Week 7 Lecture 2 Perception #2

13/11/12 Week 7 Lecture 2 Perception- 2 • Highlight an assumption that perceptual experience is a relation~ similarity between naïve realists and sense datum theorists Basic terminology • • • • Perception~ used to talk about the awareness that we have of things in the external environment through our senses - In this sense of perception touching, seeing, hearing, tasting and feeling something are all ways in recognising an object - Awareness of the world that we have via the senses - Seems that perception is fundamental to our understanding and knowledge of the world around us Philosophers have been interested in the nature of experiences that we have when we see objects - Sense datum theorist says that in a certain sense you don’t really see objects in your environment. What you are immediately aware of in having a visual experience are merely private mind dependent entities in your mind. Private in the sense that no one else can experience the sense data you are having and mind dependent in that those sense data do not exist instead of when you are perceiving them - Supposed to be contrary to our naïve or common sensual idea Perceptual experience as a relation, essentially involving awareness of one type of thing - Moore observed consciousness - Moore is getting at something very fundamental about the nature of visual experience - Sense in which you can attend to what your visual experience is like, can tell people what things you see, how they look and the characterisation of your current visual experience - Being told to attend to the nature of your visual experience without attending to anything you can see, it seems almost impossible Often suggested that a visual perceptual experience is support for a relational view of experience - Reason why you cannot attend to nature of experience without attending to those things you are experiencing is because perceptual experiences are just a way of being aware of things - Presuming that one’s perceptual experience is normal What are we related to in having visual perceptual experiences? • • • Russell refers to sense data to explain what we are related to in having visual experiences Dispute between naïve realist- who hold that in having a visual experience we are related directly to that thing- and sense datum theorist Looking at British imperialists like Locke and Hume they seem to express a version of sense datum view that we are never directly aware of external objects outside of us but only ideas in our minds 13/11/12 Week 7 Lecture 2 Argument of illusion • • • • Mueller line illusion~ lines same length, but top line looks shorter than bottom - In an illusionary experience it appears that a certain thing has a property but in reality it does not - Visual illusion - Phenomenal principle- must be two lines, to which I am relating to, that are different lengths. What my experience is relating to - In an illusionary experience one is not related to the perceptual thing - Common kind claim - Veridical experiences- perceive things as they really are - Things that you are related to in having an illusionary and veridical experience are the same Russell argues that all of our perceptual experiences are illusionary. Gives numerous examples of conflicting appearances to support his claim. - Talks about the example of a table, as he moves around it and sees from different views the shape and colour appears to change, the sound changes depending on how hard he knocks etc - Table presents an enormous variety of different appearances to him in respect to his different sense - Takes this to show that all of the features things appear to have, cannot be properties or features that things really have in themselves In at least one of perceptual experiences a case of illusion is happening Need to infer the real shape of the table top even though it is something that is never presented in my perceptual experience