Russell, Role of Philosophy

RUSSELL AND MOORE: Similarities and Differences The role of philosophy: analysis View of science View of common sense Expanded role of logic Interest in metaphysics View of physical objects A return to realism Empiricism THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY AS ANALYSIS What role did Russell see for philosophy? The business of philosophy, as I conceive it, is essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis… The most important part, to my mind, consists in criticizing and clarifying notions which are apt to be regarded as fundamental and accepted uncritically. As instances I might mention: mind, matter, consciousness, knowledge, experience, causality, will, time. I believe all these notions to be inexact and proximate, essentially infected with vagueness, incapable of forming any part of an exact science. -- Logical Atomism, 1924, p. 379-80 In some ways the analysis of Russell was very similar to the analysis of Moore. That is, Russell, like Moore, used analysis to dismiss certain works of metaphysics by scrutinizing the use of words. For example, Hegel’s mistake Hegel’s argument … depends throughout upon confusing the “is” of a predication, as in “Socrates is moral,” with the “is” of identity, as in “Socrates is the philosopher who drank the hemlock.” Owing to this confusion, he thinks that “Socrates” and “mortal” must be identical. Seeing that they are different, he does not infer, as others would, that there is a mistake somewhere, but that they exhibit “identity in difference.” Again, Socrates is particular, “mortal” is universal. Therefore, he says, since Socrates is mortal it follows that the particular is the universal – taking the “is” to be throughout expressive of identity. But to say “the particular is the universal” is selfcontradictory. Again Hegel does not suspect a mistake, but proceeds to synthesise particular and universal in the universal or concrete universal. This is an example of how, for want of care at the start, vast and imposing systems of philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial confusions, which, but for the almost incredible fact that they are unintentional, one would be tempted to characterize as puns. -- Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 39 However, Russell saw the use of analysis differently than Moore. One example of this is their differing views of role of common sense and science. Science had the place in Russell’s thought that common sense had in Moore’s.…whereas Moore used analysis to restore our confidence in common sense, a confidence that had been shaken by philosophical confusion, Russell used analysis to purify science and purge it of the errors to which, as the heir of common sense, it was the unwitting victim. -- The Twentieth Century to Quine and Derrida, p. 187 How exactly was this to be done? The special sciences have all grown up by the used of notions derived from common sense, such as things and their qualities, space, time and causation. Science itself has shown that none of these common-sense notions will quite serve for the explanation of the world; but it is hardly the province of any special science to undertake the necessary reconstruction of fundamentals. This must be the business of philosophy. -- Mysticism and Logic, 1957, p. 94 Not only did Russell hold the role of philosophy to aid science rather than common sense, but he took a different view than Moore regarding common sense. In fact, he considered common sense to be the metaphysics of savages. EXPANSION OF LOGIC AND ITS ROLE Another difference between Moore and Russell lies in the fact that the philosophy that Russell employed was one inclusive of, if not based on, formal logic. By applying the precision of logic to in philosophical criticism and exposition Russell hoped that rigor could be restored. Displeased by the fact that mathematics (specifically, geometry), relied on the assumption of premises, Russell set out to demonstrate that mathematics was based on logic. What was unknown to him at that time is the fact that he was duplicating the efforts of Frege who, a generation older than Russell, had already done much of the work that Russell was to do. Together (with Whitehead and Peano) they grounded mathematics in logic and created predicate and relational logic. They also set up to create theories of meaning based on their discoveries in logic. Although Russell explored other views, for him meaning was purely extensional. That is, meaning could be defined without appealing to any kind of mental entities. Instead meaning could be defined entirely in terms of the entities denoted by the expressions. For example, the meaning of the word “Socrates” was the person, the meaning of the class of people was the set of people. In contrast, for Frege, meaning was intensional. That is, although Frege shared Russell’s belief that the referent of the expression was relevant to the meaning of that expression, he also believed in the existence of what he called a sense, which he defined as the mode of presentation of that thing. For example, the star Venus has a mode of presentation that is part of its meaning, in addition to the star itself. The notion of intension made it possible for Frege to explain the difference in cognitive content between Venus is Venus and Venus is Hesperus. Like Aristotle, Russell (and Wittgenstein) believed that the structure of logic, which was itself indubitable, revealed something about the structure of the world. For example, the existence of predicate calculus, which allowed the attribution of qualities to subjects, reflected the structure of the world such that we can say that it is made up of substances with properties. This view allowed Russell to believe that logic offered a way out of the Kantian paradigm and to maintain a form of realism.