Observations Regarding the Prospects for a Fruitful Enlargement Centered on Europe

Observations Regarding the Prospects for a Fruitful Enlargement Centered on Europe Presented by: Dr. Marinkás Date: March 7, 2025 Structure of the Presentation - Theories and definitions regarding the integration: • a) Deepening extension that is of the integration to more and more policy areas and widening, that is geographical extension; - • b) Constitutional differentiation instrumental differentiation • c) External differentiation. Practical examples from the enlargement process • Lessons learnt from the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargement and the experiences with the current candidate states, including the Western-Balkan states and some „new candidates", Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Theoretical Part 1: Definitions, Typology - Definition of integration: 'Integration is the body of binding formal rules to which the states participating in integration agree to adhere.' (Frank Schimmelfennig and Thomas Winzen); - Typology of differentiation • (a)Dirk Leuffen and his co-authors argue that differentiated legal rules may be internally differentiated (Eurozone), externally differentiated (EEA, the bilateral agreements with Switzerland), or can be the mixture of these two (Schengen). • (b)Differentiation may be de iure or de facto (framework directives, informal cooperation); • (c)Differentiations may be codified either in the treaties of the EU (primary law) or in its legislative acts (secondary law); • (d)Differentiation may be enlargement induced 'temporary', 'multispeed' or instrumental' (Stubb: differentiation by time) vs. 'permanent', 'multi-tier Theoretical Part 2: The Supply Side - A) The supply side of constitutional differentiation: • The to create constitutional differentiation in integration and to maintain such differentiation, certain supply conditions need to be met: First, the insider group - who persist on applying uniform rules – has to be large enough to provide for effective and efficient integration. Otherwise: disintegration occurs instead of differentiated integration. (However, disintegration may occur with one MS: Brexit). • Third, easier to agree differentiation at the beginning of integration: Why certain Member States seek differentiated integration later if it easier to opt-out at the beginning? Neofunctionalism: governments typically have a short time horizon: they are either unwilling or unable to anticipate the change of integration preferences or the unintended effects of integration: the institutional factors such as the rules on decision making and the power of supranational actors create - B) The supply side of instrumental differentiation: • Most often, enlargement generates concerns about welfare redistribution and efficiency: The old member states (or their powerful interest groups) fear economic and financial losses due to restructuring the allocation policy and the new member states' weak capacity to comply with requirements; The candidate states too, may have their own fears and reservations: domestic producers have to implement demanding regulatory standards. • The superior bargaining power of the older member states: First, the lack of alternative for the candidates (the example of the EFTA) Second, candidates' market is much smaller than the internal market; Third, decision rules favor member states (veto) o „love it or leave it" situation for the (possible) candidate states which may results in external differentiation (EEA, Switzerland) - C, Support in the Member States and in the EU institutions: • EU institutions: Commission White Paper 2017, Scenario No. 3: „Those who want more, do more". Union Address in 2017; Compare with: Juncker's State of EP 2019 'second-best option' and 'a temporary step on the path towards more effective and integrated policymaking'. • “Old member states" tend to support it, while „new member states" and the Northern states tend to be against it as the afraid that their membership would degrade into a 'second-class' citizenship: 2017: the heads of states and governments of France, Germany, Italy and Spain - in favor; 2017: Macron - in favor; V4 governments (Duda, Orbán) – against; Martonyi (ex minister of foreign affairs, Hungary) - against. Practical Lessons From Past Enlargements And Their Application To Current Candidates - The EU's fata morgana: the never-ending geographical expansion • The successful integration of the 1973 and 1995 countries; • The independence of the CEE Countries; • The 'heightened atmosphere' of the 'Maastricht era' = >the continuous geographical expansion became a widely accepted principle for the EU. Lessons Of The 2004/2007/2013 Enlargement The 2004 countries: • Similar social, legal, and economical challenges after more than thirty year of Communism: lack of democratic traditions, poor alignment with rule of law requirements, planned economy; • Country specific challenges: the dissolution of Czechoslovakia; the Mečiargovernment's „reservations" against the West; the poor economic condition of Poland, the Bokros-package in Hungary; • Similar strengths: the pro-European attitude of citizens • They successfully managed the prevail of their interests during the negotiations (despite the „superior bargaining power of the member states": some of the differentiations („derogations") were in favor of them (free movement of capital) and they managed to gain agricultural dotation (Juhász). - The 2007 and 2013 countries • Romania and Croatia already faced more serious issues than the '2004 CEE countries' (foreshadowing the present problems): Romania: besides the lack of political willingness before the 1996 presidential elections, the judicial system displayed severe shortcomings => the CVM Mechanism, which became the subject of heated debates between the CJEU and the RCC. Croatia: the burdened common history of the Western Balkan states came to light: war crimes, border disputes. Croatia showed great determination to cooperate (positive feedback from the ICTY at the early stages) and also undertook to settle the border dispute regarding the Pirani-bay (still not settled) • Conclusion: any shortcomings should be handled before a country is let to enter the EU, otherwise these can seriously hinder the country's catching up on specific fields or can practically cause a permanent halt in solving and issue. The Current Candidates - The Western-Balkan states • Historical overview: Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) around the Millennium, and the 2003 Thessaloniki European Council. • The most important common issues: Kosovo (not only on the WB countries' side: some EU states also need to reconsider their views); Historical grievances towards each other; Deficiencies in prosecuting war crimes; Deficiencies in compliance with Rule of Law requirements; Laconic feeling because of the long accession process, however the popular support for EU membership is high (except for Serbia). • Some individual issues: Albania: managed to become an upper-middle-income country from one of the poorest European countries, however still a lot effort is needed; Bosnia and Herzegovina: tensions with Serbia due to Serbia's relations with the 'Republika Srpska' entity; Kosovo (possible candidate): not recognized as independent state by several EU member states and candidates; Montenegro (the failure of the 'twin-track' approach applied before the dissolution of the federal state with Serbia; North Macedonia: the official name of the country and the issue of the Bulgarian minorities; - Serbia: while its economy aligns well with the requirements of the Single Market there are serious issues which are mostly matter of principle: Kosovo, lagging in prosecuting war crimes (also denying them or glorifying the perpetrators as national heroes), low popular support for EU membership, questionable strategic direction The New" Candidates • The most important common issues: Some of them fell (and some of them presumably fell) into what Moscow considers as its own sphere of interest; Deficiencies in Rule of Law; High level of corruption; Hardships to conform the requirements of the Single Market. • Some individual issues Türkiye: the oldest candidate" state (applied for EU membership in 1987, the negotiation process started in 2005), but the negotiations came to a 'stand-still' in 2018, because 'Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union' (Council Conclusion). 2023 the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission issued a joint communiqué to negotiate on certain strategic issue (instead of membership) Georgia: the EU accession is not priority of the current government (postponed talks and does not take grants until 2028) and the lessons of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. - Agreement on the EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area; Moldova: the issue of the Transnistrian region in case of a future EU accession (the Cyprian-model?).- Agreement on EU-Moldova Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area; Ukraine: The 2014 annexation of the Crimea by Russia and the subsequent armed conflict in the Donbas area did their effect on the Ukrainian economy. According to a World Bank estimation Ukraine would need some 486 billion USD to rebuild its economy after the 2022 Russian aggression (EU funds as of November 2024: € 122 billion). Specific issue: the rights of the minorities (especially the Hungarian). Concluding Thoughts - Except for the 1973 and 1995 enlargement rounds, the integration of the newcomers by the member states and conforming the rules by the candidates or possible candidates became harder and more demanding; - The momentum of the Maastricht era has blown out: the EU most probably reached the geographical borders beyond which it is not reasonable to stretch; - Leaving the 'aut Caesar, aut nihil' attitude that is considering full-membership as the only possibility -opens the road for external differentiation, with a free-trade agreement and a limited access to the Single Market without all the other requirements, which the candidate or possible candidate countries cannot or do not wish to fulfil.