Tome v. US - Intro to Evidence

Tome v. US 513 U.S. 150 (1995) Procedural History: Tome was charged in a one count indictment with the withthe felony of sexual abuse of a child, his own daughter, four at the time ofthe alleged crime. Tome was tried by a jury in District Court and was found guilty. The prosecution's theory was that Tome committed sexual assaults upon the child while she was in his custody and that the crime was disclosed when the child was spending vacation time with her mother. The defense argued that the allegations were concocted so the child would not be returned to her father. At trial A.T., then 6 1/2 years old, was the Government's first witness. For the most part, her direct testimony consisted of one- and two-word answers to a series of leading questions. Crossexamination took place over two trial days. The defense asked A.T.348 questions. On the first day A.T. answered all the questions posed to her on general, background subjects. After AT testified, the government produced six witnesses who testified about a total of seven statements made by AT describing the alleged sexual assaults. ATÕs out of court statements, recounted by the six witnesses were offered by the governmentunder 801(d)(1)(B). The trial court admitted all of the statements over defense counselÕs objection, accepting the GovernmentÕs argument that they rebutted the implicit charge that ATÕs testimony was motivated by a desire to live with her mother. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, adopting the governmentÕs argument that all of ATÕs out of court statements were admissible under 801(d))(1)(B) even though they had been made after ATÕs alleged motiveto fabricate arose. Issue: At issue is the interpretation of a provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence bearing upon the admissibility of statements, made by a declarant who testifies as a witness, that are consistent with the testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of a Òrecent fabrication or improper influence or motive.Ó The question is whether out-of-court consistent statements made after the alleged fabrication, or after the alleged improper influence or motive arose, are admissible under the Rule. CourtÕs Reasoning and Policy: The prevailing common-law rule for more than a century before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence was that a prior consistent statement introduced to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive was admissible if the statement had been made before the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive came into being, but it was inadmissible if made afterwards. 801(d)(1)(B) embodies the temporal requirement. 801 defines prior inconsistent statements as non- hearsay only if they are offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. A consistent statement meeting the requirements of the Rule is thusplaced in the same category as a declarantÕs inconsistent statement made under oath in another proceeding, or prior identification testimony, or admission by a party opponent. Admissibility under the Rules is confined to those statements offered to rebut a charge ofrecent fabrications or improper influence or motive. In the present context, the question whether ATÕs out of court statements rebutted the alleged link between her desire to be with her mother and her testimony, not whether theysuggested that ATÕs in court testimony was true. Prior consistent statements carry little rebuttal force when most other types of impeachment are involved. Evidence that a witness made consistent statements after the alleged motive to fabricate arose may suggest in some degree that the in court testimony is truthful, and thus suggest in some degree that the testimony did not result from improper influence. The purpose of confining the types of impeachment that open the door to rebuttal by introducing consistent statements become unclear. The somewhat particular language of the Rule bears close similarity to the language usedun many of the common law cases that describe the premotive requirements. The language of the Rule, in its concentration on rebutting charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive to the exclusion of other forms of impeachment, as well asin its use of wording that follows the language of the common-law cases, suggests that itwas intended to carry over the common-law premotive rule. 801(d)(1)(B) embodies the common law premotive requirements is confirmed by an examination of the Advisory Committee notes. The Notes give no indication that 801(d)(1) (B) abandoned the premotive requirements. Ct doesnÕt think the drafters intended to scuttle the whole premotive requirement and rationale without so much as a whisper of explanation. Hearsay evidence is often relevant. Relevance is not the sole criterion of admissibility.That certain out of court statements may be relevant does not dispose of the question whether they are admissible. The Advisory Committee was explicit in rejecting a balancing approach to hearsay. The case before us illustrates some of the important considerations supporting the Rule aswe interpret it, especially in criminal cases. If the Rule were to permit the introduction of prior statements as substantive evidence to rebut every implicit charge that a witness' in- court testimony results from recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, the whole emphasis of the trial could shift to the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones. The present case illustrates the point. In response to a rather weak charge that A.T.'stestimony was a fabrication created so the child could remain with her mother, the Government was permitted to present a parade of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more than recount A.T.'s detailed out-of-court statements to them. Although those statements might have been probative on the question whether the alleged conduct had occurred, they shed but minimal light on whether A.T. had the charged motive to fabricate. At closing argument before the jury, the Government placed great reliance on the prior statements for substantive purposes but did not once seek to use them to rebut the impact of the alleged motive. CONCURRING: the Notes cannot by some power inherent in the draftsmen, change the meaning that the Rules would otherwise bear. DISSENT: issue concerns relevance, not hearsay.