One Lincoln Street (B)

One Lincoln Street (B) Timing, luck, and a little bit of guts. That’s how John Hynes summarized the recipe for success for the One Lincoln Street development. But Linda Douglass, Senior Acquisition Officer for Atlantic-Pacific Property Corp., wasn’t buying John’s latest attempt at humility. Linda had bought more than a billion dollars of property over the past five years and knew all too well the amount of negotiating, positioning, persuasion and determination needed to develop a spec building in Boston. As coffee was being served and their lunch was coming to an end, it was clear that Linda wanted to know more about the construction and financial status of One Lincoln Street, and to pick up on John’s seemingly off-hand comment regarding how Gale & Wentworth might best proceed to monetize the substantial investment value it had created during the development and lease-up phases. Linda had known John for over 15 years dating back to when she was an analyst for a private real estate fund that acquired multi-family apartments. Now at Atlantic-Pacific, this was the first time she had the sense there might be a real transaction for her and John to explore. Background In mid-1999, John Hynes identified − and then secured − a million square foot office development opportunity adjacent to South Station in Boston. The project, known as One Lincoln Street, had been kicking around for years but could never find a way to get off the ground. That is, not until the office market came storming back and John Hynes and his partners at Morgan Stanley stepped into the breach and committed enough capital to complete the required site assemblage and perfect the entitlements necessary to proceed to construction. Beyond that, all that was needed was another $300 million and a tenant or two. As it turned out, the capital was delivered first courtesy of Midwest State Teachers Retirement System (“STRS”). They, too, believed in the long-term vibrancy of the Boston office market and committed over $150 million of equity to commence construction and secure required construction financing. And to everyone’s surprise, John (with a little help from the overheated Boston office market) actually convinced STRS to flex their investment policies a wee bit and proceed to construction on a speculative basis. That’s when the unexpected occurred. This case was prepared by W. Tod McGrath for the purpose of class discussion. The case describes a hypothetical situation and is not intended to illustrate either effective of ineffective handling of a fiduciary situation. Revised February 2007. So much of John’s time and energy had been spent negotiating the terms and conditions of the site acquisition, construction loan documentation, and joint-venture structure that he hadn’t even begun to seriously engage the marketing effort for the project. Day-in and day-out his focus was on finalizing the papering of the deal so he could break ground and prove to the marketplace that he had a real project. He never expected to have a letter of intent signed for any space in the building before the heavy site work began. And he certainly never expected to receive a call from Commonwealth Avenue Custody Corporation asking if he could quickly respond to an RFP for 700,000 square feet of space before the construction drawings were even submitted to the city for review. But what was really unexpected was the actual signing of a lease with Commonwealth Avenue before the first yard of concrete was poured. And not for 700,000 square feet; but for each and every of the 1,025,000 rentable square feet in the building. Along with the parking garage. For 20 years. With rent bumps. Now that was unexpected.1 Venture Dynamics You’d think a 20-year lease with AA- rated credit would simplify things. Not necessarily. As John motioned to the waiter for the check, he mentioned to Linda that he had to catch a shuttle to New York for a late afternoon meeting with Morgan Stanley. Despite the project being on schedule, slightly under budget (due to a drop in short-term interest rates), and ready for certificates of occupancy on the first 20 floors, there was a certain restlessness brewing within the venture. MSGW III, the fund that supplied the remaining 10% of the initial equity not otherwise committed by STRS, was strategically reviewing its asset allocations and debating the wisdom of monetizing or selling its equity position in the project. After all, MSGW III was an opportunity fund that advertised a 5-year expected life, and had had a substantial amount of capital committed to One Lincoln Street without any return for over 3 years. While thrilled with the overall outcome of the Commonwealth Avenue lease, the space and capital markets had changed rather dramatically since the initial equity funding. In the space markets, Class-A vacancy rates (including sublease space) increased from under 4% in 1999 to approximately 5%, 10% and 15% in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively. Current (mid 2003) vacancy rates approached 16% (see Exhibit 1). Asking rents for Class-A space had decreased about 25% from about $65 per rentable square foot in 2000 to $50 or less in mid 2003, and most market watchers expected continued decreases throughout the remainder of the year. Current effective rents (incorporating free rent concessions, above-standard tenant improvements, etc.) were now at least 10% lower than asking rents. In the capital markets, interest rates on both long and short term debt instruments had also decreased significantly. Yields on 10-year Treasury securities had decreased from about 6.50% in early 2000 to about 3.75% in mid 2003. Yields on 15 and 20-year Treasury 1 The unusually prolonged closing festivities, however, were not. 2 securities were currently about 4.00% and 4.25%, respectively. The combination of these trends – weakening space market fundamentals and historically low interest rates – made the Morgan Stanley crowd fairly serious about the idea of harvesting profits. And then there was STRS. As part of its ongoing asset management discipline, STRS was similarly reviewing its asset allocations, particularly within regions like greater Boston that had recently exhibited a high degree of both demand and rental rate volatility. Due to its relatively unique leasing profile, STRS was quite comfortable with its investment in One Lincoln Street; so much so that members of the asset management staff routinely joked about transferring their joint-venture interest in One Lincoln Street to the fixed income group in exchange for a few more days of paid vacation. Some others within the asset management group, however, were thinking a bit more seriously. Included within the venture documentation were heavily negotiated provisions relating to mechanisms by which both STRS and MSGW could either acquire each other’s interest in the venture or divest their existing interests. Indeed, one senior asset manager was openly debating the long-term alignment of interest between STRS and MSGW, essentially asking why (now that the building is completed) is MSGW such a good long-term partner? The leasing profile of One Lincoln Street made it exactly the type of asset STRS sought to acquire: one that generated safe, long-term cash flows with predictable built-in growth and little or no future capital expenditures. And STRS was having more than a bit of trouble finding similar type assets, particularly ones that were fairly priced. It was because STRS believed that the negotiated acquisition mechanisms within the venture would deliver fair prices to either party, that some serious discussions had begun regarding triggering the operation of the venture’s Buy/Sell provisions to acquire MSGW’s interest. And, yes, Morgan Stanley (and now Gale & Wentworth) had gotten wind of it. The Buy/Sell Provisions They worked like this: Any time after shell completion, either STRS or MSGW could submit an offer to purchase the other party’s entire equity interest in the development by delivering to the other party a Buy/Sell Offering Notice that included a “Specified Valuation Amount” which the offering party would be willing to pay in cash for one hundred percent (100%) fee ownership of the development; The non-offering party would then have 45 days to notify the offering party whether or not it elected to ƒ sell (as “Seller”) its entire equity interest in the development to the offering party for a price equal to the amount the non-offering party would have received had the development been sold for the Specified Valuation Amount, or 3 ƒ acquire (as “Purchaser”) the entire equity interest in the development of the offering party for a price equal to the amount the offering party would have received had the development been sold for the Specified Valuation Amount; If the non-offering party failed to notify the offering party of its election prior to the 45-day Buy/Sell election period, then the offering party could acquire as Purchaser the entire equity interest of the non-offering party; At the time of either party’s election to purchase, the Purchaser would be required to make a non-refundable deposit to the Seller equal to five percent (5%) of the amount the Seller would otherwise receive; If the Purchaser failed to perform, in breach of its purchase obligation, then the Purchaser would (i) forfeit its five percent (5%) deposit, (ii) be responsible for all closing costs actually incurred (including, without limitation, escrow costs and transfer taxes), and (iii) lose all future rights to trigger the Buy/Sell provisions thereafter; and As a result of the breach of the Purchaser’s obligations, the Seller would have the option, within 30 days of default by the Purchaser, of substituting itself as Purchaser and thereupon have the right to Purchase the other party’s entire equity interest in the development for eighty-five percent (85%) of the amount that the other party would have otherwise received had the development been sold for the Specified Valuation Amount. Trouble in Paradise? On the shuttle to Manhattan, John couldn’t help but think of how much he wanted to preserve an ownership interest in the asset he had worked so hard to create. From his perspective, he was in the development business for the long haul – not the quick flip. He understood only too well that a development deal like One Lincoln Street happens once in a career – and only if your timing’s damn good and you’re damn lucky and you’ve got a lot of guts. The guys at Morgan Stanley didn’t understand that; or even if they did, they couldn’t care less about his personal business philosophy. He knew the conversation would be about “harvesting” and “rebalancing” and “posting numbers”. And he knew he wasn’t going to be happy with a decision to sell out to STRS. Unfortunately, the meeting went pretty much as he predicted. Morgan Stanley reiterated their understanding that STRS was preparing a Buy/Sell Offering Notice that contained the required Specified Valuation Amount, and that such Specified Valuation Amount was being established through an independent MAI appraisal process (see Exhibit 2 for recent building sales information). In addition, Morgan Stanley presented all of their high-brow reasons for why they needed to cash out and how they would try to position STRS to get the highest possible valuation for One Lincoln Street. But despite all the pinstriped bravado, one thing was clear from the meeting: if MSGW didn’t like the Specified Valuation Amount offered to them by STRS, they weren’t in a very good 4 position to come up with over a half billion dollars in 45 days to exercise their option to buy out STRS’ interest. They didn’t have a plan for that; they didn’t even have a plan for a plan. At least not until John Hynes put a call into Linda Douglass from the shuttle back to Boston to set up a meeting at his office for early the following morning. Plan B Linda arrived at John’s office at 8:00 am. She was more than a little curious as to why he wanted to meet so quickly. Before she even had the time to put milk in her coffee, John had already launched into a discourse on the status of the One Lincoln Street development and the impending ownership issues within the venture. Then John pointedly asked Linda if Atlantic-Pacific had the financial capacity to make a credible purchase offer for the property and if she was willing to conditionally explore such an acquisition. She responded “Yes. Yes. And what exactly do you mean by conditionally?” John explained “conditionally”: he was willing to give Linda an exclusive opportunity to submit an informal purchase offer to acquire a majority ownership interest in One Lincoln Street. Because he was presenting this acquisition opportunity exclusively to Atlantic-Pacific, he made it very clear to Linda that any informal purchase offer she submitted should be considered as “take-it-or-leave-it.” A formal purchase offer, if subsequently requested by MSGW and submitted by Atlantic-Pacific, would be in the same amount as the informal purchase offer and would, necessarily, be a “backstop” offer: that is, it would be submitted to MSGW on the same basis that STRS would be required to submit its Specified Valuation Amount for the development (i.e., 100% fee ownership); if such offer were greater than or equal to the Specified Valuation Amount submitted by STRS, MSGW would exercise its option to acquire STRS’ interest at a price equal to what STRS would otherwise receive if the development were sold for the Specified Valuation Amount; the extent, if any, to which Atlantic-Pacific’s formal purchase offer exceeded the Specified Valuation Amount would be paid to MSGW in cash at closing; and MSGW, or its assignee, could continue to own its current equity interest in the venture (or could elect to be partially cashed-out on a proportionate basis) and would continue to manage the development. John was confident he could get Morgan Stanley to participate, at some level, within that framework. This was his opportunity to both harvest profits and stay in the deal. Simple enough, right? Simple, but not that simple. Linda quickly pointed out to John that, as a verticallyintegrated public real estate operating company, Atlantic-Pacific would never make a 5 substantial acquisition without controlling the management of the asset and being fairly compensated to do so. If John wanted a formal “backstop” purchase offer from AtlanticPacific, he could forget about retaining management or any portion of the management fee (of which an estimated 75% was net profit after allocated staff cost). After a somewhat long and uncomfortable silence, John agreed to Linda’s rather firm position, but felt obligated to impose a few conditions of his own: namely, that (i) Atlantic-Pacific’s informal purchase offer was due within 10 calendar days, irrespective of when, or if, STRS ever delivered a Buy/Sell Offering Notice, (ii) as part of its formal purchase offer, Atlantic-Pacific would be required to indemnify MSGW against any and all financial loss or damage relating to Atlantic-Pacific’s failure to perform under such purchase offer, if such offer were formally accepted by MSGW, and (iii) based on Commonwealth Avenue’s credit, the absence of future landlord-funded capital expenditures, and the built-in rent steps throughout the initial 20-year lease term, he thought her offer price should start with a “7”. Linda wasn’t exactly sure how to evaluate John’s last condition, but she thought she understood the first two. Linda left John’s office with an abstract of the 400+-page office lease with Commonwealth Avenue Custody Corporation and a promise to immediately receive mountains of due diligence materials on the legal and physical status of the building. As she walked back to her office, she thought about two things: one, the need to quickly marshal the resources of her acquisition team to commence the necessary due diligence; and two, the need to quickly review the lease abstract and attached projection of Property Before-Tax Cash Flow (see Exhibit 3). She’d done this many times before so she knew where to start and what to focus on. The Lease and Lessee The lease executed with Commonwealth Avenue Custody Corp. was a 20-year full service gross lease with tax and operating expense stops that ensured the lessor that virtually all increases in property taxes and operating expenses throughout the 20-year term of the lease would be fully reimbursed by Commonwealth Avenue as additional required rent. Under the terms of the lease, MSGW had provided a fixed tenant improvement allowance to Commonwealth Avenue (which had already been fully dispersed for construction of interior improvements), paid all required brokerage commissions, and agreed to limit its annual property management fees to about 0.9% of Effective Gross Income. The scheduled commencement date for the lease was only a few months away. With over $6 trillion of assets under custody and more than three-quarters of a trillion dollars of assets under management, Commonwealth Avenue Custody Corporation was one of the leading servicers of financial assets in the world. Based in Boston, Commonwealth Avenue occupied well over a million square feet in the greater Boston area and was the sole tenant of One Lincoln Street. Commonwealth Avenue was publicly-traded and had an issuer credit rating of AA- by Standard & Poor’s, enabling it to borrow money in the long-term public bond markets at approximately 85 basis points over comparable-term U.S. Treasury securities. 6 Atlantic-Pacific Property Corporation Linda started with Atlantic-Pacific shortly after it went public in the mid ‘90’s. As an acquisitions officer working for a publicly-traded REIT, Linda’s responsibility was to understand not only the micro-level dynamics of specific property markets, but to apply proven capital budgeting techniques and required financial accounting conventions to arrive at investment decisions that added value to Atlantic-Pacific’s growing franchise. An important part of Linda’s responsibility was to thoroughly understand the financial performance of Atlantic-Pacific and to integrate that understanding into value-enhancing capital investment decisions. Selected summary (historical) financial data for AtlanticPacific is presented in Exhibit 4. In her frequent discussions with Atlantic-Pacific’s CFO, Linda had become aware of the CFO’s perspective and concerns relating to large deployments of investment capital. For any investment over $100 million, she’d been informed that the company would be required to issue both additional equity and unsecured debt. Atlantic-Pacific’s stock price had just recently regained the $44 share price it enjoyed about three years earlier. Over the past two years, Atlantic-Pacific had been very cautious about issuing new equity; however, after recently acquiring assets on its unsecured credit line, it found itself with a debt-to-total market capitalization ratio of approximately 50% − a threshold it didn’t really want to exceed. Any significant acquisition of property would most likely be financed with 50% equity (through a secondary public offering with an underwriters’ spread of 5%) and 50% unsecured debt which Atlantic-Pacific could issue at about 175 basis points over comparable-term treasuries, excluding financing fees and closing costs of about 25 basis points (see Exhibit 5). Linda was also painfully aware of the fact that the company’s primary investment markets had softened rather significantly. As a result, the company’s “same portfolio” year-over-year cash-basis NOI growth rate had decreased from about 6% three years ago, to about 3% two years ago, to virtually no growth last year. Expectations for 2003 were for negative NOI growth (contraction) of about 1%. According to the CFO, Atlantic-Pacific’s FFO per share, which had grown significantly over the past five years, was also now likely to plateau due to deteriorating property market fundamentals and the relatively small amount of existing secured mortgage debt available to be refinanced by the company at significantly lower rates. A few stock analysts were even reducing their estimates of Atlantic-Pacific’s FFO per share to slightly below the $4.00 level achieved in 2002. Based on increased market-based tenant improvement allowances and other structural characteristics of the company’s assets and liabilities, Atlantic-Pacific’s operating cash flow, as measured by its Funds Available for Distribution (FAD), was currently estimated at about 80% of its Funds From Operations (FFO), or about $3.20 per share. The analysts that estimated REIT Net Asset Values (NAV) were currently in the range of $39 to $42 for Atlantic-Pacific’s shares. 7 Screening Based on everything that was happening at both the property and corporate levels, Linda knew the CFO was every bit as anxious to evaluate her preliminary bid as John Hynes was. Yet before taking the time to complete a comprehensive purchase offer analysis, she quickly put the cash-basis financial projection for the property (attached to the lease abstract given to her) through her first feasibility screen. The purpose of this screen was to determine if, at John Hynes’ purported $700 million minimum offer price, a hypothetical acquisition of a 100% fee ownership interest would generate a pro forma incremental cash surplus or deficiency to Atlantic-Pacific’s shareholders based on the assumed 50/50 debt/equity capitalization and current dividend payout levels (see Exhibit 6). Her next financial feasibility screen was the financial reporting analog, or pro forma accretion/dilution to Funds From Operation (FFO)2 per share. For this acquisition, she would specifically assume that the only additional company-level general and administrative (G&A) expense would be (i) the building personnel costs included in the administrative cost line item of the property operating expense budget (Exhibit 3) and (ii) direct overhead costs equal to about 25% of the annual property management fee (implying the remaining 75% of the fee would be a new profit center to the company). To prepare this accounting-based analysis, she knew she would need to adjust the Base Rental Revenue payable by Commonwealth Avenue to reflect the financial reporting conventions under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). These financial reporting conventions require that: all contractual Base Rental Revenue (and any applicable free rent periods) be reported on a straight-line basis over the term of the lease, as opposed to the manner in which the specific annual contractual Base Rental payments would actually be received by Atlantic-Pacific, and the present value3 of the “above-market” portion of the annual contractual Base Rents be amortized on a straight-line basis as a deduction in arriving at Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA). In this regard, Linda believed – and felt Atlantic-Pacific’s independent auditors may also believe – that, over the twenty-year term of the lease, the annual contractual Base Rents per square foot (reflecting the periodic rent bumps) were no less than about $15 2 For purposes of this financial feasibility screen, Linda knew she could quickly estimate the property’s contribution to the company’s existing annual FFO, as: (i) the property’s annual Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (under GAAP), (ii) plus the “profit center” portion of the annual property management fee, (iii) less any incremental annual interest expense incurred in connection with acquiring the property, (iv) less any amortization of applicable financing fees and costs. 3 Computed using an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate reflecting the risk associated with collecting the contractual annual Base Rents. 8 per square foot per year above current market lease pricing for leases of comparable term. Bid Preparation – The Final Frontier Putting financial assumptions through preliminary feasibility screens is one thing; valuing a major real estate asset with conviction is quite another. Linda had a lot of information − and a lot of issues − to synthesize. For example, she knew that an offer price of $700 million or more would imply a very low acquisition cap rate, even lower than the cap rates observed during the height of the market when the lease with Commonwealth Avenue was signed (cap rates on recent multi-tenant office building sales in Boston were in the 7.0% range). Linda also realized that while Commonwealth Avenue’s lease had contractual rent steps, it also had contractually limited rent growth. Then again, market rents in their core markets had been deteriorating and this asset might now represent an excellent long-term performance hedge for their portfolio. She then thought for a moment about some of the challenges associated with articulating those possibly conflicting arguments as part of her pricing recommendation, both to senior management and, ultimately, the REIT analyst community if Atlantic-Pacific ended up owning the building. Linda knew she had to try to explicitly incorporate the somewhat unique characteristics of a 20-year lease and Commonwealth Avenue’s investment grade credit rating into the valuation of the asset on a stand-alone basis as well as an addition to Atlantic-Pacific’s existing portfolio cash flows. Linda understood that, from a default and loss perspective, the lease with Commonwealth Avenue was not quite the equivalent of a bond; however, she also knew that the uncertainty associated with collecting the annual rent from Commonwealth Avenue would be much less than that associated with collecting the annual rent from many of the tenants in other buildings owned by Atlantic-Pacific. Senior management at Atlantic-Pacific believed that the legal structure of a lease generally imposed more obligations on a landlord than a bondholder in terms of being entitled to demand payment. That said, they had often argued that a leaseholder was more likely to get paid than a bondholder during the early stages of a tenant’s financial distress (in order for the tenant to keep the doors open and remain in business), but once a bankruptcy petition was filed by the tenant, the leaseholder (as an unsecured creditor) was likely to receive at least a third less in terms of percentage recovery than were bondholders (as secured creditors). This was primarily due to the tenant’s right to reject the lease as part of a confirmed reorganization plan under the federal bankruptcy code. Based on this reasoning, Linda figured that an additional 25 to 50 basis point premium over the yield on Commonwealth Avenue’s long term bonds was warranted when trying to determine the value of the Commonwealth Avenue lease. There just seemed to be a lot of basic questions that were a little harder to answer on this deal than others she had worked on. For example: How might Commonwealth Avenue’s Right-of-First Offer-on-Sale affect her valuation of the property? That right provides that: 9 ƒ If the Landlord wishes to sell the property, it must first notify Commonwealth Avenue. Commonwealth Avenue then has 60 days to review the property and make an offer to purchase it. ƒ The Landlord is free to accept or reject Commonwealth Avenue’s offer. ƒ However, should the Landlord reject Commonwealth Avenue’s offer, it is free to sell the property to a third-party purchaser only if the sales price offered by such third-party purchaser is at least 2% greater than the price offered by Commonwealth Avenue. What could the building be sold for in 20 years when the lease expired? The Commonwealth Avenue lease contains two 10-year renewal options (applicable to its entire premises); the first of which is at 95% of Fair Market Rent, the second at 100%. What’s the probability that Commonwealth Avenue would exercise its first renewal option? If such renewal option(s) weren’t exercised, what would an owner have to reasonably expect to incur in terms of vacancy and tenant improvement and commission costs in connection with re-leasing the entire building? Where would market rents and related operating and capital expenses be in 20 years? To Linda, twenty years seemed like a pretty long time; yet to her CFO, twenty weeks seemed like an eternity. Based on Commonwealth Avenue’s twenty-year lease term, what effect, if any, could arranging debt financing for a term in excess of ten years have on her determination of value for the building. And the likely financial reporting impact on FFO per share – which is nothing more than an accounting fiction – how important is that really? Lot’s of important questions to ponder when you’re the Senior Acquisition Officer. And in short order, she knew she’d have to be able to respond to all of them in front of the investment committee. Quite simply, she had to prepare a bid on the largest potential acquisition of her career, and defend it on both a cash and financial reporting basis. All things considered, this was one of those days when Linda wondered aloud why she didn’t just stick with apartments. 10 Exhibit 1 Boston Office Market: Historical Class-A Vacancy and Asking Rents Class-A Vacancy Rate Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 (mid.) Mean 15.3% 14.5% 12.8% 9.5% 6.3% 3.5% 4.8% 3.5% 3.8% 11.5% 9.5% 10.0% 10.0% 14.0% 16.0% 17.3% 19.0% 17.0% 15.1% 13.0% 10.5% 7.5% 6.0% 4.2% 3.8% 4.8% 10.5% 15.0% 15.9% 10.5% Class-A Asking Rent PSF $14.00 12.00 12.00 14.00 16.00 20.00 22.00 25.00 30.00 35.00 38.00 42.00 44.00 50.00 55.00 40.00 30.00 25.00 26.00 27.00 30.00 34.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 65.00 60.00 50.00 45.00 Exhibit 2 Boston Office Market: Recent Sales Activity Purchase Price Rentable Square Footage Price PSF 99 Summer Street $68,300,000 272,000 $251.10 2003 John Hancock Tower Complex 910,000,000 2,885,000 315.42 2003 54,650,000 176,000 310.51 2003 109,230,000 274,000 398.65 2002 89,000,000 407,000 218.67 2002 122,627,000 550,000 222.96 2002 68,000,000 268,672 253.10 2002 One Boston Place 267,000,000 770,000 346.75 7.5% 2002 One Federal Street 375,400,000 1,105,064 339.71 7.2% 2001 53 & 75 State Street 687,755,000 2,100,000 327.50 2001 One Liberty Square 48,365,000 157,467 307.14 2001 213,312,500 730,000 292.21 855 Boylston Street 47,200,000 144,825 325.91 One Beacon Street 140,000,000 1,000,000 140.00 8.0% 2000 85 Devonshire / 262 Washington 195,000,000 910,000 214.29 8.9% 2000 260 Franklin Street 76,000,000 349,000 217.77 7.0% 2000 One Boston Place 188,350,000 770,000 244.61 7.75% 2000 Building 745 Atlantic Avenue 50 Milk Street 101 Arch Street 501 Boylston Street 116 Huntington Avenue 99 High Street Reported Cap Rate 7.1% Sale Date 2001 2000 Exhibit 3 ONE LINCOLN STREET PROJECTED NET OPERATING INCOME AND CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS ( $ in Thousands) Year 1 Base Rental Revenue Allowance for Free Rent Absorption and Turnover Vacancy Scheduled Base Rental Revenue Year 2 $47,215 $57,397 (4,400) 0 0 0 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14 Year 15 Year 16 Year 17 Year 18 Year 19 Year 20 $57,397 0 0 $57,397 0 0 $57,397 0 0 $63,541 0 0 $63,541 0 0 $63,541 0 0 $63,541 0 0 $63,541 0 0 $68,675 0 0 $68,675 0 0 $68,675 0 0 $68,675 0 0 $68,675 0 0 $73,800 0 0 $73,800 0 0 $73,800 0 0 $73,800 0 0 $73,800 0 0 42,815 57,397 57,397 57,397 57,397 63,541 63,541 63,541 63,541 63,541 68,675 68,675 68,675 68,675 68,675 73,800 73,800 73,800 73,800 73,800 0 0 3,850 120 72 61 4,844 270 408 345 5,271 350 680 576 5,602 361 978 826 5,932 371 1,285 1,084 6,088 382 1,581 1,336 6,243 394 1,886 1,596 6,401 406 2,201 1,864 6,559 418 2,540 2,149 6,719 430 2,846 2,441 6,921 443 3,178 2,740 7,129 456 3,520 3,048 7,343 470 3,872 3,365 7,563 484 4,235 3,691 7,790 499 4,609 4,028 8,024 514 4,994 4,374 8,265 529 5,390 4,731 8,513 545 5,798 5,098 8,768 561 6,218 5,477 9,031 578 Effective Gross Income 46,785 62,644 63,771 64,616 65,504 72,380 73,095 73,830 74,583 75,379 81,326 82,178 83,056 83,959 84,890 90,975 91,962 92,979 94,025 95,104 Operating Expenses Non-Reimbursable Administrative Parking Expenses Real Estate Taxes Management Fees (8,218) (350) (771) (5,316) (423) (8,468) (361) (793) (7,826) (567) (8,717) (371) (815) (8,061) (577) (8,976) (382) (837) (8,303) (585) (9,273) (394) (861) (8,552) (593) (9,525) (406) (885) (8,808) (655) (9,809) (418) (909) (9,073) (662) (10,103) (430) (935) (9,345) (668) (10,405) (443) (961) (9,625) (675) (10,742) (457) (988) (9,914) (682) (11,064) (471) (1,016) (10,211) (736) (11,396) (485) (1,044) (10,517) (744) (11,738) (500) (1,073) (10,833) (752) (12,090) (515) (1,103) (11,158) (760) (12,453) (530) (1,134) (11,493) (768) (12,827) (546) (1,166) (11,838) (823) (13,212) (562) (1,199) (12,193) (832) (13,608) (579) (1,233) (12,559) (841) (14,016) (596) (1,268) (12,936) (851) (14,436) (614) (1,304) (13,324) (861) NET OPERATING INCOME 31,707 44,629 45,230 45,533 45,831 52,101 52,224 52,349 52,474 52,596 57,828 57,993 58,161 58,334 58,512 63,775 63,964 64,159 64,358 64,566 Operating Expense Reimbursement Real Estate Tax Reimbursement Net Parking Revenue Antenna Income Tenant Improvements Leasing Commissions Capital Reserve PROPERTY BEFORE-TAX CASH FLOW 0 0 (105) 31,602 0 0 (108) 44,521 0 0 (111) 45,119 0 0 (115) 45,418 0 0 (118) 45,713 0 0 (122) 51,979 0 0 (125) 52,099 0 0 (129) 52,220 0 0 (133) 52,341 0 0 (137) 52,459 0 0 (141) 57,687 0 0 (145) 57,848 0 0 (149) 58,012 0 0 (153) 58,181 0 0 (158) 58,354 0 0 (163) 63,612 0 0 (168) 63,796 0 0 (173) 63,986 0 0 (178) 64,180 0 0 (183) 64,383 Exhibit 4 Atlantic-Pacific Property Corporation: Assets: Real Estate Accumulated Depreciation Less: Assets Other Total Assets Selected Financial Data As of: As of: As of: As of: As of: 31-Dec 2002 31-Dec 2001 31-Dec 2000 31-Dec 1999 31-Dec 1998 $5,780,474 $4,971,937 $4,075,186 $3,741,505 $3,278,129 (548,622) (479,903) (391,146) 933,441 854,454 386,283 343,639 466,940 506,550 735,003 $5,618,135 $4,835,673 $4,150,980 $5,181,497 $4,867,585 Liabilities: Secured and Unsecured Notes Other Payables and Liabilities Total Liabilities Owners' Equity (GAAP) Revenue: $3,615,355 $3,036,465 $2,400,685 $3,068,294 $2,824,631 $2,002,781 $1,799,209 $1,750,295 $2,113,203 $2,042,954 $37.00 $38.25 $44.50 $31.25 $30.50 For the Year Ending: For the Year Ending: For the Year Ending: 31-Dec 2002 31-Dec 2001 31-Dec 2000 31-Dec 1999 31-Dec 1998 $778,496 $646,781 $545,563 $479,777 $312,316 33,885 34,666 33,928 30,501 12,735 7,165 8,111 7,891 9,805 8,274 3,669 8,122 5,705 4,293 9,239 823,215 697,680 593,087 524,376 342,565 Less: Operating Expenses Less: General & Administrative (277,718) (220,201) (186,447) (166,179) (100,327) (31,528) (25,541) (23,773) (19,637) (15,003) 338,561 227,235 Less: Interest Expense Less: Depreciation & Amortization (181,123) (148,926) (144,709) (136,940) (124,118) (99,454) (88,149) (80,039) (83,240) (50,279) Net Income Net Income Per Share $208,728 $203,558 $150,009 $121,581 $2.57 $2.51 $2.08 $1.76 $93,717 $1.63 Plus: Real Property Depreciation Expense 116,671 47,262 Funds From Operations (FFO) $325,399 $293,067 $232,869 $195,218 $140,979 $4.00 $3.61 $3.23 $2.83 $2.45 Funds From Operations (FFO) Per Share Share Price For the Year Ending: Tenant-related Parking-related Service-related Interest and Other Total Revenue EBITDA $3,431,480 $2,876,628 $2,276,594 $2,214,389 $2,059,149 183,875 159,837 124,091 853,904 765,482 For the Year Ending: Dividends Per Share Shares Outstanding 513,969 $2.40 81,310 451,938 89,509 2.25 81,083 382,867 82,860 2.05 72,145 73,636 1.75 68,995 1.65 57,471 Exhibit 5 One Lincoln Street Acquisition: Pro Forma Capitalization Acquisition: Purchase Price Transaction Costs @ Plus: Capital Requirement to Close Equity Capitalization 0.10% $ 700,000 700 $700,700 Debt Capitalization: Unsecured Debt @ 50.00% Term-to-Maturity (Years) Comparable-Term Treasury Yield Financing Spread Over Comparable-Term Treasuries Interest Rate on Unsecured Debt (Interest-Only) Other Financing Costs @ 0.25% Financing Fees Cost Amortization Term $350,000 10 3.75% 1.75% 5.50% $875 10 Current Stock Price Current Annualized Dividend Current Dividend Yield Underwriters' Spread & Associated Costs Required Equity Raise Required New Share Offering Current Quarterly FFO Per Share Expected Annual FFO Per Share (Management Estimate) Shares Outstanding Before the New Share Offering Shares Outstanding After the New Share Offering $44.00 $2.40 5.45% 5.00% $370,079 8,411 $1.02 $4.00 81,310 89,721 Exhibit 6 One Lincoln Street Acquisition: Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Property NOI Leasing Comms. T.I.s Capital Reserve Property Before-Tax Cash Flow Incremental Cash Flow Per Share Analysis Net Mgt. Fee Profit @ Interest 75.0% Expense (1) Principal Amort'n Incremental Cash Flow To Equity Holders $31,707 44,629 45,230 45,533 45,831 52,101 52,224 52,349 52,474 52,596 57,828 57,993 58,161 58,334 58,512 63,775 63,964 64,159 64,358 64,566 $0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 $0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ($105) (108) (111) (115) (118) (122) (125) (129) (133) (137) (141) (145) (149) (153) (158) (163) (168) (173) (178) (183) $31,602 44,521 45,119 45,418 45,713 51,979 52,099 52,220 52,341 52,459 57,687 57,848 58,012 58,181 58,354 63,612 63,796 63,986 64,180 64,383 $318 425 433 439 445 491 496 501 506 512 552 558 564 570 576 617 624 631 638 646 ($19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) $0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 $12,670 25,696 26,302 26,607 26,908 33,220 33,345 33,471 33,597 33,721 38,989 39,156 39,326 39,501 39,680 44,979 45,170 45,367 45,568 45,779 $1,086,324 $0 $0 ($2,814) $1,083,510 $10,542 ($385,000) $0 $709,052 Notes: Incremental Cash Flow Per New Share Issued $1.51 3.06 3.13 3.16 3.20 3.95 3.96 3.98 3.99 4.01 4.64 4.66 4.68 4.70 4.72 5.35 5.37 5.39 5.42 5.44 Annual Dividend Payable Per Existing Share Cash Surplus (Deficiency) Per New Share Issued (2) REIT Incremental Cash Surplus (Deficiency) Incremental Cash Surplus (Deficiency) Per Share Outstanding (3) ($0.89) 0.66 0.73 0.76 0.80 1.55 1.56 1.58 1.59 1.61 2.24 2.26 2.28 2.30 2.32 2.95 2.97 2.99 3.02 3.04 ($7,516) 5,510 6,116 6,421 6,722 13,034 13,159 13,285 13,411 13,535 18,803 18,970 19,140 19,314 19,494 24,793 24,984 25,181 25,382 25,593 ($0.08) 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 $2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 2.40 (1) Assumes Unsecured Acquisition Indebtedness is Refinanced at EOY 10 Under Same Terms and Conditions.. (2) Relative to Current Dividend Payable Per Existing Share Before the New Share Offering. (3) Reflects Required New Share Offering; Assumes Existing REIT Dividend Remains Constant. $305,329 $3.40