Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Confessions

V. Privilege against Self-Incrimination and Confessions a. Miranda i. Introduction 1. Voluntariness must not be a result of coercion 2. Gov't put in place the Miranda warnings in order to have an easier time determining whether a confession was given voluntarily or not 3. Look at 5th Amendment w/ Miranda warnings which prevents police from taking a defendant's statement involuntarily a. Trying to prevent defendant from self-incrimination since statements can be used against them in the court 4. "Custody" is a term of art a. The rights are given once a suspect is under custody 5. Genesis of Miranda a. The Miranda warnings provide protection from police interrogations resulting in involuntary confessions 6. In later cases, the court tries to move away from Miranda, but in Dickerson the court is not walking away from it ii. Miranda and Right to Assistance of Counsel at Trial 1. Miranda v. Arizona a. Facts: Miranda was arrested and taken to the police station where he was identified by the victim. He was then taken to an interrogation room and questioned by two ofÏcers. Two hours later, the ofÏcers emerged with Miranda’s signed confession. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily . . . with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me. Miranda was not advised of any of his rights before he made his oral confession. The written and oral confessions were offered at trial and Miranda was convicted of kidnapping and rape b. Issue: Whether the admissibility of statements made by a suspect during a custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures to assure that the suspect can exercise his privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself c. The court held that the prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination d. Miranda Warnings (Need to sign a waiver or orally waive their rights before speaking w/ the police) i. Right to remain silent ii. Anything said can and will be used against the individual in court iii. Right to an attorney and if you cannot afford one an attorney will be appointed by the court e. Miranda obligations arise only during custodial investigations f. The facts that led the court to require Miranda warnings are that there was no way for people to know their rights while police had manuals on how to get confessions i. This was a bright line rule from the perspective of the court in order for people to know their rights g. Totality of the circumstances is not sufÏcient since it requires a lot of witnesses and more facts while Miranda was considered simple h. The 5th Amendment is used in compliance w/ the right to remain silent i. Miranda seems constitutional, but it is also refuted in further case law 2. New York v. Quarles a. Facts: Looking for a rape suspect, ofÏcers were directed to a supermarket where they saw the man who matched the description given by the victim. Aware that the suspect would have a gun, an ofÏcer approached him. Quarles ran to the rear of the store. The ofÏcer lost sight of him when he turned the corner at the end of an aisle, but soon found him and ordered him to stop. The ofÏcer frisked Quarles, but found no gun. After handcufÏng him, the ofÏcer asked where the gun was. Quarles responded, “The gun is over there.” A loaded revolver was retrieved and Quarles was arrested and given his Miranda rights from a printed card. At his prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon, Quarles sought suppression of his statement concerning the location of the gun b. Issue: Whether there is a public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's statements may be admitted into evidence at trial c. The Miranda violation: not telling D his rights d. The circumstances were similar to a routine arrest e. Court held that where public safety demands it, a suspect in police custody may be questioned w/o first being read his Miranda warnings i. The confession was admissible since it was in the interest of the public for safety f. Rule of Law: The police may question a suspect w/o first reading a suspect his Miranda warnings, and the suspect's statements may be admitted at trial, where the exigency of a situation requires that public safety take precedence over a suspect's 5th Amendment privilege g. This is a way for the court to undercut the rule by making a balancing test 3. Dickerson v. US a. Facts: Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery and other federal crimes. He moved to suppress a statement he made to the FBI on the grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The District Court allowed the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the suppression order based on 18 USC sec. 3501. This statute makes the admissibility of statements like the defendant’s turn solely on whether they were made voluntarily b. Issue: Whether the holding in Miranda established a constitutional rule that cannot be superseded by an act of Congress c. The court held that Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively d. Miranda is a prophylactic rule that utilizes/implements the 5th Amendment e. Congress cannot make a law that overrules Miranda i. Court can get around Miranda through creation of exceptions such as the public safety exception f. The Constitution has the final word on the admissibility of a confession g. CJ Rehnquist is asserting what the court can do as opposed to what congress can do h. The difference between Congress' statute and Miranda is about voluntariness 4. Berkemer v. McCarty a. Facts: After observing McCarty’s car weaving in and out of a lane on the highway, a trooper pulled him over. Because McCarty had trouble standing, the trooper asked him to perform a field sobriety test, which he failed. The trooper then asked McCarty if he had been using intoxicants, to which McCarty responded that he consumed “two beers and smoked several joints of marijuana.” He was then placed under arrest. At the jail, McCarty was asked to give information for a Highway Patrol Alcohol Influence Report. McCarty wrote in the report, “no angel dust or PCP in the pot.” No Miranda rights had been given. He was then charged with operating under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a misdemeanor. McCarty moved to suppress both statements citing the 5th Amendment b. Issue: Whether a motorist is subject to custodial interrogation for the purpose of the Miranda doctrine during a routine trafÏc stop c. Miranda applies to all crimes regardless of whether it is a misdemeanor or a felony since the police would not know what the charge would be d. The court held that a motorist is not subject to custodial interrogation for the purpose of Miranda when he is questioned during a routine trafÏc stop i. Williams was not in custody until he was arrested e. Rule of Law: While a person in custody who is suspected of a misdemeanor trafÏc offense MUST be read his Miranda warnings, a motorist temporarily detained on the side of the road after being pulled over by an ofÏcer is NOT "in custody" for the purpose of Miranda f. The standard is whether a reasonable person would believe he/she is in custody of the police g. A trafÏc stop is similar to a "Terry stop" since it is a temporary detainment that allows ofÏcers to ask questions to determine identity and confirm or dispel the ofÏcer's suspicions i. Persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda h. Why doesn't it matter that the trooper had decided to charge Berkemer w/ a trafÏc offense when he noted his difÏculty standing? i. It doesn't matter since that is what he initially pulled him over for and he is still not under custody (temporary stop, not arrest) i. Does presence at the police station equate to "in custody?" i. The presence at the police station does not equate to being "in custody" since you are free to leave and the ofÏcers just want to ask questions j. The custody standard is "objective" since it is a reasonable person standard 5. J.D.B. v. North Carolina a. Facts: Thirteen year old JDB was removed from class and escorted to a school conference room where two police ofÏcers and two school administrators were present during a 30-45 minutes interrogation. No Miranda warnings were given at the beginning of the questioning and JDB was not given an opportunity to speak to this guardian. Nor was he informed that he was free to leave the room. After a warning that he may be held pending trial in juvenile detention, JDB confessed to involvement in two break-ins. Only then was JDB given his Miranda warnings. JDB provided further details and wrote a statement at the ofÏcer’s request. He was allowed to leave to catch the bus home i. OfÏcers gave Miranda rights to J.D.B. After he confessed iii. b. Issue: Whether the age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to whether the child is in custody under Miranda c. Need to figure out whether custody applies i. Would a reasonable person believe that they are not free to leave, thus in custody ii. There are two questions that are essential 1. What were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation? 2. Given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave? d. The point of giving Miranda after a suspect makes an incriminating statement is so that the suspect feels like he/she cannot recant the confession (just admit the truth) e. The due process "voluntariness inquiry" differs from a "custody analysis" required by Miranda since totality of the circumstances are not considered in the "custody analysis" i. Age needs to be considered since the law factors age in other situations such as children not being able to form contracts, cannot marry, etc. f. J.D.B. is a close case for the supreme court b/c the dissent talks about how the totality of the circumstances already applies meaning that age is already factored while majority points to how the law factors age in torts and contract g. Dissent states that Miranda overprotects since everyone is protected by Miranda i. Miranda under protects not everyone understands the extent of their rights and people just waive their rights h. The majority's conclusion that age is relevant is consistent w/ Miranda's goals 6. **If a person is in prison, that person is in custody a. However, for Miranda purposes, an inmate that is a suspect of another crime is not in custody by virtue of his confinement in prison Interrogation 1. Rhode Island v. Innis a. Facts: Innis, the suspect in the shot-gun murder of a taxi driver, was arrested on the street in the early morning hours. The shotgun was missing. Innis was given his Miranda rights on three separate occasions, but declined to speak, asking for a lawyer instead. Innis was then placed in the back seat of a police cruiser with three ofÏcers who were to drive him to the police station. They were cautioned not to question him. While on route, one ofÏcer spoke to another ofÏcer about the fact that there were handicapped children in the area, saying, “God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves.” Another ofÏcer said, “It would be too bad if a little girl would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself.” Innis interrupted the conversation iv. and told the ofÏcers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located. The cruiser returned to the scene of the arrest and Innis was again advised of his Miranda rights. He replied that he understood but wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area of the school. He led the police to a nearby field and they found the shotgun. On appeal, the R.I. Supreme Court set aside his conviction because the police “interrogated” Innis after he had invoked his right to counsel b. Issue: Whether a suspect has been "interrogated" for the purpose of Miranda where he is in a car w/ police ofÏcers who are expressing their concern about public safety c. The court held that unless police ofÏcers reasonably should know that their comments will elicit an incriminating response from a suspect, comments made between police ofÏcers in a presence of a suspect do not constitute interrogation for the purpose of Miranda i. The suspect's incriminating response was not the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (there was no interrogation) d. Under Miranda, interrogation is not limited to situations where the police actually question a suspect i. Interrogation can also be subtle compulsion through words or actions on the part of the police they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 2. Summary a. The Innis rule on interrogation is that coercion cannot be used to obtain confessions Self-Incrimination Privilege and Confessions: Miranda Operational Rules 1. Introduction a. Miranda would be violated under the 14th Amendment due process i. There is a constitutional violation since it would violate the 6th Amendment right to counsel (not the Miranda right to counsel) 2. Illinois v. Perkins a. Facts: An informant told police that Lloyd Perkins (defendant) confessed to the murder of Richard Stephenson. Police then placed the informant and an undercover ofÏcer into the Montgomery County jail where Perkins was being held on unrelated charges. Perkins boasted about the killing to the informant and the undercover ofÏcer. Perkins was charged with murder b. Issue: Whether an undercover ofÏcer must provide Miranda warnings to an incarcerated person before engaging in questioning that could induce incriminating statements c. Court held that a voluntary statement made by an inmate to an undercover police ofÏcer does not require Miranda warning to be admissible in court v. d. Rule of Law: An undercover ofÏcer does not have to provide Miranda warnings to an incarcerated person before engaging in questioning that could induce incriminating statements e. Arizona v. Fulminante differs from Perkins since Fulminante was fearing for his life and the offered protection led to a confession which the court found was coercion while Perkins was just bragging to what he thought was a fellow inmate 3. Berghuis v. Thompkins a. Facts: Thompkins (defendant) was interrogated about his involvement in a murder. Before questioning Thompkins, the police had him read aloud a portion of a written form with the Miranda warnings printed on it. The rest of the form was read aloud to Thompkins and police asked that he sign the form to show he understood his rights. Thompkins refused. Thompkins was then interrogated for about three hours. He never stated that he wanted an attorney or to remain silent. Thompkins gave only a few one word responses. When asked if he prayed that God forgive him for shooting the victim, Thompkins said yes. Thompkins was charged with murder b. Issue: Whether a defendant implicitly waives his Miranda rights by making a voluntary statement to police where he does not invoke his right to remain silent c. The court held that a defendant may implicitly waive his Miranda rights by failing to invoke his rights after fully understanding them and embarking a course of conduct that indicates waiver d. Rule of Law: Where a defendant does not invoke his right to remain silent after fully understanding his Miranda rights, he implicitly waives his Miranda rights by making a voluntary statement to police e. The decision in the case runs counter to Miranda i. The suspect does not know the crimes about which he may be questioned ii. The suspect does not have to know that an attorney had called since it is up to the suspect to invoke his Miranda rights iii. The suspect does not have to know that there is little difference in legal effect between a written or oral statement 1. Not police's job to educate suspects Invocation of Protections 1. Michigan v. Mosley a. Facts: Richard Bert Mosley (defendant) was arrested for robbery. Before questioning, Mosley was given the Miranda warnings and invoked his right to remain silent. The ofÏcer stopped the interrogation, and Mosley was taken to a cell. Later, a detective attempted to question Mosley about an unrelated murder. Mosley was again given the Miranda warnings, but did not invoke his right to remain silent. Mosley made incriminating statements and was charged with first-degree murder. Mosley moved to suppress his statements because the detective’s questioning took place after Mosley invoked his right to remain silent. The trial court denied Mosley’s motion. Mosley was convicted by a jury and received a mandatory life sentence b. Issue: Whether Miranda forbids subsequent questioning of a suspect who previously invoked his right to remain silent c. Court held that the admission of evidence of Moseley's incriminating statement did not violate the principles of Miranda i. Miranda does not prohibit all subsequent questioning by police once a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent d. Rule of Law: Miranda does not bar police from subsequently questioning a suspect who previously invoked his right to remain silent, as long as the suspect's right to end questioning has been scrupulously honored e. The principles of Miranda are not violated because… i. The questioning was over a new subject/matter ii. There was sufÏcient passage of time from one questioning to another iii. The suspect was re-Mirandized f. Questioning about a different crime can be resumed after a suspect has invoked his Miranda right to silence as long as the circumstances are similar to this case g. Questioning for the same crime can be resumed if Miranda rights have not been invoked and there is a sufÏcient passage of time 2. Edwards v. Arizona (Violation of Miranda Right to Counsel) a. Facts: Edwards (defendant) was arrested for robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder. He was informed of his Miranda rights and agreed to answer the ofÏcers’ questions. After some questioning however, where Edwards made no incriminating statements, Edwards invoked his right to have an attorney present. He was then taken to jail. The next day, two ofÏcers came to the jail to see Edwards. Edwards said he did not want to see the ofÏcers but the prison guard said he had to talk to them. The ofÏcers read Edwards his Miranda rights and Edwards agreed to answer their questions, this time incriminating himself. b. Issue: Whether the statements made to the police after they have reinitiated communication w/ the subject admissible at trial where a suspect that has been read his Miranda warnings and has invoked his right to counsel c. The court held that the suspect's statement, made w/o having had access to counsel, did not amount to a valid waiver and hence was inadmissible i. When a suspect subject to custodial police interrogation invokes his right to have counsel present, his responses to further police questioning does not constitute a valid waiver of his rights vi. d. Rule of Law: Where a suspect subject to custodial police interrogation invokes his right to remain silent or to have an attorney present, the interrogation must cease Miranda Operational Rules and 6th Amendment Right to Counsel 1. Introduction a. Under a Miranda Right to Counsel, the police is about to conduct a "custodial interrogation" (that phrase is a term of art) i. Standard: Reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response ii. Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires at minimum some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney b. 6th Amendment right to counsel attaches only once judicial proceedings have commenced i. The 6th Amendment right to counsel attaches only at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, and before proceedings are initiated a suspect in a criminal investigation has no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel ii. This right attaches during indictment or arraignment (each jurisdiction differs on when criminal proceedings commence) iii. Standard: Deliberate or intentional conduct to illicit an incriminating response 2. Davis v. US a. Facts: Davis was interviewed by NIS ofÏcers in connection with the death of another sailor. He was given his Miranda rights which he waived orally and in writing. About an hour and a half into the interview, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Upon clarification, Davis later said, “No, I’m not asking for a lawyer. No I don’t want a lawyer.” b. Issue: Whether a search conducted in objectively reasonable reliance upon binding appellate precedent that has since been overruled is subject to the exclusionary rule c. The court held that after valid Miranda waiver, ofÏcers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. If the suspect’s statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the ofÏcers have no obligation to stop questioning him d. If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable ofÏcer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning e. After a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement ofÏcers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect CLEARLY requests an attorney 3. Betts v. Brady a. Facts: The defendant was indicted for robbery and was unable to employ an attorney. He asked the court at arraignment to appoint counsel for him and the court declined as it was the practice to appoint counsel for indigent defendants only in murder and rape cases. The defendant represented himself at trial and was found guilty. He was sentenced to eight years in prison b. Issue: c. Court was unable to rule that the concept of due process incorporated in the 14th Amendment obligates the states to furnish counsel in every case i. It is not essential to a fair trial ii. Lack of counsel must have resulted in particular prejudice to the defendant and here it did not d. Rule of Law: Under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, states are not required to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant unable to secure her own in all cases, provided that the trial is fundamentally fair e. **Need to look at the totality of the circumstances for a due process analysis i. For this case, you are looking at due process, not the lack of counsel 4. Gideon v. Wainwright a. Facts: The defendant was charged in Florida with breaking and entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony offense. He was indigent and asked the court to appoint counsel for him. He was denied b. Issue: c. Court held that any person hauled into court who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him i. The right of one charged w/ a crime to counsel is deemed fundamental and essential to a fair trial d. Rule of Law: the 14th Amendment incorporates the 6th Amendment right to counsel to the states 5. Scott v. Illinois a. Facts: Scott (defendant) was convicted of shoplifting in a bench trial and was fined $50. The maximum penalty for such an offense is a $500 fine or one year in jail, or both. Over Scott’s objection that the state was required to provide counsel for him, the intermediate appellate court and the state supreme court afÏrmed the conviction b. Issue: Whether the 6th and 14th Amendments require that states provide defendants counsel whenever imprisonment is an authorized penalty c. Court held that the 6th and 14th Amendments require only that indigent defendants be appointed counsel when imprisonment is actually imposed d. The 6th and 14th Amendments to the US Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the state has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense (this broadens the scope to any jail time) 6. Summary a. All states have to provide counsel to indigent defendants for any crime b. 6th Amendment comes into play when judicial proceedings have commenced i. Each jurisdiction has a different starting point for when the 6th Amendment begins and Miranda right to counsel ends ii. The court does not presume a waiver to the right of counsel 1. There needs to be a voluntary and afÏrmative waiver brought by the defendant iii. The 6th Amendment does not attach to the interrogation period since the Amendment states…"In all criminal prosecutions…"