Euclid v.Ambler Realty Co.

Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1926. Facts: Ambler Realty Co. (Ambler) (plaintiff) owned land in the Village of Euclid (Euclid) (defendant). Euclid is a largely residential suburb of Cleveland, Ohio. In 1922, Euclid enacted comprehensive zoning ordinances and created a board of zoning appeals charged with enforcement. The regulations created different districts based on the class of use, including purely residential, mixed use, commercial, and industrial. As a result of the ordinance, Ambler’s land was partitioned in terms of the types of uses that were permissible on it. Most notably, portions of Amber’s land were zoned in such a way as to prohibit the development of industry. Procedural History: Ambler brought suit against Euclid, alleging that the zoning ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as the Ohio Constitution, by depriving Ambler of liberty and property without due process. Specifically, Ambler argued that the ordinance significantly reduced the land’s value and deterred potential buyers. Euclid moved to dismiss on the ground that the zoning regulations had not yet been enforced against Ambler, because Ambler had not applied for any building permits. The motion was denied. The district court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Euclid appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Issue: Are zoning regulations passed by cities and municipalities constitutional? Holding: Yes, unless they are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no relation to the state’s police powers. Reasoning: Euclid’s zoning ordinance is constitutional. Zoning restrictions are unconstitutional if “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable” and without “substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.” The power to pass zoning regulations derives from states’ police powers. Zoning ordinances are a relatively recent development, created to deal with the difficulties created by increasing urban populations. As a result of this, the application of constitutional guarantees must have some “elasticity.” That said, the propriety of a zoning ordinance depends upon the situation. The common law of nuisance is built upon the maxim that one should not use her property to harm another’s use of theirs, and that principle provides guidance for determining the scope of the power to regulate property use. There is no real doubt that localities have the power to pass these types of regulations. Ordinances restricting industrial use of property may be over-inclusive, going beyond dangerous and offensive uses and forbidding the innocent as well, but this is unavoidable. Such ordinances do not “pass…the bounds of reason and assume…the character of a merely arbitrary fiat.” Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912). Thus, they are generally valid. A more difficult question arises as to the validity of purely residential districts that exclude all commercial activity. More state courts seem to sustain such ordinances than overturn them. Further, experts generally agree that such zoning laws make fire and accident prevention easier, reduce noise, and preserve residential areas. Such regulations are thus valid so long as not arbitrary and unreasonable or without connection to the general welfare. In this case, Euclid may be restricting the current course of industrial development from Cleveland, but it is acting well within its rights as a separate municipality. Euclid has the right to exercise its police powers to separate industrial development from its residential sector. Further, there was no need for Ambler to wait until a building permit had been denied to challenge the ordinance. The zoning restriction scheme here may well prove to be unconstitutional as applied, but it is constitutional on its face. The judgment of the court below is reversed.