University:
Boston University
Course:
SSW ET 753 | Ethics and the Social Work Profession
Academic year:

2022
Views:

414

Pages:

20
Author:

serumas6pev

What is an explanation? What happens when we explain? What sort of facts need to be explained? What determines when a fact has been explained? Explananda as “why-questions” Explanandum explained by explanans. Explananda can be described as “whyquestions” involving contrast cases: “why A, rather than not-A, or B, C, D?” The answer to a why-question can also be cast as a why-question, producing a regress of why-questions. What sort of facts need to be explained? To explain an event is to show it is expectable: 'given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred' (Hempel, 1965, p. 337, his italics). ‘a (good) explanation raises or makes high its explanandum's probability, p, and the more it does so (ceteris paribus) the better it is' (Mellor, 1976, p.232). Explanatory demands as expressions of surprise Surprise is a necessary condition for an explanatory demand. The explanatory demand arises because the explanandum seems to call into question the auxiliary assumptions. Explanations provide a new auxiliary basis with respect to which the explanandum no longer seems improbable. Surprise (based on Horwich, 1982) What we mean by an event not being a coincidence, or not being due to chance, is that if we came to know it, it would make us no longer regard our system as satisfactory, although on our system the event may be no more improbable than any alternative. Thus 1,000 heads running would not be due to chance; i.e. if we observed it we should change our system of chances for that penny (Ramsey, 1990, p. 106). E is surprising iff (a) p(E) ≈ 0, and (b) p(B|E) << p(B), where B denotes background assumptions. That is, an event is surprising if is both improbable and lowers our confidence in the background assumptions with respect to which its probability was judged to be low. Criterion (b) relies upon there being a competing set of circumstances, B', that render E more probable and which are 'initially implausible (but not wildly improbable)' (p.102). Then, if p(B')p(E|B')>>p(B)p(E|B), our confidence in B is lowered.

Misunderstanding as a Method of Resistance