University:
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Course:
PS 140 | Introduction to International Relations
Academic year:

2023
Views:

165

Pages:

4
Author:

5prinzg1s

Party Systems/Effective Parties Consequences of Electoral Systems 1. Party and voter behavior.  PR—every vote counts; incentive for parties to appeal to as many voters as possible; national platforms/strategies.  SMP—plurality in each constituency needed, so more focused local appeals.  Sincere versus strategic/tactical voting behavior.  Electoral systems help to determine predominant type—voting sincerely in a system favoring strategic voting, can result in least preferred option.  Strategic voting may decrease legitimacy, by increasing apathy and disengagement 2. Mechanical effects Duverger’s Laws: 1) SMP à two party system (or marked reduction in number of parties); 2) PR (double ballot majoritarian)à multiparty system   Advocates for two-party systems: clear partisan choice, alternatives and opposition; fuller, more complete governmental change; more systemic and policy stability; but ideological blandness. Others prefer multiparty system—better captures/represents societal diversity. Describing Party Systems 1) Quality:  centrist/moderating/centripetal vs. polarizing/centrifugal. 2) Categories:  Single-party systems o One-party (dictatorial): China, Vietnam, Cuba, Eritrea o Hegemonic (competitive authoritarian): Egypt o (Mubarak); Yemen; Rwanda; Kazahkstan; Russia; Malaysia; Singapore o (Pre)dominant (democratic): Japan (LDP), South Africa (ANC); Sweden (postwar)  Two-party systems: UK, USA  Moderate multiparty systems: Spain, Poland  Extreme multiparty systems: Israel, Belgium Lijphart: 2, 2 ½, multiparty system with a dominant party (3.5) and without (4.5)—closely allied parties/factions (1.5). The number of effective parties calculation (N) captures this. Two party systems (N<3), limited/moderate multiparty (35) and extreme (N>5) (Sartori uses 6). Effective Number of Parties (N) N=1/(Σp²)  p=proportion of seats or votes; use decimals, not percentages; round all answers to 2 decimal points (use 4 for the calculations). Hypothetically: 1. 1 party, 100% of votes …… N=1/1=1.00 2. party A=55%, party B=45% N=1/(.55² + .45²)=1.98 3. A=80%, B=20% N=1/(.64+.04)=1/.68= 1.50 4. A=40%, B=40%, C=20% N=1/(.16+.16+.04)= 1/.36= 2.77     Also proportion of seats—resulting in two calculations: N votes (Nv) and N seats (Ns). Another measure of disproportionality— captures difference between vote and seat shares—i.e., electoral system effects translating votes into seats. Percent reduction in the effective number of parties: (Nv-Ns)/Nv x 100. Globally: 14.3% reduction. The Least Squares Index (LSq),                Designed by Michael Gallagher (Gallagher Index) is another measure of disproportionality. Lijphart, Taagepera consider this the best measure—not only total amount of vote-seat disparity, but also way it came about. One large disparity (8%) is more significant than several small ones (4 x 2%). LSq= √ ( (∑(Si-Vi)²)/2) Use percentages. “Other” category is problematic—disregard (do not treat as a single party). The lower the score, the greater the proportionality. Plugging this into our formula: LSq= √(282.19/2)= √(141.1)=11.88, which is almost twice our baseline average (and largely caused by the high 10% electoral threshold. Better than the 2002 election where only two parties made it over threshold and LSq=24.38, almost 4 times the comparative baseline. Interpret nature of competition from such calculations (N)—two vs. multi-party competition—not just actual choice of parties, but what governing options arise. 2-party systems have closed competition with complete partisan government alterations (Mair). Opposition completely excluded from governing, incentives to become more radical. May make campaigns nastier. Multiparty systems often have coalition governments; partial alterations common. Competition less fierce; politics more consensual: Open competitive structure (Mair) Lijphart’s majoritarian vs. consensus democracy. Degree of polarization: decreased over last decades in advanced democracies (Dalton 2004, voters’ perceptions have not).     Rational choice—convergence to center/centripetal tendencies in a party system. More applicable to 2 than multiparty systems (allow niche parties); spectrum broader, more fully occupied. Lijphart (Ch 5) lists political systems and issue dimensions (cleavages). pp. 80-81. Strong and direct relationship between issue dimensions and effective number of parties.

Party Systems