Yun v Ford Motor Co Tort Law

Facts: Yun v Ford Motor Co. Superior Court of NJ, Appellate Division, 1994 (p. 314) Chang was a passenger of a 1987 Ford van, owned and driven by his daughter Yun Cho Shim, Northbound on the GSP. There was a rattling type noise coming from the rear of the van… The plastic cover and spare tire and part of the support bracket which was screwed to the rear of the van fell off and rolled across the highway and came to rest against the guard rail. Yun pulled over to the shoulder and stopped. Chang ran across the dark rain slicked highway and retrieved the tire, on the way back he was hit by a vehicle operated by DEFENDANT Precious Linderman. Yun, as representative of her fathers estate sued : Ford, Miller (spare tire assembly), Universal (converted chassis and installed the spare tire assembly), the Lindermans, and Kims Mobile Service Center (where she got her oil changed about a month ago, Kim told her the assembly was bent, but she instructed him not to fix it, b/c she was waiting for the insurance to handle it). Procedural History T1: Plaintiff’splead proximate cause as cause for all PLAINTIFF’s o Lindermans Settled. o PLAINTIFF abandoned claim against ford, b/c evidence showed that the tire was not part of the vehicle when it left the factory, and they didn’t object to fords motion for summary judgment. o Summary Judgment granted to the rest of the DEFENDANT ’s. Plaintiff’sappeal The initial complaint falls within the Products Liability Act. T2: Affirmed Issue: Was the alleged defect in the spare tire bracket assembly proximately causing the injuries sustained by Chang. Holding: In order for proximate causation to work, it must be the cause which sets off a foreseeable sequence of consequences, unbroken by any superseding cause, and which is a substantial factor in producing the particular injury. Reasoning: In this case: Changs attempt to retrieve the Spare tire was extraordinarily dangerous. Logic and fairness dictate that liability should not extend to injuries sustained as a result of Changs senseless decision to cross the highway. The alleged defective product did not cause Changs injuries. Chang and Yun’s joint decision not to repair the tire assembly , and Chang’s blatant disregard for his personal safety by crossing the highway constitute intervening superseding causes. Legal responsibility for the consequences of an act cannot be imposed w/o limit. DISSENT: the claims against Miller and Universal should stand. o Reasonable persons may differ as to the foreseeability of a particular risk, therefore it is a question for the jury. Subsequently reversed by NJSC for grounds noted in the dissent. INTERVENING CAUSES Derdiarian v Felix Contracting Corp. NY Court of Appeals, 1980 Fact: DEFENDANT Felix, in performing a K to install an underground gas main in MT. Vernon, NY, had excavated a worksite in the street. PLAINTIFF worked for a subcontractor and was sealing a gas main. DEFENDANT Dixkens suffered an epileptic seizure and lost consciousness, allowing his vehicle to careen into the worksite and strike the PLAINTIFF with such force that he was thrown in the air. When PLAINTIFF landed he was splattered over his face and body with 400 degree boiling hot liquid enamel from a kettle struck by the automobile, PLAINTIFF ignited into a fireball, but survived. Arguments: PLAINTIFF claims DEFENDANT Felix negligently failed to take adequate measures to insure the safety of workers on the excavation site. o PLAINTIFF called expert Lawton who stated: Usual and accepted method of safeguarding the workers is to erect a barrier around the excavation site, such as a truck, a piece of heavy equipment or a dirt pile, to protect workers from oncoming traffic. Also need 2 flagmen (DEFENDANT Felix had one). DEFENDANT Felix argues that PLAINTIFF was injured in a freakish accident, brought about solely by negligence of Defendant Dickens. And therefore no causal link b/w Felix’ breach of duty and the Plaintiff’sinjuries. Holding: A prime hazard with failing safeguarding in the manner prescribed above is the possibility of a car entering the worksite and cause injury to a worker. Issue: Was failing to safeguard the worksite the proximate cause of the negligence, when a car drives into the worksite, injuring an employee. AFFIRMED. DEFENDANT felix is responsible. Facts: Watson v Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & RR Co. Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1910 (p. 324) Through the negligence of DEFENDANT RR, a tank car full of gasoline was derailed and its valve broken, so that gas ran into the street. Duerr struck a match igniting the gasoline vapor, and the explosion followed, injuring PLAINTIFF. Duerr said he struck the match to light a cigar and dropped the match, and explosion happened before the match struck the ground. A witness testified that Duerr said to his companion “let’s go set the damn thing of fire” and he struck a match and deliberately threw it into the vapor. Procedure: T1: directed verdict for the DEFENDANT . PLAINTIFF APPEALS Reversed and remanded for new trial Issue: Will the contributing cause change to the proximate cause when an act is intentional instead of negligent. Holding: Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial. A negligent act is foreseeable, therefore be a contributing cause, however a malicious intentional act is not foreseeable, therefore it would be the proximate cause. Reasoning: The issue of whether Duerr acted maliciously or just carelessly was for the jury to decide. The fact that the concurrent cause or intervening act was unforeseen will not relieve the D guilty of the primary negligence from liability but if the intervening agency is something so unexpected or extraordinary as that he could not or ought not to have anticipated it, he will not be liable, and certainly is not bound to anticipate the criminal acts of others by which damages is inflicted and hence is not liable Fuller v. Preis New York Court of Appeals, 1974 Material Facts: P is the executor of the estate of Decedent, Dr. Lewis. Decedent was involved in a car accident with D in which he struck his head but thought he walked away from unharmed. As an apparent result the accident, Decedent began to suffer epileptic seizures often unconscious and before the accident he never suffered a seizure, suffered no less than 38. Seven months after the accident, Decedent had 3 seizures his daughter tried to speak with him but he did not respond. He locked himself in the bathroom and committed suicide after being heard to say “I must do it.” He shot himself in the head and died the next day. P is suing D for wrongful death, alleging that Decedent’s injuries were a result of D’s breach in operating his vehicle. P alleges that D is a proximate cause of Decedent’s suicide. Procedural History: Judgment of P at trial. Appellate Division set aside the verdict and dismissed the complaint, holding that Decedent’s suicide was a superseding cause of death and that the trial court decision was against the clear weight of the evidence. P appeals. Issue: Whether Dr. Lewis who obviously knew what he was doing and intended do did so because of mental derangement, and was incapable of resisting the impulse to destroy himself Holding/Rule: Reversed and new trial directed. When evidence exists that a negligent act has led to a damaged brain such that suicide was the result of an irresistible impulse, suicide is not a superseding cause as a matter of law. Appellate Division erred in setting aside the verdict of the jury and dismissing the complaint. Analysis/Rationale: Evidence existed in this case that the decedent sustained significant brain damage which resulted in depression and aberrational conduct. Therefore, it was reasonable for the jury at trial to conclude that the suicide was a result of an irresistible impulse. Evidence that the suicide resulted from decedent’s irresistible impulse demonstrates that the suicide was not an intentional act. The lack of intent in such a case arguably makes the suicide the direct, uninterrupted result of decedent’s original injuries. McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp. Supreme Court of WA, 1998 Parties: McCoy - , man helped and was hit by car Suzuki - , manufacturer of car Basis for Dispute:  was driving and saw a Suzuki Samurai swerve off the road and roll over  stopped to help and then a state trooper came trooper had  put flares on road to warn approaching vehicles after the scene was cleared  began walking back to his car w/a flare in his hand facing the road trooper had left w/out saying anything  was struck by a hit and run driver Procedural History:  filed suit against state, driver, passenger and  Suzuki for defective Samurai which allegedly caused accident (only 1 in this case)  moved for summary judgment for 2 reasons o rescue doctrine doesn’t apply to product liability o  can’t prove  proximately caused his injuries T1 granted summary judgment saying rescue doctrine does apply, but  can’t prove proximate cause  appealed, T2 reversed saying  only needs to prove  proximately caused the danger and rescuer was injured while rescuing  appealed Rescue Doctrine: allows injured rescuer to sue party who caused danger requiring the rescue 2 functions: o informs TF it is foreseeable a rescuer will come to aid of another, and therefore TF owes same duty to rescuer as to person imperiled o negates presumption that rescuer assumed risk when undertook rescue Issue: 1. Whether a person can recover under rescuers doctrine when the claim involves product liability, and if so, does the injured have to prove that  proximately caused his injuries or that  proximately caused the danger. 2. Is a rescuer being hit by a car a foreseeable occurrence for the manufacturer of a defective car? Holding: 1. The doctrine is shorthand for the idea that rescuers are to be anticipated and is a reflection of a societal value judgment that rescuers should not be barred from bringing suit for knowingly placing themselves in danger to undertake a rescue. It therefore, can be used for product liability, but rescuer must still show  proximately caused his injures. 2. Foreseeability of the intervening cause is sufficiently close that it should be decided by a jury. Reasoning: no reason why doctrine shouldn’t be applied when there’s product liability rescuers are like all other ’s and have to prove PC precedent was set by Maltman for this jury could consider position of rescuer, negligence of oncoming motorists , along w/many other factors alleged fault of Suzuki isn’t too remote to cut off liability as a matter of law PUBLIC POLICY Kelly v. Gwinell Supreme Court of NJ, 1984 Parties: Kelly - , injured by drunken  Gwinell - , drunk driver Basis for Dispute:  drove home co-, Zaks, and stayed for a few hours co- and his wife served  scotch (2 or 3) while there  then left to drive home and had head-on collision w/, where  was seriously injured Procedural History:  sued  and ’s employer, who then sued co-  amended complaint to make co- a direct  co-D moved for summary judgment, T1 granted  appealed, T2 affirmed b/c o NJ has no laws imposing liability on providers of alcohol o common law liability for hosts only when guest is a minor  appealed, T3 reversed Issue: Whether a social host who enables an adult guest at his home to get drunk is liable to a 3rd party who is injured by drunken driving of guest. Holding: A host who serves liquor to an adult guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will be thereafter operating a motor vehicle, is liable for injuries inflicted on a 3rd party as a result of the negligent driving of the guest when the negligence is due to intoxication. Reasoning: Majority hosts continued to serve after visibly drunk co- knew  had to drive home RPPSSC would’ve known  wouldn’t be able to drive car unless stopped serving Society penalties for drunk drivers are very harsh, injuries caused by drunk drivers increasingly intolerable, those w/licenses can’t serve intoxicated, etc Policy considerations for liability outweigh those against Dissent Legislature is better equipped to reach goals of reducing injuries from drunken driving and protecting 3rd parties Average citizen lacks expertise to determine degrees of intoxication Nature of home entertaining makes policing guests difficult Host isn’t always server and host usually drinks Not clear how far host is supposed to go & social host can’t spread liability Enright v. Eli Lilly Co. Court of Appeals of NY, 1991 Parties: Karen Enright - , daughter of Patricia Enright, whose mother had taken DES Eli - , drug manufacturer Basis for Dispute: ’s grandmother had taken DES when pregnant w/Patricia b/c of DES Patricia developed abnormalities of reproductive system, had miscarriages, and cause premature birth of  b/c of miscarriage  suffered cerebral palsy and other disabilities Procedural History:  brought suit for her injuries under negligence, breach of warranty, fraud and strict products liability T1 dismissed claims,  appealed T2 affirmed on all but strict products liability b/c of public policy in favor of remedy for DES victims justified this cause of action  appealed and T3 affirmed T1 (dismissal of all claims) Issue: Whether a DES victim can recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of exposure to the drug by her grandmother. Holding: Although recent developments demonstrate legislative and judicial solicitude for DES victims, they don’t establish DES victims as a special class for whom all traditional tort limitations don’t apply. Reasoning: this cause of action isn’t available in any other context, multi-generational cause of action doing this would force court to create arbitrary boundaries on tort even though liability encourages safer drugs, tort is not only way to do this public policy favors availability of prescription drugs even w/some risks liability might discourage research or new drugs from being put on market precedent – Albala v. NYC where mother’s uterus was perforated in abortion and when she had a baby this caused brain damage to the baby o court held Dr. who did abortion wasn’t liable, b/c holding him liable would create an unmanageable tort concept  argued: b/c this was DES and not medical malpractice it is different from Albala and basically should get special treatment o court said it wasn’t distinguishable b/c both involved concepts of reasonable care and foreseeability o both involve child injured as result of tort against mother JOINT TORTFEASORS 1. LIABILITY AND JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS pg. 374 Bierczyinski v. Rogers Supreme Court of DE, 1968 Parties: B – one of 2 defendants, speeder R- one of 2 defendants, speeder Rogers - plaintiffs, driver and passenger of car crashed into Basis for Dispute: Cars driven by defendant’s, B and R, were racing at twice legal speed ’s were coming down hill and saw ’s car in front of them, going opposite way Defendant R was in same lane as plaintiffs and tried to get back into proper lane Defendant R lost control of his car, it spun, and the side hit front of ’s car Defendant B was in proper lane and stopped 35 ft before collision DE has no statute prohibiting racing on public highways, so no neg. per se, but is neg. b/c RPPUSSC wouldn’t do it Procedural History: Ps sued both Ds T1 judgment for Ps, defendant B appealed Issue: Whether a person can recover damages for negligence of racing on a public highway from both participants when only one car was involved in an accident with s. Holding: Participation in a motor vehicle race on a public highway is an act of concurrent negligence imposing liability on each participant for injuries to any non-participant resulting from the race. Reasoning: When racing all parties engaged are wrongdoers and acting in concert Each participant has induced and encouraged tort The fact that 1 party isn’t engaged in actual accident which causes injury isn’t relevant, still liable