The Use of Artificial Intelligence-enabled Systems by Modern Armed Forces and Some Related Concerns

The Use of Artificial Intelligence-enabled Systems by Modern Armed Forces and Some Related Concerns Presented by: Prof. Dr. Prezelj Date: 7 March 2024 Introduction - Alan Touring's idea of smart machines in the future: ability to go back and forth through memory and alter own initial instructions - No single universally accepted definition exists, Definition of Al: ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings, such as ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, solve problems or learn from past experience, including the ability to adapt to new circumstances - Present in all domains of human activity or will affect all aspects of human life: some examples of use - First known use in Armed forces: 2016 US Dragon Lady Spy drone during a training exercise - Aims of this presentation - Hypothesis: Artificial Intelligence has introduced a new level of possibilities to improve military and defense capabilities (benefits) and, on the other side simultaneously also a broad range of concerns, challenges and risks. - Desired goal of society regarding Al use: strike an appropriate balance between the potential benefits and risks - We are still at an EARLY STAGE OF AI development -> more time needed to understand it, weak regulation - Al = game Changning technology, not a single technology - Drivers of Al developments: exponential increase of computational power, processing power, larger datasets + open data -> affects potentials to develop ADVANCED MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS Al as a GAME CHANGER In Military Dimension (Modern Warfare) - Al not a weapon, is an ENABLING TECHNOLOGY (like electricity, combustion engine or internet) - Concept of Revolution in Military Affairs and Military Transformation: definition = profound and radical change • Al = technological dimension • But there are also organizational, structural, doctrinal and operational dimensions or changes needed • - RMA 1 to RMA 5 = Al-led change Debate on Al: • Boomers vs. Doomers • Enthusiasts vs. deniers and pragmatics (=Al will find its way in AF in evolutionary manner) - Example of rapid implementation in Ukraine: • Faster than in NATO • Fields of use: (1) the fusion of data from all available sources and Al-assisted analysis of the data, (2) creation of own comprehensive situation picture and (3) Al-aided vehicle or target identification, prioritization and allocation of targets streamed into different weapon systems. • App KROPYVA on Android tablet • Did it help? A Broad Spectrum Of Potential And Actual Use Of Al in AF - Al analytical enabler, disruptor and force multiplier - Tactical and strategic use - Offensive and defensive use - Dual use - Key element of Al = machine learning: learning from data without being explicitly programmed • Precondition is that system is trained by experts on a large sets of data • Important EXPERIMENTATION: only experimentally proven and successfully applied Al systems in warfare will ended standard inventory of AF - Use of Artificial intelligence by Armed Forces and Intelligence Services • Intelligence, Surveillance and Multi- Domain Situational Awareness • Cyber Warfare and Cyber Security Applications • Targeting by Autonomous Weapon Systems • Maneuvering and Other Actions by Military Autonomous systems • Al-enabled Logistics • Al-based Training and Exercises A Broad Spectrum Of Concerns And Challenges Related To The Use Of Al - CHALLENGE OF INTERCONNECTED AI AND NON-AI TECHNOLOGIES: 5G, 3-D printing, biotechnology, autonomous systems, cloud connectivity and secure storage, communications (C4ISR), Internet of (Battle) things, Microelectronic chips, quantum sciences, extended reality (ER), hypersonic weapons, directed energy, nanomaterials, digital engineering, distributed ledger technology, cyber capabilities, omnipresent sensors - GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CHALLENGES: • Al perceived as a new tool for projecting power, irresistible opportunity for states, corporations, groups and individuals, disruptive technology, game changer • Internal geopolitical aspect: a handful of Al creators (companies) will create geopolitical change in terms of reducing power of states (Westphalian state system threatened), jealously guard their advantage, Al revolution takes place outside of government, states will support own national champions External Geopolitical Aspect - Goal = Al supremacy (decisive advantage, military superiority, national power, international influence) - Geopolitical competition for development and use of Al = race to adopt AI = AI ARMS RACE - zero sum game - Luberisse's book on geopolitics of Al: coins the concept of „Al power struggle" • Through the use in military applications, leading to concerns about effects, • Through the improving use in intelligence and espionage, leading to the same concerns • Through the impact on the global economic landscape, e.g. by automating many jobs, improving efficiency of various industries and affecting the global distribution of wealth and power, • Through the impact on human rights and civil liberties in a sense that Al would be used to violate them as suggested by the Chinese use of Al to monitor own citizens and suppress dissent. - Easy Al proliferation: horizontally among states (also danger that small states obtain it), to non-state actors (terrorist and criminal groups...), proxies, individuals - Al asymmetry will be a result - Secretive development + difficulty to measure capability will create typical dis-trust among states -> overestimation of Al capabilities - Key competitors= USA and China. Technology war already takes place: • USA sees Al as a tool for retaining supremacy and China (and Russia) as a tool for disrupting US supremacy • Putin's speech in 2017: the nation with a leading edge in Al would be able to "rule the world". • Perception that R. and C. advance quicker than USA: they are not looking to achieve parity, but to surpass us Situation In Europe In Military Al Development - Focused almost entirely on ethical and legal challenges and not so much on development of Al (also in military) + fragmented approach (+uneven across countries). - Soare (2023): • 1. A robust European preference for national Al adoption models where these technologies are used incrementally to optimize legacy platforms and overcome enduring capability gaps. • 2. National defense establishments and regional organizations (EU and NATO) struggle to adapt more visible role in shaping technological progress dominated by commercial, market forces and academia. • 3. European states underuse regional institutional accelerators of military Al adoption, such as EU and NATO. • 4. European states "exhibit self-imposed ethical and legal restraints, bordering on cultural-technological conservatism, which inhibits an ambitious European agenda on adopting military Al" - EU Strategic Compass (2022): plans to use Al to improve military mobility within and beyond the EU, develop and make intensive use of new technologies, notably quantum computing, Artificial Intelligence and Big Data to achieve comparative advantages in the Cyber domain, including in terms of cyber responsive operations and information superiority, boost efforts at national and EU level to be better prepared for the future battlefield and the use of the next generation technology, such as Al, quantum computing, advanced propulsion, etc. - New Al Act (December 2023): aims to create a balance between boosting innovation and uptake of Al across the EU whilst fully respecting the fundamental citizens rights. EU fears that Al systems may jeopardize fundamental rights, such as the right to non discrimination, freedom of expression, human dignity, personal data protection and privacy, risk based approach, establish a governance framework based on EU and national regulatory entities.... • Caveats: does not apply to systems exclusively in use for military and defense purposes, does not apply for public authorities in third countries or international organizations and areas outside the scope of EU law !!!! Situation in Europe - NATO strategic concept (2022) and NATO AI Strategy (2021) - partially secret document: aims to integrate Al to support its three core tasks (collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security) in an interoperable way and in accordance with international law. Specifically, the strategy aims to: • 1. "provide a foundation for NATO and Allies to lead by example and encourage the development and use of Al in a responsible manner for Allied defense and security purposes; • 2. accelerate and mainstream Al adoption in capability development and delivery, enhancing interoperability within the Alliance, including through proposals for Al Use Cases, new structures, and new programs; • 3. protect and monitor "our" Al technologies and ability to innovate, addressing security policy considerations such as the operationalization of our Principles of Responsible Use; and • 4. identify and safeguard against the threats from malicious use of Al by state and non-state actors." NATO's strategy also recognizes the risk of interference in allied Al by other state and non-state actors. this is why, NATO must strive to protect the use of Al from such interference, manipulation and sabotage. - Consequences: all above variables act as obstacles for developing and using Al, • Less investments in Al than in USA, China, • Investments asymmetric across countries, • FRAGMENTED APPROACH, • European Defense Fund too slow mechanism (from submission of project to acceptance), • Defense officials lack knowledge about Al needed to implement projects, • Leading powers reluctant to participate in collaborative defense Al projects or to transfer sensitive Al technologies to other less tech-savvy countries, • Lack of trust, sensitivities of data sharing... • Slow adoption, • Less interoperable Al, • Underused EU and NATO mechanisms... Conclusion And Identification Of Regulative Needs - Regulation of Al will be as usual: one step lagging behind practice - Al systems will be first tested in practice and then become a part of standard use - We need to build national/regional/global Al governance system: • Comprehensive - all nations, • Include also companies and programmers, defense industry • Built around key risks: unpredictability od Al systems, easy proliferation of Al algorithms, dual use nature, low trust among nations -> AI CSBM measures - Application of Al in AF: according to DOTMPFLI principle = technical innovation requests also doctrinal, organizational, structural... changes = comprehensive sociotechnical change = RMA V