Torts (Case Briefs) Part 2

Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (pg. 150; therapist had a duty to warn woman who was killed by his patient) § 315 General Principle (when a duty to cont ol the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another may arise) (pg. 151) There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection. Issue: Whether a therapist ever has a duty to warn a potential victim of possible harm from third parties. Rule: When a therapist learns from his patient about intent to do harm to a third party, the therapist has a duty to take reasonable precautions given the circumstances to warn the potential victim of danger. Holding: Yes. The Regents’ physicians involved in treating Poddar had a duty to warn Tatiana of potential danger after Poddar disclosed his intent to kill her. Their failure to warn constitutes actionable negligence. Uhr v. East Greenbush Central School District (pg. 159; school failed to screen for scoliosis) NOTE: pg. 160 lists the three-prong test to determining whether a private right of action may be fairly implied when a statute is silent to the issue at hand. Issue: Whether a private right of action based on tort liability may ever be inferred from violation of a statute. Rule: A private right of action based on tort liability may be inferred from violation of a statute if the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted, if recognition of a private right of action would promote the statute’s legislative purpose, and if creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme. Holding: Yes. Granting a private right of action in this instance would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme intended by the education law (doesn’t satisfy the third prong). Policy for Invoking No Duty Strauss v. Belle Realty Co. (pg. 166; man falls down stairs during city-wide blackout) Issue: Does a power company owe a duty of care to a noncustomer, where his injury was foreseeable, but where expanding the orbit of duty to include him would lead to unmanageable levels of liability? Rule: Courts must fix an orbit of duty which limits liability to manageable levels, even where this may exclude parties who would have been able to recover under traditional tort principles. Holding: No. Because millions of people were affected by Consolidated Edison’s gross negligence, liability for injuries sustained in the common areas of buildings should be limited to those with a contractual relationship with the company, as a matter of public policy. Reynolds v. Hicks (pg. 175; alcohol was served to minor at wedding and he then got into a car accident) Issue: May a social host be held liable to a third party for injuries sustained as a result of providing alcohol to someone under the age of 21? Rule: A social host cannot be held liable to a third party for injuries sustained as a result of providing alcohol to someone under the age of 21. Holding: No. Social hosts, unlike commercial hosts or vendors, are not liable to third parties injured as a result of providing alcohol to an under-age person. Vince v. Wilson (pg. 181; grandmother gave money to grandnephew whom she knew was an incompetent driver—the car salesmen also knew this, and sold the car anyway) § 390 Chattel for Use by Person Known to be Incompetent (pg. 182) One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them. Issue: May a party who either sells or funds the purchase of an automobile by a driver the party knows to be incompetent be held liable for injuries resulting from the driver’s incompetent operation of the vehicle? Rule: Under the theory of negligent entrustment, a party who entrusts an automobile to a driver the party knows to be incompetent may be held liable for injuries resulting from the driver’s incompetent operation of the vehicle. Holding: Yes. A person who sells or funds the purchase of a vehicle by a driver known to be incompetent may be held liable for injuries resulting from the driver’s incompetent operation of the vehicle. The Duties of Landowners and Occupiers Carter v. Kinney (pg. 187; man slips and falls on defendant’s icy driveway to attend bible study) NOTE: distinctions between classes of people – pg. 188; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 332 (defining an invitee for business purposes) – pg. 188 NOTE: Generally, the possessor owes a trespasser no duty of care; the possessor owes a licensee the duty to make safe dangers of which the possessor is aware; and the possessor owes invitees the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them against both known dangers and those that would be revealed by inspection (pg. 188). Issue: Does a landowner owe a duty of care to protect an entrant onto his land from unknown dangerous conditions, where the landowner does not expect a material benefit from the visit or extend a general invitation to the public? Rule: A landowner does not owe a duty of care to protect a licensee from unknown dangerous conditions. Holding: No. The Kinneys had no duty to protect Carter, as a licensee, from unknown dangerous conditions. Whether Carter was an invitee or a licensee, and what standard of law accompanies that status, is a question of law. There are three classes of plaintiffs in premises liability cases: trespassers, which include all entrants to land until the owner of the land gives them permission to enter; licensees, which include all persons who enter land with permission; and invitees, which include persons who have reason to believe that the premises have been made safe, after the possessor of the premises invites the visitor with the expectation of a material benefit from the visit, or extends a general invitation to the public. NOTE: pg. 191-92 – child trespassers/attractive nuisance Heins v. Webster County (pg. 192; santa slips and falls on ice/snow outside of hospital while visiting his daughter who was a hospital employee) NOTE: pg. 196 – factors for determining whether a landowner or occupier has exercised reasonable care for the protection of lawful visitors. Issue: Must a landowner or occupier exercise reasonable care for the protection of lawful visitors to his property? Rule: A landowner or occupier must exercise reasonable care for the protection of lawful visitors to his property. Holding: Yes. Here, Heins was at the hospital to visit his daughter. Although a patient visitor would have been able to maintain a negligence action, Heins was classified as a licensee under the traditional system and was denied recovery. The traditional classifications should not shield parties who would otherwise be held to a standard of reasonable care absent the arbitrary classification of the visitor as a licensee. Instead, these distinctions should be eliminated in favor of a duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain premises for the protection of all lawful visitors. This new rule places the focus on the foreseeability of the injury and not on the visitor's status. Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (pg. 202; armed robbery in Sam’s Club parking lot) NOTE: balancing test approach – bottom of pg. 205 Issue: To determine whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff to protect the plaintiff from harm caused by a third person, must a court use the balancing test approach? Rule: Under the balancing test approach, a court determines the duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff to protect from third persons by balancing the foreseeability and gravity of harm against the burden imposed on the defendant to protect against the harm. Holding: Yes. Louisiana adopts the balancing test approach, whereby a court determines the duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff to protect from third persons by balancing the foreseeability and gravity of harm against the burden imposed on the defendant to protect against the harm. A Reprise of Duty A.W. v. Lancaster County School District 0001 (pg. 209; man blows 5 YO boy in elementary school bathroom) NOTE: Restatement (Third) of Torts – pg. 212 Issue: To determine whether a defendant exercised appropriate care, may the court, as a matter of law, determine whether a foreseeable risk existed at the time of the alleged negligence? Rule: Instructors must exercise a standard of reasonable care to protect students from reasonably foreseeable risks of harm. Holding: No. The question of whether a foreseeable risk existed at the time of the alleged negligence is a question of fact for the factfinder, not the court, to decide. Intrafamily Duties Broadbent v. Broadbent (pg. 217; 2 YO suffers brain damage after his mother leaves him unattended in a pool to answer a phone call; child’s father brought suit) Issue: Should Arizona courts continue to adhere to the doctrine of parental immunity? Rule: The proper standard for determining a parent's liability in tort toward his or her children is how a reasonable and prudent parent in a similar situation would have acted. Holding: No. This court abandons all forms of the doctrine of parental immunity in favor of the reasonable parent test. Governmental Entities Riss v. City of New York (pg. 227; stalker/ex-bf has 3rd party injure woman, and this happened despite the fact that the woman repeatedly told the police about her concerns) Issue: Will a city be held liable in tort for failing to protect an individual from the criminal acts of a wrongdoer? Rule: Absent legislation creating liability, a municipality is not liable in tort for a government service’s failure to protect the public from criminal activity. Holding: No. A municipality does not have a general duty to protect the public. Lauer v. City of New York (pg. 235; medical examiner first says plaintiff’s son died due to a homicide, but then later it’s determined that he made a mistake and the death was due to a brain aneurism—which the medical examiner failed to correct) Issue: Does a medical examiner owe a duty to members of the public who may become subjects of a criminal investigation into a death? Rule: To find municipal liability, there must be a duty owed directly to a particular person or class of persons, and not simply to the public generally. Holding: No. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner does not owe a duty to members of the public who may become subjects of a criminal investigation into a death. Friedman v. State of New York (pg. 242; DOT conducted studies on median barriers, plaintiffs in three separate actions brought suit against the state for negligence) Issue: May the state be held liable for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition, where the state has undertaken a reasonable study of the danger and concluded that no action is necessary to alleviate it? Rule: Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, the state is immune from liability arising from its planning decisions. Holding: No. Although municipalities owe a duty to the public to keep streets in a reasonably safe condition, under the doctrine of qualified immunity the state is immune from liability arising from its highway planning decisions. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) FTCA abolishes tort immunity (i.e., permits the federal government to be held liable) for a negligent or wrongful act or omission by federal government employees, but this act also carves out exceptions. Cope v. Scott (pg. 249; plaintiff sustained injuries after being hit by another driver while driving his vehicle on a roadway (which is a commuter route through an urban park) maintained by the NPS—a federal agency—as a result of his injuries, plaintiff filed a negligence claim against the NPS for (1) failing to appropriately and adequately maintain the roadway, and (2) failing to place and maintain appropriate and adequate warning signs along the roadway; the trial court found that the NPS was immune from suit under the FTCA discretionary function exception; plaintiff appealed) Issue: To be exempt from suit under the discretionary-function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, must a governmental agency or employee’s action or inaction directly implicate political, social, or economic policy choices (pg. 254)? Rule: To be exempt from suit under the discretionary-function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, a governmental agency or employee’s action or inaction must directly implicate political, social, or economic policy choices (bottom of pg. 251). Holding: Yes. The Duty Requirement: Nonphysical Injuries Emotional Harm: Risk of Physical Injury to Plaintiff Falzone v. Busch (pg. 262; negligent driver hits plaintiff’s husband and came very close to hitting plaintiff who was seated in her husband’s lawfully parked car—subsequently, the plaintiff became ill and required medical attention, and as a result of her fear requiring medical attention, she filed suit; applying the rule from Ward, the trail court granted MSJ for the defendant; plaintiff appealed) Issue: May a plaintiff recover for bodily injury or sickness resulting from negligently induced fright, where the plaintiff does not suffer a direct physical impact (pg. 262)? Rule: A plaintiff may recover for substantial bodily injury or sickness resulting from negligently induced fright, even if the plaintiff did not suffer a direct physical impact (pg. 265). Holding: Yes. A plaintiff may recover for substantial bodily injury or sickness that is the proximate result of a defendant’s negligence, even if the plaintiff did not suffer a physical impact. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company v. Buckley (pg. 268; plaintiff through his work was exposed to asbestos, and after attending an “asbestos awareness class” began to fear that he would develop cancer—he subsequently received periodic checkups for cancer and asbestosis, but at the time of this suit was never diagnosed with either; nonetheless, plaintiff brought suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act seeking damages for emotional distress and to cover the cost of future medical check-ups; the trial court dismissed the case; the court of appeals reversed; the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the court of appeals decision) Issue: May a plaintiff recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress for exposure to a carcinogen, without physical symptoms of any disease (pg. 268)? Rule: To sustain a claim brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act for negligently inflicted emotional distress, a plaintiff must sustain a physical impact or be placed in immediate risk of physical harm (pg. 270). Holding: No. A plaintiff may not recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress for exposure to a carcinogen, unless he manifests symptoms of a disease (pg. 268). Emotional Harm: No Risk of Physical Harm to Plaintiff Gammon v. Osteopathic Hospital of Maine, Inc. (pg. 276; plaintiff’s father dies, and the hospital was supposed to give him a bag containing his father’s belongings but instead gave him a bag with a severed leg in it) Issue: May a plaintiff recover for emotional distress that was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence? Rule: A plaintiff may recover for emotional distress that was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence. Holding: Yes. Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital (pg. 281; mother gives birth to child—mother is d/ced but child was kept for observation; during observation child was abducted, but returned four months later) NOTE: The modern adoption of negligent infliction of emotional distress allows recovery by the plaintiff for the emotional harm if the plaintiff was within the “zone of danger.” Issue: May parents recover for emotional distress suffered as a result of injuries inflicted on a child because of a hospital’s negligence, if the parents are not within the zone of danger and do not witness their child’s serious physical injury or death? Rule: Parents cannot recover for emotional distress suffered as a result of injuries inflicted on a child because of a hospital’s negligence, if the parents are not within the zone of danger and do not witness their child’s serious physical injury or death. Holding: Parents cannot recover for emotional distress suffered as a result of injuries inflicted on a child because of a hospital’s negligence, if the parents are not within the zone of danger and do not witness their child’s serious physical injury or death. Emotional Harm: Bystanders Portee v. Jaffe (pg. 286; mother stands by helpless while police try to rescue her son who dies after being trapped in an elevator shaft) NOTE: pg. 294 – negligent interference with consortium NOTE: the negligent infliction of emotional distress requires proof of the following elements: (1) the death or serious physical injury of another caused by defendant’s negligence; (2) a marital or intimate familial relationship between plaintiff and the injured person; (3) observation of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and (4) resulting severe emotional distress (pg. 289). Issue: May a parent recover damages for emotional distress resulting from watching her young child suffer and die in an accident caused by a defendant’s negligence, where the plaintiff was not subjected to any risk of physical harm? Rule: A plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress resulting from witnessing the accident of a close relative caused by the defendant’s negligence. Holding: Yes. A parent may recover damages for emotional distress resulting from watching her young child suffer and die in an accident caused by a defendant’s negligence, even if the parent was not subjected to any risk of physical harm. Economic Harm Nycal Corporation v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP (pg. 299; plaintiff buys worthless company relying upon a publicly available financial report made by KPMG for the worthless company) § 552 Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others. (pg. 301-302) Issue: May an accountant be held liable for providing false information, upon which another party relies to its detriment, if the information was not supplied for the benefit of the injured party, or intended to be used in a transaction involving the injured party? Rule: Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 552, a person commits the tort of negligent misrepresentation if he or she, in the course of business, fails to exercise reasonable care in providing false information, and another party relies on that information to its detriment. Holding: No. An accountant may only be held liable for providing false information to a person, or a member of a limited group of persons, for whose benefit and guidance the information is supplied, and who relies to his detriment on the information in a transaction the information was intended to influence. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., Inc. (pg. 310; architecture firm hired to render plans for the construction of a light rail transit line and a construction company won the bid to construct the project—construction company had a contract with the transit authority to complete the project; however, the architecture plans were full of errors and the construction company lost nearly $14 mil on the project, but the construction company had no agreement with the architect and was not party to the architect’s agreement with the transit authority) NOTE: In actions for unintentional torts, the common law has long restricted recovery of purely economic damages unaccompanied by injury to the plaintiff or his property—a doctrine we have referred to as the economic loss rule (pg. 310). Issue: Does the economic-loss rule preclude a general contractor from recovering construction-delay damages from an architect in the absence of a contractual agreement? Rule: The economic-loss rule precludes a general contractor from recovering construction-delay damages from an architect in the absence of a contractual agreement. Holding: Yes. The economic-loss rule precludes a general contractor from recovering construction-delay damages from an architect in the absence of a contractual agreement. In unintentional-tort actions such as the one here, courts have historically restricted the ability of a party to recover purely economic damages based on the negligence of a defendant. 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. (pg. 319; 3 separate claims alleging economic loss due to construction related disasters in Manhattan) Issue: Whether a private individual may recover for economic loss commonly suffered due to a public nuisance. Rule: A private individual may not recover damages for economic loss suffered from a public nuisance if the loss is commonly suffered by members of the community. Holding: No. Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Emerson v. Magendantz (pg. 326; physician negligently performed sterilization procedure on woman and she subsequently becomes pregnant and has a child with congenital problems) NOTE: pg. 329 provides the limited recovery rule. Issue: May damages for an unwanted pregnancy resulting from a physician’s negligent performance of a sterilization procedure include the cost of child rearing? Rule: A patient’s recovery of damages for an unwanted pregnancy and birth, resulting from a physician’s negligent performance of a sterilization procedure, should be limited to medical expenses and lost wages, and should not include the cost of child rearing. Holding: No.