Some notes on Jay’s paper To be explained: Means-End: I am rationally required (if I intend to X and believe that it is possible that I X only if I intend to Y, then I intend to Y) Note: “only if I intend to Y” not “only if I Y.” Jay makes this point in his comments on Broome. See also Searle. Materials: Believes Possible: If I intend to X, then I believe that it is possible that I X. Self-consciousness: I am rationally required (I believe that I do not intend to X iff I do not intend to X). Note: What is defended in the text (p. 22–3) is the somewhat different, and perhaps slightly more plausible, principle: I am rationally required (I believe that I intend to X iff I intend to X). But it isn’t clear that this is what the argument needs. Closure: I am rationally required (if I believe P and I believe if P then Q, then I believe Q.) Consistency: I am rationally required (if I believe P, then I do not believe not P). Argument: If I violate Means-End, then I violate one of Self-Consciousness, Closure, and Consistency, and so I am irrational. 1. I intend to X. 2. I believe that it is possible that I X. (Believes Possible) 3. I believe that if I do not intend to Y, then it is not possible that I X. 4. I do not intend to Y. 5. I believe that I do not intend to Y. (Self-Consciousness) 6. I believe that it is not possible that I X. (Closure) 7. I violate Consistency. Replace Believes Possible with Doesn’t Believe Impossible: If I intend to X, then I do not believe that it is not possible that I X? This seems less controversial, and it streamlines the argument. Argument: If I violate Means-End, then I violate either Self-Consciousness or Closure, and so I am irrational. 1. I intend to X. 2. I do not believe that it is not possible that I X. (Doesn’t Believe Impossible) 3. I believe that if I do not intend to Y, then it is not possible that I X. 4. I do not intend to Y. 5. I believe that I do not intend to Y. (Self-Consciousness) 6. I violate Closure. How are we to understand the processes by which the agent’s attitudes change? Dropping the end: 1. I do not intend to Y. 2. I believe that I do not intend to Y. (1 to 2: immediate self-awareness) 3. I believe that if I do not intend to Y, then it is not possible that I X. 4. I believe that it is not possible that I X. (2 and 3 to 4: theoretical reasoning) 5. I no longer intend to X. (4 to 5: constitutively brought about) Intending the means: 1. I do not intend to Y. 2. I believe that I do not intend to Y. (1 to 2: immediate self-awareness) 3. I believe that if I do not intend to Y, then it is not possible that I X. 4. Now I intend to Y. (Is this brought about by any reasoning from 2 and 3?) 5. I no longer believe that I do not intend to Y (4 to 5: immediate self-awareness) 6. I do not conclude that it is not possible that I X. (Perhaps this is something like reasoning: I don’t conclude something that I don’t see grounds for.) 7. I continue to intend to X (6 to 7: constitutively enabled.) When we intend the means, is this the conclusion of reasoning from something involved in the means-end incoherence itself? (Granted, it can be the conclusion of reasoning from the content of a belief that we have good reason to intend the means, because it will help us achieve a worthwhile end.) Intending Y stops a certain course of reasoning, but is it itself the result of reasoning? A third way of conforming to Means-End is revising the means-end belief. It is again not clear how we can reason from the beliefs that we intend to X and that we do not intend to Y to revising the means-end belief that we will X only if we intend to Y.