Technologizing the Bank Charter by David Zaring Discussant: Mr. Muñoz Date: 15 June 2020 Paper Contributions - The paper focuses on an actual regulatory initiative by the OCC - Regulatory structure issues - Industry structure issues - Constitutional issues - Risk: the issue is a moving target Points Of Message And Substance - Message: the message or narrative could be strengthened. One possibility would be to (1) discuss what the OCC is trying to do; (2) discuss its desirability; and (3) discuss its constitutionality. - Substance. One possibility would be to expand on the arguments about the desirability of the initiative: • Regulatory competition and experimentation v. Regulatory harmonization and lowering of compliance costs. - • Diversity in banking v. Financial stability • Proximity-relational component v. scale and framework clarity Maybe expand on the arguments of the state of New York. By challenging them the conclusion could be more robust. Points Of Constitutionality - The constitutionality of the OCC's exercise of power different from the desirability of a national FinTech charter. - A minor question: • The issue of "deference" focuses on Chevron v. Natural Resources. The OCC is:  Amending its regulations to make room for "Special Purpose Banks". Potentially subject to Chevron.  Interpreting its own regulations to grant licenses to Fin Techs. Interpreting an agency's own regulations is subject to Auer deference (Auer v Robbins). Very similar to Chevron, but is it equivalent? (seeing especially that Chevron is being increasingly restricted). - One more important question: the case law cited involves the issue of "deference" but it relates to two pieces of legislation: • Glass Steagall Act restrictions. Some court rulings were more deferential (SIA v. FRB; • Nations bank v VALIC), some less so (FRB v. Dimension Financial) • McFadden Act restrictions. Some rulings were more deferential (Nations bank v. VALIC), some less so (National Bank of Logan v. Dickinson)