Kirksey v. Kirksey - Brief

Kirksey [Antillico/sis in law] v. Kirksey [brother in law] COURT AND DATE: Alabama Supreme Court 8 Ala. 131 (1845) PROCEDURAL HISTORY: Circuit Court: Antillico sues for breach of contract. Jury awarded her $200. Isaac appealed. Supreme Court: It was a gratuity, no consideration…no contract. Circuit court reversed. Isaac wins. ISSUE: Whether a promise to provide free land for a residence that is fulfilled for a finite amount of time and then revoked is gratuitous and thus unenforceable after revocation. TRIGGER FACTS: Antillico Kirksey (Antillico) (plaintiff) was the wife of Henry Kirksey, the brother of Kirksey (defendant). Antillico and Kirksey lived approximately sixty miles apart. In 1840, Henry died, and Kirksey wrote a letter to Antillico. He stated that he felt bad for the situation of Antillico and her children, and promised that if she would come see him, he would provide her with a place to raise her family on his land. A month after receiving the letter, Antillico moved her family to Kirksey’s land. Kirksey provided them with a comfortable house on his land for two years. However, for the third year, he provided them with an uncomfortable house in the woods. After that year, he asked them to leave. Antillico brought suit seeking performance of Kirksey’s promise. At trial, the jury found for Antillico and awarded her $200 in damages. Kirksey appealed. PLAINTIFF’S MAIN ARGUMENTS: DEFENDANT’S MAIN ARGUMENTS: RULE (the law): A promise to provide free land for a residence that is fulfilled for a finite amount of time and then revoked is gratuitous and thus unenforceable despite inducing the promisee to move residences in reliance on the promise. HOLDING + REASONING: Yes. Although Ormand believes the loss and inconvenience Antillico suffered in moving to Kirksey’s residence constitutes sufficient consideration to support a binding and enforceable contract, the rest of the justices believe Kirksey’s promise is gratuitous and thus unenforceable. A promise to provide free land for a residence that is fulfilled for a finite amount of time and then revoked is gratuitous and thus unenforceable. This is true even if the promise induces the promisee to move residences in reliance on the promise. Nothing in the record indicates that Kirksey’s promise was intended to be anything more than gratuitous, and thus it cannot be enforced. Promissory Estoppel DISSENT (Ormond, J): The loss and inconvenience was sufficient consideration to support Isaac’s promise.