Criminal Law - United States v. Peterson

● Rule ○ (1) Under the law of the District of Columbia, the initial aggressor in a fatal conflict may not invoke the doctrine of self-defense to justify killing his adversary, unless he withdrew from the conflict in good faith and communicated his withdrawal by words or acts. ○ (2) Under the law of the District of Columbia, the initial aggressor in a fatal conflict is under a duty to retreat, if he may do so safely, before using deadly force in self-defense. ● Facts ○ Bennie Peterson (defendant) came out of his house and discovered Charles Keitt stealing windshield wipers from his car, which was parked in the alley behind Peterson’s property. Peterson argued with Keitt, then went back inside and got a gun. When Peterson returned, Keitt was about to drive off. Peterson threatened to kill Keitt. Keitt got out of the car, grabbed a lug wrench, and walked toward Peterson with the wrench in the air. Peterson told Keitt not to come closer. Keitt advanced, though he was still in the alleyway, and Peterson shot and killed him. Peterson was standing in his yard at the time. Peterson was indicted for seconddegree murder. At trial, Peterson sought a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence, which was denied. The judge instructed the jury on selfdefense. The judge said that self-defense generally does not excuse a killing if the defendant provoked the altercation, though words alone did not constitute provocation. The judge also told the jury that even if Peterson started the fight, self-defense was available if he withdrew from the conflict in good faith and let Keitt know by words or acts. The judge instructed the jury that Peterson was under no duty to retreat but it could consider whether he could have safely retreated in deciding whether his actions were justified. Peterson was found guilty of manslaughter. Peterson appealed, arguing that the judge wrongly instructed the jury. ● Issue ○ (1) May the initial aggressor in a fatal conflict invoke the doctrine of self-defense to justify killing his adversary? ○ (2) Is the initial aggressor in a fatal conflict under a duty to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense? ● Holding & Reasoning ○ (1) No. The right to use deadly force in self-defense is generally not available to the initial aggressor in an altercation. The doctrine is rooted in necessity. Deadly force is only justified if there is no alternative. A person must honestly and reasonably believe that there is an imminent threat of death or serious injury. Only then may he use deadly force to save himself. Nevertheless, a person who provokes a fatal conflict does not have a right to kill in self-defense. The right will only be restored if (1) the aggressor makes a good-faith effort to withdraw from the conflict and (2) communicates that intent to his adversary. Here, the jury instruction comported with these principles. There was sufficient evidence that Peterson was the aggressor; he got the gun and threatened to kill Keitt. Even if Keitt had initially been the aggressor, he was not at that point. The denial of Peterson’s motion for judgment of acquittal was not erroneous. ○ (2) Yes. Historically a person was not permitted to use deadly force if he could retreat safely, because this negated the strict necessity of killing the attacker. The District of Columbia still follows this rule, though it is now in the minority. There is no duty to retreat if it would be dangerous to do so. Next, the castle doctrine, which provides that a person may stand his ground if he is attacked in his home or its curtilage, does not apply if the person was the initial aggressor. Here, Peterson was not an innocent party to the conflict. The castle doctrine is thus inapplicable, even though Peterson was standing in his yard when he shot Keitt. The trial judge correctly instructed the jury that it could consider whether Peterson could have safely retreated. The verdict is affirmed.