Effel v. Rosberg Texas Court of Appeals, 2012. Facts: Robert Rosberg (plaintiff) reached a settlement agreement with Henry and Jack Effel. As part of the agreement, Rosberg bought residential property from Henry and Jack. The agreement provided that the current resident of the property, Lena Effel (defendant), would continue to live on the property for the rest of her life, unless she voluntarily chose to vacate. Rosberg and Henry, with power of attorney for Lena, signed a lease incorporating these terms. The lease contained certain covenants governing Lena’s maintenance of the property. The lease did not reserve a life estate. Lena installed a wrought iron fence in violation of the covenants in the lease. Rosberg terminated the lease and ordered Lena to vacate the property. Lena did not vacate, and Rosberg filed a forcible detainer action. The trial court awarded possession of the property to Rosberg. Lena appealed. Issue: If a lease does not specify a definite period of time does it create a tenancy at will? Holding: Yes, in order to create a term of years, a lease must specify a definite period of time. In the absence of a definite period of time, the legal rule is that a lease creates a tenancy at will. Reasoning: A lease that is not for a certain period of time creates a tenancy at will. This includes a lease for the period of the lessee’s life. A lessee’s lifespan is not a period certain. A lease for a lessee’s lifetime is thus a tenancy at will and terminable at any time by either party. In this case, the trial court did not err in awarding the property to Rosberg. The basis for Rosberg’s action is the lease, not the settlement agreement. Additionally, Lena is not a party to the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the court looks only to the lease to determine the rightful possessor of the property. The lease stated that Lena was to occupy the property until she died or voluntarily vacated the property. The lease was thus for an indefinite time period, rendering Lena’s tenancy a tenancy at will, terminable at any time by either party. Rosberg properly invoked his right to terminate the lease and, upon doing so, is entitled to possession of the property. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.