Opinions and Social Pressure - Conformity Study Guide Part 7

There seemed to be several quite plausible ways in which the increase in compliance might have been produced. The first was simply some kind of commitment to or involvement with the particular person making the request. This might work, for example, as follows: The subject has agreed to the first request and perceives that the experimenter therefore expects him also to agree to the second request. The subject thus feels obligated and does not want to disappoint the experimenter; he also feels that he needs a good reason for saying “no” — a better reason than he would need if he had never said “yes.” This is just one line of causality — the particular process by which involvement with the experimenter operates might be quite different, but the basic idea would be similar. The commitment is to the particular person. This implies that the increase in compliance due to the first contact should occur primarily when both requests are made by the same person. Another explanation in terms of involvement centers around the particular issue with which the requests are concerned. Once the subject has taken some action in connection with an area of concern, be it surveys, political activity, or highway safety, there is probably a tendency to become somewhat more concerned with the area. The subject begins thinking about it, considering its importance and relevance to him, and so on. This tends to make him more likely to agree to take further action in the same area when he is later asked to. To the extent that this is the critical factor the initial contact should increase compliance only when both requests are related to the same issue or area of concern. Another way of looking at the situation is that the subject needs a reason to say “no.” In our society it is somewhat difficult to refuse a reasonable request, particularly when it is made by an organization that is not trying to make money. To refuse, many people feel that they need a reason — simply not wanting to do it is often not in itself sufficient. The person can say to the requester or simply to himself that he does not believe in giving to charities or tipping or working for political parties or answering questions or posting signs, or whatever he is asked to do. Once he has performed a particular task, however, this excuse is no longer valid for not agreeing to perform a similar task. Even if the first thing he did was trivial compared with the present request, he cannot say he never does this sort of thing, and thus one good reason for refusing is removed. This line of reasoning suggests that the similarity of the first and second requests in terms of the type of action required is an important factor. The more similar they are, the more the “matter of principle” argument is eliminated by agreeing to the first request, and the greater should be the increase in compliance. There are probably many other mechanisms by which the initial request might produce an increase in compliance. The second experiment was designed in part to test the notions described above, but its major purpose was to demonstrate the effect unequivocally. To this latter end it eliminated one of the important problems with the first study which was that when the experimenter made the second request he was not blind as to which condition the subjects were in. In this study the second request was always made by someone other than the person who made the first request, and the second experimenter was blind as to what condition the subject was in. This eliminates the possibility that the experimenter exerted systematically different amounts of pressure in different experimental conditions. If the effect of the first study were replicated, it would also rule out the relatively uninteresting possibility that the effect is due primarily to greater familiarity or involvement with the particular person making the first request. Experiment II The basic paradigm was quite similar to that of the first study. Experimental subjects were asked to comply with a small request and were later asked a considerably larger request, while controls were asked only the larger request. The first request varied along two dimensions. Subjects were asked either to put up a small sign or to sign a petition, and the issue was either safe driving or keeping California beautiful. Thus, there were four first requests: a small sign for safe driving or for beauty, and a petition for the two issues. The second request for all subjects was to install in their front lawn a very large sign which said “Drive Carefully.” The four experimental conditions may be defined in terms of the similarity of the small and large requests along the dimensions of issue and task. The two requests were similar in both issue and task for the small-sign, safe-driving group, similar only in issue for the safe-driving-petition group, similar only in task for the small “Keep California Beautiful” sign group, and similar in neither issue nor task for the “Keep California Beautiful” petition group. The major expectation was that the three groups for which either the task or the issue was similar would show more compliance than the controls, and it was also felt that when both were similar there would probably be the most compliance. The fourth condition (Different Issue-Different Task) was included primarily to assess the effect simply of the initial contact which, although it was not identical to the second one on either issue or task, was in many ways quite similar (e.g., a young student asking for cooperation on a noncontroversial issue). There were no clear expectations as to how this condition would compare with the controls. Method The subjects were 114 women and 13 men living in Palo Alto, California. Of these, 9 women and 6 men could not be contacted for the second request and are not included in the data analysis. The remaining 112 subjects were divided about equally among the five conditions. All subjects were contacted between 1:30 and 4:30 on weekday afternoons. Two experimenters, one male and one female, were employed, and a different one always made the second contact. Unlike the first study, the experimenters actually went to the homes of the subjects and interviewed them on a face-to-face basis. An effort was made to select subjects from blocks and neighborhoods that were as homogeneous as possible. On each block every third or fourth house was approached, and all subjects on that block were in one experimental condition. This was necessary because of the likelihood that neighbors would talk to each other about the contact. In addition, for every four subjects contacted, a fifth house was chosen as a control but was, of course, not contacted. Throughout this phase of the experiment, and in fact throughout the whole experiment, the two experimenters did not communicate to each other what conditions had been run on a given block nor what condition a particular house was in. The small-sign, safe-driving group was told that the experimenter was from the Community Committee for Traffic Safety, that he was visiting a number of homes in an attempt to make the citizens more aware of the need to drive carefully all the time, and that he would like the subject to take a small sign and put it in a window or in the car so that it would serve as a reminder of the need to drive carefully. The sign was three inches square, said “Be a safe driver,” was on thin paper without a gummed backing, and in general looked rather amateurish and unattractive. If the subject agreed, he was given the sign and thanked; if he disagreed, he was simply thanked for his time. The three other experimental conditions were quite similar with appropriate changes. The other organization was identified as the Keep California Beautiful Committee and its sign said, appropriately enough, “Keep California Beautiful.” Both signs were simply black block letters on a white background. The two petition groups were asked to sign a petition which was being sent to California’s United States Senators. The petition advocated support for any legislation which would promote either safer driving or keeping California beautiful. The subject was shown a petition, typed on heavy bond paper, with at least twenty signatures already affixed. If she agreed, she signed and was thanked. If she did not agree, she was merely thanked. The second contact was made about 2 weeks after the initial one. Each experimenter was armed with a list of houses which had been compiled by the other experimenter. This list contained all four experimental conditions and the controls, and, of course, there was no way for the second experimenter to know which condition the subject had been in. At this second contact, all subjects were asked the same thing: Would they put a large sign concerning safe driving in their front yard? The experimenter identified himself as being from the Citizens for Safe Driving, a different group from the original safe-driving group (although it is likely that most subjects who had been in the safe-driving conditions did not notice the difference). The subject was shown a picture of a very large sign reading “Drive Carefully” placed in front of an attractive house. The picture was taken so that the sign obscured much of the front of the house and completely concealed the doorway. It was rather poorly lettered. The subject was told that: “Our men will come out and install it and later come and remove it. It makes just a small hole in your lawn, but if this is unacceptable to you we have a special mount which will make no hole.” She was asked to put the sign up for a week or a week and a half. If the subject agreed, she was told that more names than necessary were being gathered and if her home were to be used she would be contacted in a few weeks. The experimenter recorded the subject’s response and this ended the experiment. Results First, it should be noted that there were no large differences among the experimental conditions in the percentages of subjects agreeing to the first request. Although somewhat more subjects agreed to post the “Keep California Beautiful” sign and somewhat fewer to sign the beauty petition, none of these differences approach significance. The important figures are the number of subjects in each group who agreed to the large request. These are presented in Table 18.2. The figures for the four experimental groups include all subjects who were approached the first time, regardless of whether they agreed to the small request. As noted above, a few subjects were lost because they could not be reached for the second request, and, of course these are not included in the table. It is immediately apparent that the first request tended to increase the degree of compliance with the second request. Whereas fewer than 20 percent of the controls agreed to put the large sign on their lawn, more than 55 percent of the experimental subjects agreed, with more than 45 percent being the lowest degree of compliance for any experimental condition. As expected, those conditions in which the two requests were similar in terms of either issue or task produced significantly more compliance than did the controls (χ2s range from 3.67, p<.07 to 15.01,p<.001). A somewhat unexpected result is that the fourth condition, in which the first request had relatively little in common with the second request, also produced more compliance than the controls (χ2=3.40, p<.08). In other words, regardless of whether or not the two requests are similar in either issue or task, simply having the first request tends to increase the likelihood that the subject will comply with a subsequent, larger request. And this holds even when the two requests are made by different people several weeks apart. A second point of interest is a comparison among the four experimental conditions. As expected, the Same Issue-Same Task condition produced more compliance than any of the other two-contact conditions, but the difference is not significant (χ2s range from 2.7 to 2.9). If only those subjects who agreed to the first request are considered, the same pattern holds. Discussion To summarize the results, the first study indicated that carrying out a small request increased the likelihood that the subject would agree to a similar larger request made by the same person. The second study showed that this effect was quite strong even when a different person made the larger request, and the two requests were quite dissimilar. How may these results be explained? Two possibilities were outlined previously. The matter-of-principle idea which centered on the particular type of action was not supported by the data, since the similarity of the tasks did not make an appreciable difference in degree of compliance. The notion of involvement, as described previously, also had difficulty accounting for some of the findings. The basic idea was that once someone has agreed to any action, no matter how small, he tends to feel more involved than he did before. This involvement may center around the particular person making the first request or the particular issue. This is quite consistent with the results of the first study (with the exception of the two control groups which as discussed previously were rather ambiguous) and with the Similar-Issue groups in the second experiment. This idea of involvement does not, however, explain the increase in compliance found in the two groups in which the first and second request did not deal with the same issue. It is possible that in addition to or instead of this process a more general and diffuse mechanism underlies the increase in compliance. What may occur is a change in the person’s feelings about getting involved or about taking action. Once he has agreed to a request, his attitude may change. He may become, in his own eyes, the kind of person who does this sort of thing, who agrees to requests made by strangers, who takes action on things he believes in, who cooperates with good causes. The change in attitude could be toward any aspect of the situation or toward the whole business of saying “yes.” The basic idea is that the change in attitude need not be toward any particular issue or person or activity, but may be toward activity or compliance in general. This would imply that an increase in compliance would not depend upon the two contacts being made by the same person, or concerning the same issue or involving the same kind of action. The similarity could be much more general, such as both concerning good causes, or requiring a similar kind of action, or being made by pleasant, attractive individuals. It is not being suggested that this is the only mechanism operating here. The idea of involvement continues to be extremely plausible, and there are probably a number of other possibilities. Unfortunately, the present studies offer no additional data with which to support or refute any of the possible explanations of the effect. These explanations thus remain simply descriptions of mechanisms that might produce an increase in compliance after agreement with a first request. Hopefully, additional research will test these ideas more fully and perhaps also specify other manipulations that produce an increase in compliance without an increase in external pressure. It should be pointed out that the present studies employed what is perhaps a very special type of situation. In all cases the requests were made by presumably nonprofit service organizations. The issues in the second study were deliberately noncontroversial, and it may be assumed that virtually all subjects initially sympathized with the objectives of safe driving and a beautiful California. This is in strong contrast to campaigns which are designed to sell a particular product, political candidate, or dogma. Whether the technique employed in this study would be successful in these other situations remains to be shown. 21 Deindividuation and Anger-Mediated Interracial Aggression: Unmasking Regressive Racism Ronald W. Rogers Steven Prentice-Dunn A factorial experiment investigated the effects of deindividuation, anger, and race-of-victim on aggression displayed by groups of whites. Deindividuating situational cues produced an internal state of deindividuation that mediated aggressive behavior. Deindividuation theories were extended by the finding that the internal state of deindividuation was composed not only of the factors Self-Awareness and Altered Experience, but also Group Cohesiveness, Responsibility, and Time Distortion. As predicted, nonangered whites were less aggressive toward black than white victims, but angered whites were more aggressive toward blacks than whites. Interracial behavior was consistent with new, egalitarian norms if anger was not aroused, but regressed to the old, historical pattern of racial discrimination if anger was aroused. This pattern of interracial behavior was interpreted in terms of a new form of racism: regressive racism. Mob violence that has occurred since the time of the Roman republic has been attributed typically to short-term economic motives and political issues (cf. Rude, 1964). Economic and political motives, however, were inadequate to explain the torture, mutilation, and burning that frequently occurred in outbursts of interracial violence. Lynch mobs convinced social scientists that “the fundamental need was for a better understanding of the causes underlying the resort to mob violence” (Southern Commission on the Study of Lynching, 1931, p. 5). The major purpose of the present experiment was to examine interracial aggression within a group context, especially a context conducive to deindividuation. Deindividuation is a process in which antecedent social conditions lessen self-awareness and reduce concern with evaluation by others, thereby weakening restraints against the expression of undesirable behaviors (e.g., Diener, 1977; Zimbardo, 1970). Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1980) provided the first confirmation of deindividuation theory’s major assumption that deindividuating situational cues produce an internal state of deindividuation that mediates the display of aggressive behavior. The deindividuating cues lowered self-awareness and altered cognitive and affective experiences. This deindividuated state weakened restraints against behaving aggressively that are normally maintained by internal and external norms of social propriety. In the present study, therefore, we hypothesized that deindividuating situational cues would produce more aggression than individuating cues, and that an internal state of deindividuation would mediate the effects of deindividuating cues on antisocial behavior. Many problematic forms of interracial conflict occur in group contexts. The major contribution to our understanding of interracial aggression has come from the Donnersteins’ research program (cf. Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1976), which has focused on situations involving one aggressor and one victim; no published studies have examined interracial aggression displayed by a group of whites toward a black individual. The present experiment examined interracial aggression in a group setting in which angry aggressors were deindividuated. This social situation approximates many naturalistic situations. Studies of interracial aggression have consistently shown that the strength of aggression directed toward a different-race victim varies as a function of, for example, potential censure (Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1973), threatened retaliation (Donnerstein, Donnerstein, Simon, & Ditrichs, 1972), and the victim’s expression of suffering (Baron, 1979; Griffin & Rogers, 1977). Donnerstein and Donnerstein (1976) have reported that, in a variety of conditions, white subjects manifest less direct aggression toward black than white victims. Griffin and Rogers (1977) interpreted their white subjects’ more lenient treatment of blacks than whites in terms of “reverse discrimination” (cf. Dutton, 1976): To avoid appearing prejudiced, whites treated blacks more favorably (i.e., less aggressively) than they treated whites. Reverse discrimination is the overt manifestation of white people’s viewing themselves as egalitarian and feeling threatened by the prospect of appearing prejudiced. Blacks would not be expected to display reverse discrimination, and studies of blacks’ aggression have confirmed they do not (Wilson & Rogers, 1975). Both blacks’ and whites’ behavior, however, can be traced to the same underlying source: Both races seem to be “reacting against the older, traditional patterns for their races” (Griffin & Rogers, 1977, p. 157). For whites, the historical pattern of appropriate behavior toward blacks was racial discrimination and inferior treatment. Although whites may have negative attitudes on several specific issues such as blacks’ economic gains (Ross, Vanneman, & Pettigrew, 1976) and race riots (Davis & Fine, 1975), survey data indicate that the new norm is an egalitarian view of the races (Brigham & Wrightsman, 1982; Campbell, 1971; Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978). This new norm is especially prevalent among college students. Surveys at the university where the present study was conducted confirmed that the current norm among white students is an unprejudiced, egalitarian view of the races (Rosenberg).1 Theoretically, reverse discrimination is a product of this relatively new egalitarian view of blacks (Dutton, 1976). For blacks, the historical pattern of appropriate interracial behavior was to inhibit aggression toward whites and to displace it to fellow blacks. The new norms favor more militancy, antiwhite attitudes, and overt hostility toward whites (Caplan, 1970; Wilson & Rogers, 1975). The new norms for blacks and whites represent dramatic departures from the deep-rooted values of the past. Both races have been found to act on these new norms if they are not emotionally aroused by a verbal insult. Thus, blacks are more aggressive toward white than black targets (Wilson & Rogers, 1975), and whites are more aggressive toward white than black targets (Griffin & Rogers, 1977). But what happens to behavior based on these new norms if the aggressors are insulted? Baron (1979) reported a three-way interaction effect among race-of-victim, insult, and pain cues. An examination of the conditions comparable with those to be studied in the present experiment (i.e., Baron’s no-pain-cues condition) indicated that when white subjects were not insulted, black victims received less aggression than white victims (i.e., reverse discrimination); if insulted, the level of aggression expressed toward blacks increased, but did not significantly differ from the level directed toward the white victims. Since we wish to understand interracial aggression in general and not merely whites’ behavior toward blacks, let us also examine blacks’ aggression toward whites. To interpret the interracial aggressive behavior of blacks, Wilson and Rogers (1975) suggested that emotional arousal produced a regression to a chronologically earlier mode of responding. The data from that experiment were interpreted as evidence that blacks’ behavior could be understood as a product of “the conflict between new militant norms and the residue of oppression” (p. 857). Anger-mediated aggression should not be as firmly under the cognitive control of new norms of in-group solidarity and pride. The black students had been exposed to the traditional values of in-group rejection and out-group preference for many years before the appearance of the Black Power movement. They undoubtedly retained some residual symptoms. Thus, when they became emotionally aroused, the new values, which had not been fully internalized, gave way to the older, more traditional pattern. Similarly, the young white adults in the present study had been exposed during their socialization to the older tradition of belief in black inferiority. The foregoing considerations converge to suggest an interaction between race-of-victim and insult variables. If whites are not angered, we predicted that they would display reverse discrimination, directing weaker attacks against blacks than against whites. If angered, we hypothesized that whites would regress to the traditional pattern, displaying more aggression toward blacks than toward whites. One class of deindividuation theories suggests that victim characteristics (e.g., different race) become less salient under conditions of deindividuation. For Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (1952), the defining characteristic of deindividuation is that individuals are not paid attention to as individuals. As elaborated by Zimbardo (1970), deindividuated behavior is not under the controlling influence of usual discriminative stimuli; it is “unresponsive to features of the situation, the target, the victim” (p. 259). Based upon this theoretical position, any differential treatment of different-race victims should vanish when group members become deindividuated. On the other hand, Diener’s (1980) theory of less extreme forms of deindividuation postulates that crowd members are more responsive to external stimuli as a result of the focus of attention shifting away from the self. It is plausible to infer that any differential treatment of different-race victims should be enhanced by deindividuation. Therefore, the present study was designed to test these two alternative predictions. Verbal attack, or insult, is a potent and well-established antecedent of aggression in dyadic situations involving one aggressor and one victim (see review by Baron, 1977); however, the effects of anger in a group context have not been investigated. Virtually all studies of deindividuation and aggression have involved unprovoked aggression. Yet, anger adds an important theoretical and applied dimension to our understanding of mob violence. It was hypothesized that insult, or anger arousal, would facilitate the expression of aggression among members of small groups. One class of deindividuation theories postulates that deindividuated behavior is not influenced by usual discriminative stimuli. It may be derived from these theories that prior insult would have less impact on deindividuated than individuated group members. On the other hand, it may be derived from Diener’s (1980) theory that “because self-regulation is minimized or eliminated the deindividuated person is more susceptible to the influences of immediate stimuli, emotions [e.g., anger], and motivations” (p. 211). There are several limitations to deriving predictions of interaction effects from these two classes of deindividuation theories. First, neither theory explicitly states how the variables of insult or different-race victim would interact with deindividuation. Thus, other interpretations are possible. Second, the form of the interaction effect may vary as a function of the strength of the deindividuation state. The present study is certainly not an experimentum crucis, but perhaps it can shed light on the interaction of deindividuation and anger-mediated interracial aggression. Method Design and Subjects A 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design was employed with three between-subjects manipulations: (a) deindividuating cues versus individuating cues, (b) white versus black victim, and (c) no insult versus insult. Ninety-six male introductory psychology students participated in the experiment to earn extra credit. Twelve subjects were randomly assigned to each cell. Apparatus The shock apparatuses were modified Buss aggression machines connected to a polygraph. Each of the four aggression machines had 10 pushbutton switches that could be depressed to deliver “shocks” of progressively increasing intensity. Of course, shocks were not actually delivered. A Grason-Stadler noise generator (Model 901A) was used to produce white noise in the deindividuating cues condition. Procedure The procedure was highly similar to one we had used previously (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980). Subjects arrived in groups of five; four were naive participants and one was our assistant. The study was explained as a combination of two experiments. The subjects had signed up for an experiment entitled “Behavior Modification” and were to be tested together. Our assistant, ostensibly another introductory psychology student, had volunteered for a study labeled “Biofeedback.” After the experimenter determined who had volunteered for each topic, the biofeedback subject was sent to another room to receive detailed instructions for the biofeedback study. After hearing explanations of the concepts of behavior modification and biofeedback, the four white behavior modifiers were told that the response of interest in both studies was heart rate. It was indicated that the biofeedback subject would be attempting to maintain his heart rate at a predesignated, high level. Whenever his heart rate fell below the predetermined level, the behavior modifiers would administer an electric shock. The purpose of having groups of four behavior modifiers was explained as an attempt to establish a laboratory analog of a ward at the local state hospital where behavior modifiers actually worked in small groups. We explained to all subjects that they received their extra credit points for simply showing up and that they could discontinue at any time. Each subject was asked if he had any questions about or any objections to the use of electric shock. All questions were answered and no one declined to participate. In addition, written informed consent was obtained. Two mild sample shocks were administered to the behavior modifiers (i.e., the subjects) via finger electrode. The shocks were from Switches 4 (.3 mA) and 6 (.45 mA) on the aggression machine and each lasted for 1 sec. These samples were administered to convince the subjects that the apparatus really worked and to give them some idea of the shocks they would be delivering. The behavior modification subjects were then taken to an adjoining room, seated at aggression machines with partitions that blocked observation of others’ responses (thus, responses were experimentally independent), and given instructions for operating the shock apparatus. Each time the biofeedback subject’s heart rate fell below the predetermined level, a signal light would be illuminated on their panels. It was explained that the higher the level chosen and the longer the switch was depressed, the stronger the shock administered would be. The “shock” received by the biofeedback subject was alleged to be the average of the intensities and durations selected by the four behavior modifiers. The final instruction given to the subjects was that any of the 10 shock switches would be sufficient for the purposes of the experiment. It was explained that the equipment had been designed with different shock intensities because we had not known how strong the shocks would have to be to increase heart rate. We explained we had discovered that the different shocks all had equal effects on the biofeedback subject’s heart rate, so the naive subjects could choose any intensity they wished on each trial. These instructions were designed to eliminate any potential altruistic motivation, and they made clear that use of the lowest possible intensity on every trial would fulfill the requirements of the experiment. Use of any intensity greater than “1” would only result in additional pain to the biofeedback subject. Each group was presented with 20 signal lights over the course of the experiment. The interval between the appearance of any two signals was initially chosen randomly, ranging from 20 to 50 seconds. The intervals were then held constant across subsequent trials. The experimenter then left to bring the biofeedback subject from a waiting room to the experimental room. The doors were left open, so that subjects heard the final instructions given by the experimenter to the biofeedback subject about his role. Thus, the naive subjects would easily hear, but not see, their future victim. Experimental Manipulations The first manipulation attempted to differentiate maximally between deindividuating situational cues and individuating ones. In the deindividuating cues condition, the experimenter did not address subjects by name. They were informed that the shocks they used were of no interest to the experimenter and that he would not know which intensities and durations they selected (anonymity to the experimenter). Subjects were further informed that they would not meet or see the biofeedback subject (anonymity to the victim). The experimenter indicated that he assumed full responsibility for the biofeedback subject’s well-being (no responsibility for harm-doing). Finally, white noise was played at 65 dB (SPL) in the dimly lit room under the guise of eliminating any extraneous noise from the hall or other experimental rooms (arousal). Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1980) have shown that such manipulations decrease the subjects’ feelings of identifiability and self-awareness. In the individuating cues condition, the subjects wore name tags and were addressed on a first-name basis. As in Zimbardo’s (1970) study, the “unique reactions” of each subject were emphasized, and the experimenter expressed his interest in the shock intensities and durations used by the subjects. Subjects were informed that they would meet the biofeedback subject on completing the study. It was emphasized that the biofeedback subject’s well-being was the responsibility of each individual behavior modifier. The room was well-lit and no white noise was broadcast. A second independent variable, race of victim, was manipulated through the use of four experimental assistants, two whites and two blacks. Assistants were assigned to the treatment cells randomly, with the exception that they appeared an equal number of times in each treatment combination. Analyzing this “assistants” factor as an additional variable in the factorial design yielded no main or interaction effects. Thus, the data from the assistants of each race were pooled in the analyses reported below. The third independent variable was introduced when the behavior modifiers overheard a conversation in an adjoining room between the experimenter and the biofeedback subject. This conversation took place immediately after the naive subjects received their instructions. This insult manipulation was operationalized as a series of questions and answers between the experimenter and the biofeedback subject (i.e., our assistant). Care was taken that the insulting remarks applied to all of the subjects and were devoid of any racial content or connotation. In the insult condition, the biofeedback subject, when asked if he objected to the behavior modifiers shocking him, responded that the equipment looked complicated and he wondered if people who appeared as dumb as the behavior modifiers did could follow instructions properly. When the experimenter reiterated the biofeedback subject’s option to withdraw from the experiment, the biofeedback subject answered that he hoped the behavior modifiers were not as stupid as they appeared. Finally, when asked by the experimenter if he knew the behavior modifiers, the biofeedback subject said that he didn’t know them personally, but that he knew their type; he could tell that they thought they were “hot stuff.” In the no insult condition, the biofeedback subject simply stated that he had no objections to these particular behavior modifiers shocking him. Postexperiment Session Following the last shock trial, subjects completed a questionnaire containing manipulations-check items (10-point Likert rating scales) and 17 items tapping an internal state of deindividuation. A second questionnaire assessed suspicions about the experiment. Five subjects suspected that shocks were not actually delivered, two subjects correctly guessed the race-of-victim hypothesis, and four subjects believed that the insult manipulation was staged. These subjects were deleted from the data analyses. The data in this unequal n design were analyzed with the complete least squares model recommended by Overall, Spiegel, and Cohen (1975) because this model meets the criterion of estimating the same parameters as those estimated in an orthogonal design. After each experimental session, each subject was thanked and given a full debriefing that was based on Mills’s (1976) recommendations. Finally, a questionnaire was given to each student in a stamped envelope addressed to the Psychology Department’s Committee on Ethics. These anonymous responses were returned by 58 percent of the subjects. Ninetyeight percent of the respondents understood why the deception had been necessary and did not resent it. One subject (2% of the sample) indicated that he did not think the deception was necessary, and another subject stated that his participation had not been voluntary. Neither of these two subjects explained their responses in the space provided on the questionnaire. Fortunately, both of these students, along with every other respondent (100% of the sample), indicated that (a) the experiment should be allowed to continue and (b) that they would be willing to participate in another similar experiment. Results Aggression Deindividuating cues. A multivariate analysis of variance was performed on the sums of the shock intensity scores and the shock duration scores. This analysis yielded a main effect associated with the situational cues manipulation, Wilks’s lambda (Λ)=.843, F(2,152)=6.79, p<.001. Univariate analyses of variance disclosed main effects for the situational cues variable on both shock intensity, F(1,77)=12.01, p<.001, and on shock duration, F(1,77)=5.37, p<.03. Compared with subjects in the individuating cues condition, subjects exposed to the deindividuating cues used higher shock intensities (Ms=5.3 and 6.4, respectively) for longer durations (Ms=1.6 and 2.8 sec, respectively). Neither of the two predicted two-way interaction effects with deindividuating cues were significant (Fs<1).