Excuse Defenses

Excuse Defenses I. Introduction a. Excuse defense: What the defendant did was socially unacceptable, but she lacks moral responsibility for her actions (micro view). Insanity, duress, minor, etc. b. Justification defenses: What the defendant did was socially acceptable, indeed socially optimal (macro view). Duress I. II. III. IV. Introduction a. Also known as coercion or compulsion – an affirmative defense in which D claims they were threatened by another person w/ physical force (either to self or a 3 rd party) unless she committed a specific crime. b. The key difference between necessity and duress is that conduct under duress is a response to a threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm from a specific individual unless the defendant commits the acts that constitute the crime. Conduct under necessity, in contrast, involves a response to a dire situation. Necessity The “choice of evils” defense – Justification Defense (socially acceptable) (1) Harm D seeking to avoid greater than harm D would cause by breaking law; (2) D seeking to avoid clear and imminent danger; (3) causal connection; (4) no effective legal alternative. Breaking the law affirmatively to avoid acts of god, NOT human coercion Duress Excuse Defense (not socially acceptable) Necessity typically seeks to promote the general welfare Typically involves saving one’s own (or another’s) life. Being coerced by another human being Common Law Duress a. Defendant acted in response to an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; i. May include threats to anyone’s life, not just defendant’s. b. Defendant had a reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out unless they committed a specific crime; c. Defendant had no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm. d. Note: Duress is not available as a defense to murder. MPC Duress (Not Widely Adopted) a. Duress excuses criminal conduct that was coerced by the use of, or threat to use, unlawful force against the actor’s person or the person of another that a “person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.” b. No imminence requirement c. No need for unlawful force to be death or SBI d. A duress defense to homicide is possible, even if the victim was an innocent person. United States v. Contento-Pachon a. Facts: Contento-Pachon (D) was a taxi driver in Colombia. A passenger (Jorge) offered to hire him as a private driver. D agreed to meet him to discuss the details. Rather than discussing the job, Jorge asked D to transport cocaine-filled balloons to the US. When D refused, Jorge recited details about D’s private life that D had never told. Jorge threatened D that if he refused to cooperate, his wife & child would die. D agreed to cooperate. About 3 weeks later, D swallowed 120 balloons of cocaine & arranged to land in Panama & then the US. He was told that he would be watched at all times & his V. failure to follow directions would lead to the deaths of him & his family. D did not go to the police b/c he feared they were corrupt. Upon arriving in the US, customs x-rayed D’s stomach & found the cocaine. D was charged with unlawful possession of narcotics w/ intent to distribute. D attempted to submit the defenses of duress and necessity. TC excluded both. b. Issue: Is a defendant excused from criminal culpability if he commits his crime under a threat of death or SBI? c. Holding: There are three elements of a duress defense: (1) immediate threat of death or SBI; (2) well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out; and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape. The defendant offered sufficient evidence of all 3. Jorge was an established drug dealer that had a network of people who would monitor D and he knew private details about D’s personal life. This lent credibility to his death threat. Although the threat was conditioned on D’s failure to smuggle the cocaine in the future, the 3-week delay between did not undermine the immediacy. D’s belief that the police were corrupt and would report to Jorge excused his failure to seek their help. The district court erred by refusing to admit the evidence and instruct the jury on the duress defense. d. Dissent (Coyle): Jorge’s conditional threat was not immediate enough in view of the 3-week delay. In addition, D and his family could have fled during the 3 weeks. e. Rule of Law: Defendant is excused from criminal culpability if he commits his crime under threat of death/SBI. f. Key Takeaways: i. Immediacy: The specificity of the threat, lengths to which the threatener went, and the nature of the threatener made it clear the harm would be specific, immediate, and harsh if not carried out. Thus, threat and action need not coincide – failure to act and harm must. ii. Escapability: The opportunity to escape mut be reasonable. (two choices: pack up entire family, belongings, and leave country or report to corrupt police who would report to the drug lord) State v. Hunter a. Facts: § 21-3401 of the KA Statute precluded use of the defense of compulsion in cases where D was charged w/ 1 st degree or voluntary homicide but did not specifically state whether the defense was permitted in FMR cases. Hunter (D) hitched a ride in a truck in which Remeta (R) & others were riding. R, after brandishing guns & making threatening comments to D about killing hitchhikers, shot & wounded a policeman who had pulled the truck over. Group then proceeded to grain elevator, where R, apparently assisted by D, took 2 people as hostages. After the truck had proceeded some distance, R shot and killed hostages. D was charged w/ 2 counts of FM for his participation in the kidnapping & killing of the hostages. At D’s trial, witnesses for the State testified that D had been armed, but both D & R testified that only R was armed and that R had ordered D to watch the hostages. Was testimony that D had been out of R’s sight at back of the elevator building for about 5 minutes, but D testified that he did not think he had a chance to escape. Ct refused D’s request to instruct jury on defense of compulsion on the ground that § 21-3401 precluded defense in cases of FM. D was convicted of FM. b. Issue: Is defense of compulsion precluded only in cases where defendant is charged w/ an intentional killing? c. Holding: D contends that TC committed error by refusing to instruct the jury on his defense of compulsion. We agree. Any limitation to the defense of duress be confined to crimes of intentional killing & not to killings done by another during the commission of some lesser felony. The record is replete w/ testimony that R was a person to be feared. It was the function of the jury to determine if it was believable that D was afraid for his life, if such fear was reasonable, and if such fear justified any criminal acts which D may have performed. If A compels B at gunpoint to drive him to the bank which A intends to rob, and during the ensuing robbery, A kills bank customer C, B is not guilty of robbery “due to duress.” When trial judge refused the requested compulsion instruction, he effectively prevented the jury from considering the evidence presented in D’s defense. Denial of the jury’s right to determine the facts constitute reversible error. d. Rule of Law: The defense of compulsion is precluded only in cases where the defendant is charged w/ an intentional killing. Intoxication Operates to negate the mens rea element of the offense, such that you are arguing that the prosecution has not met its burden of proof in its case in chief. I. II. III. Voluntary intoxication a. A disturbance of mental or physical capacities, resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body. The traditional rule has been that whether a defendant can argue voluntary intoxication as a defense turns on whether the crime with which she is charged is considered a specific intent crime or a general intent crime. b. If the charged offense is a general intent crime, then the defendant will not be permitted to introduce evidence of her intoxication. c. If the offense is a specific intent crime, the defendant will be allowed to present evidence of her voluntary intoxication. In order to secure an acquittal, defendant must show that b/c of her intoxicated condition, she did not have the specific intent required for the commission of the crime. d. People v. Velez: D voluntarily smokes a joint unaware it is laced w/ PCP – “common knowledge that unlawful street drugs do not commit w/ warranties of purity or quality associated w/ lawfully acquired drugs, such as alcohol.” i. Contrast w/ voluntarily taking wrong drugs accidentally filled by a pharmacist. ii. Alcohol or drug use by alcoholics/addicts deemed voluntary. e. Early Common Law: NO DEFENSE AT ALL. Intoxication was “an aggravation of the offense, rather than an excuse for any criminal misbehavior.” f. Mid-19th Century: Allowed introduction of evidence to negate mens rea required for specific intent crimes. g. Modern Jurisdictions: Returning to early common law ban. Involuntary Intoxication a. Four Situations: i. Caused by fault of another (force, duress, fraud, mistake). ii. Innocent but reasonable mistake by defendant (reasonable belief that ecstasy was aspirin). iii. Unknowingly suffers from an ailment, making defendant abnormally susceptible to a legal intoxicant. iv. If an unexpected intoxication results from a medically prescribed drug. b. Majority: Can be the basis for a temporary insanity claim. Thus, being used as an affirmative defense. c. Minority: Evidence of involuntary intoxication is admissible to negate specific or general intent. Montana v. Egelhof a. Facts: Egelhoff (D), Pavlova, & Christenson spent the day drinking. Police found Christenson’s car in a ditch. Pavlova & Christenson had been shot to death. D was alive w/ gunshot residue on his hands. D’s gun was on the floor. 1 hour later, D still had a BAC of .36 & charged w/ deliberate homicide, (purposely or knowingly causing a death), under MT law. D claimed his extreme intoxication made him physically incapable of committing crime & unable to remember what happened. Jury was b. c. d. e. f. g. instructed that it could not consider D’s intoxication in deciding whether he had requisite mental state. MT statute provided that D’s intoxicated condition could not be considered in determining if he had mental state required for commission of offense. D was convicted. Law: Deliberate Homicide – Purposely or knowingly causing the death of another human being. Precedent: i. Trial Court: Instructed the jury not to consider D’s intoxication when evaluating mental state. Guilty. ii. Montana SC: Reversed. Evidence of intoxication was relevant to whether D had acted knowingly or purposely. Issue: Does the due process clause guarantee a criminal defendant the right to have the jury consider evidence of voluntary intoxication? Holding: A state law that prohibits a jury from considering a criminal defendant’s voluntary intoxication in finding mens rea does not violate the defendant’s due process rights. Although the Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to present all relevant evidence to rebut the state’s evidence, evidence may be inadmissible if it is prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or wastes time. Judgement reversed. Dissent (O’Connor): MT law prevented jury from considering evidence relevant to the defendant’s mental state in a case in which it was an essential element of the offense. The statute unfairly mitigates the prosecution’s burden of proof. History is not the only factor in determining whether a principle is fundamental. Jurisdictions throughout the nation have recognized that a defendant must be permitted to offer evidence of voluntary intoxication if it negates the required mental state of the crime. Rule of Law: A state is not required to allow defendants to introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate specific intent. History Scalia: “Our primary guide in determining whether the principle in question is fundamental is, of course, historical practice O’Connor: “Early law was indifferent to the defense of drunkenness b/c the theory of criminal liability was then too crude & too undeveloped to admit of exceptions.” IV. Principles Scalia: “The rule comports w/ & implements society’s moral perception that one who has voluntarily impaired his own faculties should be responsible for his consequences.” O’Connor: “Fundamental principle” that D “has a right to put forward a defense” and make State prove each element BRD is frustrated when D categorically prevented from negating mens rea element. Commonwealth v. Smith a. Facts: A police officer observed Smith (D) as she drove her truck into an oncoming lane & continued in the wrong lane for one-tenth of a mile. Police officer pulled D over to the side of the road & asked her to exit the truck. D attempted to comply but stumbled & staggered her way out of the truck. Police officer noticed that D’s eyes were glassy, she was slurring her speech, & she smelled like alcohol. D admitted to consuming several beers earlier in the evening. Police officer administered 3 sobriety tests, all of which D failed. D was arrested for DUI & was transported to the hospital for a BAC est. At a bench trial on the DUI charge, D testified that she drank beer while wearing a prescribed pain patch that administered narcotic medicine. D admitted to not reading the patch’s directions or the fine print related to warnings about its use. No other testimony was provided. D was convicted on the DUI charge. b. Issue: Under state law, may a criminal defendant prevail on a defense of involuntary intoxication if the defendant voluntarily consumed alcohol that heightened the effect of a medically prescribed drug? c. Holding: In PA, a defendant in a criminal case may not prevail on a defense of involuntary intoxication if the defendant voluntarily consumed alcohol that heightened the effect of a medically prescribed drug. Similar to other jurisdictions, PA statutorily limits the availability of a voluntary-intoxication defense. However, there is no limitation on the availability of a defense of involuntary intoxication. Generally, this defense has been recognized in four situations: (1) the intoxication was caused by the fault of another through force, duress, fraud, or similar conduct; (2) the intoxication was caused by an innocent mistake on the part of the defendant; (3) the defendant unknowingly suffered from a physiological or psychological condition that caused abnormal susceptibility to a legal intoxicant; or (4) unexpected intoxication resulted from a medically prescribed drug. In each scenario, the key component is the defendant’s lack of culpability in causing the intoxication. Here, Smith’s claim resembles the fourth situation, because her intoxication partially resulted from a medically prescribed drug. However, Smith has not alleged that the duragesic patch alone caused an intoxicating effect. Rather, Smith alleges that the patch’s effects were enhanced after she voluntarily consumed alcohol. Smith’s voluntary consumption of alcohol with prescription medication does not give rise to a defense of involuntary intoxication, even if Smith had no knowledge of the alcohol’s effects on the duragesic patch. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. d. Rule of Law: Under state law, a criminal defendant may not prevail on a defense of involuntary intoxication if the defendant voluntarily consumed alcohol that heightened the effect of a medically prescribed drug. Necessity I. II. Introduction a. Breaking the law affirmatively to avoid acts of god, NOT human coercion b. Direct Civil Disobedience: Affirmatively breaking the law itself that you deem to be unjust. Few courts recognize defense. c. Indirect Civil Disobedience: Trespassing onto a nuclear powerplant to protest for climate change. Breaking a law that is not the one you want changed. No court has ever recognized this defense. Examples a. Pedrom is lost in the woods w/o a tent during a heavy blizzard that is expected to last all night. He breaks into a mountain cabin to find shelter and stay alive. b. Nazanin lives in an extremely dry part of southern California. During a sudden wildfire outbreak, she deliberately burns part of a park to create a firebreak & stop the spread of the fire into a neighborhood.