teaching about Japanese-American internment, much of the U.S. public remains ignorant of Japanese-American internment. Erica Harth stated that “the mass detention of Japanese Americans may well be the most documented and the least known miscarriage of justice in [American] history.” How, then, “has all the material on incarceration so long available to the general public managed not to penetrate the national consciousness? Certainly it is a story that we would rather not hear.”57 In other words, Harth argued that national shame has minimized U.S. response to the atrocity. She also recognized that condemnation of Japanese-American internment seems to, in a way, invalidate the U.S. victory in World War II;58 because this victory is so important to U.S. public memory, government remorse for the human rights violation remains overshadowed by the positive memory of the Good War. In the 1970s, internees were urged to speak up about their detainment. It was not until the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, however, that “a new age of public apologies throughout the world” began.59 With the Civil Liberties Act the Reagan administration 54 Gordon and Okihiro, eds., Impounded, 20. Gordon and Okihiro, eds., Impounded, 21. 56 Gordon and Okihiro, eds., Impounded, 6. 57 Erica Harth, ed., Last Witnesses: Reflections on the Wartime Internment of Japanese Americans (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1-2. 58 Harth, Last Witnesses, 2. 59 Murray, Historical Memories of the Japanese American Internment and the Struggle for Redress, 435. 55 114 provided $20,000 for every person who was interned, a total of $1.25 billion.60 Even so, redress for Japanese-American internment was dependent on U.S. citizenship of the detainees, expressing the issue as one of citizenship rights rather than of human rights. Furthermore, the United States refused to recognize the authority of international bodies such as the World Court, International Criminal Court, and United Nations which have sought justice on behalf of the Japanese-American internees.61 The U.S. government continues, half a century later, to stand by the Just War and national defense justifications of the Roosevelt administration. During the Second World War, the United States military and government engaged in multiple human rights violations. Some were against the people of enemy nations: the brutal fighting between U.S. and Japanese ground troops and the dropping of the atomic bombs on the Japanese home islands exemplify this category. Other atrocities were reflexive, and affected U.S. citizens, such as Japanese-American internment. Regardless of type of victim, these atrocities were racially motivated. Andrew J. Rotter eloquently explained that white American racism caused, or at a minimum enabled, the United States to use a devastating weapon on the Japanese, brown people whom they considered inferior to themselves, barbaric in their conduct of war, and finally subhuman—‘a beast,’ as Truman put it. It is certainly true . . . that the Pacific War was fought with a savagery unfamiliar to those who had engaged each other in Europe.62 The assumptions under which the government of the United States operated explain how Roosevelt and Truman justified their actions. The Just War theory allowed for unprecedented violence in the name of democracy and peace. In parallels all too alike to 60 Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese, 390; Teresa Tamura, Minidoka: An American Concentration Camp (Caldwell: Caxton Press, 2013), i. 61 Howard, Concentration Camps on the Home Front, 21. 62 Rotter, “Atomic Bomb: Wartime Endgame and Cold War Catalyst” in Merrill and Paterson, Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II, 209. 115 its Axis counterparts, the government of the United States accepted mass noncombatant casualties at the hands of U.S. soldiers, justified the atomic bomb blasts, and detained U.S. civilians on American soil. It has been only in recent decades that redress has been sought for the crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War and that analysis has shifted to viewing such acts as violations of human rights rather than aspects necessary to warfare. 116 Conclusion World War II is known for unprecedented destruction. This destruction was due not only to new technology and bitter fighting conditions; it also stemmed from the systematic annihilation of various races, ethnicities, religions, and nationalities breaking previously uncharted—and highly lethal—territory. These atrocities are almost unilaterally associated with the actions of Adolf Hitler and the Holocaust in Europe. However, the Japanese Army in Japanese-occupied Asia employed similarly methodical, brutal, and lethal tactics as early as 1931. The Chinese and American Allied troops in Asia also committed significant atrocities. The policies of the Roosevelt administration remained Europe-focused throughout the war, guided by the Just War Theory and a racially hierarchical view of the world, muting U.S. response to atrocities in East Asia during World War II. Response of the U.S. government to the atrocities in East Asia committed by both Axis and Allied armies was minimal. There is a remarkable amount of literature on World War II and the atrocities in Europe. Regarding East Asia, however, there is decidedly less scholarship. Scholarly writing that does exist primarily focuses on war crimes committed by the Japanese, with most attention on civilian massacres. Some works also discuss U.S. response to Japanese atrocities, but most focus on the atrocities themselves. Literature on Chinese atrocities is all but nonexistent, and that which does exist discusses only the 1938 Yellow River flood. Scholars who focus on Sino-American relations during the war only tangentially reference Chinese (or U.S.) atrocities, if at all. Within the last two decades, scholarship on U.S. atrocities has begun to grow, especially regarding Japanese-American internment and the use of the atomic bombs. Although in some cases these works are particularly 117 scathing of the U.S. government, the vast majority of scholarship has yet to emerge from an analysis driven by the Just War theory and a memory of the Good War. Although the Second World War in East Asia began in 1931, when Roosevelt became President of the United States in 1933 he was far more focused on pulling the United States out of the Great Depression than on international affairs. It was not until after Europe erupted into war in 1939 that he truly shifted his attention to war, and even then his decisions were predominantly Eurocentric. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war on Japan. To get the anti-Japanese American public to agree with Roosevelt’s U.S. wartime priority to defeat Hitler, the Roosevelt administration initiated a public relations campaign in which it referred to the Axis as a whole rather than naming individual nations and did not publicly discuss atrocities committed in Asia. A product of this wartime attention on Europe, atrocities in East Asia during World War II have since faded from public consciousness. The East Asian country known most for committing crimes against humanity during the Second World War is Japan. The Japanese Army and government were known to have sanctioned civilian massacres such as the Rape of Nanking, organized a system of forced prostitution known as the comfort women system, abused its prisoners of war including subjecting them to medical testing, and researched and used biological and chemical weaponry. Although the U.S. public knew of and abhorred the Japanese atrocities, Roosevelt adhered to his Europe-first policy and attempted to sway public opinion into line with his own by deliberately not responding to Japanese atrocities. 118 Even before Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt was planning for the postwar world. This included preliminary planning for an international governing body to be led by the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China. During this planning, Roosevelt and his advisors spent most of their energy discussing the future of Europe. They only briefly discussed the future of East Asia, quickly deciding that China should become a Great Power and lead Asia while Japan should be disarmed and forced under trusteeship of the United States. After Roosevelt’s death, the reality of the postwar world was only somewhat different from Roosevelt’s plan. Truman and the other Allies were able to fulfill Roosevelt’s ideas regarding Europe, and participated significantly in bringing Japanese leaders to justice in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials. However, with the eruption of the Civil War in China and subsequent formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 as well as the early sparks of the Cold War with the USSR, the Truman administration’s focus in East Asia shifted substantially to Reverse Course for Japan, in which Japan was to be rebuilt as the haven for democracy in Asia. China, as did its enemies, committed some of the worst atrocities of the war. These atrocities were almost exclusively intra-Chinese: the Chinese government abused its military, which in turn abused the Chinese public. Chiang Kai-shek also used various scorched-earth methods including, most significantly, the 1938 Yellow River Flood. These actions were based in Chiang’s assumption that defending China against the Communist and Japanese aggressors was more important than preserving the Chinese public’s lives. This was contrary to the U.S. assumption that American lives were most important, yet remarkably consistent with the U.S. assumption that Chinese lives could be sacrificed. Whereas Roosevelt felt the greater threat to China came from Japan, 119 Chiang Kai-shek was determined to oust the Communists from China. These differences in wartime goals created a hostile working relationship between the two Allies. However, because the Roosevelt administration hoped China would champion the Third Way in Asia, the U.S. turned a blind eye to Chinese atrocities. Perhaps most controversial in the postwar era, the atrocities committed by the United States government and military have only recently been viewed in a critical light. American ground troops met their foe with as much viciousness as the Japanese showed them, leading military and civilian massacres in the island hopping campaign in the Pacific. Following Pearl Harbor, and in an effort to appease the vengeful U.S. public, Roosevelt interned all Japanese and Japanese-Americans on the west coast of the United States for the duration of the war. The U.S. military bombed cities, including dropping two atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945, killing thousands of civilians. Under the rubric of the Just War theory and American exceptionalism, the U.S. government justified all violence perpetrated by the United States, and has given minimal restitution for U.S. atrocities. Although these atrocities are becoming more commonly recognized, the understanding that such actions were necessary and good as put forth in Roosevelt’s public relations campaigns remains the predominantly accepted view of the U.S. involvement in the Second World War. The human rights violations perpetrated by the Japanese during the war are significantly less known than their European Axis counterparts. Allied forces in East Asia actively engaged in what would have been called war crimes had the Axis won. The persistent desire and prioritization of national security, belief in the sanctity of American lives, the vision of the goodness of democracy, and Euro-centrism fueled by racial 120 stereotypes all guided the choices of the U.S. government throughout the war and were invoked to justify its use of unprecedented violence. Although the U.S. government purportedly also was interested in protecting human rights around the globe, these other goals, more often than not, outweighed the importance of preserving non-American and non-Western human lives. 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