American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy

American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy Introduction: In writing his book, American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy, John Lamberton Harper seeks to shed more like on the controversial figure that digressed from the prevailing revolutionary ethos of agrarian classical republicanism, and sought to harness the varied interests of the American population through a strong central government. This strong central government would serve as the means to advance the burgeoning nation to a position of strength that would rival the great prevailing nations of the world. By referencing the infamous Italian political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli, whose work The Prince serves as a sort of manual for rulers to achieve and maintain power while being indifferent to moral considerations, Harper seeks to parallel the lives of the theorist and founding father to show that they not only had similar ideas, but that their lives resembled each other (6). Additionally, Harper seeks to move away from the prevailing partisan literature on Hamilton and focus on his foreign policy and ideas (2). Part I: In the first part of his book, Harper expounds upon the political themes of Machiavelli. The main overarching idea to Machiavelli’s political notions was his belief that human nature was inherently fixed and that it is unchangeable over time. What primarily drives human beings is a desire to pursue one’s own self interest, usually at the expense of another’s. Machiavelli also believed that human affairs were in a state of constant flux and that life was guided by “unreason, chance, and contingency”(12). His idea of fortuna and virtu differed from the metaphysical terms associated with classical and Christian ideas. Like Machiavelli, Hamilton also believed human nature was fixed and that it would take a strong leader to harness the resources of the burgeoning country to bring it to a position of strength. Like Machiavelli, he believed that, for the most part, people were driven by the love of power and wealth, instead of rationality. For people with “higher passions,” he believed their love of fame would compel those who possessed it to work towards the greater public good (21). Harper also parallels the lives of Machiavelli and Hamilton to show their similarities. Both were born into questionable circumstances, both were trying to guide their fledgling republics in times of peril, and more importantly, “Each was driven by a vision of national greatness, but destined for personal disenchantment and defeat.” (6). In regards to Hamilton, Harper shows that he had a deep distrust of France, who he believed wanted a weak America. In contrast, he pushed for a strong relationship with Britain, whose model and people he admired (21). Concerning internal politics, Hamilton pushed for a strong central government because he believed that confederations would ultimately disintegrate and that outside powers would play one state against the other (Their motto would be Divide and conquer). The Newburgh Conspiracy, the status of western land, Indian and foreign encroachments, and the post-war economic depression, all contributed to Hamilton’s argument for a stronger central government (32). Part II With regard to Hamilton’s controversial decision to fund foreign debt, Lambert argues that Hamilton’s push toward the funding of old Continental paper debt at its original value, which was in the hands of speculators for the most part, would concentrate the wealth into the hands of the financial elite, give them a greater stake in the government, and lead to greater productive investment (45). Hamilton continued to pursue a nurturing relationship with Britain. He differed from James Madison and Thomas Jefferson in the sense that he did not entertain a romantic agrarian vision of America and instead looked to manufacture and a monied economy instead. The Nootka Sound Crisis, which resulted from a dispute along the northwest coast of North America, contributed to fear that the U.S. would be entangled in a European war. The Crisis also led to a broach with Britain on the subject of abducted slaves, the occupied strategic posts, and the commercial treaty with Britain. While Jefferson continued to support France and Spain, Hamilton pushes for U.S. manufactures to stimulate more amicable relations with Britain, instead of the confrontational strategy endorsed by Jefferson (96). Part III When hostilities between France and Britain broke out again in 1793, both Hamilton and Jefferson agreed on a policy of U.S. neutrality (Hamilton interpreting this as favoring Britain, and Jefferson as it favoring France). Both also had difficulties working out the policy of neutrality in regard to the impressments of ships and contraband. Jefferson, in particular, found himself dealing with an indignant Minister Genet when he had to reject plans for a liquidation of debt and a “national compact” between the republics. Ultimately Genet’s conduct led to his recall and a “form of neutrality favorable to Britain had been established” (125). Hamilton himself often found it difficult to deal with the British whose order-in-council of 1793 pushed him into defending a settlement that took defensive steps, but was ultimately a peace mission (135). The Jay Treaty of 1794, though leading to positive outcomes such as free navigation of the Mississippi and the port of New Orleans in Pinckney’s treaty, was opposed by Republicans because it was seen as a violation of neutral rights. Part IV The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 helped to support Hamilton’s arguments for a strong central government. According to Harper, “Washington, Hamilton, and many others connected the defiance of federal authority with the pernicious influence of the pro-French Democratic Societies.” (154) The Jay Treaty continued to draw criticism. Opposition and pressure on Washington to reject it continued and another order-incouncil infuriated many, including Washington (159). The Fauchet dispatch, which suggested that Edmund Randolph was trying to obtain a bribe from the French in regard to the Whiskey Rebellion, impelled Washington to finally ratify the treaty. According to Harper, Hamilton tried to take an equitable approach towards the French and British. In this way, if the French still refused to meet the U.S. halfway, a break in the relationship would fall on them (170). During his discussion of Washington’s Farewell Address of 1796, Harper gives us a more intimate glimpse in Hamilton’s role in drafting the document. Washington hated political faction and he wanted to articulate this in his address. Harper argues that Hamilton’s draft included ideas that were not present in Washington’s and that what was distinct about them were their Machiavellianism. They included his position on the “precariousness of alliances and confederations” and the predominant human passion of “love of power, and proneness to abuse it.” (178) Part V In this section, Harper expounds upon the relationship between Jefferson and John Adams. Both admired the British system and recognized the need of competing interests but differed in policy. Jefferson rejected an American bank resembling the British one. This difference culminated in the attempt by Hamilton to have Thomas Pinckney obtain more votes in the election of 1796. Harper argues, however, that Hamilton “simply thought Pinckney had a better chance to beat Jefferson and acted on that belief” (197). In 1797, Hamilton found himself in the midst of a barrage of accusations regarding blackmail of the husband of Hamilton’s lover, Maria Reynolds (202). Unfortunately for Hamilton, the affair only tarnished his reputation for having “bad blood” (204). The XYZ affair, in which France essentially requested a bribe from the U.S as a precondition for negotiations, incited anti-French sentiments and led to a Federalist campaign to provision new warships, harbor fortifications, a Navy department, and an abrogation of the French treaty. It also led to the Naturalization Act and the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 (217). Harper argues that Hamilton reacted to the recent events “with a mixture of expectation and trepidation” (217). When war with France loomed just around the corner, accusations were being thrown around about Hamilton’s and the Federalists’ intent with the army. His defenders argued he responded appropriately to a possible external threat and that there was never a readiness to conquer Florida and Louisiana or incite a civil war favorable to the Federalists. His opponents, however, argued just that. Harper maintains that Hamilton separated the “imagined” with what was feasible (228). Part VI If there was any hint of Hamilton’s Machiavellianism is was during the 1800 election. In order to prevent Jefferson winning the election Hamilton urged Federalist in New England to give equal support to Adams and Pinckney, in the hope of securing Pinckney’s victory over Jefferson. Hamilton is known to have said to Governor Jay, “In times like these in which we live, it will not do to be over scrupulous. It is easy to sacrifice the substantial interests of society by a strict adherence to ordinary rules” (254). Adams responded with furor to Hamilton’s attempt to prevent his reelection. Accusations that Hamilton was “of a British faction in the Country” only exacerbated the Adams-Hamilton fued. Hamilton’s “Letter from Alexander Hamilton Concerning the Public Conduct and Character of John Adams” only hastened his loss of authority in the government. Harper says that “even for friendly observers, Hamilton’s subsequent role in the presidential campaign, culminating in his notorious attack on Adams, is evidence of a self-destructiveness and loss of equilibrium for which the Federalist party paid the price.” Conclusion: Despite Hamilton’s political defeat, his legacy has continued with the financial system that survived his death “with its monetized national debt, secure federal revenues, and national bank, needed to promote economic development and to mobilize wealth for military purposes” and “minimum standing forces, peacetime cultivation of the military arts and sciences, and defense-industrial preparedness” (272). Hamilton’s reputation as an American Machiavelli doesn’t take into account his ability at self restraint and pragmatism. He recognized the danger of a War with Britain and the benefits of maintaining amicable relations. The Jay treaty, though being criticized by the opposition, helped secure the navigation of the Mississippi. Most importantly, Hamilton recognized the burgeoning republic needed a “heroic leadership” and a strong central government to sustain the republic in its early stages.