Precis on America on the Brink

Precis on America on the Brink: How the political struggle over the War of 1812 Almost Destroyed the Young Republic by Richard Buel Jr. Buel’s main contribution to the literature of this period is his bold assault against the Federalists. He maintains that their Pro-British inclinations combined with their protracted struggle to maintain political strength during the early 19th century led to conduct bordering on treason. His avowed intent is to describe their behavior rather than attempt to explain it. While the Federalists remain his primary antagonists, he credits foreign affairs as the catalyst that brought America to the edge of the precipice culminating in the Hartford Convention. Much of Buel’s book is devoted to describing the sequence of events leading to the war of 1812. Consequently, he begins Chapter One by describing the political and diplomatic background both of the antagonism between Republicans and Federalists and the strains between America and France. Significantly, he explains the context of the Federalist victories of 1798 in contrast to the waning powers of the Federalists in 1800. He also discusses the importance of the Quasi-War with the French and its odd effect upon public sentiment. Buel goes on to recount the Federalist attempts to strengthen their influence within New England by allying with Congregationalists and enforcing stipulations in the Massachusetts State Constitution. Buel’s next chapter presents in detail the political situation in the Federalist stronghold of Massachusetts and the eruption of fiercely partisan politics as the War of 1812 approached. The principal problem that arose took the form of the nationally supported embargo. Buel maintains that the Republicans saw the embargo as the way to avoid conflict with either France or England but also as a means for asserting their indignation at the way that American ships were being treated. Federalists in New England roundly protested the Embargo. Buel does little to explain the Federalists’ motivation, but instead catalogues the rhetoric they employed. He also explains the “Political Theater” that occurred between the ailing Governor Sullivan, the two Senators Pickering and John Quincy Adams, and various arms of State legislatures. This recounting underscore another of Buel’s main assertions, namely, that state and local government constituted a more immediate presence in the early nineteenth century than did the federal government. Likewise, Massachusetts proved an example to nearby New England states as several of the more prominent Federalist towns held “town meetings” that also denounced the Embargo. Chapter Three begins to categorize some of the more egregious examples of deliberate Federalist attempts to undermine the embargo. It particularly rests on the example of Josiah Quincy, an eloquent, influential orator and a subtle politician. He precipitated a disportionate amount of debate in the Congress by employing any means necessary to destroy Republican accord. Significantly, Quincy orchestrated a maneuver to split Republicans over the embargo. By dividing the majority, he set in motion the repeal of the embargo in favor of non-importation. While Federalists succeeded in ridding themselves of the embargo, they were hardly satisfied with the terms of non-importation. Instead, they still viewed the inability to trade freely with Britain as an impediment to their aims. As the political climate in Europe transformed and as foreign policy representatives to America came and went, the course of non-importation was repealed or implemented and especially in the case of the Erskine affair. Particularly noteworthy is the role that the crossAtlantic communications played. Repeatedly Buel emphasizes that international events unfolded differently in light of the slow speed of communication between Europe and the United States. Chapter Five begins with the provocative act of naval engagement between the USS President and HMS Lille Belt. This event paired with crumbling relations between Britain and the United States led Madison toward the path of war in order to protect American interests. Ironically, Buel points out that the United States’ main goal, the revocation of the Orders-in-Council, occurred shortly before the declaration of war. But for the inability of the foreign minister to interpret the climate in Britain and, again, the difficulty of communication across the Atlantic, war might have been averted. In the course of Chapter Six Buel commences his assault on the Federalists’ attempts to resist and even weaken the American military struggle during the War of 1812. Here, Buel asserts that Federalists undermined the war effort in many ways. Their direct opposition in Congress has already been noted. They also continued their barrage against the war effort through the many newspapers and publications printed in Massachusetts and throughout New England. Additionally, they failed to provide militias and the necessary elements of force to defend the harbors. Financially the Federalists supported their own interests instead of those of a united effort by the American people and were consequently enriched by the protraction of the war. Chapter Seven demonstrates how important foreign affairs were to the heightening of tensions within the United States. The surprising defeat of Napoleon eased for a time the conflict between Republicans and Federalists as it deflected some of the British attention away from the American engagement. This did not last, however, and continued British prosecution of the war on American soil embittered Federalists. Federalists responded by appealing to a broad “convention,” a populist gathering consisting largely of New England delegates that would set out to challenge the current process of the federal government and stop the war. Chapter Eight is aptly titled “Denouement.” It begins by revealing that Massachusetts Governor Strong actually dispatched an emissary to the British forces in Canada inquiring about prospects of joining in the British efforts and seceding from the Union. However, in the next instance Buel undercuts the importance of this correspondence. He proposes that while the calling of the Hartford Convention was the “precipice” of the crisis of the War of 1812, the actual prostration of the Convention turned out to be irrelevant. This was due largely to the successful outcome of the battle of New Orleans in the Americans’ favor and to the signing of the Treaty of Ghent. The end of the War of 1812 essentially ended the antagonism of the Republicans by the Federalists, but Buel asserts that it also signaled the end of Federalism as a significant force in politics. Federalism no longer producing a threat to the union, the only remaining specter in the nation was the issue of slavery. Thereafter, the southern states replaced Massachusetts and New England in Congress as the region in which opposition centered.