An American Social Science International Relations

HOFFMANN An American In the past autonomous cal science's Social International Science: thirty years, part of political international relations science. Even vicissitudes?battles though various among Relations as a has developed largely it has shared many of politi? orientations, and theories, also has a story of its own. What follows is an attempt at neither a nor a a set of reflections on the complete balance sheet capsule history?merely and frustrations of a particular field of specific accomplishments scholarship.l methods?it in America Only Political attempt at science has a much longer history than international relations. The the patterns of conflict and studying systematically cooperation actors?a alien shorthand definition of the subject matter?is among mutually recent. To be sure, we can all trace our ancestry back to Thucydides, just as can trace to scientists theirs was a Aristotle. But historian. political Thucydides He was, to be sure, a historian of genius, rightly convinced that he was writing for all times manent because he logic of behavior. . . . then" was and propositions, using one to incident particular a describe per? Yet he was careful to avoid explicit generalizations, analytic categories or classificatory terms. "if Modern themselves from political and social sociology and political science emancipated and law in the nineteenth history, political philosophy, public century. Inter? national relations did not, even though the kind of social (or asocial) action de? never scribed by Thucydides from a fragmented world, and disappeared flourished particularly in the period of the European balance of power. One can wonder why this was so. After all, here was a realm in which political philoso? about the com? phy had much less to offer than it did to those who wondered mon in the vast domestic order. for the of Roman Catholic good Except body literature preoccupied with just war, and not very relevant to a world of sover? the marginal comments eign states, there were only the recipes of Machiavelli; on the international state of nature in Hobbes', Locke's, and Rousseau's writ? two short and ings; some pages of Hume; tantalizing essays of Kant; compressed considerations and by Hegel; oversimplified fragments by Marx. Even so, the little political philosophy that was available should have been sufficiently pro? vocative to make students want to look into the realities. For the philosophers disagreed about the nature of the international milieu and the ways of making it 41 42 STANLEY HOFFMANN more bearable; and they wrote about the difference between a domestic order stable enough to afford a search for the ideal state, and an international contest in which order has to be established first, and which often clashes with any to justice. Similarly, the contrast between the precepts of law and the aspiration realities of politics was sufficiently greater in the international realm than in the to the empirical, domestic realm, to make one want to shift from the normative a if only in order to understand better the plight of the normative. Without one of how could understand the and fail? study political relations, fumblings ures of international law, or the tormented debates on the foundation of obliga? tion among sovereigns unconstrained by common values or superior power? And the chaos of data provided by diplomatic history did not require any less masses of facts turned up by the history of states and societies. ordering than the a of international relations nevertheless did social science fail to ap? Why answer to in the be that The well found may pear? discrepancy sweeping phe? nomenon which Tocqueville feature of the modern identified as the distinctive to from their Old Regimes As domestic societies moved ige: democratization. and interests for the their modern of conditions?parties competing allegiance of previously dispersed subjects; large classes of citizens; the social mobilization he politics of large agglomerations and unified markets; an increasingly univer? institutions or plebiscitar?an sal suffrage; the rise of parliamentary techniques; or social, within nations?the the fall of fixed barriers, whether geographic to provide concerned observers study of flux began in earnest, if only in order some clues about and predictions of and insecure officials with regularities if also less sweeping nature than those grandiosely less mythical, somewhat as Comte had strewn around by philosophers of history. With democratization, was came the age of positivism to mistake confuse his own (his only predicted, or his grand speculations, with positive brand of metaphysics, science). But international politics remained the sport of kings, or the preserve of cabinets? the last refuge of secrecy, the last domain of largely hereditary castes of diplo? mats, relations as the specialized international Aron has characterized Raymond of and soldiers. However, soldiers, to paraphrase Clausewitz, diplomats activity have their own grammar but not their own logic. It is not an accident if armies, and Napole? by the ordeals of the French Revolution having been democratized in Clausewitz, whereas the still re? onic era, found their empirical grammarian stricted club of statesmen and ambassadors playing with the fate of nations found no logician to account for its activities. Indeed, the historians who dealt with these succeeded only in keeping them beyond the pale of the kind of mod? to look at societies, by perpetuating ern science that was beginning the myth of There isolated from domestic politics. was, to be foreign policy's "primacy," was one sure, put under domestic checks and country in which foreign policy balances, knew no career caste, and paid little respect to the rules and rituals of the initiated European happy few: the United States of America. But this coun? in the kinds of contests that were the try happened to be remarkably uninvolved actors. Either it remained aloof, eager merely for continental of fare other daily not by conflicts and and economic growth; or else it expanded, consolidation deals with equals, hut by short spurts of solipsistic exuberance at the expense of relntions is the science of the tests and International much weaker neighbors. RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL trials of actors. intertwined several Where 43 were they no intertwined, science grew. In the United States before the 1930s, there was no reason for it to grow. to It was only the twentieth century that brought democratization foreign to from of the few issues moved the calculations the passions policy. Diplomatic of the many, both because more states joined in the game that had been the a actors and (mainly extra small number of (mainly European) of preserve stakes, and above all because within many states parties and interests European) links or pushed claims across national borders. And yet, aWorld established and slaughter of millions, marked the demise of War that saw the mobilization as a kind of debate between Wilson and ended and the old diplomatic order, forth little Lenin for the allegiance of mankind, "scientific brought analysis" of relations. Indeed, the rude intrusion of grand ideology into this international realm gave a new lease of life to Utopian thinking, and delayed the advent of "how it is, and why," but "how things should be improved, reformed, overhauled," was the order of the day. Old Liberal normative dreams were covenant, while at the same time being licensed by the League of Nations was the young Soviet Union itself. calling for the abolition of diplomacy It is against this reassertion of utopia, and particularly against the kind of "as if thinking that mistook the savage world of the 1930s for a community, the a common a modern Church, for and collective for that security League duty, E. H. Carr wrote the book which can be treated as the first "scientific" treat? ment of modern world politics: Twenty Years Crisis2?the work of a historian intent on deflating the pretenses of Liberalism, and driven thereby to laying the both of a discipline and of a normative approach, "realism," that foundations a future. Two are worth was to have quite paradoxes noting. This historian who was a social science, did it in reaction founding against another historian, whose not the normative Carr deemed of approach illusory?Toynbee, philosopher the Study ofHistory, but the idealistic commentator of the Royal Yearbook of Inter? national Affairs. And Carr, in his eagerness to knock out the illusions of the social science. Not not idealists, Japan had such asMussolini's been using ing that idealism as Pravda tively," some swallowed only sionist powers the against of the order of arguments "tough" Italy, Hitler's Germany, aimed Versailles?arguments served the interests of the status quo powers?but would say, served the cause of the which revi? and the militaristic appeasement. at show? also "objec? was There a triple lesson here: about the springs of empirical analysis (less a desire to under? stand for its own sweet sake, than an itch to refute); about the impossibility, even for of opponents a normative to orientation, separate the empirical and the normative in their own work; and about the pitfalls of any normative dogmatism in a realm which is both a field for objective and a battlefield be? investigation tween predatory beasts and their prey. But it was the United cumstances not in effort bore fruit. It was in England that Carr's pioneering that international relations became a discipline. Both the cir? States and the causes deserve some The scrutiny. circumstances were, the rise of the United States to world power, a rise accompanied obviously, by two contradictory as renewed impulses: utopianism, exemplified by the plans for postwar international organization; and a mix of revulsion against, and guilt idealism (as symbolized about, the peculiar prewar brew of impotent American doctrine), (the neutrality laws), by the "nonrecognition" escapist isolationism STANLEY 44 HOFFMANN in appeasement. Two books brought to America and participation the kind of in England. Once was Nicholas realism Carr had developed Spykman's America's was more a treatise in the tradition of geopolitical Strategy inWorld Politics,3 which than a book about the principal characteristics Admiral Mahan or Mackinder of interstate politics; but it told Americans that foreign policy is about power, not or even merely primarily about ideals, and it taught that the struggle for power was the real name for world politics. The other book was Hans Morgenthau's If our discipline has any founding Politics Among Nations.4 father, it is Mor a historian ganthau. Unlike Carr, he was not by training; he had been a teacher of international law. Like Carr, he was revolting against Utopian thinking, past and present. But where Carr had been an ironic and polemical Englishman about the nature of diplomacy in the thirties?a sparring with other Englishmen discussion which assumed that readers knew enough diplomatic history to make pedantic allusions was unnecessary?Morgenthau a refugee from suicidal Eu? new world power all the lessons it rope, with a missionary impulse to teach the had been able to ignore until then but could no longer afford to reject. He was in the "sea change," one of the many social scientists whom but one participant had driven to the New World, and who brought to a country whose Hitler and conformity social science suffered from "hyperfactualism" the leaven of and philosophical concerns.5 But he was, among his col? critical perspectives one whose interests made him the founder of a discipline. leagues, the only to joust with fellow literati, Mor? to educate the heathen, not merely Eager in the terms of general propositions couched his work genthau quite deliberately a and grounded them in history. Steeped in scholarly tradition that stressed the difference between social sciences and natural sciences, he was determined both to erect an empirical science opposed to the utopias of the international lawyers and the political ideologues, and to affirm the unity of empirical research and of to be nor? philosophical inquiry into the right kind of social order. He wanted norms in the realities of politics, not in the aspirations of mative, but to root his or in the constructs of lawyers. The model of interstate relations politicians and the precepts of "realism" which he presented which Morgenthau proposed, as the only valid recipes for foreign policy success as well as for international moderation, were derived from the views of nineteenth-century and early and also Weber). historians of statecraft (such as Treitschke, twentieth-century the paradox of introducing to the America of the cold war, and of making Hence a "wisdom" about statecraft and dogmatically explicit, notions and analytically that had remained largely implicit in the age to which they best applied, and mass whose validity for the age of nuclear weapons, ideological confrontations, was at least open to question. and economic interdependence politics, that work played a doubly useful role?one Be that as itmay, Morgenthau's one looks at the scene either from the if it may be hard to appreciate fully or thirty years later, as does the new generation of outside (as does Aron), to lay down the scholars. On the one hand, his very determination American the search for the laws, or regularities, of state behavior, law made Morgenthau his of chief the of power; by tying sweeping analy? types configurations policies, ses to two masts, the concept of power and the notion of the national interest, he a from was boldly positing the existence of field of scientific endeavor, separate the of the or breadth his other the law. On brushstrokes, hand, very history INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 45 about power, the sub? pronouncements ambiguities hidden by his peremptory denied by his assertion of an objective national interest, and jective uncertainties even more the sleights of hand entailed by his pretense that the best analytic scheme necessarily yields the only sound normative advice?all of this incited to readers react and, by reacting, criticizing, correcting, on to build refuting, foundations. Those who rejected his blueprint were led to try Morgenthau's other designs. He was both a goad and a foil. (Indeed, the more one agreed with his approach, the more one was irritated by his flaws, and eager to differentiate own one's A product). less arrogantly a writer scholar, dogmatic more modest in his empirical scope and in his normative assertions, would never have had such an impact on scholarship. Less sweeping, he would not have imposed both the that idea here was not have made would two. One of the a realm with many reasons of properties scholars burn with why its own. Less Aron's Raymond he trenchant, the itch to bring him down a peg or monumental Peace and in its scope and far more sophisticated book far more ambitious in its no than Politics Nations?incited reaction from analyses Among comparable and modesty of scholarly readers may well have been the greater judiciousness War6?a Aron's normative conclusions. Humane invite skeptics nods and not sighs, and fury; and sound and fury are good for creative scholarship. More? to be discouraging; over, Aron's own scholarship was overwhelming enough was to Morgenthau's just shaky enough inspire improvements. Still, Politics Among Nations would not have played such a seminal role, if the ground in which the seeds were planted had not been so receptive. The devel? relations as a discipline in the United States results opment of international from the convergence of three factors: intellectual predispositions, political cir? and institutional The are intellectual cumstances, opportunities. predispositions those which account for the formidable explosion of the social sciences in gener? al in this country, since the end of the Second World War. There is, first, the in a nation which Ralf Dahrendorf has called the Applied profound conviction, that all problems can be resolved, that the way to resolve them Enlightenment,7 sound is to apply the scientific to method?assumed be value free, and to combine that the resort formation, and testing?and empirical investigation, hypothesis to science will yield practical will that is spe? applications bring progress. What is the scope of these beliefs, or the depth of this faith: cifically American they encompass the social world as well as the natural world, and they go beyond the concern for problem-solving (after all, there are trial-and-error, piecemeal ways of solving problems): they entail a convicci?n that there is, in each area, a kind of an intellectual, but an masterkey?not merely operational paradigm. Without this paradigm, no continuous there can be muddling progress; through, but once one has it, the practical recipes will follow. We are in the presence of a sort of national fascinating ideology: itmagnifies and expands eighteenth-century What has ensured their triumph and their postulates. growth is the absence of on the or the Left, that this faith either any counterideology, Right challenges or conservative in its validi? (as did, radically thought Europe) by subordinating ty ence to a of change economic reinforcing Second, in the social development, system. Moreover, social this set of beliefs. and as a kind of practical on integration, consequence, the whole, and external the national success the very prestige experi? has kept and sophis 46 STANLEY HOFFMANN tication of the "exact sciences" were bound to benefit the social ones as well. voices of gloom or skepticism that lament the differences between the natu? ral world and the social world have never been very potent in America. Pre? one of conflict, precisely world social is because the because national cisely The history had entailed civil and foreign wars, the quest for certainty, the desire to find a sure way of avoiding fiascoes and traumas, was even more burning in the realm of the social sciences. The very contrast between an ideology of progress reason to human concerns?an through the deliberate application of ideology a social reason in and faith in moral reason?and which fuses faith instrumental reality inwhich the irrational often prevails both in the realm of values and in the choice of means, breeds a kind of inflation of social science establishments and a new At the end of the One of the social war, pretensions. dogma appeared. was economics, sciences, to have deemed met the of expectations the national a science on the model of the exact ones; it was ideology, to the solution of the age-old problems of celebrated for its contribution scarcity and inequality. This triumph goaded the other social sciences. Political science, and to have become or the mother was that here ty. of is not emphasis or of community of a certain drew international on the kind of power, to it closer that effects of but on association, science of scarcity, on creative and on its interplay with other nor the and and competition, activi? structures coercive social conflict. It spurred. econom? realm of human culture, the Like greatest. yet specialized and origins particularly was economics a universal voluntary was relations, to emulate science deals with ics, political Its of stepmother the temptation role This also eco? power, or to disciplines like anthropology nomics, sociology, which deal with more diffuse phenomena and which are less obsessed by the solution of pressing means of central action. enlightened problems by than in which Nations have whelming also grandiose after known, sion of the social sciences. lever.8 And political and this But science the the United abroad activist Second has ideology World War, States often usually been of is less science a considerable expan? served as model more reflective over? and as than re? more than therapeutic; here and in sociology, formist, descriptive although, reacted social scientists the traditional against foreign intelligentsia of moralists, that and aesthetes (not old-fashioned by stressing philosophers, knowledge were not at was least driven (or wisdom) influence), they power by the dream set in, disillusionment when of knowledge for power. Moreover, (inevitably) crises within the professions, vio? it took often far more drastic forms?identity in the United States. An ideology on probation lent indictments outside?than reacts to failure in the cannot afford a fall. An ideology serenely hegemonial manner of the work horse inOrwell's Animal Farm, or of Avis: "Iwill try harder." a was A third predisposition transplanted element: the scholars provided by of who had immigrated from abroad. They played a huge role in the development the in American science in general. This role was particularly social important an additional sciences. Here, injection of talent, but they provided not merely talent of a different sort. No social science ismore interesting than the questions it asks, and these were scholars whose philosophical training and personal expe? to than ask far those much of American moved them rience bigger questions so had asked about social science far, questions ends, not just about means; about choices, not just about techniques; about social wholes, not just about RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL or towns small of units So government. they 47 often as served conceptualizers, their analytic skills with the research talents of the "natives." More? a sense of history, an awareness of the diversity of they brought with them and blended over, social that experiences, more could stir only research comparative and some? make social science. In the there was a galaxy of the wise and empiricism: of the frequently parochial American relations, in addition toMorgenthau, universal thing field of international scholars, all concerned with transcending foreign-born Ernst Haas, George Lis Klaus Knorr, Karl Deutsch, learned Arnold Wolfers, a few. They to name and the and (and Brzezinski, ka, young Kissinger only in child? the Atlantic their had them who crossed those among quite especially to find out the meaning and the causes of the hood or adolescence) wanted a the and that had keys to better world. perhaps uprooted them, catastrophe The last two names bring us to politics. And politics mattered. Hans Mor? as if truth and power were bound to be enemies genthau has often written more categorical). And yet he shaped his truths even has been Arendt (Hannah so as to in power. The growth of the discipline cannot be separated those guide role in world affairs after 1945. First, by definition from the American (or tau? are fascinated with power?either because scientists they want tology), political want to or it and understand the mon? fear at because least it, they vicariously, as with her usual has ster, lucidity.9 And in Judith Shklar devastating suggested was more than the imperial of the postwar years, what part power interesting a the sole economic of leader the sudden bit? America coalition, superpower, the nuclear later monopolist, the nuclear was superior, far more to interesting or the many students than local politics, or the politics of Congress, politics of a concern in the for America's conduct group pluralism. Almost inevitably, a for the world of international whole world blended with relations, study seemed to be stake the of confrontation. the American-Soviet Here was a do? main which was both a virgin field for study and the arena of a titanic contest. To study United States foreign policy was to study the international system. To study the international system could not fail to bring one back to the role of the United States. the Moreover, or to criticize to temptation the official ones was made give to offer advice, even more courses of by the spotty character and the gaffes of past American behavior in world affairs, by the in American thinness of the veneer of professionalism diplomacy, by the eager? was the one-eyed ness of officialdom for guidance?America leading the two drives merged, for the benefit of the discipline and to its cripples. Thus, action, detriment also, in some ways: the desire or to concentrate to want on irresistible what is the most to be useful, not only as relevant, and the tendency (implicit explicit) a scientist, but as an expert citizen whose science can help promote intelligently that was not negligible, the embattled values of his country (a motive among newcomers was all too easy to assume that the to America it For especially). values that underlie scientific research?the respect for truth, freedom of inves? of and of also those for which Washing? discussion, publication?were tigation, ton stood in world affairs. as I have just said, what the scholars offered, the policy-makers Second, wanted. between their Indeed, there is a remarkable chronological convergence needs and the scholars' performances. Let us oversimplify the greatly. What leaders looked for, once the cold war started, was some intellectual compass 48 STANLEY HOFFMANN serve multiple functions: exorcise isolationism, which would and justify a per? manent and global involvement in world affairs; rationalize the accumulation of of and the methods of the containment intervention, power, appar? techniques to a public of idealists why international ently required by the cold war; explain not leave much leeway for pure good will, and indeed besmirches politics does force purity; appease the frustrations of the bellicose by showing why unlimited or on extremism of behalf liberty was no virtue; and reassure a nation eager for about the possibility of both avoiding war and achiev? accommodation, critical of specific policies, however (and thus its ideals. however "Realism," ing in its diverse recommendations, precisely provided what self-contradictorily) ultimate was there Indeed, necessary. was a always sufficient margin of disagreement and actual policies, and also between its many cham? its suggestions a war to but of it from rationalization cold prevent pions, being nothing policies. wave of writings?those of Morgenthau, ur-Kiss And yet the first Wolfers, or both the Walt Rostow, Kennan, McGeorge Bundy?gave Osgood, inger, new intellectual enterprise and the new diplomacy the general foundations they strat? from 1957 to the mid-1960s?turned needed. The second wave?roughly, the discipline. This coin? egy in the nuclear age into a dominant field within between to replace the reassuring of officialdom but the preoccupation a doctrine with that would of massive retaliation be simplicities implausible more that force, in amixture of it the conviction also reflected but sophisticated; cided with nuclear and deterrence conventional (or subconventional) limited uses, re? a asset. important aspect of power and major American Here again, in the literature, the attempt at finding principles for any "strategy to devise a is inseparable from the tendency in a nuclear world of conflict" mass a at sides had of destruc? both when time for America, weapons strategy mained tion, both and when the most there were serious problems of alliance management, guerrilla or "wars of national liberation." A third wave is quite recent: I refer to the It coin? relations. literature on the politics of international economic growing cides with what could be called the post-Viet Nam aversion for force, and with a issues to the top of the diplomatic the surge of economic agenda, caused by of the Bretton Woods of factors: the degradation combination system, the in? in the domestic poli? creasing importance of economic growth and social welfare tics of advanced societies, the resurgence of aggressive or protectionist impulses the gains from interdependence, in order to limit the bad effects or to maximize wars, the revolt of the Third World. blend. policy-making Once more, the priorities of research and those of stress States is the factor I would of the United The political preeminence in the most in explaining why the discipline has fared so badly, by comparison, in and Soviet Union like the countries rest of the world leave aside China, (I Insofar as it itwould be hard to speak of free social science scholarship!). which it seems to require the con? the contemporary deals primarily with world, so to a of of looking, speak, at global capable vergence scholarly community or of nation's the the of of (i.e., study foreign policy, going beyond phenomena concerned with the interstate politics of an area) and of a political establishment the political elites are the other. When world affairs; each one then strengthens to their country, because it lacks the is happening obsessed only with what or this of lack because to what is elsewhere, power has happening power shape INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49 on another state (such as the United bred habits of dependence States), or be? cause (as in the case of are severe and West there constraints on Germany) Japan the global use of the nation's power, the chances are that the scholars will not or receive the to turn individual efforts have the motivation impulse necessary into a genuine scientific enterprise, and will either turn to other fields with more solid traditions and outlets (such as, say, electoral behavior in France and Brit? ain) or merely reflect, more or less slavishly, and with some delays, American or else there will be often brilliant individual contributions, but uncon? fashions; a a Pierre nected and unsupported: Bull in Australia (and England), Hedley name to a in not Hassner make Even in France, just these two, do discipline. England and France, which have become nuclear powers, strategic studies have been to a very large extent the preserve of a few intellectual military men, con? cerned either with reconciling national policy with the predominant doctrines of or with these. But the doctrines have re? deterrence, predominant challenging as if even in the more abstract efforts at a mained American, theorizing about that has transformed world politics, itmattered if one was the citizen or weapon host of a country with a worldwide writ. Scholars do not like to think about on the status of their country, and on the ambi? their intellectual dependence to a tions of its political elite; it disturbs their sense of belonging cosmopolitan, science. of Even the of free-floating community sociology knowledge, which has often looked at the debts of scholars to their countries, has been singularly coy about this particular kind of bond. And yet, the link exists. And it is sometimes reinforced by institutional arrangements. In the case of the United States, there have been three institutional factors that have acted as multipliers of political connection?factors which have not not and most direct and elsewhere. One is the existed, certainly simultaneously, visible tie between the scholarly world and the world of power: the "in-and outer" system of government, which academics puts and researchers not merely in the corridors but also in the kitchens of power. it may be wise to Actually, two phases. In the late forties and fifties, those kitchens remained distinguish the preserves men, enemy, of the old and lawyers. They with the travails deterrence. They needed ties. This was the age of was the period in which had the biggest resources establishment: a mix had to cope with of economic of career the whole reconstruction civil servants, world, with and the turmoil business? a persistent of nuclear both data and ideas, and they turned to the universi? the academic as consultant (officially or not), and this much research got funded by those departments that (Defense more than State). The year 1960 was a turn? became proconsuls and joined the old boys; often ing point. Academics they tried to prove that they could cook spicier dishes and stir pots more vigorously than their colleagues. If one had some doubts about these "policy scientists," could only be doubled by the spectacle of scientific as it Be that policy-makers. connection turned an intellectual a into may, the Washington pro? interchange fessional one. In countries with a tight separation between the career of bureau? and the academic m?tier, such are limited to cracy or politics exchanges or occasional formal occasions?seminars colloquia?and frequent diners en ville \ but the former tend to be sterile, and the latter hover between witty debates on current affairs, and small talk. A second institutional factor of great importance is the role of what I have 50 STANLEY HOFFMANN of power and the academic is the network of foundations that fed international relations research after the war, and whose role is essential if one wants to understand exactly why the three waves of scholarship coincided concerns of the statesmen. A combination so of in? aptly with the consecutive to "frontiers of to and civic desire tellectual encouragement be of knowledge" to a of boards of directors composed, service, the sociological peculiarities large and former officials, the happy accident of vast extent, of former academics financial resources that kept growing until the end of the sixties, all this made of a and academia. the foundations golden half-way house between Washington as in served the the institution?as well State; ex-State Wasps CIA?pardon, officials served in the foundations; and even those professors who had some reservations about serving in the government, had no objection to applying to It was a seamless pluralism. These precious relays exist virtual? the foundations. called elsewhere salons. The most ly the relays between the kitchens important of these dumbwaiters else. nowhere third institutional opportunity was provided by the universities them? selves. They had two immense virtues. They were flexible; because of their own and specialization, and also be? variety, which ensured both competition cause of the almost complete absence of the strait jackets of public regulations, and intellectual routine which traditions, financial dependence, quasi-feudal of postwar Europe. The the universities latter got have so often paralyzed The caught in the contradiction between their own past?a combination of vocation? for the elites?and the sudden demands of al training and general education to mass from confusion could vacillate education; they collapse, but the higher was to one do innovate. The other could virtue of American rarely thing they resulted in part from the fact that mass higher education was al? universities a of political science, which ready fait accompli: they had large departments In France could serve as the matrices of the discipline of International Relations. inter? until the late sixties, in Britain until the spread of the new universities, of histo? national relations remained the handmaid of law, or the laughingstock to mushroom, the other rians; and when political science departments began reasons for the development in America were still missing. of the discipline as the in America could a creative sociologist write about the university Only most characteristic the institution of the postindustrial age, laboratory of its In other discoveries.10 countries, universities are rarely the arenas of research; on concentrates they are, the research funded by public institutions for the political issues of public policy which are rarely international?partly reason I have mentioned above, partly because the existence of a career foreign the tendency to look at inter? service with its own training programs perpetuates Civil servants obliged national relations as if it were still traditional diplomacy. to deal with radically new tasks such as urbanization, the management of banks think they can learn from the social sci? and industries, or housing sometimes ences. Civil servants who deal with so "traditional" a task as national security and diplomacy do not always realize that the same old labels are stuck on bottles as well as their content are new. And when diplomats discover whose shapes that they too have to cope with the new, technical issues of technology, science, it is to "domestic" specialists of these subjects that they turn?if and economics, and when they turn at all. RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL Even 51 in America If one looks at the field thirty years after the beginning of the "realist" revo? The remarks which follow lution, can one point to any great breakthroughs? am more and I are, of course, thoroughly subjective, undoubtedly jaundiced. struck by the dead ends than by the breakthroughs; the often by particular, to but nonadditive contributions brilliant, occasionally generally elegant, specif? ic parts of the field, than by its overall development; that by the contradictions of scholars, than by its harmony. The specific contri? have rent its community butions have been well analyzed in a recent volume of the Handbook of Political Science,n and I shall not repeat what is said there. If I had to single out three I would list the concept of the international system, an significant "advances," to do for international relations what the concept of a political regime attempt does for "domestic" political science: it is a way of ordering data, a construct for describing both the way in which the parts relate, and the way in which pat? terns of interaction change. It emerged from the first period I have described to be of importance. Next, I would mention and continues the way in above, on has and which the literature deterrence codified "rules of the game" analyzed which have been accepted as such by American and which have statesmen, served as the intellectual foundation of the search for tacit as well as explicit interstate restraints: MAD and arms control ("Mutual Assured Destruction") are the two controversial but influential offsprings of the doomsday science. there is the current attempt to study the political roots, the originality, Third, and the effects of economic in order to establish interdependence, particularly it shatters the "realist" paradigm, which sees international relations as whether marked by the predominance of conflict among state actors. And yet, if I were to a recluse on a desert island, I asked to assign three books from the discipline would have to confess a double embarrassment: for I would select one that is more than two thousand years old?Thucydides' Peloponnesian War, and as for the two contemporary ones, Kenneth Waltz' Man, the State and War12 is a work in the tradition of political philosophy, and Aron's Peace and War is awork in the tradition of historical grand sociology, which dismisses many of the scientific pretenses of the French postwar American of Montesquieu, disciple jargon; the two contemporary is missing. How us return a field of more scholars, and emanates from the genius of a and Weber. All three works avoid Clausewitz, ones carry their erudition lightly: the sweat of toil unscientific can you get? to the ideology I alluded to earlier. There was the hope of a science, and the turning inquiry into hope that this science would be useful. Both quests have turned out to be frustrating. The desire to proceed which has been manifest in all the social sciences, has run into scientifically, three particular snags here. First, there was (and there remains) the problem of at some I have discussed elsewhere the difficulties scholars have theory. length encountered when they tried to formulate laws accounting for the behavior of states, and theories that would explain those laws and allow for prediction. A more recent comes to an if analysis, by Kenneth Waltz, interesting conclusion: mean to in is here it what does then the of inter? theory physics, only "theory" national relations is that of the balance of power, and it is unfortunately in? sufficient to help us understand the field! The other so-called general theories Let 52 STANLEY are not more than HOFFMANN conceptualizations, grand "confused, using and vague fluctu? seems to of variables."13 This may well be the case; Waltz ating definitions blame the theorists, rather than asking whether the fiasco does not result from the very nature of the field. Can there be a theory of undetermined behavior, which is what to use action," "diplomatic-strategic Aron's amounts terms, to? a Aron has, in my opinion, demonstrated be? why theory of undetermined havior cannot consist of a set of propositions that laws make explaining general and can do little more than define basic concepts, prediction possible, analyze basic out sketch configurations, the a constant of features permanent of logic in other words make the field intelligible.14 It is therefore not surpris? behavior, or vivisected, if of the theories are, as he puts it, dissected, Waltz, many by ing such as the theories of imperialism, which are what he had called reductionist, in his earlier book "second image" theories (they find the causes of interstate relations in what happens within the units); or else, the theories he dismisses were all (or fetish) stage?of neophytish produced during the first phase?the for the of the scientific the philosopher's search research: postwar equivalent stone has been far less ardent in the past twenty years. Waltz' own attempt at so for theory is conceptually rigorous as to leave out laying the groundwork to account for. I agree with him that a theory much of the reality he wants mere reality must be removed from it and cannot be arrived at by explaining so it to that what has little it relation if removed is but induction; "explains" in all politi? what occurs, what is the use? One finds some of the same problems is right in stating that international relations suffers from cal science; but Waltz a fascination instrumental has subject to pursue scholars led power to far clearer and recreated, it is the science, the in chimera of the realist actors?the in vain tried in economics. money theories to make And they to a grand unrelated the have theory failure. a theory the paradigm recently, have They as role of partial production without "science" same the play tantamount behavior. economic acted as if the mere until is created, that the study of a purposive activity aimed at a of ends, political action, could be treated like the study of action, of A that economics They variety bewildering was are variables key have believed masterkey. concept "the on it."15 Still, here as in the rest of political by those who work with the clues": here whereas systems, political sense common of "absence peculiar domestic has been a science in the absence a with of a and, paradigm; conflict that of permanent However, paradigm. be still may state among theory, a second to answer: what is it that should be explained? The field question has been hard insofar has both suffered and benefited from a triple fragmentation?benefited, to each fragment, yet suffered as much has been research brought ingenious because the pieces of the puzzle do not fit. First, there has been (and still is) the so-called level of analysis problem. Should we be primarily concerned with the we international system, that is, the interactions among the units? Or should our concentrate potheses speak, some on efforts these behind sort of life the units strategies. of its own, themselves? One even postulates if some There are that the the actors of two so hy? to have a conflicting system obviously has, in shaping and changing the rules of interaction. The are the that the actors themselves strategic level for postulates role than others greater other approach understanding what goes on among them. One says, in effect: Grasp the pat INTERNATIONAL terns of interaction, the one other outcomes. RELATIONS and you will understand at Look says: the of Students the actors' and will you students and system as they do; the actors behave why moves, international 53 the comprehend of foreign-policy never really blended their research. My own conclusion is that of a making have writer who has worked both sides of the street: I am dissatisfied with each, but I admit that it is hard to be on both at once. The study of the international system one with a fine framework, but no more?precisely because the system provides for the actors, but does may well put constraints on and provide opportunities not "dictate" their behavior; and the study of the actors tells you, inevitably, more about actors the than about the linkage theory (before linkage became about the bonds between propositions has in the remained frozen of stage interactions. But what to be used called a that is, Kissinger-inspired technique), foreign policy and international politics, static taxonomies. at each level of analysis. One there has also been fragmentation Second, that each student of international could say, not so flippantly, systems has own version of what that abstract scheme "is." Aron's is not Richard his hugged is not Morton which Rosecrance's, one each Moreover, Kaplan's. has to tended look at the postwar international system in a different way (once again, in the absence of a single theory, it is not easy to determine authoritatively the dynam? ics of a that system particular still unfolds under one's A eyes). dozen years scholars acted as if they were competing for a prize to the best discourse and many subject: are we in a bipolar system? Waltz, Liska, Kissinger, me) (including In recent took the years, part, new since but contest there was no there Academy, or Demise "Persistence is about was of ago, on the others no prize. the Realist concept of international politics, with its focus Paradigm?": Is the state-centered on the and its obsession with the use of force, chessboard diplomatic-strategic still relevant to the age of interdependence? and Robert Aron, Joseph Nye are Edward and others Morse, Bull, Keohane, many (including myself) busy I As that the will verdict be and that like before, suspect evaluating. history's, in Ionesco's Chairs, it will speak in incomprehensible the long-awaited Orator At of analysis, we have accumulated masses of studies the other level gibberish. of concrete foreign policies, and moved from the period of Chinese boxes?the theories of the 1950s?to the age of the "bureaucratic politics" decision-making model. The former provided endless items for laundry lists; the other one draws attention to the kitchen where the meal is being cooked, but forgets to tell us that matters what is whether the and assumes to prepare, ordered chefs cook what they want or what they are all too readily that what they do is determined in the kitchen, rather than by what they have by their particular assignment learned outside, or their personal quirks. as well. If there is, or can be, there has been functional fragmentation Third, no are if the satisfactory general theory, "overarching concepts" excessively clothes, loose-fitting why ic level, we have integration reached ries of the practical, imperialism, level (although try greater thus witnessed (where, of transnational not for once, on rigor such clusters the theoretical ingenuity relations accomplishments race models and measurements and international it tries to straddle both) scale? of research "real-life" arms a smaller of the on system? regional of scholars has far out statesmen), of wars, modern recent theo? studies At the foreign policy cluster has been that of strate economics. the main At as work 54 STANLEY HOFFMANN now a on in the growing literature gic literature; and there is decision-making each cluster has tended to foster its own jargon; United States. Unfortunately, has had other effects, which will be discussed and this kind of fragmentation below. the quest for science has led to a heated and largely futile battle of it iswe want to study, in answer to a third question: Whatever methodologies, a we it is double battle. On the one hand, there is do it? Actually, how should those "traditionalists" who, precisely because of the resis? the debate between tance the field itself opposes to rigorous theoretical formulations, extol the vir? tues of an approach that would remain as close to historical scholarship and to as the concerns of political philosophy taken by (this is the position possible own brand of all whatever their and those who, Bull), Hedley theorizing, be? not in the lieve that there can be a political science of international relations?if form of a single theory, at least in that of systematic conceptualizations, classifi? etc.?a science which can be guided in its questions by the cations, hypotheses, discourse yet finds reliance on philosophical interrogations of past philosophers, intuition both insufficient and somewhat alien to the enterprise and diplomatic is little likelihood that this debate will ever come to of empirical analysis. There Finally, a neither because conclusion?especially side is and consistent, totally one each tends to oversimplify what it actually does. On the other hand, here as in other branches of political science, there is the battle of the literates versus the numer? of ates; or, if you prefer, the debate about the proper place and contributions mathematical models. The fact that methods and the practitioners quantitative of the latter tend to hug the word science, and to put beyond the pale of science "from the unique to the all those who, while equally concerned with moving events and types of entities," believe of with "classes and considering general" that cannot these "accumulating to lead one fact has made be to reduced coefficients of expect what kind for rather or numbers a connection of strained relations that science . . . "without correlation" among among not does which in consist theories asking which variables"16?this scholars of different methodo? In domestic political science, behaviorists and old-fashioned logical persuasions. scholars have found coexistence easier, because their respective approaches fit behavior or the behavior of legislative bod? separate parts of the field?electoral treatment. In international affairs, such a func? ies lends itself to mathematical tional division of labor is much harder to apply. As a result, the prophets of dismiss as mere hunches based on "insight" (aword quantitative methodologies were an insult) the elaborate ruminations as use if it of their oppo? often they one turn that tell calculations in ridicule the and these nents, costly nothing about causes or lump together different types of the same phenomenon (say, wars), and the endless correlations among variables lifted from their context, that evidence can be derived from that ... no conclusive all too often conclude them: endless If there asm for the nonanswers is little state to agreement of the science trivial as questions. to what constitutes of international a science, relations, what and little about enthusi? the other I am struck by one apparent contradiction. that of usefulness? great expectation, a affairs have, on the whole, declared of international of science The champions to objective empiri? their and from philosophy their independence allegiance to most have for the real wanted draw of them cism. And yet, consequences INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 55 from their research: the greater the drive to predict (or the tendency to the and prediction), equate science, not just with intelligibility but with control of the engineer. It to play the role of the wise adviser?or the inclination greater is in the nature of human affairs, and of the social sciences. But in this specific realm, there are some very peculiar problems. The first could be called: advice to whom? Many scholars, especially those whose level of to a as if they were addressing themselves implicitly write analysis is systemic, or as if they aimed at reaching those who wish to transcend world government, and state calculations the traditional (the logic of national self-righteousness same can be said, even more strongly, of theorists of regional or functional to distribute recipes for going beyong the nation-state). integration; they tend is empty, and change comes (if at Statecraft of World the chair Unfortunately, state And of the so, scholars of this kind oscillate all) through agents. operations or retard in? that make for conflict, of state practices from condemnation world tegration, or promote injustice, it is however or secretariats advice to international to state to advice limits of the game which agents on how to transcend these agents' role and duty and subnational bureaux on the to perpetuate, the best strat? and turning the resistance of national statecraft. These are egy for undercutting for the scholars. all perfect guarantees of unhappy consciousness those whose level of analysis is national Other scholars, especially among are advising see themselves as efficient Machiavellians?they decision-making, on to to how best and the Prince on how best promote the manage his power case the of the strategists, the group which national interest. This is particularly and policy? of researchers turned consultants proportion are fully aware of the differences between an writers who "Systemic" of mankind, that is, the "realists," do international system and a community national their best to make advice to the only Prince who still matters?the with their bound to enhance the interests of his state?coincide statesman, views of the interests of the whole. They advocate "enlightened" concepts of the contains the highest makers. national interest, or "world order" policies that would somewhat reconcile the needs of the part and of the whole. But this is a difficult exercise. The logical thrust of "realism" is the promotion of the national interest, that is, not unhappy "Realists" who become but happy national celebration. global consciousness aware of the perils of realism in aworld of nuclear interconnection and econom? or myself?suffer from the addi? like Morgenthau, ic interdependence?writers in that which afflicts all "systemic" writers tion of two causes of unhappiness: search of a radically new order, and that which comes from knowing only too does not work. well that utopianism in their relations which the real world, the scholars are torn Thus, basically, irrelevance and absorption. Many do not like irrelevance, and want between even the most esoteric or abstract research to be of use. The oscillation I have described above is what they want to escape from, and yet they do not want to the service of the Prince. But be absorbed by that machine for self-righteousness, romantic hope that "the people" their only excuse is the populist dream?the can be aroused and led to force the elites that control the levers of action, either out of power altogether or to change their ways. Much of peace research, once it got tired of advocating for the solution of world conflicts the discrete techniques in domestic affairs, has been traveling down that route. used for accommodation 56 STANLEY HOFFMANN It is one on which scholarship risks finding both irrelevance and absorption, for the policies advocated here do inspire both those intelligentsias that want to and those established elites that countries, displace certain elites in developing are eager to boost national power dominance. if Yet the former against foreign come to power, and if the latter follow the advice of theorists, "dependencia" the result is not likely to be a world of peace and justice, but a world of revolu? tions, and new conflicts, and new inequities. As for the scholars who want to avoid esot?rica or romanticism and who set run are two in their sights on Washington, into There turn, they, problems. so reasons why the is is There the temptation strong. Washingtonian simple fact or not, in the that international politics remains the politics of states: whether abstract, the actor is the shaper of or is shaped by the system, in reality there is no doubt that the United States remains the most potent player. And there is the fact that a science of contemporary politics needs data, and that in this much is public?in the records of international organizations, state documents?a great deal remains either classified or speeches, published accessible only to insiders: the specific reasons for a decision, the way in which it was reached, the bargains that led to a common stand, the meanderings of a a breakdown. Far more than domestic of the circumstances political negotiation, realm, whereas relations international science, is an insider's even game, for scholars concerned with the systemic level. But a first problem lies in the fact that gathering information from and about the most potent actor, creates an irresistible urge to nudge the player: the closer the greater the temptation of letting oneself be the Washingtonian connection, advice suffers from oversimplification. outsider absorbed. Second, always comes to it the When tactical suggestions, insiders, who control not only all the facts but This also the the increases down the slope derived-from-research, reasons for cacy links connecting scholar's urge realms separate to in closer. get of once Third, to from research-with-practical-effects, to the tendency slight career either of personal have policy, the or research of the one advantage. starts rolling practical-advocacy the and to slant political or advo? bureaucratic will become insidious. Which means that the author may still be opportunity, as an intelligent and skilled decision-maker?but not as a scholar. useful highly Either his science will be of little use, or else, in his attempt to apply a particular a pet theory or dogma, he may well become public danger. This does not mean is fateful to the scholar, that the greatest that the experience of policy-making lie in blowing up the bridge that leads across the hope for the science would moat into the citadel of power. A scholar-turned-statesman can, if his science is it wise and his tactics flexible, find ways of applying soundly; and he can later draw on his experience for improving his scholarly analytical work. But it is a delicate exercise which Because few have performed well. ofAmerica in America, I have examined have arisen mainly because the problems so to be relations of international specialists happens preponderantly profession the same difficulties Insofar as it flourishes elsewhere, American. appear: they result from the nature of the field. But because of the American predominance, The INTERNATIONAL has also taken some additional the discipline and can, RELATIONS in evidence less in those other 57 are traits which countries the where essentially field an object of serious study. ing It explains The most striking is the quest for certainty.17 mature the desire to calculate the theoretical formulation, to the but crusade discussions status), replace merely power such more data objective as word counts and vote counts, the is now Ameri? becom? the rage for pre? incalculable (not of motives with crowding of stra? are given, and it becomes a quest for the means). tegic research (here, the ends International relations should be the science of uncertainty, of the limits of states to never of in which but the action, ways try manage quite succeed in own a to eliminate their There drive been has, instead, insecurity. eliminating a quest for from the discipline all that exists in the field itself?hence precision Hence that turns out false or misleading. also two important and related gaps. One is the study of statecraft as an art. With very few exceptions (such as A World Restored) it has been left to historians. could much of the same (One say about domestic political The other is the of and science). study perceptions the of essential side international Robert subjective yet misperceptions, politics. to fill that gap, but it is not certain that his Jervis' work is beginning example will be widely followed.18 Almost by essence, the statecraft study of diplomatic and of perceptions or to a refuses to lend itself to mathematical formulations, small number of significant generalizations (one may generalize, but the result is and case studies do not quench the thirst to likely to be trivial). Taxonomies to advocate. and predict A second feature, intimately tied to the discipline's principal residence rath? er than to its nature, is the of studies dealing with the present. preponderance Historians continue to examine past diplomatic history in their way. Political on the scientists concerned with international affairs have concentrated politics of the postwar era; and when they have turned to the past, it has all too often been either in the way summary, I would say almost "college outline" fashion, or in long ago denounced by Barrington Moore, Jr., which consists feeding data detached from their context into computers. This is a very serious weakness. It leads not only to the neglect of a wealth of past experiences?those earlier of imperial systems, of systems of interstate relations outside Europe, of in domestic policies far different from the contemporary foreign policy-making ones?but also to a real deficiency in our understanding of the international system of in highly the Because present. we have an inadequate basis for comparison, we are tempted to exaggerate either continuity with a past that we know badly, or the radical originality of the present, on whether we are more struck depending we or the features deem permanent, with those we do not believe existed by before. And yet a more rigorous examination of the past might reveal that what we sense as new some is and that of the "traditional" features are far not, really more complex than we think. are many reasons for this flaw. One is the fear of "falling back into we fear that if we the in indeed find gener? history"?the past may study depth, alizations difficult and categorization either endless or pointless; and we may lose the thread of "science." A related reason is the fact that American political scientists do not receive sufficient training either in history or in foreign lan? for work on past relations among states. A third reason is guages, indispensable There 58 STANLEY HOFFMANN to be found in the very circumstances of the discipline's birth and development. In a way, the key question has not been, "What should we know?" It has been, "What should we do?"?about the Russians, the Chinese, the bomb, the oil to as we as tried to know how We have know much in needed order producers. a motivation to act?and more: we that find in other parts of political rarely some dis? science (the study of political development, for instance), where illusionment set has in. But we can say to ourselves that are no there to shortcuts that the United States cannot build nations for others, political development, and that we should go back to the foundations, that is, to an understanding of the others' are We past. to unable say to ourselves that we must stop a having on our and impose amoratorium diplomacy, advising drive until we have found out more about the past of behavior. And the interest diplomatic-strategic the less which, and, government quite naturally, wisely but understandably, the foundations have shown in supporting research that deals with the present it into the future, or scrutinizes the near future so as to discern (or extrapolates what would riveted on be sound the in the present) action has kept the scholars' attention scene. contemporary The stress on the present and the heavily American orientation have com? several important issues?issues bined to leave in the dark, at least relatively, a determination of the dynamics whose of international study is essential to not is the relation of domestic One politics (and merely bureaucratic politics. in far greater detail the need to examine politics) to international affairs?we states not of have in which the (or not only) from the way goals originated, of the but from the of domestic actors, play position political forces geopolitical and economic interests; to act primarily abroad to reach or the way for the world certain objectives in which stage, statesmen, nevertheless within; or the way even when also wanted in which they seemed their moves external issues and affected internal battles. The desire to alignments shaped domestic relations from the rest of political sci? of international the discipline distinguish ence is partly responsible for this gap; scholars who study a given political sys? to foreign policy, tem do not usually pay all that much attention and the not do know of about international politics simply enough specialists foreign political systems. The only country for which the bond between domestic and in some depth is, not so surprisingly, the external behavior has been examined United States. Here again, an assessment of the originality of the present?with in the and foreign policy concerns, of domestic its visible merging especially a much realm of international economic affairs?requires deeper understanding have of the past relations between domestic politics and foreign policy. We may dis? stresses the primacy of foreign policy, cover that the realist paradigm, which has to be seriously amended, not only for the present but for the past. zone of relative darkness is the functioning of the international hier? Another nature of the relations between the weak and the archy, or, if you prefer, the a on strong. There has been (especially in the strategic literature) glaring focus moves to it (such that undermine by the presumption accompanied bipolarity, if the as nuclear proliferation) would be calamitous (it may not be a coincidence a on taken the whole, French have, very different line). Much of the study of if one may refer to power in international affairs has been remarkably Athenian, the famous Melian dialogue in Thucydides (the strong do what they can, the RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL 59 the strong have often dealt with the weak in ways weak what they must). How far more oblique, or less successful than the simple notion of a high correlation between might and achievements would suggest; how and under what condi? tions the weak have been able to offset their are inferiority?these until OPEC came along, had not been at the center of research more historical work again, far ought to be undertaken. issues which, and for which, a celebration of supposed to be creativity seems to have degener? ated into a series of complaints. We have found here an acute form of a general tension between the need for so-called problem that afflicts social science?the basic research, which asks the more general and penetrating questions that de? rive from the nature of the activity under study, and the desire of those who, in What the real was world, support, demand, or orient the for research, quick answers to seems more than the need, it pressing issues. And if the desire often compelling is because of the scholars' own tendency to succumb to the Comtian temptation This is enhanced by the opportunities of social engineering. the temptation United States provides to scholar-kings (or advisers to the Prince), or else by the anxiety which scholars, however "objective" they try to be, cannot help but feel about a world threatened with destruction and chaos by the very logic of tradi? tional interstate behavior. Born and raised in America, the discipline of international relations is, so to to too It close the fire. needs speak, triple distance: it should move away from the contemporary, toward the past; from the perspective of a superpower (and a one), toward that of the weak and the revolutionary?away highly conservative from the impossible quest for stability; from the glide into policy science, back to the steep ascent toward the peaks which the questions raised by traditional a This would also be represent. way of putting the frag? political philosophy ments into which the discipline not if explodes, together, at least in perspective. in the social sciences, are the scientific priorities the decisive ones? But where, that exist in this country, Without the possibilities the discipline might well have avoided being stunted, only by avoiding being born. The French say that if one does not have what one would like, one must be content with what one But has got. Resigned, content? A state of dissatisfaction is a goad to perhaps. in research. Scholars satisfied: the state of the world, reasons always international relations have two good the state of their discipline. reasons If only to be dis? those two converged! References see my xFor an earlier discussion, Relations Contemporary Theory in International (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960); and my The State ofWar (New York: Praeger, 1965), chs. 1 and 2. 2E. H. Carr, Twenty Years Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939). 3Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy inWorld Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942). 4Hans Politics (New York: Knopf, 1948). Morgenthau, Among Nations 5Cf. H. Stuart Hughes, The Sea 1975). Change (New York: Knopf, 1962; New York: Doubleday, 1966). 6Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Paris: Calmann-L?vy 7Ralf Dahrendorf, Die angewandte (Munich: Piper, 1963). Aufkl?rung 8See the forthcoming Ph.D. thesis (Harvard University, of History) of Diana Department in Italy and France. Pinto, who deals with postwar sociology in an introduction to the field of science written for Harvard fresh? 9Judith Shklar, political men. 60 STANLEY HOFFMANN 10Cf. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial 1973). Society (New York: Basic Books, llHandbook of Political Science, Vol. and Nelson 8, International Politics, Fred I. Greenstein eds. (Reading, Mass,: 1975). Polsby, Addison-Wesley, 12Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia Press, 1959). University ^Handbook ofPolitical Science, Vol. 8, International Politics, ch. 1, p. 14. 14See my The State ofWar, ch. 2. W. l5Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 8, International Politics, p. 8. 12. 16Ibid.,p. see also Albert O. Hirschman, 17On this point, as a Hindrance "The Search for Paradigms to World Politics, April 1970, pp. 329-343. Understanding," 18See Robert in International Politics Princeton (Princeton: Jervis, Perception and Misperception 1976). Press, University