Qualified Majority Voting In EU Enlargement Process

The EU Enlargement Process and the Qualified Majority Vote Presented by: Prof. Dr. Bohinc Date: March 7, 2025 There Is A Strong Push In The EU To Adopt QMV In The CFSP - Decision-making efficiency, - Geopolitical challenges and - Internal EU dynamics The Conference On The Future Of Europe, QMV Would - Prevent MS from blocking collective action, particularly in response to crises. - Facilitate stronger measures against MS that violate EU principles (rule of law...). Arguments pro QMV - Reasons to abandon MS consensus (system that requires unanimous agreement among all MS): • Enhanced decision-making efficiency and higher speed of response; (To make EU decisions more swiftly is crucial during crises), • The current security and geopolitical situation requires rapid reactions, responses to geopolitical challenges (not possible by unanimous decisionmaking and the veto right of the MS). Arguments against QMV: - QMV faces challenges related to: • Concerns over EU cohesion, unity and sense of democracy, • National sovereignty and MS resistance. Abandoning Consensus Is Challenging, As - It is the fundamental democratic design of the EU; - EU is an association of equal and sovereign states. QUESTIONS - 1. Is the fear that sovereignty of small MS is threatened, justified? - 2. How to ensure safeguards to smaller MS, when using QMV: • To protect their vital national interests, • To alleviate concerns about losing influence (tensions within the EU), -not to feel marginalized or overruled by larger MS - coalitions? - 3. Do we need additional sovereignty safety net (in addition to EB, CA) enabling MS: • To retain some level of control, -over QMV decisions, impacting their national policies? Research Finding - The additional transition to QMV: • Might worsen political tensions within the EU, • MS could find themselves in conflicts more frequently. - Unanimity: • Fosters unity among MS, is viewed as a significant internal democratic strength. • Abandoning unanimity could weaken the EU's external credibility and internal coherence. - Broadening of QMV: Does not guarantee, nor encourage MS to negotiate and find common ground Could even lead to a fragmented foreign policy that • Could undermine the EU's collective stance on global issues. Even if veto is not frequently utilized, its presence: Encourages MS to engage in discussions That lead to compromises, thereby reducing the likelihood of deadlock. TEU, without amendments, allow for the implementation of the QMV in CFSP The legal basis for QMV exists: • 1. Constructive abstention, CA; MS are allowed to be excepted from implementing a decision (Art. 31/1), - • 2. Emergency brake, EB, as exception to the of Article 31/2, • 3. The Passarelle clause of the of Art 31/3 TEU. Art. 24 of the TEU: • The CFSP is defined and implemented by the EC, acting unanimously, • Except where the Treaties provide otherwise! Constructive abstention (CA) is a way to avoide blockages! - - Any MS: • When abstaining in a vote, -may qualify its abstention • By making a formal declaration (Art 31/1). In that case, MS: • Is not obliged to apply the decision but accepts that the decision commits EU. • In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the MS must: refrain from any action to conflict with or impede EU action based on that decision (Art 31/1). MS using CA: - • Is not formally bound to respect the content of the measure, • It must respect the Principle of sincere cooperation (SC). MS must refrain from actions that: • Would contradict the adopted positions of the EU or • Could reduce its effectiveness in international relations. Although a Emergency brake (EB) - the right to oppose MS may declare that: • for vital reasons of national policy, intends to oppose the adoption of a EC decision to be taken by QM (Art 31(2); In such a case a vote is not taken. - It is sufficient to rely on justified reasons of national policy. - MS this way prevents the application of the QMV decision. - The High Rep. is then obliged to try to find a solution acceptable to the MS. - However: • if the High Rep. fails to do so, the EC (by a QM) decides to decide on the matter by unanimity). - The key question is how to interpret the concept of essential and justified reason for national security. - MS should necessarily consider the strategic interests and guidelines of the EC, adopted by consensus. Emergency brake (EB) - - - - The EB may be applied in the context of the CFSP when a MS considers that: • the proposed measure • could jeopardize MS essential interests. However, despite the application of the brake, the MS must still act: • in accordance with the principle of SC • refrain from actions that could harm the interests of the EU. These duties are essential to: • ensuring the unity and effectiveness of the EU • to maintaining trust between MS. The question is whether the right to invoke national interests (TEU): • does not allow for too broad a discretion - - • that may completely prevent decision-making by QM. • to what extent does this discretion go? • does it outweigh the principle of sincere cooperation in the Or: The duty of Sincere cooperation (Art 4/3 TEU) means • that the EU and the MS shall, in full mutual respect, • - assist each other in carrying out tasks. The principle of SC is legally binding: • on all MS authorities and EU institutions and • must be reflected in their actions and decision-making. - Application of the EB (31/2 TEU) is subject to compliance with the principle of SC. - MS must justify the use of the EB: - • demonstrating that they protect • essential and justified reasons of national policy. When the EB is applied, MS must refrain from acting that could: • contradict the adopted positions of the EU or • undermine its effectiveness in international relations. The 'Passarella Clause - - Article 31(3) TEU accordingly states: • that the European Council may unanimously adopt a decision • stipulating that the Council shall act by QMV. The 'Passarella clause' (Article 31(4) TEU), offers the possibility: • to extend QMV to CFSP • - unless the decisions have military or defense implications. It is a safety net mechanism, which will seek to ensure: • that vital national interests will continue to be respected • in areas of the CFSP where QMV is expanded through the Passarella • (in addition to the existing emergency brake). CONCLUSIONS - QMV decision-making process could be faster and shorter, but at the same time offers: • less ground for seeking of positive compromises • lower willingness and motivation to reach a compromise! (negative indirect effect of the introduction of QMV). - QMV does not really contribute to the EU's ability to manage conflicts between members. - QMV is not a magic wand that will suddenly make EU decision-making more efficient! - The power of large countries to outvote small ones will not contribute to more: • - cohesion, internal democracy, tolerant dialogue, and quality decision-making. Considering the interests of all nations, regardless of size, is one of the democratic values in the EU's founding treaties! - The TEU now, if it is well interpreted, contain safety mechanisms (EB, CA, SC, Passarella): • to ensure that no MS could be dictated to on issues vital to its national interests if QMV were to be used in CFSP. EU credibility - - An enlargement policy that is: • full of delays in one period hasty in the next • Such enlargement policy does not inspire the necessary credibility. For example: • North Macedonia waited 16 years (BiH 7 years) to achieve candidate status, Montenegro is negotiating since 2012, Serbia since 2014. • In the case of Moldova, Ukraine and Gorgia, EC needed only 4 months to complete its assessment)! - - Justifying enlargement should be balanced by: • fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria • emphasizing geopolitical necessity. In order to maintain its legitimacy, as it is one of the conditions for public support in the MS. - Predictable and credible EU enlargement policy only : • would signal to candidate countries that their aspirations for membership are taken seriously and • could accelerate their integration into EU structures.