The Balancing Approach to Reasonableness

III. The Balancing Approach to Reasonableness a. Cases to Remember i. Katz (Maybe Mapp v. Ohio) ii. Terry - genesis of reasonable suspicion 1. Under Terry, the court states that reasonable suspicion is enough to allow seizures b. Stop and Frisk (Timeline) i. Terry stops require reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts 1. Prosecution has the burden to prove that the stop was valid ii. Once the stop occurs, then the questioning period begins and must pertain to the reasonable suspicion (reason for the stop) iii. Frisk has to be based on reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous based on the reason for the stop 1. Can be based on things other than the questions an ofÏcer asks (i.e. actions) iv. Frisks are just a pat down of the outer garments, but it can escalate if the ofÏcer feels something that the ofÏcer reasonably believes is a weapon 1. There is no obligation to ignore what an ofÏcer feels and knows is contraband v. Frisks can occur right after a person is stopped, but only after exigent circumstances c. Reasonable Suspicion i. Terry v. Ohio 1. Facts: A plain clothes police ofÏcer, McFadden, was patrolling in the afternoon in downtown Cleveland when he saw Terry and Chilton on the street corner. He knew neither man, but began to observe them because “they didn’t look right to me at the time.” McFadden had been a detective for 35 years and had patrolled this area of Cleveland for 30 years. The men paced, one at a time, back and forth along the street past stores, pausing to look into the same store window and returning to the corner and conferring with each other. The men made a dozen of these trips. McFadden suspected that the two men were “casing a job, a stick-up” and feared they may have a gun. McFadden approached the men, identified himself as a police ofÏcer and asked for their names. When the men mumbled something in response, McFadden grabbed Terry, spun him around and patted down the outside of his clothing. In the left breast pocket of Terry’s overcoat, he felt a pistol. McFadden reached inside the coat pocket and could not retrieve the gun. He then ordered the men inside a store and removed Terry’s coat and recovered a revolver form the pocket. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. 2. Issue: Whether a person may be seized under a reasonable suspicion standard 3. OfÏcer McFadden seized Terry under what the court termed reasonable suspicion ii. 4. The reasonable suspicion standard is an objective one since there are instances leading up to making the seizures 5. Court alludes to the fact that OfÏcer McFadden may not have probable cause since the crime has not taken place yet 6. The court balances gov't interest of keeping people safe and rights of people a. State court says that what occurred is less than a search and seizure 7. However, the Supreme Court does not buy that since police should be able to prevent a crime a. This falls somewhere between no violation and 4th Amend. violation b. If the police were required to obtain a warrant before a crime was committed, it would defeat the purpose of preventing a crime 8. Court held that when an ofÏcer observes suspicious conduct that reasonably leads him to believe that a crime is occurring or about to occur, the ofÏcer may identify himself as a police ofÏcer and make an initial inquiry 9. What does 4th Amendment require for a "stop & frisk"? a. OfÏcer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot b. OfÏcer must identify himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him 10. Once the ofÏcer clears up what the ofÏcer stopped you for, then the ofÏcer can let you go if he does not find anything or vice versa 11. How does the court dispense w/ probable cause? a. Court limits the scope of the use of the "stop and frisk" i. Must still get a warrant for registered searches and seizures ii. But may pat the outer garments of the people and only reach in to the area where they feel a weapon (that place only) iii. The seizure occurs first by having a reasonable suspicion Dunaway v. New York 1. Facts: The police were investigating a killing committed during an attempted armed robbery of a pizza parlor. Det. Fantigrossi questioned a jail house inmate but learned nothing that gave the police probable cause of an arrest warrant for Dunaway. Nevertheless, they picked Dunaway up from his neighbor’s house and drove him to police headquarters where he was placed in an interrogation room and questioned by the police. He eventually made incriminating statements. 2. Issue: Whether the police can seize a suspect and bring him to the police station based only on reasonable suspicion a. Whether the seizure of Dunaway was legal 3. Court held that in order to lawfully bring a suspect into formal police custody and interrogate him at the police station, the police must have probable cause a. This case is not like Terry, thus seizure was illegal iii. iv. 4. Rule of Law: Except in the case of temporary stops on the street where the police need only have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the police may only seize a citizen based upon probable cause 5. The detention was more like an arrest since Dunaway was taken from one place to another and placed in an interrogation room before being questioned 6. However, the dissent notes that Dunaway voluntarily went w/ the police a. But, the Detective gave an order to bring Dunaway in regardless of whether he goes voluntarily or not i. The majority sees the tactics of the police in asking Dunaway to go w/ them as coercive 7. Also, Dunaway was given Miranda warnings at the police station US v. Mendenhall 1. Facts: Upon exiting her plane, Mendenhall (defendant) was approached in the airport by two plain clothes Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents who asked to see her plane ticket and identification. The agents testified that they decided to question Mendenhall because she was behaving in a way typical of people illegally transporting drugs. Mendenhall showed the police her identification and ticket which they then gave back to her. After identifying themselves as DEA agents, the agents then asked if she would come with them to their ofÏce and she complied. The agents did not brandish their weapons but at trial, one of the agents testified that at this point if she had wanted to leave, Mendenhall would have been restrained. Once at the ofÏce, the agents asked if she would consent to a search of her bag and her person. She agreed. As she was undressing, two packages of heroin that Mendenhall was hiding on her person were discovered. The district court held that the consent to search was freely and voluntarily given while the court of appeals held that consent to the search was not voluntary and the result of prior government misconduct 2. Issue: Whether a 4th Amendment has occurred where the totality of the circumstances indicate that the citizen was free to leave police custody 3. The court held that a no seizure was made since Mendenhall was free to leave a. The majority viewed the search and seizure as legal 4. Rule of Law: A 4th Amendment "seizure" occurs when a reasonable person would believe that he is not free to leave police custody 5. Justice Stewart attempts to create a doctrinal standard by stating that a person is "seized" under the 4th Amendment, only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave Florida v. Bostick 1. Facts: Two ofÏcers with badges and insignia boarded a bus bound from Miami to Atlanta during a stopover in Ft. Lauderdale. Without articulable suspicion, the ofÏcers, picked out the defendant passenger and asked to inspect his ticket and identification. They returned the information as unremarkable, but asked to search the defendant’s luggage. The police advised defendant that he had a right to refuse consent. The police had guns, but did not threaten Bostick. Bostick was arrested and charged with trafÏcking in cocaine 2. Issue: Whether the encounter w/ the Police constituted a seizure 3. Florida Supreme Court held that the drug practice of "working the buses" is unconstitutional a. Under this view, asking questions and seeking consent to a search does not extend to buses 4. The court held that a police request for identification and consent to search private belongings does not amount to a seizure when the police inform the subject of the right to refuse consent to questioning and search a. Bostick was free to leave and not talk to the police, thus the consent and search was legal 5. Rule of Law: A police request for identification and consent to search private belongings does not amount to a seizure when the police inform the subject of the right to refuse consent to questioning and search d. Scope of Stops, Frisks and Sweeps i. Introduction 1. Reasonableness is now subject to a balancing test after Terry (no longer a probable cause standard) 2. Reasonable suspicion must be accompanied by articulable facts a. This is an objective standard b. Stop and frisks made under reasonable suspicion is not illegal 3. For Terry to apply, detention of a person must be temporary and not taken to the station or subject to arrest a. One must be free to leave in order for a seizure to not take place i. Also, a person must be able to feel like they can refuse to speak to the police ii. California v. Hodari 1. Facts: OfÏcers patrolling in an unmarked car in a high-crime area of Oakland noticed several youths huddled around a red car parked at a curb. When the youths noticed them, they fled. Hodari ran through an alley and tossed away a small rock. A moment later, he was tackled by an ofÏcer. The rock Hodari discarded was found to be crack cocaine. Hodari was prosecuted and moved to suppress the cocaine evidence 2. Issue: Whether Hodari had been "seized" w/in the meaning of the 14th Amendment at the time he dropped the drugs 3. Based on the facts, the defense would argue that Hodari was seized before he disposed of the crack cocaine by the police showing their authority a. The defense would assert that the seizure was unreasonable 4. However, a seizure occurs only when a person submits to the authority and the police lays their hands on you 5. The court held that a 4th Amendment seizure occurs when a citizen submits to a show of police authority or is physically restrained by an ofÏcer iii. iv. 6. Rule of Law: A 4th Amendment seizure occurs where the police exercise physical force over a subject or where a subject submits to an ofÏcer's show of authority 7. Under these facts, there was no seizure when Hodari was running and he threw the rock cocaine away a. The seizure occurred after Hodari abandoned the rock cocaine, thus the drug is admitted into evidence 8. A seizure occurs when there is a show of authority and the suspect submits to authority (police lay hands on you) a. This is just another way a seizure occurs b. The kind of seizure that occurs (Mendenhall and Hodari) depends on the circumstances Illinois v. Wardlow 1. Facts: OfÏcers patrolling in a high crime area known for narcotics trafÏcking observe Wardlow standing next to a building holding an opaque bag. Wardlow looked in their direction and fled. The ofÏcers turned their car around, followed him and eventually cornered him. OfÏcer Nolan exited the vehicle and stopped him. Nolan performed a “protective pat-down” search for weapons and felt a heavy hard object similar to the shape of a gun. He opened the bag and discovered a handgun 2. Issue: Whether unprovoked flight, while in a high crime area, amount to reasonable suspicion to justify a stop and frisk 3. The court held that the flight of a suspect in a high crime area can amount to reasonable suspicion and justify a lawful stop and frisk by the police 4. Rule of Law: A police ofÏcer may stop and frisk a citizen on the street when he has reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and may pose a threat to the ofÏcer 5. The court does not create a per se rule that any person running from the police may be stopped Alabama v. White 1. Facts: An anonymous tipster said White would be leaving an address at a particular time carrying an attaché case and driving to a motel with an ounce of cocaine inside the case. The police observed White leave the building, without an attaché case, and followed her along streets that were the most direct route to the motel. They stopped her just short of the motel. An ofÏcer told White she was suspected of having cocaine in the vehicle and asked if he could look for the cocaine. White allowed the ofÏcer to open the attaché case in the car and he found marijuana. A very small amount of cocaine was later found her purse 2. Issue: Whether an anonymous tip furnishes reasonable suspicion under Terry 3. An anonymous tip can furnish reasonable suspicion a. The Gates totality of the circumstances test applies here 4. The court held that an anonymous tip furnishes reasonable suspicion when the informant's tip can be sufÏciently corroborated v. vi. i. ii. iii. iv. a. The crucial fact that justified the stop was the predictive behavior the tipster gave 5. Rule of Law: To determine whether an informant's tip provides reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be analyzed, with attention given to the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of an informant Florida v. JL 1. Facts: An anonymous caller reported to the police that a young black male standing at a bus stop wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. The police went to the bus stop and saw three black males, one of whom was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, there was no reason to suspect any of the men of illegal conduct. The police did not see a firearm and there was no threatening conduct. An ofÏcer approached JL and frisked him, seizing a gun from his pocket. JL was charged with carrying a concealed firearm 2. Issue: Whether the bare-bones anonymous tip that does not predict future behavior will support reasonable suspicion under Terry 3. The court held that, w/o corroboration, an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun does not justify a stop and frisk under the 4th Amendment 4. Rule of Law: An anonymous tip that a person may be carrying a gun does not justify a stop and frisk under the 4th Amendment unless there is additional corroboration to ensure that the tip has "sufÏcient indicia of reliability" to create reasonable suspicion justifying a stop 5. This case differs from White since the tipster did not predict any future behavior (unsupported tip) a. Police cannot have reasonable suspicion on an unfounded tip Navarette v. California 1. Facts: An anonymous 911 caller reported that she had been run off the road by a pickup truck. The caller specified the area where the event occurred and the color, model, and license plate number of the truck. Soon thereafter, an ofÏcer spotted the truck. After following the truck for five minutes and witnessing no trafÏc violations or suspicious driving, the ofÏcer pulled the truck over. As he approached, he smelled marijuana. A subsequent search of the truck bed led to the discovery of thirty pounds of marijuana. 2. Issue: 3. An anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity However, under appropriate circumstances, an anonymous tip can demonstrate sufÏcient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion The court held that the stop complied w/ the 4th Amendment b/c, under the totality of the circumstances, the ofÏcer had reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated 1. Upheld the stop based on the tipster's call This case differs from JL since there is no predictive behavior mentioned in the call, but courts are more lenient to the police in cases of drunk driving Hayes v. Florida v. vi. 1. Facts: The police suspected that Hayes was involved in the burglary-rapes that occurred in the area. They went to his home and asked Hayes to accompany them back to the police station for fingerprinting. When Hayes expressed reluctance, they told him he would be arrested if he declined to go. Hayes went with them to the station where he was fingerprinted. When the police determined that his prints matched those left at the scene of the crime, Hayes was arrested 2. Issue: Whether it is permissible to take a suspect to the police station against his will to obtain his fingerprints 3. Hayes differs from Dunaway since Hayes never consented to being taken to the station against his will for fingerprinting a. But in essence, this case is the same as Dunaway that what occurred exceeded what is allowed under Terry US v. Sharpe 1. Facts: A DEA Agent and a police ofÏcer signal two vehicles traveling together to stop. The first vehicle, a car, pulls over and the second, a camper-truck continues on. The agent was suspicious of the vehicles because the area was under surveillance for drug trafÏcking and the truck was riding low in the rear indicating a heavy load. The ofÏcer was able to pull the truck over a distance away, but held the driver for the arrival of the agent. Fifteen minutes after the truck had been stopped, the agent arrived and questioned the driver. He ultimately placed his nose against the rear window of the camper and smelled marijuana. He then opened the rear of the camper and observed burlap wrapped bales that resembled marijuana. He placed the driver under arrest 2. Issue: Whether a detention is justified as an investigative stop if police diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly 3. The court held that a detention is not too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop if police diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it is necessary to detain the suspect 4. Rule of Law: A detention is not too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop if police diligently pursue a means of investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it is necessary to detain the suspect US v. Place 1. Facts: Place’s behavior aroused suspicion of agents at the Miami Airport. DEA Agents approached him and asked for identification and his ticket. He complied and consented to a search of his two suitcases. However, since his flight was about to depart, agents decided not to search the luggage. They investigated Place’s luggage tags and were more suspicious. DEA agents at Place’s destination airport, LaGuardia, in New York were informed and those agents approached Place when he landed. They told him they believed he may be carrying narcotics. When Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage, agents took the bags to Kennedy Airport and subjected them to a sniff test by a narcotics detection dog. The dog reacted positively to one of the bags. By this vii. viii. time 90 minutes had passed since the seizure of Place’s luggage. Because it was late on a Friday afternoon, the agents retained the luggage until Monday when they obtained a search warrant for the bag. The discovered a large quantity of cocaine. 2. Issue: Whether the permissible scope of the detention is the same as the scope applicable to investigative detentions of the person himself when police seize luggage from a suspect's custody on less than probable cause for purposes of investigative detention 3. The court held that when police seize luggage from a suspect's custody, the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of person under Terry should define the permissible scope of an investigative detention of a person's luggage on less than probable cause (Also Rule of Law) a. The 90 min detention of the luggage was illegal even w/ the extension of Terry 4. Property independent of the person must be detained under reasonable scope and duration 5. The detention of the luggage was deemed to be a seizure 6. A pat/frisk of a car is only reasonable for the search of weapons Michigan v. Long 1. Facts: Long, whose car was stuck in a ditch, began walking toward the open door of the car and the ofÏcers followed. They observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the car. They pat him down and found no weapons. One of the ofÏcers shined his flashlight into the car, but did not enter. His purpose was to search for other weapons. The ofÏcer then saw something protruding from under the armrest on the front seat. He lifted the armrest and saw an open pouch that appeared to contain marijuana. Long was arrested for possession of marijuana 2. Issue: Whether a state court may provide a defendant w/ broader procedural protection than is guaranteed in the Constitution 3. The court held that a state court may provide a defendant w/ broader procedural protection than is guaranteed in the Constitution as a matter of state law a. Ruling is based on independent and adequate state grounds is not reviewable by the Supreme Court 4. Rule of Law: A state court providing a defendant w/ broader procedural protection than is guaranteed in the Constitution must explicitly indicate that its ruling is based on separate, adequate, and independent state grounds Minnesota v. Dickerson 1. Facts: Dickerson (defendant) was indicted for bank robbery. Dickerson moved to have statements he made during an FBI interrogation suppressed, claiming he never received proper Miranda warnings. The trial court found that Dickerson had not in fact received proper Miranda warnings. However, the court admitted the statement, claiming 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was satisfied. This statute was enacted by congress and permits statements made by a suspect during a custodial police interrogation to be admitted at trial, provided they are voluntarily made ix. X. 2. Issue: Whether the holding in Miranda established a constitutional rule that cannot be superseded by an act of Congress 3. Court held that the search went too far and that Congress cannot supersede Miranda by passing legislation a. The pat/frisk extended to overly feeling for the drugs 4. Rule of Law: Congress cannot legislatively supersede a decision by the United States Supreme Court that interprets and applies the Constitution Maryland v. Buie (protective sweep - only requires reasonable suspicion) 1. Facts: The police obtained an arrest warrant for Buie for an armed robbery of a restaurant and executed the warrant at Buie’s home. Upon entering the home, the ofÏcers spread out to find Buie. One ofÏcer proceeded to check the basement and, with his gun drawn, shouted down the basement stairs for anyone down there to come out. Eventually, Buie emerged and he was arrested. Another ofÏcer then went into the basement to ensure no one else was present who could pose a threat to the police. In the basement, and in plain view, the ofÏcer noticed a red running suit that matched the description of what the thief was wearing when the restaurant was robbed. At trial, Buie’s request to suppress the running suit was denied II. Issue: Whether the police may conduct a warrantless search of a premises when they have reasonable suspicion to believe that other people who may pose a threat could be hiding in the home incident to a lawful arrest III. Court held that, incident to a lawful arrest, a protective sweep of a premises is permitted provided it is supported by reasonable suspicion justified by articulable facts that others may be hiding in the building a. Very limited search (protective sweep) IV. Rule of Law: Incident to an arrest, the police may conduct a protective sweep of a premises based on reasonable suspicion that other people who pose a threat are in the building, providing the search is limited to those areas where a person may be hiding New Jersey v. TLO a. Facts: A student discovered smoking in a school lavatory was sent to Mr. Choplick, the Asst. Vice Principal. When the student denied smoking, Choplick opened her purse and found cigarettes. In the process of searching for the cigarettes, he saw rolling papers. In his experience rolling papers are associated with the use of marijuana. He then searched the purse thoroughly, finding evidence of marijuana dealing. He turned this evidence over to the police and TLO was prosecuted and sentenced to probation b. Issue: Whether the search violated the 4th Amendment c. Court held that the search did not violate the 4th Amendment i. The school and those associated w/ the school are state agents d. The school acts like the parents of the student while in their care e. An adult on the street would not be allowed to be subject to this type of search since it is usually illegal f. The school environment is special since school ofÏcials set rules that carry out order and learning i. If the rules are broken, school ofÏcials may discipline the student g. School personnel are state agents/agents of the police i. The court places the school in the place of gov't h. Could Mr. Choplick or female teacher perform a strip search under these facts? i. Note 3: The search must not be excessively intrusive in light of age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction (in most situations no) V. Checkpoint Searches a. Michigan Dept. of Police v. Sitz i. Facts: The State Police established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program and created guidelines governing checkpoint operations. Under the guidelines, all vehicles passing through a checkpoint would be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. If an ofÏcer detects signs of intoxication, the motorist is directed to a location out of the trafÏc flow and investigated further. All other drivers would be permitted to resume their journey immediately. A declaratory judgment action and request for injunctive relief was filed. The Michigan Court of Appeals afÏrmed the trial court’s holding that the program violated the 4th Amendment ii. Issue: Whether vehicle seizures at checkpoints are "reasonable" under 4th Amendment iii. Sitz would argue that this stop is illegal since there is no reasonable suspicion that someone is driving under the influence iv. However, the Supreme Court states that the checkpoint stops are legal 1. Court balances the state interest and the private interest of the driver a. The state interest to protect the roads from drunk drivers outweighs the private interest 2. The stops are also reasonable since they are short a. The state procedure must be lawful v. This is a suspicionless seizure which is okay since everyone is subject to the stop vi. Dissent: Boarder searches are okay, but the checkpoint stops must cease to exist 1. Boarders are easy to track and know where they are while the checkpoints are constantly moving and hard to track b. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond i. Facts: The city began to operate vehicle checkpoints on roads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each location, the police stop a predetermined number of vehicles. Under written directives, an ofÏcer approaches the vehicle, advises the driver that she is being stopped at a drug checkpoint and asks for license and registration. The ofÏcer looks for signs of impairment and looks into the vehicle. A narcotic-detection dog walks around the outside of each stopped vehicle. Edmond file a class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that the roadblock violated the 4th Amendment ii. Issue: Whether the checkpoint stop is legal iii. Checkpoints may only be used as long as there is a higher calling/good primary purpose (i.e. preventing deaths from drunk driving) iv. Checkpoints cannot be used to catch criminals, need to have reasonable suspicion (what city is doing is overly broad) v. The narcotic snifÏng dogs raises red flags since it alerts people that they are looking for drugs vi. This checkpoint is wrong since it was being used to catch criminals in general, especially drug smugglers vii. This checkpoint's primary purpose was for drugs (the state tried to hide that purpose) viii. The narcotic dog is not a search, so the use of the dog would not make a difference as long as the primary purpose of the checkpoint is legal ix. Rule of Law: A suspicionless roadside checkpoint established for the purpose of deterring general criminal activity is unlawful under the 4th Amendment c. Illinois v. Lidster i. Facts: On August 23, 1997 an unknown motorist hit and killed an elderly bicyclist on an Illinois highway. The accident occurred at night, and the motorist drove off without identifying himself. Exactly one week later, the local police set up a highway checkpoint for the purpose of finding out more about the previous accident. Police blocked the highway, forcing the trafÏc to slow down, and detained each car for about 10 to 15 seconds. OfÏcers asked the vehicle occupants if they knew anything about the hit-and-run accident and distributed a flyer, which contained news of the accident. Lidster (defendant) was driving his minivan toward the checkpoint, but suddenly swerved his vehicle before the checkpoint, narrowly missing an ofÏcer. An ofÏcer smelled alcohol on Lidster’s breath and administered a sobriety test, after which he was arrested. Lidster was tried and convicted in state court for driving under the influence of alcohol ii. Issue: Whether a roadside vehicle checkpoint is unlawful if the primary law enforcement purpose of the stop is to ask vehicle occupants for information about crimes possibly committed by others iii. Court held that a roadside vehicle checkpoint is not unlawful if the primary enforcement purpose of the stop is to ask vehicle occupants for info about crimes possibly committed by others 1. The police checkpoint in this place was reasonable and constitutional VI. Special Balancing Contexts a. Skinner v. RLEA i. Facts: The FRA adopted regulations which required blood and urine tests of railway employees involved in train accidents and authorized breath and urine tests to employees who violated certain safety rules. These regulations were in response to evidence of drug and alcohol abuse by some employees, the obvious safety hazards posed by such abuse, and the link between drug and alcohol impaired employees and the incidence of train accidents. RLEA file suit to enjoin the FRA regulations. The Court of Appeals invalidated the regulations on 4 th Amendment grounds ii. Issue: Whether the tests/regulations were created based on a special need and thus valid under the 4th Amendment iii. Highly regulated industries should put employees on notice that they have a lessened expectation of privacy iv. Court balances the private interest of the EE w/ the gov't interest for safety (transportation) 1. Ultimately, the court held that the alcohol and drug tests are reasonable w/in the meaning of the 4th Amendment v. The drug testing was authorized by gov't action which is important since the 4th Amendment only applies to gov't action 1. Private employers/orgs can impose these tests if they want (4th Amendment does not apply) vi. The court deals w/ the intrusive nature of these searches by mentioning how there are procedures that lessen the intrusion and how there is a lessened expectation of privacy vii. The reason is that the gov't interest for safety outweighed the private interest viii. Rule of Law: Governmental regulations authorizing the collection of biological samples from public employees in the absence of suspicion do not violate the 4th Amendment when special law enforcement needs render probable cause and warrant requirement impracticable b. Chandler v. Miller (Georgia politicians) i. Facts: A Georgia statute required that candidates for designated state ofÏces certify that they have taken a drug test and that the test result was negative. One month before the deadline for submission of the certificates required by the statute, Chandler and other candidates nominated by the Libertarian Party filed an action for declaratory and injunctive relief barring enforcement of the statute ii. Issue: Whether the suspicionless search is valid iii. The supreme court held that the drug tests were invalid 1. There was no special need for the test iv. The court stated that elected ofÏcials do not face the same type of duties as customs agents, police ofÏcers, train conductors, etc. v. The difference between Skinner and this case is that there was no special need for the test (i.e. safety), no evidence showing the prevalence of drug abuse amongst gov't ofÏcials, and the gov't ofÏcials would be seen (in the public eye) c. US v. Flores-Montano i. Facts: Defendant attempted to enter the U. S. from a port of entry in southern California traveling in his station wagon. A customs inspector inspected the vehicle and asked him to leave the vehicle for a second inspection station. There, another inspector inspected the gas tank by tapping on it and called in a mechanic who removed the gas tank. 37 kilos of marijuana were found in the tank. The whole process took up to 55 minutes. The search was not based on reasonable suspicion ii. iii. iv. v. Issue: Whether the search was 'routine' at a border checkpoint where there is no suspicion of wrongdoing The court held that the search of the gas tank of a vehicle attempting to enter the US is 'routine' at a border checkpoint where there is no suspicion of wrongdoing The border is special since each sovereign can control what goes in and out of the border The police are able to take the vehicle apart since it is a routine search at the border